Energy supplier involvement in English fuel poverty alleviation: a critical analysis of emergent approaches and implications for policy success by Lauren J. Probert (7152821)
  
 
 
 
 
Energy supplier involvement in English fuel 
poverty alleviation: a critical analysis of 
emergent approaches and implications for 
policy success 
 
 
Lauren Joyce Probert 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Doctoral Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of Doctor of 
Philosophy of Loughborough University 
 
September 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Lauren Joyce Probert (2014)
 ii 
Abstract 
 
 
Over the last twenty-five years, fuel poverty in England has successfully transitioned from niche 
academic interest to mandated concern of the state. More recently still, government have opted to 
charge energy suppliers with primary delivery responsibility for fuel poverty programmes. The 
original contribution to knowledge made by this thesis is in offering a novel comparative 
analysis of the potential for the state and energy suppliers to effectively support fuel poor 
households. This research offers one of the first academic assessments of the new suite of 
policies championed by the coalition government formed in 2010. It is also amongst the first 
pieces of work to apply and critically assess the new official metric for fuel poverty, the ‘Low 
Income, High Costs’ definition. By assessing delivery choices against the tenets of neoliberalism 
identified as guiding recent UK governments, the work further takes into account the motivations 
of policymakers. A diverse methodological approach is applied, incorporating policy evaluation, 
quantitative analysis, synthesis of existing literature, and professional engagement. 
 
This research establishes that in passing the Warm Homes and Energy Conservation Act 2000, 
politicians did not appreciate the demands of the commitment to eradicate fuel poverty by 2016. 
Subsequently, supplier obligations – initially intended as a means of mitigating climate change – 
have become the primary policy tool for tackling fuel poverty. The evidence presented here 
suggests, however, that suppliers are inherently poorly suited to this task for a variety of reasons: 
their access to the data required to successfully identify fuel poor households is limited; they 
fund activity in a manner that is unavoidably regressive; and the extent to which they are able to 
deliver programmes more efficiently than the state is, particularly for economic interventions, 
subject to question. It is consequently argued that, whilst supplier obligations are likely to appeal 
to an austerity-driven, neoliberal government as an expedient means of keeping expenditure 
away from the public purse and of limiting the role of the state, this work demonstrates that 
increased government involvement and greater political ambition will be required if fuel poverty 
policies are to be successful.  
 
Keywords: fuel poverty; energy efficiency; energy supplier obligations; energy policy; policy 
analysis; neoliberalism. 
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1 | Introduction 
 
 
Fuel poverty – broadly defined as “the inability to afford adequate heat because of 
energy efficiency in the home” (Boardman 1991: 221)  – exists as the product of three 
aggravating factors; low incomes, high energy prices, and energy inefficient housing 
stock. It is the last of these components that is critical in differentiating fuel poverty 
from income poverty, and in establishing efficiency interventions as the appropriate 
policy response. As Brenda Boardman characterised the issue in her pivotal 1991 
book Fuel Poverty: 
 
General poverty can be reduced through additional income support, but the 
most effective way to lessen fuel poverty is through capital investment. It is the 
crucial role of the capital stocks – the house, heating system, and other energy 
using equipment – in causing fuel poverty that determines the need for policies 
that are specific to the problem. 
(Boardman, 1991: 221) 
 
Fuel poverty exists where low income households pay inflated energy costs because 
they live in inefficient dwellings. This is a very real concern for many households in 
England due to the comparatively low quality of the national housing stock (see 
Guertler, Royston 2013). This inefficiency, coupled with a temperate national climate 
in which external temperatures regularly dip below those required for healthy living, 
presents a very real risk of households subsisting in conditions that range from 
thermally uncomfortable to the terminally debilitating. It is important to emphasise 
that to effectively address fuel poverty, it is necessary to tackle the base inefficiencies 
of the English housing stock. Whilst cash supplements can provide temporary respite 
for those struggling to pay their energy bills, only efficiency upgrades can insulate 
against the effects of rising prices and low incomes. However, the delivery of a 
programme that could represent an enduring solution to fuel poverty in England is 
likely to be both expensive and operationally complex; herein lies the challenge. 
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Whilst the impacts of what we now define as fuel poverty have likely been felt in 
England for centuries, the issue is of comparatively recent concern to policymakers. 
Isolation of fuel poverty as a distinct form of deprivation is usually traced back to the 
1973 oil crisis, when soaring domestic fuel prices resulted in many households facing 
difficulties affording fuel (see Bradshaw, Hutton 1983). The issue began to gain 
attention, and in 1975 the National Right to Fuel Campaign (NRFC) was formed with 
the objective to “end fuel poverty in the UK and secure a warm, dry, well-lit home for 
all, regardless of income and location” (NRFC 2013). A major advancement in the 
understanding of fuel poverty came in 1988, when Brenda Boardman’s PhD thesis, 
Economic, Social and Technical Considerations for Fuel Poverty Policy (1988) – 
later published in book form as Fuel Poverty (1991) – provided a pioneering multi-
disciplinary account of the problem. This offered the first quantitative definition, 
whereby fuel poverty was defined as the situation in which expenditure on energy 
services is equal or greater than 10 per cent of income (Boardman 1991: 201). Despite 
the ongoing efforts of campaigning groups, fuel poverty was not formally established 
as a concern of UK Government until 2000, when the Warm Homes and Energy 
Conservation Act 2000 (WHECA) required that the Government, “specify a target 
date for achieving the objective of ensuring that as far as reasonably practicable 
persons in England or Wales do not live in fuel poverty” (s. 2(2)(d)). Subsequently, a 
target was established that fuel poverty should be eradicated in England by 2016, and 
in vulnerable households by 2010 (DEFRA/DTI 2005, DTI 2001). A complementary 
strategy was published, and a version of Boardman’s fuel poverty definition 
operationalised for monitoring purposes (DTI 2001). 
 
In the subsequent decade, a range of policies – both economic and technical – have 
been implemented with the goal of tackling fuel poverty. However, on the face of it, 
these have been a resounding failure. Figure 1.1 illustrates the rise in fuel poverty 
levels in England between 2003 and 2011 under Boardman’s ‘ten per cent’ (10pct) 
definition. This increase is at least partially attributable to substantial fuel price 
increases, to which the definition of fuel poverty is extremely sensitive (see Hills 
2011); UK fuel price indices are also graphed in Figure 1.1 for comparison. However, 
that official fuel poverty figures steadily rose for year upon year, with little 
reassessment on the part of Government, can be construed as evidence of an 
ineffective policy approach. The interim 2010 fuel poverty eradication target was 
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missed, and achievement of the 2016 target would seem far out of reach given the 
lack of progress to date. 
 
 
Based upon compilation of sources: (DECC 2013c: 10, Bolton 2014:14). 
 
Figure 1.1: Number of fuel poor households in England by ‘ten per cent’ definition and United 
Kingdom Retail Price Index fuel and light component, 2003-2011  
 
This research, conducted primarily in the period from October 2010 to September 
2013, has coincided with major changes to the way fuel poverty is considered and 
tackled in England. Perhaps most fundamentally, the very definition of fuel poverty 
used for monitoring policy changed substantially within that time period. The October 
2010 Spending Review published by the recently elected UK coalition government 
included a commitment to re-consider the use of the 10pct definition, as part of a 
drive to reduce state expenditure (HM Treasury 2010b). A subsequent review lead by 
Professor John Hills of the London School of Economics ran from March 2011 to 
March 2012 and reaffirmed fuel poverty as a problem both serious and distinct from 
income poverty (Hills 2012). The review further proposed a new definition, which 
reconfigures fuel poverty in relative terms, as the situation whereby households “have 
required fuel costs that are above the median level; and were they to spend that 
amount they would be left with a residual income below the official poverty line” 
(Hills 2012: 9). Whilst this conceptualisation does not eliminate the failure of policy 
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to date, it does go some way to mitigating the distortionary impact of price rises upon 
official figures. As of July 2013, Hills’ ‘Low Income High Costs’ (LIHC) definition 
of fuel poverty has been adopted for official purposes (DECC 2013l). 
 
This austerity-driven reassessment of the fuel poverty definition has been 
accompanied by a step-change in the manner in which responsibilities for delivering 
fuel poverty mitigation measures are apportioned. Warm Front, the sole national state-
led, Treasury-funded, energy efficiency programme targeted at low income and 
vulnerable households, was concluded in January 2013. As of that time the only 
national scheme delivering energy efficiency measures to fuel poor households is the 
supplier-led Energy Company Obligation (ECO), which constitutes part of the 
coalition government’s flagship Green Deal energy efficiency policy mechanism. 
Further supplier obligations to provide economic support to fuel poor customers have 
also recently been introduced via the creation of a new economic initiative, the Warm 
Home Discount Scheme (WHDS). Taken together, the impact of these changes is a 
shift in responsibilities such that energy suppliers are held entirely accountable for the 
delivery of energy efficiency measures to fuel poor households, and partially so for 
the delivery of economic interventions. Thus the role of the state in supporting the 
fuel poor has been significantly diminished in favour of a model based on supplier 
obligations, which are funded via energy bills. 
 
The beginnings of this shift predate this work, and served as a catalyst for the research 
that is reported here. Whilst the requirement that suppliers provide economic support 
to customers at risk of fuel poverty is a new one, energy efficiency obligations that 
incorporate some prioritisation of low income households have been in operation 
since 1994. Moreover, as will be discussed in Chapters Two and Three, this change 
can be understood as part of a broader trend that has persisted since the Thatcher 
government of the 1970s, whereby functions previously delivered by the state have 
been transferred to the private sector in the belief that the profit motive leads such 
agencies to achieve more efficient delivery. As such, the reassignment of 
responsibility for supporting fuel poor customers plays into larger dialogues about the 
role of the private sector in delivering welfare services. Such debates have become 
increasingly heated in the wake of the global financial crisis. The UK’s coalition 
government has continued to pursue an austerity strategy based around welfare cuts, 
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married with an ongoing emphasis upon the pursuit of privatisation. This has been 
met with dismay by those who believe that particular public services are unsuited to 
the delivery by the private sector, because they are both too important to place in the 
hands of the market, and fundamentally unsuited to delivery driven by profit motive. 
There has been recent contention along these lines in relation to, amongst other 
things, the perceived quasi-privatisation of the National Health Service (NHS) under 
the Health and Social Care Act 2012, the introduction of increased private sector 
involvement in schools via the Academies Act 2010, and the ongoing role of for-profit 
providers in delivering employment initiatives such as the Work Programme. In the 
case of energy efficiency, the approach might seem particularly curious given that it 
requires obligated companies to invest significant amounts in reducing consumption 
of their own product. However, the previous successes of supplier-led programmes in 
meeting targets have justified their continuation and expansion. However, in view of 
the ongoing failure of fuel poverty policy, it is important to consider the implications 
of this shift upon fuel poor households. The choice of delivery agent has significant 
implications for the impact of such schemes. One critical example of this is that 
supplier programmes are funded via levies on bills, whereas the Exchequer meets the 
costs of state programmes. As levies tend to be much more regressive than income 
taxes, the comparative net impact of expenditure by suppliers is diminished. It is 
consideration of such differences that form the focal point of this work. 
 
Whilst research exists examining supplier energy efficiency obligations (e.g., 
Rosenow 2012), as does work evaluating the ongoing efficacy of fuel poverty policy 
(such as Boardman 2010), comparatively little work has considered the particular 
repercussions of the shift from state to supplier-led delivery in terms of fuel poverty 
alleviation. Furthermore, no work is known to have taken a comparative approach in 
assessing the choice to use supplier obligations rather than state programmes as a 
means to alleviate fuel poverty. This work addresses that existing gap in knowledge 
by responding to the overarching research question, ‘what role is appropriate to the 
energy supplier in alleviating fuel poverty?’ This incorporates consideration of the 
impacts of previously mentioned new policies, as well as of the new LIHC definition 
of fuel poverty, making this one of the first pieces of academic work to employ that 
conceptualisation of the issue. The aim and objectives of this work are as follows: 
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Research Question: 
• What role is appropriate to the energy supplier in alleviating fuel poverty? 
 
Aim: 
• To compare energy supplier and central government delivery of fuel poverty 
alleviation policies. 
 
Objectives: 
 
• Determine and describe the processes by which energy suppliers and central 
government deliver fuel poverty alleviation policies. 
• Identify where and why structural differences exist between energy supplier 
and central government delivery of policies. 
• Evaluate the likely impact of differences upon the level of fuel poverty 
mitigation achieved by policies. 
• Explore the political and environmental drivers and implications of delivery 
agent choice. 
 
 
The approach adopted in this thesis is grounded in social policy analysis. In particular, 
the policy analysis framework offered by Patton and Sawicki (1993) is applied to 
compare alternative strategies with a view to establishing which is likely to be most 
successful in meeting fuel poverty policy goals. For the purposes of responding 
effectively to the overarching research question, the primary comparison made is 
between supplier-led models of delivering fuel poverty alleviation policy and state-
driven alternatives, with a view to establishing whether those approaches in which the 
supplier plays the more significant role are likely to have the greater impact in 
reducing LIHC fuel poverty. A mixed methodology is employed in making this 
assessment, with a focus upon analysis of the wealth of existent secondary data and 
pragmatic critical synthesis as a means of establishing likely implications of 
approaches in terms of fuel poverty mitigation. The work is focused on England, 
rather than upon the UK as a whole for two primary reasons; because considering the 
often complex variations to the way in which fuel poverty is handled by the devolved 
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nations risks complicating matters unnecessarily, and because there is considerably 
more quantitative data available to researchers relating to the housing stock in 
England, in the form of the English Housing Survey (EHS). In analysing the 
comparison, the notion of policy constraints as described by Dunn (2012) is applied 
as an appropriate descriptive tool, and as a means of understanding the tensions 
inherent in making fuel poverty policy.  
 
The original contribution of this thesis is in applying a novel approach informed by 
policy analysis disciplinary perspectives to clarify the impacts of constraints upon two 
actors in delivering fuel poverty policy under the current institutional formation. It is 
concluded that a range of factors limit the ability of energy companies to tackle fuel 
poverty and that suppliers are in many respects poorly suited to meeting the stated 
goals of policy. However, it is argued, despite the establishment of fuel poverty 
eradication as a legal obligation of government, ultimately the decision to transfer this 
responsibility to suppliers seems less informed by the efficacy of that agent in 
meeting the stated goal than it is by factors such as dominant ideological views 
regarding the appropriate role of the state and, more recently, the economic policy 
approach of the coalition government. This work further identifies where gaps in the 
knowledge base still exist and provides recommendations to guide future research, 
policy and practice. The thesis is structured as follows: 
 
Part One establishes the theoretical and analytical underpinnings of this thesis.  
 
Chapter Two opens with a discussion of fuel poverty definitions, justifying the 
choice of this work to employ the LIHC definition, as currently used in official UK 
policy. This is followed by an account of the context in which this work has been 
undertaken, the conflicting political priorities of government, and the policy 
community that exists around fuel poverty alleviation in the UK. 
 
Chapter Three lays out the analytical approach adopted in tackling the overarching 
research question, first discussing the decision to treat the problem as one of social 
policy. The policy analysis framework applied is outlined, one based upon 
comparison of state and supplier approaches in previous delivery. Finally, the 
methodological means of evaluation are described, a pragmatically mixed approach. 
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Part Two reports analysis of four critical elements of the fuel poverty process. 
 
Chapter Four considers the manner in which responsibility for meeting the 
requirements of WHECA have been apportioned. Analysis of Hansard and official 
documents establishes that the choice to shift to supplier delivery has been not been 
clearly justified, and that the original legal commitment was based upon an inaccurate 
appreciation of the scale of the problem.  
 
Chapter Five turns to the historically problematic issue of targeting fuel poverty 
measures, comparing the ability of energy suppliers and the state to identify both 
households that are fuel poor, and those that are eligible for measures. It is concluded 
that government have much better access to data that can help with these tasks, and 
that suppliers expend considerable, duplicated, effort and resource that is ultimately 
transferred to household bills. 
 
Chapter Six discusses the manner in which measures are financed. A distinct 
difference exists here, as suppliers fund delivery via charges on energy bills, whilst 
the state is expected to collect necessary monies from taxation revenues. Levy 
funding is shown to be more regressive, not only with reference to income deciles, but 
also with regard to the LIHC measure of the fuel poverty gap. Whilst a more 
ambitious programme could mitigate such distributional impacts, it is suggested that 
this would go beyond the ambition demonstrated by government to date. 
 
Chapter Seven considers the delivery of both technical and economic measures. The 
supplier-led ‘white certificates’ system employed in delivering energy efficiency 
measures is assessed as offering considerable benefits to government, e.g., in terms of 
cost-effectiveness, scope to set ambitious targets, and history of delivery success. By 
contrast, there is little to recommend supplier delivery of economic measures, 
particularly given previously discussed problems in targeting and funding 
programmes.  
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Part Three offers a final discussion before concluding the thesis. 
 
Chapter Eight draws together findings to provide a response to the overarching 
research question. It is argued that suppliers are fundamentally less suitable than the 
state when it comes to delivering measures that will successfully mitigate fuel 
poverty. However, given the weakness of the legislative incentive, the lack of political 
impetus to tackle the problem, and the current political pursuit of austerity and a 
limited role for the state, supplier obligations are likely to be viewed as “appropriate”, 
if not to fuel poverty alleviation, to the broader aims of government.  
 
Chapter Nine concludes the thesis.  
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Part One 
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2 | Theoretical Foundations and Research Context 
 
Scientific studies of poverty in the United Kingdom can be found at least as far back 
as the work of Gregory King in the late 17th century, arguably further (see Stone 
2010, Deeming 2010). By comparison, the consideration of fuel poverty as a distinct 
social problem is in its infancy, both as an identified concept and as a focus of study 
and policy. Since Brenda Boardman offered the first extensive description of the 
problem in her 1991 book Fuel Poverty, the development of a policy process that can 
effectively address the issue described has encountered significant difficulties. Recent 
changes to the official definition, policies and broader strategy mark what might be 
regarded as a new paradigm for fuel poverty policy. As this thesis seeks to understand 
the impact of these changes, it is necessary that the approach be founded upon an 
appropriate interpretation of the concept and context. 
 
This chapter clarifies the foundations of this research. The first section considers the 
debate around the definition of fuel poverty and the way the concept has been 
operationalised, establishing and justifying the choice of definition to be used within 
this work. The second section discusses the policy context in which this work is 
situated, including the broader political environment, a general overview of previous 
alleviation activity, and current fuel poverty policies. The third section examines other 
significant policy priorities that interact with the goal of fuel poverty alleviation. The 
final section describes the policy network that exists in relation to fuel poverty, 
including the roles and responsibilities of key stakeholders. 
 
2.1 Defining Fuel Poverty 
 
In a 2012 interview marking twenty-one years of fuel poverty research, Brenda 
Boardman offered her views on the role – or absence – of theory in fuel poverty 
research: 
 
I still don’t know that there is a theory around fuel poverty. There is a factual 
statement which is that fuel poverty is very different from poverty because of 
the role of capital investment. Capital investment is endemic whenever you 
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talk about energy, so as soon as you bring energy into the equation you are 
looking at something very different from poverty. 
 
Brenda Boardman, interviewed by Christine Liddell (2012: 15) 
 
Boardman’s approach reflects the type of pragmatism that is valuable, even necessary, 
in addressing a problem that integrates the social and the technical. The “crucial role 
of the capital stocks”, as originally identified by Boardman (1991: 221) - the physical 
reality of inefficient homes - introduces an element of objective deficiency to the 
problem that it is hard to contest. Certain dwellings will undeniably cost more to heat 
than others, as a function of their physical properties, and it is this that distinguishes 
fuel poverty from general poverty. However, to define fuel poverty as an integrated 
concept, it is necessary to introduce some more constructed elements that go beyond 
what can be empirically established. Some theoretical consideration is required, for 
example, in deciding whether fuel poverty should be considered as a relative 
phenomenon, or one that is absolute. This section offers an account of the way in 
which this requirement has been negotiated in previous work, which has been 
dominated by two interpretations; Boardman’s early conceptualisation of fuel 
poverty1 as the situation whereby a household is required to spend 10% of income to 
maintain acceptable levels of warmth, referred to in this work as the ‘10pct’ 
definition, and the much more recent LIHC definition proposed by the Hills Fuel 
Poverty Review. The section concludes by justifying the choice to use the LIHC 
definition in this research. 
 
2.1.1 Establishing a Fuel Poverty Definition 
 
Whilst Brenda Boardman’s early work was by no means the first academic 
consideration of fuel poverty (cf. Bradshaw, Hutton 1983, Bradshaw, Harris 1983), 
her doctoral thesis (1988), subsequently published as Fuel Poverty: From Cold 
Homes to Affordable Warmth (1991) represents the first in-depth analysis of the 
factors affecting fuel poverty and their interactions, synthesising evidence and 
building on broader definitions to provide the basis for a metric. Boardman proposed 
                                                
1 Some academics have used the terms ‘energy poverty’ and ‘energy vulnerability’ as alternatives to 
'fuel poverty' (see Bouzarovski et al. 2012, Walker, Day 2012).  However, the term 'fuel poverty' is 
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that fuel poverty be defined as the situation whereby a household cannot achieve 
adequate warmth (clarified in 1991: 103-126) for 10 per cent of income (1991: 227). 
This figure was derived from then contemporary data as to the energy expenditure of 
households in the lowest three income deciles, verified with reference to 1979 work 
undertaken by Isherwood and Hancock that found that 30 per cent of households were 
spending twice the median amount on fuel, an amount deemed unacceptable 
(Isherwood, Hancock 1979, as cited by Boardman 1991: 46-47). 
 
Fuel poverty under the 10pct definition can theoretically be alleviated by lowering 
energy prices, increasing incomes, or by lowering energy requirements. Boardman’s 
work emphasised the latter of these, the “crucial role of the capital stocks” (1991: 
221) in distinguishing fuel poverty from income poverty. A household can be income 
poor without being 10pct fuel poor, assuming the price paid for energy is low enough 
and the dwelling sufficiently energy efficient. Equally, a non-income poor household 
can be 10pct fuel poor if prices paid are high and the home poorly insulated. Whilst 
the 10pct definition considers all energy use, Boardman’s work focuses on space and 
water heating as offering the greatest potential savings. This is appropriate, given that 
those usages account for 82% of overall energy consumption (see Figure 2.1). 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Table 3.04 of DECC (2013f) 
 
Figure 2.1: United Kingdom domestic final energy consumption by end use, 2012 
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upgrades should be more cost effective in the long run (Boardman 1991: 189-192). 
Furthermore, Boardman argues, given the lamentable state of the UK housing stock, 
the government have a responsibility to support those unable to afford to improve 
their own homes (1991: 223-224). Boardman’s work on fuel poverty was undoubtedly 
pivotal, and her 10pct definition was used by government as the official definition 
from 2001 until 2012 (see DTI 2001, DECC 2013l). However, Boardman herself later 
criticised the manner in which her definition was operationalised by government 
(2010: 21-45), and suggested that the use of an absolute threshold be reconsidered 
(2010: 50)2. 
 
2.1.2 The Hills Fuel Poverty Review 
 
In October 2010, the recently elected coalition government launched a 
Comprehensive Spending Review focused upon deficit reduction (HM Treasury 
2010b). This included a commitment to reassess the manner in which fuel poverty 
was addressed: 
 
The Government is committed to focusing the available resources where they 
will be most effective in tackling the problems underlying fuel poverty. The 
Government therefore intends to initiate an independent review of the fuel 
poverty target and definition before the end of the year. 
(HM Treasury 2010b: 62) 
 
The resultant review was launched in March 2011, led by Professor John Hills, 
Director of the Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion at the London School of 
Economics (see DECC 2011a). The Hills Fuel Poverty Review lasted for one year, 
and involved extensive consultation with stakeholders (see Hills 2011: 184, Hills 
2012: 178-179). An interim report was published in October 2011 (Hills 2011), and a 
final report followed in March 2012 (Hills 2012). Hills’ terms of reference for the 
review called for response to the following issues: 
 
                                                
2 In this context, ‘absolute’ fuel poverty refers to the use of a fixed expenditure threshold in 
measurement, e.g., 10 per cent of income. By comparison, ‘relative’ fuel poverty is measured using a 
threshold that responds to standards in wider society, e.g., median income levels. 
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• Whether ‘fuel poverty’ is, in fact, a distinct problem, or simply a manifestation 
of more general problems of poverty.  
• If it is distinct, how it is best measured and whether the current approach to 
doing this captures the problems most effectively. 
• The implications of measurement for the way we understand the effectiveness 
of the range of policy approaches to reducing it. 
(Hills 2012: 6) 
 
This section focuses upon the first two of these; the third, the primary focus of the 
final report, will be referenced extensively later in this work. 
 
The Hills Fuel Poverty Review reaffirmed fuel poverty as “a distinct and serious 
problem” that “deserves and requires attention, as recognised by Parliament when it 
adopted the Warm Homes and Energy Conservation Act 2000” (Hills 2011: 21) . This 
distinction was identified with reference to the interaction between low incomes and 
high required spending, a condition that Hills (2011: 93) concluded WHECA was 
“entirely appropriate” in defining as follows: 
 
…a person is to be regarded as living “in fuel poverty” if he is a member of a 
household living on a lower income in a home which cannot be kept warm at 
reasonable cost. 
WHECA (s.1 (1)) 
 
Whilst Hills praised the ability of the 10pct definition to capture the interactions of 
the drivers of fuel poverty (Hills 2011: 102-103), he found fault with its ability to 
effectively represent the nature of that problem described in WHECA. Table 2.1 offers 
an overview of those particular weaknesses identified by the Review. 
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Table 2.1: Weaknesses of the 10pct definition of fuel poverty, as identified by the Hills Fuel 
Poverty Review 
 
Issue Description of Issue 
The fixed threshold The threshold used is somewhat arbitrary – which might be 
unavoidable, to some extent – but that it is fixed means that 
the definition is extremely sensitive to that choice. 
Sensitivity to price changes The fixed threshold creates the illusion of rapid worsening 
or improvement when prices change. This does not 
effectively capture the true problem, that of a substandard 
housing stock. 
Depth and extent The 10pct measure offers only a headcount at the national 
level, and does not consider the extent to which houses are 
in fuel poverty. 
High incomes Under the 10pct definition, those with very high incomes 
can be counted as fuel poor if their fuel costs are 
sufficiently high. This issue was highlighted in media 
reports suggesting that the Queen was close to being in fuel 
poverty (see Blair 2011). 
Policy assessment and the ratio basis of 
the indicator 
The ratio basis of the 10pct definition puts an emphasis on 
the energy bill as a cause and solution, as any increase to 
bills necessitates a ten-fold increase to income to 
compensate. This could result in policies that provide 
rebates to bills being inappropraitely favoured over those 
that supplement income. 
Sensitivity to low reported incomes Severely underreported incomes could result in hugely 
inflated fuel poverty levels. 
Sensitivity to temperature standards Any change in required temperatures will result in changes 
to fuel poverty levels. 
Consistency with policy on the ground For delivery purposes, it is difficult to relate the fuel 
poverty definition to the actual energy efficiency of the 
house, or to proxies for income such as the receipt of 
benefits. 
Treatment of housing costs Arguably more an issue of operationalisation, but for the 
purposes of fuel poverty measurement, incomes have been 
considered before housing costs are subtracted, i.e., 
inclusive of income that is not truly disposable as it is 
apportioned to a specific, essential, purpose. 
Source: Summary of Hills (2011: 103-107) 
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As an alternative, Hills proposed a different conceptualisation of fuel poverty, the 
LIHC definition. Unlike the 10pct definition, which is based upon whether a 
household exceeds an absolute threshold for fuel costs, the LIHC definition is 
relative; a household is fuel poor if its fuel expenditure is comparatively high, and its 
income is comparatively low. Hills also suggested a further indicator, that of the fuel 
poverty gap3, measured as “the [amount] by which the assessed energy needs of fuel 
poor households [exceeds] the threshold for reasonable costs” (Hills 2012: 9) . This 
effectively measures the extent to which a given household is in fuel poverty, and can 
further be aggregated to the national scale4. Figure 2.2 illustrates both the LIHC fuel 
poverty definition and the fuel poverty gap. Households A and B are both in fuel 
poverty as they inhabit the grey-shaded quadrant of the diagram which is below the 
income threshold and above the cost threshold. Though household A has a lower 
income, it has higher energy needs, which results in a similarly sized fuel poverty gap.  
 
 
Note: the income threshold is sloping because measurement is of income after required 
expenditure on energy. And so as energy costs increase, the threshold tilts.   
Source: Adapted from Hills 2012: 9. 
 
Figure 2.2: The LIHC definition of fuel poverty and the fuel poverty gap 
 
                                                
3 Though it should be noted that Sefton (2004) used a similar measure in assessing the Warm Front 
energy efficiency scheme. 
4 However, the aggregated measure does not offer any helpful information as to the distribution of the 
gap. 
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The thresholds used are as follows. The income threshold falls where subtraction of 
required equivalised energy costs from income leaves the household at the 
Department for Work and Pensions’ (DWP) official poverty line, as defined in 
Households Below Average Income (HBAI) analysis; less than 60 per cent of median 
equivalised household income, after housing costs (see Hills 2012: 53). Effectively, 
this defines a low income household as one that, having paid required energy costs, is 
below the official poverty line. The cost threshold lies at the point whereby 
equivalised household bills equal the national median (see Hills 2012: 59-60)5. 
 
Equivalisation is the process by which household incomes are weighted to take 
account of the impacts of differing occupant compositions upon demand for 
resources. Though it is highly unusual for incomes not to be equivalised for the 
purpose of poverty measurement (see ONS 2012a, DWP 2013a), the previous fuel 
poverty definition did not apply equivalisation when used for official purposes (see 
DECC 2010b). The reasoning was that the 10pct definition of fuel poverty related 
incomes to required fuel expenditure, and that required fuel expenditure is also likely 
to vary based upon household size. The argument, then, is that incomes should only 
be equivalised if fuel costs are also equivalised; it might be further considered that the 
scaling of energy needs with household size offers a type of in-built equivalisation (a 
point argued by Palmer et al. (2008: 35)  and restated by Hills (2011: 138)). However, 
the lack of equivalisation under the 10pct definition likely resulted in more large 
households failing to be classed as fuel poor: for example, where additional members 
of a household are children, more space will need to be heated but household income 
will not increase accordingly (as noted by Sefton, Chesshire 2005: 47-48). Hills 
recognised that the separation of income and required fuel within the LIHC 
strengthens the case for equivalisation, and the proposed LIHC definition equivalised 
both household incomes and required energy (2011: 138). Incomes were equivalised 
using the standard modification of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
                                                
5 The majority of respondents to the Government consultation on changing the measurement of fuel 
poverty disagreed with the manner in which this threshold was set (DECC 2013l: 7). The critique 
offered by ACE et al. (2012) presented an alternate threshold formulation based upon the modelled 
potential energy costs of fuel poor households after receiving measures; this was found to strengthen 
the relationship between fuel poor and energy inefficient households. However, government rejected 
this proposal on the grounds that “it would skew the priorities of any strategy towards households with 
costs close to the cost threshold” (DECC 2013l: 9). It might be argued that this will be the case 
anyhow, as cost effective reductions are likely to be favoured by market delivery of measures. 
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Development (OECD) equivalence factors used by the DWP in HBAI when 
considering incomes after housing costs, also known as the ‘companion scale’ (Hills 
2011: 170; for a more detailed consideration, see National Statistics/DWP 2012: 265-
284). The equivalisation of energy use proved more difficult as there was no pre-
existing reference methodology, and the process went through several iterations. The 
Fuel Poverty Review interim report simply applied the HBAI companion scale 
weightings to fuel use, though recognised that this may be inappropriate (Hills 2011: 
172). The final report applied a bespoke index from historical fuel requirement data, 
based upon five different household classifications (Hills 2012: 182-183). The final 
DECC consultation response used a similar index, but one based upon the number of 
individuals in the household (in the manner of the HBAI index) (DECC 2013l: 12-
14), a partial acceptance of proposals by ACE et al. (2012: 37-55) that equivalisation 
should be based upon both number of occupants and property size (in m2)6. 
 
Hills also recommended measuring income After Housing Costs (AHC) rather than 
Before Housing Costs (BHC). Poverty measures - including HBAI analysis – have 
tended to consider both BHC and AHC incomes, on the grounds that expenditure on 
housing costs may be difficult for households to modify in response to income 
fluctuations (National Statistics/DWP 2012: 254-255). Under the 10pct definition, 
DECC measured fuel poverty under both AHC and BHC incomes, but used BHC for 
official statistics (DECC 2010b: 6). Considering AHC income results in a reduction in 
considered income for those with higher housing costs, manifested as a shift away 
from pensioners (who are more likely to have paid off mortgages) towards working-
age adults, including families with children7. Hills noted that the shift to prioritising 
AHC as an income measure was a popular proposal with consultation respondents and 
agreed that AHC more accurately reflects the composition of the fuel poor group, 
particularly where housing costs are high (Hills 2011: 113, Hills 2012: 32). This 
change was adopted by DECC (2013l: 14). Hills also recommended that income 
should be measured exclusive of any disability-related benefits, on the grounds that 
                                                
6 The latter element was rejected by both Hills and DECC on the grounds that it would penalise 
underoccupancy, which in some cases might be unavoidable (Hills 2012: 185-189, DECC 2013i: 12-
14). 
7 This shift is illustrated in the HBAI analysis for 2010/11, wherein consideration of AHC rather than 
BHC income results in the proportion of low income households who are pensioners falling from 23% 
to 14%, whilst the proportion of households with children rises from 45% to 53% (National 
Statistics/DWP 2012: 73). 
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said benefits are intended to alleviate the additional costs incurred as a result of said 
disability (DECC 2012i: 37).  
 
The LIHC definition responds to many of the issues identified with the 10pct 
definition by removing the absolute threshold and ratio elements, and moving towards 
a relative definition that reduces the identified sensitivities to temperature 
requirements, misreported low incomes and incidences of those on very high incomes 
being considered fuel poor, and which favours adjustments to bills over adjustments 
to incomes (see Hills 2011: 134-147). The new definition has important implications 
for the dynamics of policy, as will be considered throughout this thesis  (see also 
ACE, CSE & Moore 2012) 8. One of the more significant impacts of shifting to a 
relative definition is that the impacts of fuel price rises are neutralised; only fuel rises 
that disproportionately affect those with higher costs or lower incomes will result in 
an increase in the fuel poverty gap. Price rises, as opposed to any drop in incomes, 
inarguably drove the increase in 10pct fuel poverty over the past decade, and Hills 
identifies that this is likely to conceal the positive impacts of energy efficiency 
improvements (2012: 31). That said, it could equally be argued that neutralising the 
impact of prices on fuel poverty so thoroughly means that the LIHC measure risks 
masking any broad shift towards energy becoming unaffordable; theoretically, under 
the relative measure all fuel prices could increase ten-fold, leaving only a small 
minority able to afford heating, and there would be no resultant increase in fuel 
poverty.   
 
Figure 2.3 illustrates the relationship between the 10pct definition and fuel prices, 
previously shown in Figure 1.1, but additionally graphs LIHC fuel poverty levels, 
demonstrating the comparative stability of that measure. 
 
                                                
8 Some implications of the definition proposed following the Fuel Poverty Review interim report, along 
with potential ramifications for policy, were previously discussed in Probert et al. (2011). Moore 
(2012) also offers a preliminary assessment of the LIHC definition (developed in ACE et al. (2012). 
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Based upon compilation of sources: (DECC 2013c: 10, Bolton 2014:14). 
 
Figure 2.3: Fuel prices and fuel poverty under two different indicators, 2003-11 
 
When the intention to review the fuel poverty definition was announced, fuel poverty 
advocates could have been forgiven for concerns that the intention was to ‘define the 
problem out of existence’ (see CSE 2011). Whilst the number of fuel poor households 
did decrease under Hills’ modelling of the LIHC definition, from 4.0m to 2.7m, the 
number of fuel poor individuals increased, from 7.4m to 7.8m (Hills 2012: 52; model 
uses data from 2009). This shift can be at least partially explained by previously 
discussed adjustments to the way in which income and expenditure are considered, 
which result in more larger households being considered as fuel poor. The resultant 
compositional change is shown in Figure 2.4, which is based on analysis of the 2011 
English Housing Survey (EHS) undertaken for this work(DCLG 2013c). The broader 
use of EHS data within this thesis will be explained further in section 3.4.3.  
 
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
120 
140 
160 
0 
0.5 
1 
1.5 
2 
2.5 
3 
3.5 
4 
4.5 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
In
de
x 
of
 p
ri
ce
s 
Fu
el
 p
oo
r 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
 (m
ill
io
ns
) 
10pct fuel poor households (millions) LIHC fuel poor households (millions) 
Index of prices: fuel & light (real terms). 2008=100 
 22 
 
Source: Own analysis of DCLG (2013c). 
Note: This analysis applies the later adjustments to the equivalisation index for fuel proposed by 
DECC, based on household size rather than type (DECC 2013l: 12-14, DECC 2013h: 40)   
 
Figure 2.4: Composition of fuel poor households under two different indicators, 2011 
 
2.1.3 Operationalising the Definition  
 
To be applied as a policy instrument, the fuel poverty definition needs to be 
‘operationalised’: that is, framed in terms that lend themselves to real-world usage. 
Fuel poverty first emerged as a concern of the state within what has been referred to 
as a ‘measurement culture’, a form of evaluative governance championed by New 
Labour that placed particular priority on the use of quantitative goals and metrics (see 
Hudson, Lowe 2009: 274-278). When the 10pct definition was first used within 
policy, it was operationalised by government statisticians so that it could be used to 
generate annual national statistics based upon EHS data (see DECC 2010b). 
Measurement is the primary policy employment of the definition (see Hills 2011: 
182) and a key application in this thesis. In the move from the 10pct definition to the 
LIHC definition, many of the same operationalisation techniques have been 
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maintained; Figure 2.5 gives an overview of the way high costs and low income are 
treated under current process9.  
 
 
Source: Based upon DECC (2013i, 2013h). Anderson et al. (2002) provides a full explanation of the 
Building Research Establishment Domestic Energy Model (BREDEM) (2002). 
 
Figure 2.5: Government operationalisation of the LIHC fuel poverty definition 
 
The method of operationalisation is crucial, as it is the form of the definition that is 
active in policy, and the process may (and, in the case of fuel poverty, does) involve 
decisions that have a significant impact on final outcomes. Three elements of the 
current process have been identified here as being particularly likely to distort the 
manner in which statistics used to monitor policy represents the experiences of fuel 
poor households.  
  
                                                
9  Note that Hills’ (2012) assessment blurs the lines between definition and operationalisation in a way 
that Boardman (1991) did not, because of the context of the consideration; Hills was examining the 
definition as already in use as a policy tool rather than proposing a wholly new concept. So, for 
example, Hills considers modelled energy usage as an integral part of the definition (see 2011: 102) in 
a way that Boardman did not. 
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• Estimation of Fuel Prices 
 
Whilst the LIHC definition of fuel poverty neutralises the impact of generalised fuel 
price rises, the official fuel poverty statistics are based upon estimated prices, rather 
than those actually paid by households (see DECC 2013i: 25-31). This means that in 
instances where fuel prices could have an impact, i.e., where the actual prices paid by 
fuel poor households are more than those paid by non-fuel poor households, it is 
likely that official statistics will not register that effect. The notion of a ‘poverty 
premium’ – that low income households pay more for goods and services for a range 
of structural reasons – is well established (see Caplovitz 1964). With respect to fuel, it 
has been documented that low income households are more likely to have been given 
prepayment meters (because of previous debt), or be unable to pay by direct debit, 
because they are less likely to have bank accounts (see Hirsch 2013). Both of these 
payment methods incur higher costs, though these would be accounted for in official 
statistics, which consider payment method (DECC 2013i: 25-26).  
 
Limited evidence does, however, suggest that low income households also tend to be 
on less favourable tariffs for reasons that would not be accounted for by the official 
methodology. The Office for Gas and Electricity Market’s (Ofgem) Energy Supply 
Probe identified via consumer interviews and focus groups that low-income 
households were less likely to change tariffs, switch suppliers, compare offers, be able 
to access online offers, and be more likely to be prevented from switching because of 
existing debt (Ofgem 2008a: 11 and 57). These findings were substantiated by follow-
up qualitative work undertaken in 2011 (see FDS International 2011). Hills 
acknowledged that such circumstances are likely to persist, but highlighted a data gap 
and suggested that the Energy Follow Up Survey (at that time scheduled for release 
before the end of 2012) might go some way to establishing any price differentials 
experienced by fuel poor households (Hills 2012: 13). This piece of official research 
considers the actual energy used and prices paid by a subset of EHS households (see 
DECC 2012c: 10-11), but has yet to be released (for unknown reasons) at time of 
writing. If low income households were systematically paying higher prices in the 
manner described here, it would constitute a further, undetected inequality that would 
currently be hidden from official monitoring. More research would be beneficial in 
clarifying the extent of any issue. 
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• Modelling of Energy Use 
 
Government consideration of cost is based upon modelled required energy usage, 
rather than on the energy actually used by households. In his review, Hills praises the 
objectivity of this approach: 
 
It has long been contended that, since actual spending may be distorted by 
financial constraint (i.e. some people cut back on heating to make ends meet) 
– or its reverse, profligacy – measuring fuel poverty on such a basis would be 
inappropriate. 
(Hills 2011: 102) 
 
There is a strong argument for favouring energy requirements over actual usage; it is 
clearly inappropriate to count amongst the fuel poor those whose energy costs are too 
high only because they choose to keep their homes excessively warm. It would also 
be patently unreasonable to exclude as fuel poor those whose costs are low because 
they are not spending enough to keep their home adequately heated. However, 
required usage assumes rational choice with respect to energy consumption, even 
though it is well documented that such decisions are often based on imperfect 
information and heavily influenced by factors such as personal habit  (see Critchley et 
al. 2007, Maréchal 2010, Huebner, Cooper & Jones 2013) . Hutchinson et al. (2006) 
found dwelling quality to be a weak indicator of actual indoor temperatures, contrary 
to what might be expected if households were using energy in line with modelled 
assumptions. Furthermore, estimated usage could be subject to the ‘building 
performance gap’, the phenomenon whereby there is a discrepancy between modelled 
and actual building performance (see Sanders, Phillipson 2006, de Wilde 2014, 
Menezes et al. 2012). There is a dearth of data relating to the actual energy 
consumption of known fuel poor households. Again, the Energy Follow Up Survey 
might usefully fill this gap by providing information on the actual usage of EHS 
households, including those that are fuel poor, that would enable comparison with 
modelled figures. The evidence base for actual energy consumption is stronger when 
expanded to consideration of low income households. A number of studies have 
found evidence of low income households engaging in what Gibbons and Singler 
(2008) refer to as ‘fuel rationing’, i.e., curtailing energy expenditure as a means of 
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coping with poverty  (see Doble 2000, Wright 2004, Harrington et al. 2005, O'Neill, 
Jinks & Squire 2006, Anderson, White & Finney 2012) . The Warm Front Study 
Group (Hong et al. 2009a, Oreszczyn et al. 2006) found that the low income 
households monitored kept their homes at an average temperature colder than that of 
the general population, but that internal temperatures and thermal comfort rose after 
energy efficiency measures were installed. This is evidence of what has been termed 
the ‘rebound effect’ or ‘take-back’ (see Galvin 2014), whereby improved efficiency 
does not translate to a reduction in costs because households choose to enjoy those 
savings as increased thermal comfort10 (a further argument against considering actual 
costs). Harrington et al. (2005) and Gilbertson et al. (2006) found qualitative evidence 
of similar behaviours where measures have been installed11. Hirsch et al. (2011) 
considered a synthesised dataset that estimated consumption of English House 
Condition Survey (EHCS)12 households and identified systematic under-consumption 
by those on low incomes. Further research using related datasets by White et al. 
(2010) identified some particular groups of low income households who did have 
high levels of consumption, however, the indication from regression analysis was that 
this was linked to structural causes, e.g., underoccupancy, or electrical space heating. 
Possible policy responses to high or low levels of consumption are considered later in 
this thesis; for now, it is simply necessary to highlight that whilst there is a sound 
theoretical basis for considering required, not actual, energy use in modelling fuel 
poverty, this gap between official statistics and real world experience needs to be 
taken into account where those figures are used to guide policy analysis, both in 
practice and in the context of this work.  
 
• Heating Regime Applied 
 
Defining an adequate heating regime for operationalisation purposes requires 
assumptions to be declared as to appropriate temperature levels and occupancy 
patterns. Currently, Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) define “an 
adequate level of warmth” as “21 degrees for the main living area, and 18 degrees for 
                                                
10 Refer also to Jevons’ Paradox (see Alcott 2005) and the Khazzoom-Brookes postulate (see Saunders 
1992). 
11 Note that Gilbertson et al. (2006) and Hong et al. (2009) evaluated the Warm Front scheme at 
different times, the former via technical monitoring and the latter via qualitative interviews. 
12 The predecessor survey of the EHS, the EHCS was also used to generate fuel poverty statistics (see 
DECC 2010b: 4). 
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other occupied rooms” (DECC 2013i: 2). Heating regimes are based upon BREDEM-
12 standards (see Anderson et al. 2002), with occupancy defined according to the 
Parker-Morris Standard, as established in 1961 (Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government 1961). Whilst temperature requirement might initially seem objectively 
verifiable, in practice, the justification for use has been unclear and DECC 
methodological literature has never provided any sound evidential rationalisation for 
the choice of temperature level. The source of the definition of an acceptable heating 
regime is generally traced to a 1987 World Health Organisation (WHO) report 
(Boardman 2010: 22, further discussion in Ormandy, Ezratty 2012), which recounts 
the conclusions of a review of contemporary evidence as to the impacts of low 
temperatures on both general and at-risk populations and concludes that:! 
 
There is no demonstrable risk to the health of healthy sedentary people living 
in air temperatures of between 18oC and 24oC… for certain groups, such as 
the sick, the handicapped, the very old and the very young, a minimum air 
temperature of 20oC is recommended. 
(WHO 1987: 19) 
 
This recommendation appears to have been used only as imprecise guidance. The 
level of subjectivity in operationalisation choice is demonstrated in that the Scottish 
application of the 10pct definition is different from that applied in England. The 
Scottish Government considers a heating regime that is not adjusted for under-
occupancy (Boardman 2010: 23) and applies a higher temperature requirement of 23 
degrees to households containing certain physically vulnerable groups, in 
acknowledgement of WHO guidance (Scottish Executive 2002: 7). The LIHC 
definition of fuel poverty is less sensitive to such variation than the 10pct definition, 
as it applies a relative consideration rather than an absolute threshold (Hills 2011: 
147). However, there remains the possibility that those who require more energy 
because they are vulnerable are currently being classed as over-consuming. It would 
therefore seem appropriate to follow Hills’ recommendation (2012: 13) and take 
account of current medical research, along with work considering thermal comfort 
(e.g. Shove 2003) in reconsidering assumptions around heating regime.  
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There are also potential risks around the application of the BREDEM-12 model of 
domestic energy use. Whilst this is widely used as a model for the average house, it 
has been argued that some of the underlying assumptions do not hold to an extent that 
can be problematic, including with specific reference to fuel poor households (see 
Sefton, Chesshire 2005). A report commissioned by Scottish Government (Cambridge 
Architectural Research et al. 2009) posited that, amongst other weaknesses, 
BREDEM-12 underestimates the energy used by domestic appliances (being based on 
data from the 1980s), assumes average U-values (which may be optimistic), and is 
based upon dwellings having a single living room (an assumption also raised by 
Todd, Steele 2006 as being unrepresentative of the practices of certain BME 
communities). In this respect, BREDEM-12 can be argued to suffer from the same 
problems observed in other models – including models of poverty measurement – 
which are based upon the ‘objective’ perceptions of experts rather than the ways in 
which people actually live (see Gordon, Pantazis 1997). 
 
2.1.4 Research Application of Definition  
 
The definition of fuel poverty used in this research is the LIHC definition as applied 
by DECC (see DECC 2013i, with amended equivalisation index as detailed in DECC 
2013h). The choice to use this definition, despite the fact that it was only formally 
adopted in July 2013, towards the end of the research process, was made for four 
reasons.  
 
Firstly, that – subject to any significant change in direction – the LIHC definition will 
be adopted as the primary means of monitoring fuel poverty policy (see DECC 
2013l). To continue to refer to the 10pct definition of fuel poverty, particularly when 
assessing new policies would therefore be inappropriate. By using the LIHC 
definition of fuel poverty, and considering the concept of the fuel poverty gap as 
introduced by Hills, this thesis maintains coherency with current and future policy. 
The nature of policy research is that principles and perspectives are constantly 
changing, but by using the LIHC definition, this work can retain relevance into the 
foreseeable future.  
 
 29 
The second justification is simply that the LIHC definition is arguably more 
appropriate than the 10pct definition. The strengths and weaknesses of the definition 
and its operationalisation have already been referenced in previous sections, including 
the valid critiques of ACE et al. (2012). To offer a full critique of the definition is 
beyond the scope of this work; this section has looked only to identify where 
particular weaknesses in its application could impact upon its use in evaluating policy. 
On balance, it is held that – as agreed by government consultation (DECC 2013l) – 
the LIHC definition more effectively captures the nature of fuel poverty as originally 
described both by Boardman (1991) and in WHECA, as a problem of fuel 
affordability experienced by those on low incomes as a function of their living in 
inefficient dwellings.  
 
The third justification is that this work – as will be explained in the next chapter – 
examines policy primarily at the national level. Work examining the implementation 
of schemes on the ground could defensibly consider any means by which fuel poverty 
is implicitly defined by practitioners (i.e., ways that do not rely upon complex 
building modelling13). However, at the national level it is the DECC definition that is 
ostensibly used to track progress, and so it follows that the same definition should be 
used in this work.  
 
The final justification is that Hills’ approach agrees on a conceptual level with the 
approach taken in this thesis, which emphasises fuel poverty as a poverty problem, 
and as a problem of social policy. In reconfiguring fuel poverty as an inequality – 
comparative, rather than absolute – Hills brings it in line both with current 
government treatment of child poverty (as defined in the Child Poverty Act 2010), and 
with the broader academic consensus on the importance of inequality with regards to 
social wellbeing and cohesion (see, for example, Townsend 1979, Hills 2004, 
Wilkinson, Pickett 2010a). The Hills Fuel Poverty Review included consideration of 
common concerns of poverty research that had already been identified in the early 
                                                
13 Previous work has considered the potential of consensual and subjective measures of fuel poverty 
(see Healy 2004, Waddams Price et al. 2012). Whilst exploration of such measures is beyond the scope 
of this work, the addition of a broader range of measurement with regards to experiences of energy 
affordability would undoubtedly offer valuable insights into the reality of fuel poverty. In particular, it 
would be helpful to understand where and why such experiences deviate from fuel poverty as 
objectively defined by DECC. 
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stages of this research as crucial in evaluating fuel poverty policy (e.g., targeting, 
distributional impacts), and the LIHC definition of fuel poverty proposed by Hills is 
viewed as well-suited to the approach taken in this work. Throughout this thesis, then, 
the term ‘fuel poverty’ refers to the LIHC definition of fuel poverty as operationalised 
from August 2013 (see DECC 2013i, DECC 2013h). Where it is appropriate to use 
Boardman’s definition, for example, in discussing older policies or research, this will 
be made clear by referring to it as ‘10pct’ fuel poverty. 
 
2.2 Policy Context 
 
The research reported in this thesis was conducted between September 2010 and 
September 2013, within a turbulent political climate in which unrest was by no means 
limited to changes in fuel poverty policy. This section provides information on 
relevant policy context in order to guide understanding of the work that follows, 
incorporating discussion of the broader political and economic situation and priorities 
of government, a brief overview of older relevant policies, and a more detailed 
account of currently active policies linked to fuel poverty alleviation.  
 
2.2.1 Broader Political Context 
 
It is perhaps an understatement to say that the global recession of 2008 to 2009 - often 
framed as a crisis of capitalism – was the product of complex factors (see Gamble 
2009). In the initial recessionary period from 2008 to 2009, UK Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) shrank by 7% (ONS 2013f), and unemployment rose by almost 3% 
(ONS 2014). This was followed by a second smaller ‘double dip’ recession from 2011 
to 2012, and recovery has generally been protracted (ONS 2013f). It was against this 
economic backdrop, in May 2010, that David Cameron’s Conservative Party achieved 
a narrow electoral victory and joined with Nick Clegg’s Liberal Democrats to form a 
coalition government capable of commanding a majority in the House of Commons, 
ending thirteen years of Labour Party rule. A growing body of research has 
considered the implications of coalition government policies for social welfare (see 
Hatcher 2011, Hodkinson, Robbins 2013, Cutler, Waine 2013), though as yet little 
attention has been paid to fuel poverty specifically. The political philosophy of 
Cameron’s coalition government can be considered as neoliberal, a characterisation 
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reinforced in the literature (see Wright 2012, Wiggan 2012, Pownall 2013). David 
Harvey describes neoliberalism as:  
 
...a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being 
can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and 
skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong private 
property rights, free markets and free trade. 
(Harvey 2005: 2) 
 
Accordingly, neoliberal governments tend to focus on restricting the role of 
government to one of regulation, placing greater emphasis on the role of free markets 
and individual liberties14. This school of thought is famously influenced by Friedrich 
Hayek’s (2006) critiques of centralised planning and the supply-side economics of 
Milton Friedman (1962), in contrast to the fiscal approach advocated by John 
Maynard Keynes (1936). Whilst the ideological stance of government colours the 
policy process in innumerable ways, for the purpose of this research, three 
articulations of the neoliberal approach taken by the coalition government (and, to 
some extent, their New Labour predecessors under whom WHECA was enacted) are 
of particular relevance in considering the shape of current fuel poverty policy.  
 
• Restricting the Role of the State 
 
Firstly, a commitment to privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation is a common 
theme of neoliberal policy, in line with the belief that markets can achieve a more 
efficient allocation of resources than central government. The privatisation of the UK 
energy market is a legacy of this commitment enacted under the government of 
Margaret Thatcher (as will be discussed further in Chapter Four). Such an approach 
has been extended to social welfare services, resulting in an expanded role for the 
private sector in those domains. New Labour adopted something of a compromise 
approach, the Third Way, which applied market principles but with a stated 
                                                
14 This broad characterisation of neoliberalism meets the requirements of this work. For a discussion of 
the more complex definitional debates around the term, see Thorsen (2009). There is no one expression 
of neoliberal priorities, though Williamson’s (1990) account of the ‘Washington Consensus’, ten policy 
instruments he believed to have been commonly accepted by the American neoliberal political 
establishment, is often cited as a prominent articulation. In the interests of concision, the focus here is 
on three elements that are both uncontroversial and of particularly relevance. 
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prioritisation of social justice, 15  resulting in some level of increased market 
involvement in the delivery of government services, for example, via the expansion of 
Private Finance Initiatives  (Wilks-Heeg 2009, Toms, Beck & Asenova 2011) 16. 
Cameron’s coalition government has pursued a more vigorous agenda on this front, 
declaring in the Conservative Party’s 2010 general election manifesto that their 
election would represent a shift “from big government to Big Society” (Conservative 
Party 2010: vii), pledging to reduce regulation (2010: 20), encourage private 
investment, including in the low carbon economy (2010: 31), and increase the overall 
share of the economy held by the private sector (2010: 23). To date, this commitment 
has been articulated via increased private sector involvement in the delivery of a 
range of public services, including health (see Davies 2013), policing (see Jones 
2012b) and the postal system (see Parker 2014b). 
 
• Lower Marginal Tax Rates 
 
Secondly, neoliberal governments usually support lower taxes on individuals and 
businesses on the grounds that, again, markets are better at allocating funds than the 
state. Lower marginal tax rates are generally supported by neoliberal administrations 
as a means of stimulating the economy via supply-side measures. The broad impact of 
New Labour tax and benefit policy over their three terms was a net increase to 
government accounts, progressively distributed (see Browne, Phillips 2010). By 
contrast, the 2010 Conservative general election manifesto made repeated references 
to low taxes, particularly for business (see Conservative Party 2010) with the 2013-14 
UK budget cutting income taxes, council taxes and the main rate of corporation tax in 
a manner which, when considered alongside welfare cuts, has a generally regressive 
impact (see Joyce, Phillips 2013). It should be further noted that one notable increase 
to the marginal tax rate made by Conservatives – the 2010 uplift in the rate of VAT 
from 17.5% to 20% – is, if not inarguably regressive  (see Crossley, Phillips & 
Wakefield 2009, Murphy 2010) , certainly likely to be less progressive than an 
equivalent income tax. 
 
                                                
15 This is a necessary simplification; for more discussion of the Third Way as enacted by New Labour, 
see Giddens (1998) and Powell (1999). 
16 Though as Gingrich (2011) explains, markets in the welfare state can take many distinct forms. 
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• Deficit Reduction 
 
Thirdly, neoliberal policies tend towards the limitation of government budget deficits. 
The reasoning for this links into those principles of the philosophy already discussed, 
that the role of government should be restricted, with a consequent reduction in the 
level of public expenditure. Reduction of the national debt (for which New Labour 
were blamed) via deficit reduction was central to the platform on which the 
Conservative Party ran for election, with a pledge to “cut wasteful government 
spending to bring the deficit down and restore stability” (Conservative Party 2010: 7). 
Following the general election, the coalition government undertook a comprehensive 
spending review across all departments that, as already discussed, led to the Hills Fuel 
Poverty Review. The coalition government’s target to “achieve cyclically-adjusted 
current balance” (HM Treasury 2010a: 1)  was originally forecast to end in 2015/16; 
however, the 2012 Autumn Statement indicated that the expected period of austerity 
had been extended into 2017/18 (see Osbourne 2012). The coalition government’s 
commitment to reducing public spending has to date resulted in dramatic cuts across 
government (see Jones 2012a), including the pursuit of £20bn in savings to the NHS 
by 2015 (see DoH 2010)17 and £22bn in welfare expenditure savings by 2014-15 (see 
CPAG 2013). 
 
2.2.2 Policy Evolution 
 
The primary research focus of this thesis is analysis of fuel poverty policies. The 
specifics of such policies and relevant legislation are clarified in subsequent chapters 
as appropriate, however, it is it is useful at this preliminary stage to clarify which 
policies have been identified as targeted at fuel poverty alleviation in order to provide 
the level of familiarity necessary going forward. The task of identifying these policies 
is not so straightforward as one might assume. Whilst fuel poverty is frequently 
mentioned in policy documents, it is rarely stated as an explicit aim of any policy, and 
there is no official document that clarifies which defined policies are expected to 
contribute to fuel poverty mitigation (as is discussed in Chapter Four). Within this 
                                                
17 Though this ‘Nicholson Challenge’ pre-dated the coalition government (see Wollaston 2013), the 
Health and Social Care Act 2010 expands the role of the private sector in achieving efficiency gains 
(see Davies 2013). 
 34 
work, drawing upon the basis of the LIHC fuel poverty definition, ‘fuel poverty 
policies’ are defined as those legislated activities for which official documentation 
indicates that they sought (or seek) to support low income households in a manner 
specifically related to the reduction of energy costs. With regards to the latter factor, 
two primary types of intervention are available to policy makers: 
• Technical interventions are those physical measures that reduce the amount of 
energy required in order to meet required heating standards. These could 
include, for example, improvements that lower the heat transfer coefficient 
(U-value)18 of the building envelope, or the installation of more efficient water 
or space heating systems. 
• Economic interventions are those monetary measures that either supplement 
the income of households (with the specific intent of improving fuel 
affordability) or reduce the cost of energy, e.g., via a direct rebate to the bill. 
 
Furthermore, for the purposes of this work, policies are divided into two distinct 
classifications: 
• Supplier-led policies are those policies based upon energy suppliers delivering 
a legally obligated level of activity; these are often termed ‘supplier 
obligations’. Government then monitors delivery success. 
• State-led policies are those policies where activity is delivered (or procured) 
by central government directly. 
 
This division informs the analytical approach taken in this work; this is discussed 
further in the next chapter. Note that both intervention and policy types are also 
directed at non-fuel poor households, often within the same programme. This work is 
focused specifically upon delivery directed at fuel poor households. Figure 2.6 gives 
an overview of fuel poverty policies since November 2000, when WHECA formalised 
fuel poverty eradication as a policy objective (some earlier initiatives are discussed in 
Chapter Four). Consideration here is restricted to supplier and state-led national-level 
English policies through September 2013; this constraint in scope is discussed further 
in the next chapter. 
                                                
18 The heat transfer coefficient, or ‘U-value’ is a quantitative measure of heat transfer, or heat loss. A 
low value indicates that the building elements resist thermal transfer, i.e., are more efficient to heat. 
Thus adding insulation to a wall might be expected to lower its U value. 
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Based upon compilation of sources: (Watson, Bolton 2013, Kennedy 2010, Kennedy 2013b, Ofgem/EST 2003, Ofgem 2008c, Ofgem 2011a, Ofgem 2009b, Barker 2013, Ofgem 2013k) 
 
Figure 2.6: Overview of English fuel poverty policies, November 2000 - September 2013 
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Two prominent programmes are perhaps notable omissions from Figure 2.6, but do 
not meet the stated criteria. Firstly, local authorities (LAs) have since 2000 been 
obligated to ensure their stocks of social housing meet the Decent Homes Standard, 
which includes a requirement that public sector housing provide a reasonable degree 
of thermal comfort (for more details, see DCLG 2006). A 2010 report by the National 
Audit Office concluded that the Decent Homes Programme had been broadly 
successful, with 14.5 per cent of social housing ‘non-decent’ in 2009, down from 39 
per cent in 2001 (following spend of £29.37bn) (see Morse 2010). The corresponding 
delivery of energy efficiency measures saw the average SAP rating of social housing 
increase by 5.9 points in the period 2001 to 2007 (against four points for housing in 
the private sector) (Morse 2010: 34). Analysis undertaken for this project (reported in 
section 5.2.1) found that households living in social housing are less likely to be fuel 
poor than the wider population, despite the strong likelihood of such households being 
low income; the Decent Homes Programme has no doubt contributed to this. Whilst 
the Decent Homes Programmes has indisputably had a positive effect on energy 
affordability, it was not a state-led policy in the manner described previously: the 
state set the standard, but LAs drove activity. 
Secondly, whilst WHDS is the first legally mandated supplier-led economic 
programme, its clear precursor was the 2008-2011 Voluntary Agreement under which 
the Big Six energy suppliers pledged to assist vulnerable and fuel poor customers. 
Over its three-year duration, suppliers spent £488.7m on initiatives including rebates, 
trust funds and energy efficiency initiatives(see Ofgem 2011b: 4). Around 70% of 
Voluntary Agreement expenditure was through offering social tariffs(building on 
Ofgem 2004), which enabled eligible households to purchase energy at unit rates at 
least as low as the supplier’s cheapest direct debit tariff(Ofgem 2011b: 15). Again, 
though, whilst all Big Six suppliers opted to participate in this programme of activity, 
it was not mandatory.  
 
2.2.3 Current Policy Approach 
 
As illustrated in Figure 2.7, until January 2013 a progression of supplier obligations 
were delivered alongside Warm Front, the state-led technical scheme. From that 
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point, ECO became the only technical scheme in operation. Table 2.2 offers more 
detail on those policies active after January 2013. 
  
Table 2.2: English fuel poverty policies active after January 2013 
 
Policy Period 
active 
Description Agent tasked 
with delivery 
Responsible 
governmental 
department  
Technical Interventions 
En
er
gy
 C
om
pa
ny
 O
bl
ig
at
io
n 
(E
C
O
) 
Carbon Emissions 
Reduction Obligation 
(CERO)* 
2013-2015 
(anticipated) 
Support for the 
installation of 
measures in hard-
to-treat homes. 
Energy 
suppliers 
DECC 
Carbon Saving 
Community Obligation 
(CSCO) 
Energy efficiency 
scheme targeted at 
areas of low 
income. 
Home Heating Cost 
Reduction Obligation 
(HHCRO) 
Energy efficiency 
scheme targeted at 
low income 
households. 
Economic Interventions 
Cold Weather Payments 
(CWPs) 
1986- Payments made to 
low income 
households during 
periods of cold 
weather. 
Government DWP 
Winter Fuel Payments 
(WFPs) 
1997- Payments made to 
all households 
meeting age-based 
criteria. 
Government DWP 
Warm Home Discount 
Scheme (WHDS) 
2011-2015 
(anticipated) 
Rebates on energy 
bills applied to 
qualifying low 
income households. 
Energy 
suppliers 
DECC 
*CERO is included here as an element of ECO, however, it does not target low-income households and 
so does not meet the definition of a fuel poverty policy applied in this work; this is discussed further in 
section 3.2.2. 
Based upon compilation of sources: (DECC 2012j, Kennedy 2010, Kennedy 2013b, DECC 2011h) 
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ECO is one element of a broader programme of changes to energy policy introduced 
by the coalition government under the auspices of the Energy Act 2011, including the 
Green Deal, the coalition government’s flagship energy efficiency policy, of which 
ECO is a component. The mainstream element of the Green Deal is a pay-as-you-save 
scheme to fund energy efficiency improvements, touted as “the biggest home 
improvement project since the Second World War" (see DECC 2011j). Both the 
Labour and Conservative parties included similarly styled energy efficiency financing 
measures in their 2010 general election manifestoes (see Conservative Party 2010: 93, 
Labour Party 2010: 8:4) and the launch of the Green Deal was confirmed in the 2010 
Spending Review (HM Treasury 2010b: 61). The principle is that eligible households 
can receive a loan towards the installation of an energy efficiency measure that is 
effectively an advance on the financial savings they are expected to enjoy from that 
technology, with this sum then paid back over a period of years via the dwelling 
energy bill. The idea, then, is that the cost of improvements are eventually repaid by 
those receiving the benefit, and that the barrier of potentially prohibitively expensive 
initial financial outlay is removed or reduced. Eligibility, though, is contingent upon 
measures meeting the so-called ‘Golden Rule’ of the Green Deal; that savings earned 
must be greater or equal to the cost of installation. DECC (2010c) offers more detail 
around the operation of the Green Deal mechanism. Despite a £2.9m marketing 
campaign at launch (see Lloyd 2012), the Green Deal had something of a rocky start, 
with the Minister of State for Energy and Climate Change, Greg Barker, pushed to 
defend low take-up (see Murray 2013). A range of criticisms of the scheme design 
have also emerged, including that the interest rate on loans made is too high, that the 
Golden Rule relies upon unrealistically high calculations of likely savings, and that 
the scheme is unlikely to appeal to homeowners who do not live in the property 
themselves, e.g., landlords (see Vidal 2013, Collinson 2014, Haddon 2013). 
 
In developing the Green Deal, the government recognised a need to drive delivery of 
measures to low income and vulnerable households given the likely reluctance of 
those households to self-finance (DECC 2012h: 191) and the potential for such 
households not to meet the Golden Rule because they may consume less energy in 
order to save money (DECC 2011i: 120). The HHCRO and CSCO (‘Affordable 
Warmth’) elements of ECO are designed to fill this gap by providing subsidised 
measures to low income households (see DECC 2012h: 4). The primary interaction 
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between ECO and the Green Deal pay-as-you-save mechanism applies to the CERO 
element of the scheme, which considers hard-to-treat homes for which required 
measures might be too costly to meet the Golden Rule; in this instance, the 
homeowner may apply for additional financial support under ECO CERO to meet the 
cost difference (see DECC 2012h: 21). ECO CERO is particularly focused towards 
the delivery of Solid Wall Insulation (SWI) and hard-to-treat Cavity Wall Insulation 
(CWI), the measures which have been identified repeatedly as offering the greatest 
technical potential for savings (see Element Energy/EST 2013: 75-77). The 
mainstream Green Deal and ECO CERO are not, then, aimed specifically at low 
income households, and as such so do not meet the definition of a fuel poverty policy 
used in this work. Accordingly, the focus of this research with regards to ECO is on 
the HHCRO and CSCO elements of the scheme, as these are aimed at reducing the 
energy costs of low income households and can consequently be considered to be fuel 
poverty policies.  
 
The overall ambition of the Green Deal and ECO represents a significant reduction on 
previous supplier obligations. Rosenow and Eyre (2012) show that, considered in 
terms of projected annual carbon savings, the current programme is on par with EEC 
2 (which ran from 2002 to 2005), with an expected impact around a quarter of that of 
CERT and CESP (see Figure 2.7).  
 
 
Source: Adapted from Rosenow and Eyre (2012: 4). 
 
Figure 2.7: Changing ambition of energy efficiency programmes in the UK 
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2.3 Interacting Policy Priorities 
 
This thesis is focused primarily on fuel poverty mitigation as a goal of policy. 
However, there are three other policy areas with which fuel poverty policies have 
considerable interaction; carbon reduction, energy security, and the promotion of 
health and wellbeing. This section discusses the interaction of fuel poverty reduction 
with those other objectives, identifying potential tensions where policy goals conflict. 
 
2.3.1 Carbon Reduction and Energy Security 
 
Energy affordability constitutes one element of what has been termed the energy 
‘trilemma’, as illustrated in Figure 2.8. 
 
 
Based upon various accounts: (WEC 2013, Pond 2013, E.ON UK 2014a) 
 
Figure 2.8: The energy trilemma 
 
The trilemma characterises current energy policy challenges. The three elements – 
energy affordability, environmental objectives and security of supply – represent 
policy goals. As the resources available to policymakers are finite, they will face 
choices as to how these are balanced, and compromises will be necessary. So, for 
example, shifting supply to 100% domestic renewables would reduce carbon 
emissions and enhance security of supply, but would likely come at an enormous cost 
to bill payers. The World Energy Council (WEC) recommends that governments seek 
to maintain a balanced profile in managing these elements, and release annual 
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scorecards rating achievement of this (in 2013, the UK was ranked 5th out of the 24 
countries in its GDP banding; see: WEC 2013: 98)19. 
 
In addition to fuel poverty eradication targets, UK government is committed under the 
Climate Change Act 2008 to “ensure that the net UK carbon account for the year 2050 
is at least 80% lower than the 1990 baseline” (s. 1(1)). The UK is also under 
international scrutiny as a party to the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (1998), and to European Union ‘20-20-
20’ climate and energy policy targets (see European Commission 2014). UK 
government also seeks to maintain energy security, to “minimise the risk of any 
unplanned interruptions, whether from severe weather, malicious attacks, technical 
failure or industrial action.” (DECC 2012g: 1). Improvements to the energy efficiency 
of the UK housing stock can support the achievement of all three elements. In 
addition to potentially reducing the fuel costs of low income households, energy 
demand reduction has been identified as a more cost effective means of reducing 
carbon emissions than investing in new supply technologies (see Eyre et al. 2011). 
Reducing fuel demand can further support supply security by minimising dependence; 
DECC identifies energy efficiency as one of the six ‘pillars’ upon which energy 
security rests (2012g: 17).  
 
The relationships between fuel poverty mitigation and carbon reduction and energy 
security might, then, appear unproblematic. However, despite a broad compatibility, 
there are areas of tension. As LIHC fuel poverty is a relative poverty, its mitigation 
requires that inequality be reduced, i.e., that fuel poor households be improved at a 
faster rate than non-fuel poor households (this constraint is expanded upon in the next 
chapter). However, fuel poor households are not necessarily the most desirable from 
energy security or carbon reduction perspectives, which would favour households that 
are high consumers or ‘carbon rich’. Whilst having high costs (as the LIHC definition 
requires) might imply high usage, as discussed previously, research indicates that the 
actual usage of low income households tends to be lower than that modelled; Preston 
et al.  (2013c)  estimated that the carbon emissions from household fuel of the richest 
                                                
19 The WEC’s account of the energy trilemma terms the affordability node ‘energy equity’. However, 
their methodology bases this metric upon national electricity access and affordability rather than intra-
national equality (see WEC 2013; 96-97). LIHC fuel poverty mitigation, in effect, represents a further 
requirement of equity for low income households upon the ‘affordability’ node. 
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10% of households are twice those of the poorest 10%. This introduces an 
‘opportunity cost’ in carbon terms to improving the dwellings of low income 
households, i.e., to prioritise low income households in line with the requirements of 
fuel poverty mitigation would result in lower carbon emissions savings for any given 
rate of expenditure than would otherwise be possible. There is also the troubling 
implied assumption that low income households are choosing to save, whilst those on 
higher incomes could effectively (and problematically) be rewarded for consuming 
too much. A further tension – one that is core to the notion of an ‘energy trilemma’ – 
is that many measures designed to reduce carbon emissions or improve energy 
security are funded via levies on bills, for example, the Renewables Obligation (RO), 
which added £21 to the typical household electricity bill in 2013 (see Ofgem 2013i). 
Whilst across-the-board increases to energy prices will not create further fuel poverty 
under the LIHC definition, they will add to the cost burden from an absolute 
affordability perspective.  
 
2.3.2 Health and Wellbeing  
 
The association between fuel poverty and negative health and wellbeing outcomes 
might appear self-evident. However, in practice the relationship is methodologically 
difficult to clarify and quantify due to the array of confounding factors involved. The 
link between cold environments and negative outcomes is more straightforward. In 
2011, the Marmot Review Team undertook a comprehensive review of the health 
impacts of fuel poverty and cold homes and compiled evidence that living in a cold 
environment can exacerbate a range of conditions, including – but not restricted to – 
circulatory diseases, respiratory problems and mental health, with older people, 
children and infants being particularly vulnerable (Geddes et al. 2011: 26-29). There 
is also ongoing evidence of Excess Winter Mortality (EWM) in the UK, an increased 
rate of deaths during colder months often used as a metric to demonstrate the link 
between low temperatures and poor health. Figure 2.9 illustrates this relationship for 
the period August 2012 to July 2013. 
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Source: Adapted from Figure 2 of ONS (2013d: 5).  
 
Figure 2.9: Mean daily deaths each month and mean monthly temperatures, August 
2012 - July 2013 
 
Prior research has shown that variance in EWM is subject to a range of explanatory 
factors including influenza rates, depth and duration of low outdoor temperatures, and 
level of precautions taken against cold weather (see Curwen, Devis 1988, The 
Eurowinter Group 1997, Wilkinson et al. 2004). The explanatory power of indoor 
temperatures – and, by extension, dwelling quality and fuel poverty levels – is harder 
to establish. Wilkinson et al. found “strong, although not conclusive, evidence that 
winter-mortality and cold-related mortality are linked to sub-optimal home heating” 
(2001: 18). Pan–European analysis by Healy (2003) found a similarly inconclusive 
but probable causal link between the thermal condition of national housing stocks and 
EWM levels. Liddell and Morris’ (2010) review of studies considering the broader 
health impacts of specific fuel poverty interventions found limited evidence of 
resultant improvements to adult physical health, though there were stronger 
indications with regard to adult and adolescent mental health, and the physical health 
of children and infants. Overall, Liddell and Morris conclude that the current evidence 
base drawn from evaluation of energy efficiency programmes is somewhat 
methodologically limited, with a greater emphasis on perceived (rather than 
demonstrable) improvements to health. Gilbertson et al. (2012) has further drawn 
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attention to the many positive impacts reported by householders in receipt of Warm 
Front measures that were not recorded by the Health Impact Assessment methodology 
used to evaluate that scheme (Green, Gilbertson 2008). Again, it is emphasised that 
the causal pathways between fuel poverty, inefficient dwellings, thermal comfort and 
negative health outcomes are complex, and that approaches to monitoring the impact 
of energy efficiency schemes should reflect this.  
 
A further, more restricted research base considers the impacts of the inability to afford 
adequate home heating upon wellbeing more generally. Work by Day and Hitchings, 
for example, found that strategies developed by older people in dealing with cold had 
implications for self-esteem tied to ageism (Day, Hitchings 2011, Hitchings, Day 
2011). Evidence on the specific wellbeing impacts of cold homes on children is 
sparse, but analysis of Families and Children Study survey data by Barnes et al.  
(2008)  found a significant association between incidence of inadequate heating and 
children who reported having nowhere quiet to do their homework; it is suggested that 
this may be because those households only heat a main living area. Increased levels of 
worry and stress are commonly associated with heating affordability; in 2013, 59% of 
all respondents to DECC’s Public Attitudes Tracker survey reported being worried 
about energy bills (DECC 2013e: 1). A number of evaluation studies have found that 
participants report improved emotional wellbeing following the installation of energy 
efficiency measures (see Gilbertson et al. 2006, Shortt, Rugkåsa 2007). It is self-
evident that households with high costs and low incomes will face greater constraints 
in balancing budgets. The use of fuel rationing as a coping strategy has already been 
discussed; the incidence of households resorting to ‘heat or eat’ as a common trade-
off between two costs perceived as flexible  (as described by Anderson, White & 
Finney 2012: 41)  has also been documented  (see O'Neill, Jinks & Squire 2006, 
Beatty, Blow & Crossley 2011, Anderson, White & Finney 2012) .  
 
Existing evidence indicates a causal link between tackling fuel poverty via 
improvements to the housing stock and improved health and wellbeing. However, 
despite these synergies (and few sources of tension20), there is a noted lack of 
                                                
20 It has been demonstrated that insulation measures could create a risk of overheating (see ARCC CN 
2012, Lomas, Kane 2013), with potential negative health impacts, particularly for older people (see 
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evidence quantifying the demonstrable impacts of energy efficiency interventions, 
including in terms of economic benefit to the NHS (see Stewart, Habgood 2008, 
Boardman 2010: 167-168). Professor Christine Liddell has undertaken a number of 
cost benefit analyses of fuel poverty alleviation programmes  (see Liddell 2011, 
Liddell, Morris & Lagdon 2011) . By way of example, analysis of the Kirklees Warm 
Zone Project by Liddell et al. estimated that, of the £24m total capital investment in 
that project, twenty pence from every pound would be recouped via health benefits  
(Liddell, Morris & Lagdon 2011: 32) . Taking a different approach, the Warm Front 
Health Impact Assessment estimated expenditure of £12,905 per life year saved 
where insulation was installed under that scheme (Green, Gilbertson 2008: 18). 
However, current evidence of this type is sparse. Recent systematic analysis of 
international evidence on the health impacts of housing improvements by Thomson 
(2013) found that opportunities to gather data were often missed when delivering 
interventions. Further research - ideally capturing the full range of impacts - would 
support the integration of health and fuel poverty policy objectives, making a 
potentially compelling argument that investment in energy efficiency is not only 
socially important but also economically sensible. 
 
2.4 Fuel Poverty Policy Networks  
 
The interactions between sets of stakeholders within policy networks have the 
potential to shape both agendas and outcomes. Any thorough attempt to apply policy 
networks theory as a means of analysing the dynamics between key players engaging 
with fuel poverty policy in England is beyond the scope of this work, however a 
description of the main stakeholders is helpful in terms of establishing a foundation 
for the chapters that follow. Figure 2.10 illustrates the primary interactions of key 
actors in fuel poverty policy as understood by this work, and the remainder of this 
section then describes how they are perceived for the purposes of this research. This 
assessment is derived from multiple methodological approaches – particularly 
literature synthesis and professional engagement – to be described further in section 
3.4. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
NHBS 2012). Whilst the current evidence on heat-related impacts is more limited than that on cold-
related impacts, risk levels are likely to increase as the UK climate becomes warmer. 
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Source: Own analysis; employs mapping approach applied by Turnpenny et al. (2005) in analysing 
climate change policy networks. 
 
Figure 2.10: Fuel poverty policy network 
 
Numerous academic and policy community events were attended over the period in 
which this work was undertaken. Inevitably, participation in such events – which 
included representatives from all stakeholders discussed in this section – resulted in 
informal exchange of knowledge. In the interests of transparency, a record of events 
attended is included as Appendix Two. 
 
2.4.1 Central Government 
 
The supreme legislative body for England21 (and the UK as a whole) is Parliament, 
which holds responsibility for passing primary legislation. Central government 
ministerial departments are then responsible for overseeing the administration and 
development of policies, including the creation of the secondary legislation that 
support delivery (i.e., Statutory Instruments) and the negotiation of budgets with HM 
Treasury (see Jones, Norton 2010). As already discussed, the current UK Government 
                                                
21 The devolved administrations of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have their own legislative 
bodies, with differing levels of oversight with regards to fuel poverty (and interacting policies). 
However, as will be justified in section 3.2.2, the focus of this work has been limited to England. 
 47 
is a Conservative-led coalition with the Liberal Democrat party. In this thesis, 
consideration of central government activity mainly refers to the fulfilment of the 
requirements of WHECA (though reference is also made to other legislation that sets 
duties or confers powers, e.g., Utilities Act 2000, Energy Act 2010). The Department 
for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) is the ministerial department with primary 
responsibility for overseeing fuel poverty policy, producing the annual statistical 
reports, managing the current review of fuel poverty policy and supervising the 
supplier obligated programmes, ECO and WHDS (see UK Government 2014c)22. 
However, the current state-led policies, WFPs and CWPs (both of which are benefits 
supplements), are administered by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) via 
the Social Fund (see DWP 2013b).  
 
2.4.2 Regulator 
 
Ofgem is a non-ministerial government department, which acts as the primary 
instrument of regulatory governance for energy policy in the UK. Ofgem’s primary 
objective is to “protect the interests of existing and future electricity and gas 
customers”, which primarily entails the promotion of competitive markets (see Ofgem 
2014h). The management of supplier obligations23 – both ECO and WHDS – is one of 
Ofgem’s key responsibilities; they are tasked with assigning individual supplier 
obligations (serving as ECO Administrator), monitoring compliance against targets 
and penalising underperformance as necessary (see Ofgem 2014c). Previously, Ofgem 
also played a role in monitoring and defining the social programmes that suppliers 
delivered under the Voluntary Agreement. Ofgem are overseen by the Gas and 
Electricity Markets Authority (GEMA), whose members are political appointees (see 
Ofgem 2014g). 
                                                
22 DECC was only established in 2008; before this time, a number of other departments played a role in 
fuel poverty policy (the possible impact of changes in this respect are discussed further in Chapter 
Four). For example, until 2009, Annual Progress Reports on the UK Fuel Poverty Strategy were 
published by DEFRA, either alone or with the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), and then the 
Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR). In 2009 DECC published one 
final report before they were seemingly abandoned entirely, as is discussed in Chapter Three (see 
DEFRA/DTI 2003, DEFRA 2004, DEFRA/DTI 2005, DEFRA/DTI 2006, DEFRA/BERR 2007, 
DEFRA/BERR 2008, DECC 2009). 
23 Ofgem’s role has been entirely limited to supplier obligations; they play no role in monitoring CWPs 
or WFPs, nor did they participate in Warm Front delivery (monitored by the National Audit Office and 
the House of Commons Committee on Public Accounts, see for example Burr 2009, CPA 2009). They 
did play a more pronounced role in the earlier supplier obligations, for which they set targets, however, 
this power was revoked under Utilities Act 2000. 
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2.4.3 Energy Suppliers 
 
For the purpose of this work, energy suppliers24 are considered to be that group of for-
profit companies established as a result of the Gas Act 1986 and the Electricity Act 
1989 and licensed by Ofgem for the supply of domestic electricity or gas (see Ofgem 
2014a, Ofgem 2014b). That is, not those companies responsible only for generation or 
import of energy, but those who supply energy directly to households and receive 
payment for it. More specifically – as is further justified in section 3.2.2 – this 
research focuses on those energy suppliers who are obligated to deliver the set of 
national-level programmes under consideration here to fuel poor households – at the 
moment this is under the ECO and WHDS programmes. The focus of this research is 
therefore on the so-called ‘Big Six’ energy suppliers who account for 98% of 
electricity and gas accounts in Great Britain (see Figure 2.11).  
 
 
Source: Ofgem (2013a: 59, 110) 
Note: Percentages do not sum to 100 per cent due to rounding. 
 
Figure 2.11: Market share of energy suppliers, Great Britain, December 2012 
 
A trade association, Energy UK, exists to represent energy industry stakeholders, 
commenting on policy and produce research on behalf of their membership. 
 
                                                
24 The terms ‘energy supplier’ and ‘energy company’ are used interchangeably here, in line with 
common practice. 
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By Ofgem’s own assessment, the UK energy market is not sufficiently competitive 
for a number of reasons, including that barriers to market entry and exit are high, 
customers rarely change supplier, and that the Big Six energy suppliers are also 
responsible for the majority of generation (see OFT/Ofgem/CMA 2014). Research has 
indicated that the general public does not trust energy suppliers; one survey 
undertaken by Ipsos MORI for Ofgem found that 43% of customers did not trust their 
energy supplier to be open and transparent (Ipsos MORI 2013a: 52). Elsewhere, Ipsos 
MORI found that 79% of MPs surveyed did not trust energy suppliers to protect the 
vulnerable from high prices (Ipsos MORI 2013b). 
 
2.4.4 Local Government!
 
Local government in England is undertaken by a system of LAs. Whilst the exact 
specifics vary between areas, these authorities tend to be responsible at the local level 
for functions such as housing, waste management, transport and education (see 
Wilson, Game 1994). LA involvement in energy efficiency policy, and fuel poverty 
policy more specifically, has been variable, both over time and between different 
areas. LAs have been obligated since 2000 to deliver energy efficiency measures 
under the Decent Homes Standard, which includes a requirement that public sector 
housing provide a reasonable degree of thermal comfort (as discussed in section 
2.2.2). LAs are also required, under the Home Energy Conservation Act 199525 
(HECA), to prepare annual reports on the current state of the housing stock in their 
localities, and on the costs of potential improvements. Under the Local Area 
Agreements (LAAs) that ran between 2004 and 2010, ‘Tackling fuel poverty’ was 
National Indicator (NI) 187, and LAs who this adopted this NI as part of their LAA 
were required to report annually on the number of low income households in 
inefficient homes (DCLG 2008: 51, see Hossain 2009 for an examination of impact). 
In practice, LA involvement in delivery has been largely discretionary, and whilst 
some have chosen to deliver their own fuel poverty alleviation schemes  (the 
ambitious Kirklees scheme being a well-known example of such activity, see Liddell, 
Morris & Lagdon 2011) , this is by no means widespread. Probert (2010) found 
evidence that the discretionary nature of LA involvement impacts on the ability of 
                                                
25 The coalition government proposed revoking this requirement during the research period, but 
ultimately opted to retain and revise it (see Cabinet Office, 2012).  
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individual households to access support. The role of LAs under the Green Deal is 
similarly discretionary, though DECC have looked at ways of encouraging their 
participation (see DECC 2011k). Establishing the appropriate role of LAs in fuel 
poverty alleviation would in itself be a valuable topic of further research. However, 
such an investigation is beyond the scope of this work, and as such consideration of 
LAs here tends to be incidental. 
 
2.4.5 Wider Policy Community 
 
The policy networks model proposed by Marsh and Rhodes (1992a) features two 
broad categories of policy network – issue networks and policy communities – at 
either end of a continuum. Issue networks are those networks containing a large 
number of varied types of actor, with the nature of the membership and their 
interactions fluctuating over time. Policy communities, meanwhile, are more tightly 
constructed, with a comparatively fixed set of member organisations that tend towards 
the technocratic and professional. Applying Marsh and Rhodes’ approach, the policy 
network that engages with, and influences, fuel poverty policy tends toward the policy 
community end of that spectrum26. A core group of professional stakeholders engage 
substantially with fuel poverty issues, publishing robust research and engaging in 
public dialogue with government. This group includes National Energy Action 
(NEA), the Centre for Sustainable Energy (CSE) and the Association for the 
Conservation of Energy (ACE). A more peripheral group of stakeholders - still 
tending towards the professional - participate in similar ways, but do not have fuel 
poverty as a core organisational concern. These include Friends of the Earth (FoE) 
and the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (JRF). A third group of actors have some form 
of official (though non-departmental) remit, though the roles performed are extremely 
varied, e.g., consumer representation by Consumer Futures, independent policy 
advice from the Fuel Poverty Advisory Group (FPAG). Many fuel poverty 
stakeholders have been campaigning around the issue for decades27, and observation 
                                                
26 It must be emphasised that the description offered here is not intended as a detailed network analysis, 
as such an investigation is beyond the scope of this research. However, the particularly professional 
nature of the fuel poverty policy network means that key actors are prominent in the ensuing account of 
analysis undertaken. As such, an account of those actors, drawn from the research process (e.g., 
attendance at events, collection andanalysis of grey literature) is helpful to support understanding. 
27 As will be discussed in Chapter Four, the work of some of these groups was instrumental in the 
successful proposal and passage of WHECA. 
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suggests that often individuals move between organisations within the community. 
Table 2.3 describes key actors within the fuel poverty policy community as featured 
in this work. 
 
Table 2.3: Key members of fuel poverty policy community 
 
Stakeholder Type of organisation Core focus Types of activity 
undertaken 
Association for the 
Conservation of 
Energy (ACE) 
Membership 
organisation for 
companies working 
within the energy 
conservation industry 
Energy efficiency, 
energy policy, fuel 
poverty 
Campaigning and research 
Centre for 
Sustainable 
Energy (CSE) 
Charity Sustainability, 
greenhouse gas 
emission reduction, 
fuel poverty 
Advice and guidance, 
training, energy project 
management, research and 
policy analysis 
Committee on 
Climate Change 
(CCC) 
Independent statutory 
body established under 
the Climate Change Act 
2008 
Climate change, 
greenhouse gas 
emission reduction 
Provide independent advice 
to government on matters 
relating to climate change, 
undertake monitoring and 
analysis 
Consumer Futures Non-departmental public 
body 
Energy policy, 
consumer advocacy, 
vulnerable 
customers, fuel 
poverty 
Consumer advocacy 
organisation, undertake 
policy and research activity 
eaga Charitable 
Trust (eaga-CT) 
Independent grant-giving 
trust 
Fuel poverty, energy 
equity 
Funds action and research 
projects, hosts database of 
completed work 
Energy Bill 
Revolution (EBR) 
Campaigning group Fuel poverty, energy 
policy 
Campaigning (advocates a 
more ambitious approach to 
fuel poverty mitigation). 
Energy UK 
(formerly the 
Energy Retail 
Association 
(ERA)) 
Trade association Energy policy, 
energy industry 
Representation, 
campaigning on behalf of 
energy industry 
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Energy Saving 
Trust (EST) 
Social enterprise and 
charitable trust funded 
largely by UK 
Government 
Energy efficiency, 
energy consumption, 
greenhouse gas 
reduction 
Energy project 
management, assurance, 
testing, development of low 
carbon technology 
Friends of the 
Earth (FotE) 
Charity Greenhouse gas 
emission reduction, 
climate change 
Campaigning, part of an 
international network 
Fuel Poverty 
Advisory Group 
(FPAG) 
Advisory non-
departmental body of 
DECC, membership 
includes representatives 
of stakeholders 
Fuel poverty Advice on policy 
effectiveness and co-
ordination of organisations, 
produces annual report 
Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation (JRF) 
Charity Poverty, 
communities, older 
people 
Social policy research and 
development 
National Energy 
Action (NEA) 
Charity Fuel poverty, energy 
efficiency 
Campaigning, research, 
advocacy, energy project 
management 
Compiled with reference to sources: (ACE 2014, CSE 2014a, CCC 2014, Consumer Futures 2014, 
eaga-CT 2014, EBR 2014b, Energy UK 2014, EST 2014a, FotE 2014, UK Government 2014a, JRF 
2014a, NEA 2014)   
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has offered an account of the theoretical context for this work, in 
particular clarifying and justifying the use of the new ‘LIHC’ definition of fuel 
poverty. Fuel poverty is overtly technical, being based in part on consideration of the 
physical properties of the dwelling in which a household resides. It might therefore 
seem that fuel poverty is more objective in nature than other ‘poverties’. However, 
like any form of poverty, fuel poverty is, to some extent, a constructed concept and 
the choices made in establishing a definition to be used as a metric in policy 
maintenance have important implications for the implementation of those policies. As 
this thesis is primarily concerned with analysis of fuel poverty policies, it is therefore 
important that the definition, its operationalisation, and any potential weaknesses be 
clarified from the start. This chapter has further offered an account of the broader 
political context in which the work is situated, including of the manifested priorities 
of the current coalition government, a brief overview of previous fuel poverty 
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policies, a more detailed account of the current policy framework for domestic energy 
efficiency, a discussion of major interacting objectives, and a description of the 
network of stakeholders linked to fuel poverty. Whilst much of this is expanded upon 
in the remainder of this thesis, the information offered thus far provides the necessary 
foundation for the next chapter, which details the analytical approach adopted in this 
thesis as a means of responding to the overarching research question, and the 
methodological techniques applied in the ensuing work. 
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3 | Analytical and Methodological Approach 
 
 
The multifaceted nature of fuel poverty presents challenges in defining a research 
approach. The overarching research question addressed by this thesis is broad, and 
requires deconstructing in order to provide an effective outcome. One major decision 
made in this respect has already been touched upon; the choice to address the work as 
a comparative policy analysis that considers the two most prominent responsible 
agents for national-level fuel poverty programmes, energy suppliers and the state. 
 
This chapter explains in detail the analytical approach and research methods applied 
in this thesis. The first section discusses the choice to approach the overarching 
research question from a social policy perspective, and the implications of that 
decision for the work. The second section then discusses further the aims and 
objectives of this research, and the limitations that have been applied to the scope of 
inquiry. The third section justifies the choice of policy analysis framework primarily 
used in this work – that proposed by Patton and Sawicki (1993) – before explaining 
how it has been applied, along with analytical techniques such as Dunn’s (2012) 
notion of policy constraints, within the rest of the thesis. The final section details how 
the research has been operationalised in methodological terms, the types of data used, 
and the means of analysis. 
 
3.1 A Problem of Social Policy 
 
Fuel poverty mitigation is intrinsically interdisciplinary. Our attempts to combat the 
impacts of a physical world that is inhospitable to the welfare of human inhabitants 
has, to date, incorporated technical improvements to the housing stock, political and 
economic interventions, study of social and environmental implications, and 
epidemiological research. A coordinated solution to fuel poverty will require 
contributions from these perspectives and more. Whilst there is by no means any 
requirement that disciplinary boundaries be strictly observed, for the purposes of this 
work, the decision has been made to focus on what is primarily the consideration of 
fuel poverty as a problem of social policy. This section provides a justification for that 
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approach. In the first instance, an overview of the core concerns of social policy is 
offered. The manner in which fuel poverty fits into such a conceptualisation – and the 
implications of the approach – are then discussed. 
 
3.1.1 The Remit of Social Policy 
 
There is no single agreed interpretation as to the remit of social policy, though there 
does tend to be a fair degree of accepted flexibility with regard to boundaries (see, for 
example, the different interpretations offered by Marshall, Bottomore 1992, Becker, 
Bryman 2004, Alcock 2008, Dean 2012). The establishment of social policy as a 
defined field of academic study is generally attributed to Professor Richard Titmuss, 
who discussed conflicting definitions in an essay originally published in 1974 
(Titmuss 2008). Titmuss observes that whilst perceptions of the purpose of social 
policy are influenced by political and ideological expectations, definitions tend to 
include three values-driven objectives; that social policies should provide welfare to 
citizens, that they should be based on both economic and non-economic objectives, 
and that they should involve an element of progressive redistribution towards those on 
low incomes (2008: 144). For the purposes of this discussion, social policy is 
considered according to the general consensus drawn by those scholars cited above, 
who broadly agree that social policy is the study of policies that promote social 
welfare. Furthermore, social policy fulfils Dean’s description of a field of study that is 
necessarily interdisciplinary and pragmatic (2012: 5). There are numerous 
comparatively uncontentious definitions of ‘policy’; Jenkins, by way of example, 
defines a policy as “a set of interrelated decisions taken by a political actor or group 
of actors concerning the selection of goals and means of achieving them within a 
specified situation where these decisions should, in principle, be within the power of 
these actors to achieve” (1978: 5) . However, the notion of what it is to promote social 
welfare – particularly when this is extended to consideration of how that is best 
achieved – is more subjective and potentially ideologically driven, thus creating 
further definitional difficulties whilst also driving much of the academic debate that 
takes place within the field.  
 
A core element of this discussion – and a fundamental concern of social policy – is 
that of the appropriate role, responsibilities and limits of the state in addressing 
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problems of welfare via policy interventions. Perhaps the most prominent 
manifestation of this is in social policy’s continued focus upon the workings of the 
welfare state, the system of government policies that in the UK that were originally 
created in response to the Beveridge Report (1942), which identified five ‘Giant 
Evils’ in society – want, disease, ignorance, squalor, idleness – and proposed a role 
for the state in addressing these. The result was what has been called the Keynesian 
Welfare National State (Jessop 2000), a programme of state intervention that sought 
to create a system of social protection whilst also providing a means of managing the 
economy via fiscal measures. It is generally agreed that recent decades have brought a 
paradigmatic shift away from this form of welfare state towards a ‘competition state’ 
(see Evans, Cerny 2003, see, Hudson, Lowe 2009: 41-65 for an overview). The 
‘winter of discontent’ of 1978-79 under Labour Prime Minister James Callaghan saw 
trade union strikes that immobilised many public services. Subsequently, the 1979 
general election took Margaret Thatcher’s Conservatives to power, bringing a 
doctrine of neoliberal monetarist policy and commitment to ‘rolling back the state’. 
This amounts to what Jessop (1999, 2000) christened the Schumpeterian Workfare 
Post-National Regime, in which state intervention is viewed as inefficient and the role 
of markets is greatly increased, with social policies made subordinate to economic 
policy. That approach that was aggressively introduced by Thatcher continued by 
New Labour (see Cerny, Evans 2004) and is pursued with renewed vigour by the 
current coalition government, as has already been touched upon in the previous 
chapter. This paradigmatic shift is one of the core current topics not only of social 
policy, but also of political economy, and is deeply entrenched in ideological beliefs. 
The broader political and economic context cannot be disregarded in considering the 
role of the market in the delivery of fuel poverty policy. 
 
3.1.2 Fuel Poverty in a Social Policy Context 
 
The potential for living in fuel poverty to be detrimental to welfare was discussed in 
the previous chapter, with risks of negative impacts to health and wellbeing. Poverty 
alleviation is a common focus of social policy research given the widely established 
negative impacts on welfare  (see Lister 2004, Alcock 2006, Ridge, Wright & Social 
2008) . Fuel poverty can be seen as a manifestation or cause of at least three of 
Beveridge’s Giant Evils; squalor, want and disease. Access to quality housing has 
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also historically been a concern of social policy (see Lund 2011). UK lawmakers have 
already acknowledged that policy action is necessary to tackle fuel poverty, most 
prominently by passing WHECA28. This recognised that, as Bradshaw and Hutton 
(1983) argued seventeen years earlier, fuel poor households may be unable or 
otherwise reluctant to invest in energy efficiency, and that governments need to 
engage in the sort of redistribution referred to by Titmuss (2008). However, as is 
discussed in Chapter Four, the limits of this responsibility remain unclear. 
 
Fuel poverty, therefore, can be taken as a social policy problem in the sense that it is a 
social welfare issue that policies seek to tackle. There is a strong precedent for such a 
treatment. In one of the earliest academic treatments of fuel poverty, Bradshaw and 
Hutton argue that, “until everyone lives in adequately insulated, efficiently heated 
homes, conservation measures must be given priority as a social policy” [emphasis in 
the original] (1983: 264) and register that at that time there was disconnection 
between energy policy and social policy. Boardman’s (1991) treatment of the subject 
was, to some extent, a policy approach (as was her 2010 work), and it was a social 
policy academic – John Hills – who was selected to lead the 2011 review of the fuel 
poverty definition. Hills identified three perspectives from which fuel poverty is a 
concern– poverty, health and social wellbeing, and environmental (Hills 2011: 812). 
The literature review undertaken for this work (some of which has already been 
reported) found that the latter two perspectives tend to dominate; there is a significant 
body of work considering the health implications of fuel poverty, and a smaller 
subsidiary body looking at social wellbeing. A separate area of research considers 
environmental policies, and some of those authors have also addressed the 
distributional impacts of policies (this is considered in Chapter Six). There is also a 
small but focused literature that considers the targeting of fuel poverty policies, 
including work measuring local incidence of fuel poverty, which is discussed in 
Chapter Five. However, little academic literature has been found examining fuel 
poverty from a policy analysis perspective, certainly in recent years. This thesis seeks 
to fill that gap in taking a core concern of social policy identified previously – the role 
                                                
28 Boardman (1991: 223) further argues that fuel poverty contravenes Article 25(1) of The Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights, which states that, “everyone has the right to a standard of living 
adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family” 
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of the state in delivering policies that seek to improve welfare – and applying that 
perspective specifically to fuel poverty.  
 
This approach has implications for the scope of the work; the focus of analysis is the 
broad effects of multiple policies at the macro-level. The research design accordingly, 
is based primarily upon analysis of official documents and nationally representative 
quantitative data. This work tends away from being overtly theoretical, as a more 
pragmatic method befits both the approach of policy analysis and the comparatively 
unexplored (from that perspective) nature of the topic. However, some useful 
concepts are applied relating to the study of institutions, as befits the level of enquiry, 
e.g., Marsh and Rhodes (1992b) on policy networks, and Pierson (2000) on path 
dependency. 
 
3.2 Research Scope 
 
This work responds to an expansive research question, and it has been necessary to 
more closely define the scope of the inquiry in order that a satisfactory response can 
be provided within the limitations of a thesis. This section first outlines the aim and 
objectives of this work, and explains the underlying rationale for these. Then, the 
main limitations applied to the scope of the research are discussed, and the choices 
made in this respect justified. 
 
3.2.1 Aim and Objectives 
 
The research reported here was supported by an Industrial Co-operative Award in 
Science and Engineering (CASE), co-funded by the Engineering and Physical Science 
Research Council (EPSRC) and E.ON UK, one of the largest six energy suppliers in 
the United Kingdom. The work responds to the overarching research question, ‘What 
role is appropriate to the energy supplier in alleviating fuel poverty?’ The broad 
question was devised by E.ON UK, alongside the supervisory team at Loughborough 
University29. E.ON UK had recognised that their role, in common with other energy 
                                                
29 A member of staff from E.ON UK attended project meetings regularly and offered guidance and 
support (e.g., with regard to access issues), but did not seek to influence or repress findings in any 
respect. 
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suppliers, was evolving with regards to fuel poverty and a previous project – 
Challenge 100 – undertaken in partnership with Loughborough University had 
focused on this at the implementation level. In the Challenge 100 project, E.ON UK 
sought, via a range of interventions, to eradicate fuel poverty for 102 households (see 
E.ON UK 2010). The project involved a range of stakeholders and one of the goals 
was to establish what role E.ON UK, as an energy supplier, could best play in fuel 
poverty alleviation projects on the ground. The follow-up research reported here 
looked to examine the same broad research question but from a policy analysis angle. 
Some of the more academic reasons for such an approach have already been 
discussed. From a more pragmatic perspective, the work coincided with major 
changes to fuel poverty policy made by the coalition government, elected five months 
before research began. As such, the timing of the project was apposite for a critical 
analysis of emergent policy strategies. This question is by no means new, with two of 
the earliest academic considerations of fuel poverty highlighting the need for the role 
of energy suppliers to be clarified (Bradshaw 1983, Boardman 1991: 163). However, 
whilst the shape of the industry has changed substantially since those works were 
published, but the issue remains unresolved. 
 
Ultimate responsibility for fuel poverty mitigation falls to government, as it holds 
ultimate responsibility for ensuring WHECA is fulfilled. However, government is also 
able to define, via policy, how it chooses to meet this obligation. It is here that 
suppliers may play a role, as government is empowered to obligate suppliers to 
promote energy efficiency (a capability first granted under section 41 of the 
Electricity Act 1989), and to levy fines for non-compliance of up to ten per cent of 
global turnover (see Utilities Act 2000, s. 59; s. 95). To date, two clear groups of 
national-level fuel poverty policies can be identified, as already discussed in section 
2.2.2. Hill and Bramley (1986: 103-105) describe models of state and market division 
of policy delivery along a continuum, which serves as a helpful descriptive tool. The 
first group of policies, classed here as ‘state-led’, are those where the state is either at 
the far end of that continuum as sole delivery agent (as is the case for CWPs and 
WFPs), or engages in what Hill and Bramley describe as “state purchase of packaged 
services” (1986: 104) , e.g. the model used for Warm Front whereby government 
decided which households were eligible and what level of support should be given, 
and then simply procured that provision from private companies. The second group, 
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described here as ‘supplier-led’ fall nearer the other end of the continuum, meeting 
Hill and Bramley’s classification of “state as regulator,” a scenario whereby, “the 
relationship is legalistic rather than financial” (1986: 105). As will be discussed in 
section 7.1.2, there are some unusual elements to the particular form of supplier 
obligations, notably their ability to trade obligations, and that the obligations are in an 
industry that is separate to, even in conflict with, their primary activity. However, Hill 
and Bramley’s descriptors are otherwise fitting. Effectively, supplier obligations are a 
policy instrument that government use as a means of transferring their legal 
obligations towards fuel poverty eradication. As shown in Figure 2.6, both economic 
and technical measures have been delivered under each model, and in recent years 
there has been a clear shift towards supplier obligations, as articulated in the 2010 
Spending Review; “DECC will develop innovative ways of working with the private 
sector, acting as an enabler rather than the default provider.” (HM Treasury 2010b: 
62) . 
 
In the context of this shift, the decision was made to interpret the overarching research 
question as considering the appropriate role of the energy supplier by comparison to 
that of the default agents of responsibility, the state. A comparative research design 
was therefore selected, comparing energy supplier and state delivery of policy with a 
view to establishing which is more appropriate to the legislative goals of WHECA. As 
such, the aim of this work is to compare energy supplier and central government 
delivery of fuel poverty alleviation policies. In summary, this research critically 
evaluates current fuel poverty policy with a view to establishing whether a supplier-
led approach is likely to be more or less effective than a state-led approach in 
reducing LIHC fuel poverty30. Figure 3.1 shows, in matrix form, where both the state 
and suppliers have delivered technical and economic schemes and – accordingly – the 
main sources of comparison explored.  
  
                                                
30 The Hills Fuel Poverty Review, which took place alongside this work, also applied a comparative 
approach in some of the analysis undertaken of policy options (see Hills 2012). 
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• Carbon Emissions Reduction Target 
• Community Energy Saving 
Programme 
• Energy Efficiency Commitment 
• Energy Efficiency Standards of 
Performance 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Matrix illustrating state and supplier delivery of technical and economic programmes 
 
Achievement of this broad aim is supported by four more defined research objectives. 
The first objective is to determine and describe the processes by which energy 
suppliers and central government deliver fuel poverty alleviation policies. Policy 
delivery is a complex endeavour, and it is a necessary first step to establish how this is 
designed for the schemes under consideration. The second objective is to identify 
where and why structural differences exist between energy supplier and central 
government delivery of policies. Having mapped out policy processes, the next step 
in assessing the comparative efficacy of two different delivery agents is in identifying 
differences that are likely to have an impact, and understanding the reasons for these. 
The third objective is to evaluate the likely impact of differences upon the level of 
fuel poverty mitigation achieved by policies. Having established where and why 
policy approaches differ between agents, the next step is to consider the relationships 
that exist between those areas of difference and fuel poverty eradication. The fourth 
objective is to explore the political and environmental drivers and implications of 
delivery agent choice. As already discussed, fuel poverty policy does not exist in a 
vacuum. Whilst fuel poverty eradication is the main focus of this investigation, it is 
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also valuable – and in some instances necessary - to reflect upon the ways in which 
political and environmental priorities interact with delivery agent choice. 
 
In summary this research responds to the following research question, aim, and 
objectives: 
 
Research Question: 
• What role is appropriate to the energy supplier in alleviating fuel poverty? 
 
Aim: 
• To compare energy supplier and central government delivery of fuel poverty 
alleviation policies. 
 
Objectives: 
 
• Determine and describe the processes by which energy suppliers and central 
government deliver fuel poverty alleviation policies. 
• Identify where and why structural differences exist between energy supplier 
and central government delivery of policies. 
• Evaluate the likely impact of differences upon the level of fuel poverty 
mitigation achieved by policies. 
• Explore the political and environmental drivers and implications of delivery 
agent choice. 
 
 
One important decision made in framing the overarching research question was the 
choice between referring to the “eradication” or the “alleviation” of fuel poverty. This 
decision was not made lightly, and the wording was not finalised until late in the 
research process. WHECA, crucially, refers to eradication of fuel poverty (“as far as 
[is] reasonably practicable”) (s.2). However, as will be discussed in section 4.3.1, that 
target was undermined – arguably fatally – by a 2008 judicial review. More recent re-
evaluation of policy has seen the government explicitly rejecting eradication as a goal 
of policy (see DECC 2013j: 12-13), effectively framing the target as one of 
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alleviation. In such a context, the choice to use “alleviation” in both the overarching 
research question – and, by extension, the thesis title – might be read by those fighting 
to keep the focus firmly on eradication as an acceptance of that downgraded ambition. 
It should be made clear, then, that the choice is intended, firstly, to emphasise that 
government have effectively abandoned a legally binding policy commitment. 
Secondly, the title wording reflects the ultimate conclusion of this work: that, 
considering specifically the role of the energy company, any policy programme in 
which suppliers are required to take a leading role is unlikely to result in the 
eradication of fuel poverty for at least another generation. The choice, then, should be 
read not as an acceptance, but as a reflection of the government’s increasingly limited 
commitment to fuel poverty policy, as detailed throughout this thesis. 
 
3.2.2 Defined Limitations 
 
As in all research, certain limitations to the scope of this work are inevitable, detailed 
below. 
• Timescale 
 
This work was been undertaken during a time when English fuel poverty policy has 
been undergoing substantial revision. Table 3.1 presents a timetable of policy changes 
that have occurred, and their proximity to the main research period of this work. 
 
Table 3.1: Policy changes occurring over the main research period, October 2010- October 2013 
 
Date Event 
2010 May UK General Election, Coalition Government formed. 
October Commencement of research. 
Publication of Spending Review confirms Green Deal, re-evaluation of fuel 
poverty definition. 
2011 March Hills Fuel Poverty Review commences. 
April Launch of WHDS. 
November Hills Fuel Poverty Review Interim Report published. 
Government consultation on the Green Deal and ECO opens. 
2012 March Hills Fuel Poverty Review Final Report published.  
June Government response to consultation on Green Deal and ECO published.  
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September Consultation on changes to fuel poverty definition opens. 
2013 January Warm Front, the national Exchequer-funded energy scheme targeted at low 
income households, closes. 
Launch of Green Deal and ECO. 
May Fuel poverty statistics methodology published reflecting Hills Review definition. 
July Preliminary revisions to Government framework for tacking fuel poverty in 
England published. (DECC 2013j, DECC 2013k) 
Government response to consultation on changes to fuel poverty definition 
published, with the LIHC definition adopted subject to minor adjustments. 
August Further revisions to the fuel poverty methodology published.  
September Labour Party Leader Ed Miliband announces at Party Annual Conference that, if 
elected, Labour would freeze energy prices till 2017.  
October Conclusion of data collection period. 
Based on compilation of sources: (HM Treasury 2010b, Hills 2011, DECC 2011i, Hills 2012, DECC 
2012j, DECC 2012i, The Warm Front Team 2013, DECC 2013i, DECC 2013j, DECC 2013k, DECC 
2013l, DECC 2013h, Miliband 2013) 
Note: Unshaded cells relate to the policy process or other external event; grey shaded cells relate to 
the research process. 
 
As Table 3.1 demonstrates, this project has taken place against a background of 
significant change, with a mixed impact. Some elements – such as the changing of the 
official definition of fuel poverty midway through the project and the introduction of 
major new policies – have presented substantial challenges in terms of producing 
work that will retain relevance into even the near future. However, in some respects 
the timing has been beneficial; with fuel poverty policy receiving renewed political 
attention, the relevance of this work has been reaffirmed, new data have been made 
available for consideration, and this thesis takes the opportunity to be amongst the 
first pieces of academic work to offer analysis of a fresh approach. Politics is a 
process, and current policies were being refined even during the writing up period 
(e.g., the consultation on the future of ECO launched in March 2014, see DECC 
2014f). The lengthy policy process was helpful in enabling new evidence to be 
considered on an ongoing basis, however, to make thesis completion feasible, a limit 
was imposed whereby only policy changes occurring within the core research period  
were included in analysis, i.e., through 30th September 2013. This restriction has also 
been broadly applied to literature considered, though some later publications have 
been included where particularly relevant.  
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• Policies Considered 
 
This research focuses upon those national-level English policies meeting the 
definition of ‘fuel poverty policy’ as discussed in section 2.2.231, active between 
January 2013, when ECO came into operation, and September 2013, when data 
collection concluded. This incorporates all major policies active at the end of the core 
research period, as already detailed in Table 2.3, making the work somewhat unusual 
in considering both economic and technical measures (Note that ECO CERO will be 
excluded from the majority of analysis, as it is not targeted at low income 
households)32. However, consideration of earlier policies is integrated where it can 
add value to the comparison being made. Most prominently, the now-defunct Warm 
Front remains the only state-led energy efficiency scheme, and so is taken as a basis 
for comparison.  Due to practical limitations, consideration is limited to technical and 
economic interventions, as described in section 2.2.2. This means that programmes 
such as Fuel Direct, schemes looking to change energy consumption behaviour, and 
the impact of building regulations are not considered. Whilst the Decent Homes 
Standard remains active, as a Local Authority programme, it will not be evaluated, 
only used as evidence where appropriate. The same applies to the Voluntary 
Agreement, which has now concluded but was the clear predecessor of WHDS 
(though the potential of social tariffs is considered in detail in section 7.2.3). Energy 
efficiency measures considered are limited to those provided under these policies (see 
Ofgem 2014e), with a resultant focus upon thermal retrofit33 and heating system 
upgrades as opposed to more advanced measures or appliance replacement.  
 
• Geographic Boundaries 
 
The United Kingdom is currently the only country in which the government has a 
legal obligation to tackle fuel poverty. The UK is a sovereign state made up of three 
legal jurisdictions; England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. The 
                                                
31 I.e., as policies seeking “to support low income households in a manner specifically related to the 
reduction of energy costs.” 
32 The combination of policies considered in this research is validated by the fact that other researchers 
have generally identified the same group, e.g., Hills (2012: 16), Jansz and Guertler (2012). 
33 Retrofit is particularly important in the UK given that an estimated two-thirds of the 2050 housing 
stock is already standing (see Boardman et al. 2005: 5). 
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geographical extent of WHECA is limited to England and Wales, though Wales has its 
own legislature that has some degree of jurisdiction over delivery. Some suppliers and 
policies are active across the United Kingdom, but there remains some variation, 
particularly with regard to Northern Ireland. Furthermore, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland have not yet adopted the LIHC definition of fuel poverty34. Accordingly, for 
the purposes of this work, Scotland and Northern Ireland are excluded from 
consideration. Furthermore, Wales has been excluded for practical reasons; the data 
used for the quantitative element of this research, the English Housing Survey (DCLG 
2013c) relates, as the name suggests, only to the English housing stock, and no similar 
accessible dataset exists for Wales (or, for that matter, Scotland or Northern Ireland). 
With this in mind, this work should be taken as applicable only to England. However, 
given the economic, political and geographical similarities between the countries as 
well as the correspondences in policy approaches applied, the findings of this research 
are likely to have some bearing beyond England; the extent to which they can be 
generalised are discussed in the concluding chapter. 
 
• Institutional Structure 
 
For the purpose of this research, it is assumed that the institutional structure (as laid 
out in section 2.4) will remain broadly unchanged, i.e., it is assumed that the same 
actors will remain in place, with no substantial changes to the system described thus 
far (such as the renationalisation of domestic energy supply) or the broad roles of 
actors described previously.  
 
• Characterisation of Energy Suppliers 
 
As this work evaluates supplier obligations, it follows that only obligated suppliers35 
should be considered. Suppliers are obligated to deliver ECO and WHDS if they have 
                                                
34 Historically, the devolved administrations have used the basis of the 10pct definition, but have 
operationalised it differently, or selected different targets (see Scottish Executive 2002, DSDNI 2004, 
WAG 2010). 
35 Under CESP, all electricity generators, whether or not they were also suppliers, were subject to a 
delivery obligation, (Ofgem 2009: 2). However, generators are not obligated under ECO and are not a 
focus of this work. 
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over 250,000 customer accounts36. Currently, the only obligated suppliers are the Big 
Six and – under ECO – one much smaller company, First Utility (see Ofgem 
2013c)37. Whilst exact customer numbers appear not to have been published, First 
Utility’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO) reported in October 2013 that the firm then 
had 200,000 accounts (see Cave 2013), comprising less than 1% of the energy market 
(making them approximately 10% the size of the next largest firms, see Ofgem 
2013a). Furthermore, a number of other smaller suppliers have opted in to delivery of 
WHDS (see UK Government 2014d). Obligation levels are informed by company 
size, and so smaller suppliers should not bear a larger burden. Whilst the findings of 
this work may apply to suppliers regardless of size, the natural focus is upon the Big 
Six companies that account for 98% of delivery, and specific implications for smaller 
companies are not considered. This research treats energy suppliers as homogenous. 
In practice, this is not accurate; organisational cultures and the influence of 
individuals (particularly those in high-ranking positions) will influence the character 
of any company (see Handy 1993, Schein 2004). Understanding the way in which 
firms behave is the subject of an enormous body of academic work (for example, 
Winter, Williamson 1991, Putterman, Kroszner 1996), however, mapping out inter-
firm differences is beyond the scope of this work. In terms of the motivation of firms, 
this thesis adopts the “theory of the firm” in its simplest form; the assumption, rooted 
in neoclassical economics, that the ultimate motivation of private companies is the 
optimisation of profit (for a more advanced discussion, see Spulber 2012). For the 
purpose of this thesis, only obligated activity is evaluated, though other activity, 
including that undertaken under the auspices of Corporate Social Responsibility, is 
considered as evidence where appropriate. 
 
• Characterisation of the State 
 
Catherine Mitchell (2013) has written of “the inevitability of politics in energy policy 
decisions”; the political character of the state undoubtedly has an impact on the shape 
of political commitment to fuel poverty eradication and the favoured means of 
                                                
36 For ECO, “licensed gas and electricity suppliers that have 250,000 domestic customers or more, and 
supply more than 400 gigawatt hours of electricity or 2,000 gigawatt hours of gas to domestic 
customers, in any relevant year.” (Ofgem 2013: 17). 
37 Presumably First Utility is only obligated under ECO because their customer base was not yet at 
250,000 when WHDS launched eighteen months prior. 
 68 
effecting change, including the role of the supplier. As with suppliers, the internal 
machinations of government are hard to access (a second theme of Mitchell’s article), 
and again, there is a considerable literature dedicated to this subject (Easton 1981, 
Hill, Ham 1997, Müller, Strøm 1999, Stone 2002, Sabatier 2007). Some level of 
transparency is ingrained in the UK political process via public debates on legislation, 
committee hearings and consultations around new policies, all of which are 
considered in this work. However, inevitably, some decisions are made behind closed 
doors. It is difficult to assess precisely, for example, exactly the extent to which the 
government prioritises fuel poverty in comparison to carbon reduction mitigation. 
Whilst the existence of international carbon reduction targets under the Kyoto 
agreement might indicate that that this is likely to be the higher priority, it is not clear 
how this preference might be manifested in policy. An underlying theme of this 
analysis is consideration of the level of governmental ambition, particularly given 
competing priorities. While any attempt to fully interrogate the ranking of 
governmental policy priorities is beyond the scope of this work, it would be remiss to 
exclude the priorities of government from analysis entirely; the manner in which this 
is done will be discussed shortly. 
 
3.3 Policy Analysis Framework 
 
William N. Dunn describes policy analysis as: 
 
…a process of multidisciplinary enquiry aiming at the creation, critical 
assessment, and communication of policy relevant information… draw[ing] 
on social science methods, theories and substantive findings to solve practical 
problems. 
Dunn (2012: 2) 
 
Dunn further represents policy analysis to be “methodologically eclectic”, 
characterising the approach as pragmatic, and open to consideration of any source of 
reliable knowledge as informing assessment (Dunn 2012: 3-4). This depiction agrees 
with the approach of this work, which looks to apply policy analysis techniques as a 
means of considering responses to a complex problem to which no single 
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‘experiment’ or method could provide a satisfactory answer and in which data were 
often inaccessible. 
 
For the purposes of this work, the six-step policy analysis framework proposed by 
Patton and Sawicki (1993) has been applied as the primary analytical structure, 
however, other policy analysis techniques have been used alongside this, most 
prominently Dunn’s (2012) classification of policy constraints, This section first 
justifies the selection of Patton and Sawicki’s policy analysis framework over the 
other options available, and gives an overview of its structure. The remainder of the 
section discusses in turn each of the applicable ‘steps’ of that framework, and how 
they are used in the context of this research. 
 
3.3.1 Patton and Sawicki’s Policy Analysis Framework 
 
A substantial literature considers the process of policy analysis, with numerous 
analytical frameworks proposed by different authors. At the most basic and consistent 
level, such frameworks identify key elements of the policy process as a means of 
guiding analysis. Most tend towards the pragmatic, as befits the study of policy as a 
real-world activity. The value of both quantitative and qualitative methodologies as 
tools of analysis is also generally accepted. Indeed, as might be expected given the 
common topic of study, there tends to be significant overlap in the frameworks 
proposed, and many authors acknowledge the influences of others. However, there are 
also substantial differences between frameworks in terms of complexity (e.g., the 
extent to which methods are encompassed), in emphasis, (e.g., whether they are 
intended for use by academics or practitioners), and in scope (e.g., the scale of 
consideration). In selecting a policy analysis framework to be used, a thorough review 
of literature was undertaken and many options considered, including those 
frameworks proposed by Sabatier (2007), Dunn (2012), Hogwood and Gunn (1984), 
Hill (2009), and Bardach (2011). It was necessary that the selected framework be 
suited to the pre-established aims of this work, particularly in that analysis was to be 
undertaken at the national-level, that the focus was to be a comparison of state and 
supplier-led policies, and that the analysis was to combine consideration of 
prospective policies with evidence from retrospective evaluation; whilst policies such 
as ECO and WHDS are new, evaluation of previous supplier obligations offer a 
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means of assessing impact. The six-step policy analysis framework proposed by 
Patton and Sawicki (1993) was selected from the review as most effectively meeting 
these criteria; Figure 3.2 below gives an overview of the framework. 
 
 
Adapted from Patton and Sawicki (1993: 53). 
Note: Dotted lines are used to indicate iterative nature of the policy analysis process, as approaches are 
constantly re-evaluated (this research itself being an example of that). 
 
Figure 3.2: Patton and Sawicki’s (1993) Six-Step Policy Analysis Framework 
 
Compared to some other frameworks reviewed, Patton and Sawicki’s model is 
undeniably minimalist, something the authors themselves recognise in referring to it a 
“basic” model (1993: 53)38. However, in the context of this work that simplicity is 
taken as an asset. A simpler framework enables greater flexibility in application, as 
less adjustment is required to meet policy-specific needs. Patton and Sawicki suggest 
their framework as one upon which diverse approaches can be projected: “we expect 
people who read this book to devise their personal versions of the policy analysis 
process” (1993: 53). Such a potential is particularly valuable in this work where, as 
will be explained shortly, the policy process is broken down and stages analysed 
individually via differing methodologies. A model with too many moving parts would 
                                                
38 That said, based on review of frameworks undertaken for this work, their approach is no more 
“basic” than many others reviewed, including more academically-focused texts; that characterisation is 
perhaps more tied to the pragmatic framing of their work, as a guide aimed at practitioners. 
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be less amenable to such an approach. More generally, Bardach (2011) emphasises 
simplicity as a virtue in policy analysis given that the effective application of research 
generally requires that results can be effectively communicated to policymakers, who 
are often both time poor and non-specialists.  
 
Patton and Sawicki's model is also a rationalist one, conceptualising the policy 
process as almost mechanical in nature: a problem is identified, solutions established, 
progress measured. Alternate conceptions of the policy analysis, heavily influenced 
by post-structuralism (and in particular the work of Michel Foucault), have focused 
on interrogating the process by which problems are represented by government, and 
the implications of power dynamics (see, for example, Rose, Miller 2010, Bacchi 
2009). Whilst such an approaches undoubtedly offer an important perspective (and 
have been used to analyse fuel poverty policy previously, see Powells 2009) a 
rationalist perspective is viewed as more appropriate to this thesis, which is largely 
concerned with critiquing the manner in which programmes have been enacted rather 
than the formation of the problem itself. 
 
The remainder of this section explains how the framework has been applied in the 
analysis undertaken here. Please note that the first step (‘verify, define and detail the 
problem’) has been subsumed into discussion of the second step (‘establish evaluation 
criteria’) given that significant discussion of the fuel poverty definition has already 
been undertaken in the previous chapter. Furthermore, the sixth step (‘monitor the 
implemented policy’) is excluded as extraneous to the work undertaken here, though 
outputs from the monitoring of previous policies are included as a means of analysis. 
 
3.3.2 Establishing Evaluation Criteria 
 
Policy analysis literature tends to discern between the descriptive elements of analysis 
– those that consider the form and consequences of how policy is – and the 
prescriptive elements – those that make recommendations about how policy should be 
(see Patton, Sawicki 1993: 23-24, Dunn 2012: 4). This analysis tends towards the 
former, taking as a starting point the normative assertion of WHECA, to which fuel 
poverty policies respond, that the government have a duty to facilitate fuel poverty 
eradication. In line with the overarching research question, fuel poverty prevalence is 
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taken as the primary metric by which policy alternatives will be evaluated. As already 
established, the definition applied will be that used by DECC for monitoring purposes 
as operationalised from August 2013 (see DECC 2013i, DECC 2013h). 
 
However, the change in the fuel poverty definition does present some difficulties in 
establishing evaluation criteria. Under the 10pct definition, progress towards 
eradication was weighed against a fixed threshold. Under the LIHC definition, 
thresholds will shift in line with changes in income levels and in energy costs, 
including where the latter are lowered due to increased energy efficiency. Thus 
eradication is inherently more difficult (though not impossible) under the LIHC 
definition; as national energy efficiency increases, the threshold for ‘high costs’ will 
move upwards, pushing more households into fuel poverty (see Whitham 2012 on the 
use of median thresholds). By extension, in order for fuel poverty levels to drop, fuel 
poor households would need to be the relative beneficiaries of policies; if all 
households benefited equally from a policy, fuel poverty levels would remain the 
same. Eradication of LIHC fuel poverty would require either that no household be of 
a relatively low income, that no household pay relatively high costs, or (most 
feasibly) that no low income household pay relatively high costs. Furthermore, such a 
condition would have to be maintained even as the ‘high costs’ threshold rose in 
response to improvements made. Hills acknowledged in his review that his proposed 
definition “makes literal eradication of fuel poverty extremely challenging (though 
not theoretically impossible)” (Hills 2012: 68). The eradication target could, then, be 
maintained, though achieving this by 2016 is now beyond the realms of possibility 
under either definition (Hills 2012: 176). At time of writing, the fuel poverty target 
was being re-evaluated, with DECC contemplating a move to minimum or average 
standards for fuel poor households: 
 
We therefore propose focusing our efforts primarily on ensuring that those 
households who are fuel poor (as defined by the LIHC indicator) attain a 
certain standard of energy efficiency in their homes. Progress could be 
measured against an average or minimum standard of energy efficiency for 
fuel poor households. 
(DECC 2013j: 13) 
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Further speculation on the form of any future target is beyond the scope of this work. 
Evaluation therefore focuses on the comparative impact of policies on the level of fuel 
poverty, and on the fuel poverty gap.  However, in recognition of the need for policies 
to favour fuel poor households in order for progress to be made, equity weighting (see 
HM Treasury 2011: 91-94) is used to highlight distributional impacts of policies, and 
the impact across the fuel poverty gap distribution is also used as a measure. Where 
possible, assessment of policy impact on fuel poverty prevalence is quantitative. 
However, as will be established, in some respects the opportunity to do this is limited 
(particularly with regards to energy efficiency measures), and so qualitative 
assessments are also given. 
 
As discussed previously, the operationalisation of the fuel poverty definition as 
applied by government (and within this work) is subject to three main limitations; 
energy price modelling might not register where fuel poor households are on more 
expensive tariffs39; low income households might systematically underuse energy; 
and some vulnerable households may need to use more than is assumed in modelling. 
In recognition of these, where applicable, the work will reflects upon the implications, 
of these assumptions being violated. 
 
It is undeniable that a large element of policy choice is ideological. Whilst this 
research tends away from normative judgements, it is helpful to consider some of the 
criteria by which policymakers select an approach. The previous chapter included a 
discussion of some of the political priorities of the current coalition government. The 
choice to require greater supplier involvement in fuel poverty alleviation would 
inherently be in line with current governmental support for market delivery of welfare 
functions. This work seeks to evaluate the likely impact of policy choice upon the 
public purse, with its implications for the size of the deficit and tax levels. This 
information is of interest to policymakers across the political spectrum (the austerity-
driven perspective of the current government having already been recorded). 
However, proponents of fiscal policy are not in favour of spending for spending’s 
sake; the underlying principle behind Keynesian economics is that increased 
                                                
39 Use of the LIHC definition has resulted in there being less consideration of factors that influence 
broader price trends, such as those influenced by Electricity Market Reform (see DECC 2012a), than 
might have been appropriate in work considering the 10pct definition. 
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government expenditure can stimulate economic growth. Accordingly, this work also 
reflects on the broader economic implications of policy choice, e.g., for employment 
and growth. 
 
Section 2.3.1 noted tensions between environmental objectives and fuel poverty 
reduction. Advanced modelling of the implications of policies for greenhouse gas 
emissions is beyond the scope of this work, though evidence from other studies is 
included as available and appropriate. Given these limitations, for the purposes of this 
work it is assumed that the policies under consideration prioritise fuel poverty 
reduction. However, as a broad consideration of environmental impact, the risk of 
policies violating the ‘polluter pays’ principle is considered. This is a general 
principle of international environmental law that requires that those creating negative 
externalities (such as pollution) pay, proportionately, the resultant costs (see OECD 
1972). In considering policies designed to promote energy affordability, there exists 
the potential that, for example, reducing the unit price of fuel for certain households 
might violate this principle, incentivising greater consumption; evaluation of this risk 
will be incorporated.  
 
In summary, evaluation criteria applied are as follows: 
 
Primary: 
• Impact on fuel poverty levels (by numbers of households and individuals). 
• Impact on fuel poverty gap (average and aggregate). 
 
Secondary 
• Distributional impacts of policies. 
• Potential repercussions where actual energy use and prices do not comply 
with modelled assumptions. 
• Likely costs of policies to the public purse and broader economic implications 
(e.g., for employment and growth). 
• Identification of possible tensions with environmental goals (e.g., violation of 
the ‘polluter pays’ principle). 
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Other evaluation criteria were considered, and would have been equally valid and 
worthwhile as means of evaluating policies. For example, social justice, 
environmental justice, or human rights perspectives could have guided alternate ways 
of framing criteria. Achievement of environmental goals was strongly considered as a 
possible criterion, but – whilst considered to some extent within the secondary criteria 
– it was ultimately decided that the quantification necessary to include this effectively 
went beyond the scope of the project. The final evaluation criteria were selected after 
extensive consideration as best reflecting the aims, objectives and scale of the work. 
 
Results of evaluation are reported as appropriate throughout the thesis, and 
summarised in Chapter Eight, the discussion. 
 
3.3.3 Identifying Alternative Policies 
 
An account has already been given of the policies covered by this analysis. To clarify 
further, the direct comparisons made are as follows. With regards to economic 
interventions, the comparison is between a supplier obligated rebate scheme modelled 
after WHDS, and state benefit enhancements modelled after WFPs and CWPs. With 
regards to technical interventions, the comparison is between supplier obligations of 
the type currently exemplified by ECO CSCO and HHCRO, and a state scheme 
similar to the now defunct Warm Front scheme. However, given that no state 
technical scheme is currently in effect, further consideration is also given to the form 
a new state-led programme might take, given the more recent emphasis on market 
delivery of welfare policies. 
 
3.3.4 Evaluating Alternative Policies 
 
Fuel poverty is a complex policy problem, with alleviation involving multiple, 
interacting stages. No single research design can effectively respond to the 
overarching research question40. The analysis structure adopted is reflective of the 
purpose, with the process broken down into a number of distinct stages that are 
                                                
40 Brenda Boardman has discussed how her own doctoral consideration of fuel poverty at the state-level 
necessitated a similar structural approach; see Liddell 2012. 
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independently examined. In developing this structure, reference was initially made to 
the extensive body of literature relating to the policy implementation process (e.g., 
Hogwood, Gunn 1984, Hill 2009). Whilst, as might be expected, no existing account 
perfectly fits the policy process as it relates to fuel poverty, considering such theories 
alongside the existing literature base highlighted a number of distinct elements as 
worthy of particular focused consideration. These were used to define the structure 
applied in this thesis, illustrated in Figure 3.3. 
  
 
 
Figure 3.3: Fuel Poverty Policy Process 
 
Existing literature on fuel poverty reflects this emphasis, with state-level whole-
system analysis undertaken by Boardman and Hills acknowledging the importance of 
the elements identified here (see Boardman 1991, 2010, Hills 2011, 2012). Each of 
these elements are the focus of a chapter of this thesis; however, with a view to 
avoiding reductionism, findings are then brought together in the final chapter of the 
thesis, which then offers a unified conclusion 
 
Within each set of analysis, the procedure followed was guided by the established 
objectives. First the processes undertaken were mapped out, considering both state 
and supplier delivery of technical and economic policies. Those processes were then 
examined to establish where differences existed, and – as far as possible - the reasons 
for variation. The focus of this work is on major differences between delivery 
processes, which occur as a result of the nature of the delivery agent41 42. One novel 
                                                
41 Chapter Four, ‘Establishing Responsibilities’ is somewhat different in scope, as it considers an 
element of the process in which suppliers and the state play an inherently different role. Nevertheless, it 
is framed as a comparison; more details of the analytical approach and distinct methodology applied 
are included in that chapter.  
 77 
feature of the analytical process used in this work is the application of the concept of 
policy constraints as a comparative tool. Dunn describes policy constraints as 
“limitations and obstacles that stand in the way of achieving policy and program 
objectives” (see 2012: 226). Majone (1974) considers the identification of such 
constraints as “a crucial step of policy analysis” and argues that one of the key 
contributions social scientists can make to the policy process is “pointing out all the 
constraints (economic, sociological, organisational, etc.) which effectively limit the 
set of feasible alternatives.” Such an approach is valuable in the type of comparative 
analysis applied here, as a key objective is to map out the differences faced by 
delivery agents, and establish how they will impact upon outcomes. To this end, 
Dunn’s classification of policy constraints (see 2012: 226-227) was found to be 
valuable both as a descriptive tool, and in guiding analysis43. Table 3.2 describes 
Dunn’s policy constraints model as applied in this work. 
 
Table 3.2: Dunn’s (2012) categories of policy constraint 
 
Category Description 
Technological Dunn termed these ‘physical’ constraints, however, ‘technological’ would seem 
more appropriate to this context. These are limitations subject to current state of 
knowledge or technology development. This constraint is less of a factor in this 
work, though fuel poverty itself is the result of the ongoing technological constraint 
of a low-quality housing stock that is currently difficult and costly to upgrade. 
Legal  Legal and regulatory constraints. In the scenario considered here, one of the agents, 
the state, do have some power to amend such requirements, though work begins 
from an assumption of no significant changes in that respect. 
Organisational  Organisational (and in this interpretation, institutional) structures may limit 
progress. 
Political Ideological perspectives, political objectives and competing priorities are likely to 
impact on policy activity. For the purposes of this work, constraints relating to 
environmental goals are generally also treated as political. 
Distributional Distributional constraints are largely disregarded here as a constraint type in itself, 
as fuel poverty reduction – which requires progressive distribution – is assumed as 
the objective of policy. 
                                                                                                                                      
42 In comparing processes, many differences were also noted which were minor in nature, which related 
to specific technical details or were otherwise clearly independent of delivery agent choice. Such 
differences are not the focus of this thesis, and are therefore not detailed here. 
43 Though the term ‘constraint’ is fairly widely used in policy analysis literature, Dunn’s classification 
of types of policy constraints is the only one of its type identified via the review undertaken here.   
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Economic Dunn termed these ‘budgetary’ constraints, as his classification implicitly assumed 
the public sector as delivering policies. However, ‘economic’ is more apt where 
suppliers are delivering policy, as their response is to profit margins. 
Adapted from Dunn (2012: 226-227). 
 
The strength of constraints is discussed when relevant, though no attempt at 
quantification is made. Whilst it is assumed that institutional structure remains 
constant, ways in which constraints might be circumvented are discussed, where they 
are apparent. 
 
To maintain complete objectivity is extremely difficult44, if not impossible, when 
carrying out social science research. As researchers we can try to mediate the impact 
of personal influence upon the final argument by reflecting upon our own perspective 
throughout the process. We must ensure that we draw conclusions from the evidence 
available, and seek to prevent personal political beliefs from clouding analysis. This is 
perhaps particularly difficult when researching a subject matter such as poverty, 
which is inherently political. The process of researching this thesis required a constant 
interrogation of assumptions on the part of the author so as to try to ensure that all 
policy options were weighed in as unprejudiced a manner as possible. In this respect, 
the notion of policy constraints offered an unexpected additional value, particularly as 
a means of assessing policies against the priorities of the coalition government in as 
objective a manner as possible. The three core ideological elements identified as 
guiding the broader undertaking of the coalition (see section 2.2.1) were established 
prior to analysis with extensive reference to the literature, and then applied as a sort of 
yardstick in analysis. This proved an effective means of gauging political constraints 
in a manner that was clearly focused and as apolitical as possible. That said, whilst 
researchers should strive to ground their arguments in evidence, it is important that 
we do we do not neglect our duty to effectively communicate findings, even where 
they have political implications. This is arguably a particular responsibility when 
researching a topic with consequences for human wellbeing. The concluding chapters 
of this research seek to maintain an effective balance in this respect; no judgement is 
made as to whether the neoliberal project is the best way forward for society overall, 
                                                
44 And, some would argue, not necessarily desirable (see Letherby, Scott and Williams 2012). 
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but the evidence evaluated in this thesis indicates that its ideological influence on 
policymaking serves as a barrier to fuel poverty eradication. 
 
Having identified any constraints, the next stage is to consider how these have causal 
relationships with the evaluation criteria. In respect to fuel poverty, the most obvious 
impact is where a factor has a clear impact on incomes or fuel costs. However, similar 
consideration is extended to the other evaluation criteria, e.g., in considering political 
implications, tensions with environmental objectives, costs to the public purse, etc. 
Where possible, a variety of methodological techniques are used to consider the 
impacts of constraints. 
 
3.3.5 Displaying and Distinguishing Amongst Alternative Policies 
 
As discussed above, the approach taken here considers elements of the policy process 
separately. However, as Brenda Boardman cautions, an entirely “reductionist 
approach” to fuel poverty policy is likely to be unsuccessful (2010: 190). 
Accordingly, the final chapters of this thesis draw earlier findings together to present 
a unified response to the overarching research question. Chapter Eight provides a 
discussion of findings that spans the entire process, though necessarily separating out 
assessment of technical and economic measures45. It should be noted that the form of 
this discussion is not one of quantitative comparison; such a response is limited both 
by the current availability of data and by a lack of transparency around the priorities 
of fuel poverty policy that enable options to be accurately weighted (Patton and 
Sawicki (1993: 61-63) discuss this type of limitation). Policy Analysis Matrices and 
graphical mapping are used throughout the work to summarise findings where 
appropriate, and the broad implications of policy options, the limits of the work 
undertaken, and potential areas for future research are discussed.  
 
3.4 Methodological Approach 
 
Having established the analytical framework adopted, this section describes the 
methodological approach applied, one based upon synthesis of multiple techniques. 
                                                
45 Consideration of balance between technical and economic policies is beyond the scope of this 
project. 
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This section first gives an overview of the research design, justifying the choice of a 
mixed methodology as appropriate to the research topic, and establishing the manner 
in which synthesis of secondary data has been applied as a method of inquiry. The 
methods employed are then discussed in turn46. 
 
3.4.1 Research Design 
 
This research employs a diverse strategy, applying mixed methods to respond to the 
stated objectives. As already outlined, the analysis of policy has generally tended 
towards mixed method approaches, applying available evidence pragmatically to 
assess complex problems. The approach taken here is recognised to tend towards the 
rationalist and positivistic in the assessment of causal factors linked to fuel poverty 
prevalence, even in its employment of non-quantitative data. This is largely a function 
of the conceptualisation of fuel poverty used in the work. The growing ‘measurement 
culture’ in policymaking (see Hudson, Lowe 2009: 275-277) has led to an increased 
use of metrics and targets as policy instruments. Fuel poverty policy is no exception 
to this, and whilst in practice a multifaceted social problem, fuel poverty as framed in 
policy terms is a constructed metric used primarily as a measurement tool. The metric 
applied reduces the problem to a latent variable, one measured via a set of observable 
factors that accordingly infer clear causal inputs (e.g., incomes, dwelling quality). As 
already discussed, this conceptualisation is shared by this work as a means of 
reflecting upon government approach to a policy problem47. However, it is recognised 
that such a formulation may be inappropriately reductionist or otherwise unsuitable in 
reflecting the experiences of fuel poor households, and that there is undoubtedly 
scope for consideration of alternate approaches, i.e., the subjective options mentioned 
in Chapter Two48. Furthermore, the institutions that are the object of study are, 
                                                
46 On a few occasions distinct methodologies are applied within individual sections of this work to 
specific ends, most notably the analysis of Hansard undertaken in Chapter Four. Where this is the case, 
those methods are discussed within the relevant chapters for ease of reference   
47 Morçölk and Ivanova (2010) suggest there is a circularity in effect; public policy as taught in 
academia emphasises positivist approaches, these are transferred into practice when academics become 
practitioners, and subsequently academic study tends to apply the same positivist approaches used by 
government.  
48 This is not to say that the use of quantitative methods and metrics don’t have a crucial role to play in 
monitoring progress and promoting equity, only that it is important that they be applied effectively, as 
argued by Cokley and Awad (2013). 
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themselves, clearly societal constructions and so some level of epistemological 
pluralism is necessary. 
 
Mixed methodology refers to the combination of quantitative and qualitative methods 
within a single research design. This approach is increasingly popular given the 
potential for different strategies to be complimentary and reinforcing; a mixed 
methodology enables complex, real-world phenomena to be pragmatically examined 
via multiple avenues (see Robson 2002: 13-41). Fuel poverty as a topic is perhaps 
particularly well served by a mixed methods research design, as it considers the 
manner in which the technical reality of cold homes further exacerbates the 
experiences of those living in poverty. The focus of this research is upon attempts to 
respond to the resultant problem via policy. As has already been discussed, the 
manner in which government considers fuel poverty is strongly quantitative in nature. 
Policy research is neither inherently qualitative nor quantitative.  Whilst measurement 
by its nature relies on quantitative data, the definition, identification and management 
of problems draw on both types. The means of measuring progress in fuel poverty 
alleviation might be quantitative, but the role of policy in tackling fuel poverty is less 
tied to any notion of an objectively correct outcome; it involves negotiating a 
constructed political and social reality, and the methodology adopted in researching 
fuel poverty at the state-level must reflect this. Such a diverse approach is also well 
suited to a research topic in its infancy; qualitative and quantitative evidence can both 
help to identify and understand relevant issues.  
 
The question of how to mix methods is in some respects dictated by the analytical 
approach adopted, comparing policy alternatives to assess likely impacts upon fuel 
poverty alleviation. Figure 3.4 illustrates the broad design employed; note that only 
core methods are illustrated, and in practice on occasion there was further cross 
application. 
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Figure 3.4: Overview of Research Design 
 
The procedure can helpfully be divided into two parts; the first describes processes 
and analyses differences, the second considers the impacts of those differences. The 
key respect in which methods are mixed in this thesis applies to the latter, particularly 
with regards to fuel poverty measurement. Mason describes six ways in which mixed 
methodologies can be applied. The approach described here fits her description of 
their use to “ask questions about connecting parts, segments or layers of a social 
whole” (2006: 6-7). Here, the connection between fuel poverty policy approaches and 
outcomes is being explored. Mason cautions that when integrating methods in this 
manner, it is vital to ensure that there is a coherent logic to the interaction. In the case 
of fuel poverty itself, this logic is pre-substantiated as the relationships between 
elements such as income, fuel prices and energy requirements have been established 
via the government operationalisation of the problem. Elsewhere, care is taken to 
describe the relationships, and the use of multiple methods is helpful in reinforcing 
connections made. Crang (2003) discusses analysis as an active and repetitive 
process, and that characterisation is appropriate to the approach undertaken here. The 
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synthesis of multiple methods, including as a means of triangulation, along with the 
need to reassess analysis throughout the process as new material emerged (including 
changes to the policies under consideration), meant the process of developing a 
response to the research question was unavoidably iterative in nature.  
 
3.4.2 Policy Document Analysis  
 
A core requirement of the analysis was a detailed understanding of the operational 
structure of policies. This proved to be a complex undertaking; this work incorporates 
a range of scheme types, some of which were under development during the research 
period. Such activity is comparatively removed from the public realm and highly 
technical in nature. To this end, policy documents – those materials produced for the 
purposes of supporting or communicating the implementation or delivery of schemes 
- constitute a rich source of data. These documents serve as primary instruments of 
policy, the formal articulations of goals and the means of achieving them, and prove 
particularly valuable in considering policies during the developmental stages, as this 
work frequently does, offering points of stability for analysis in an otherwise 
tumultuous policy environment. Increased emphasis on the use of evidence, 
engagement and transparency in UK governance has further enabled policy 
development to be tracked, i.e., via open consultation processes (see Cabinet Office 
2013a for an overview of government consultation principles). 
 
Scott (1990) established four criteria that are commonly applied in assessing 
document quality for analysis: authenticity, credibility, representativeness and clarity 
of meaning. Whilst official documents are comparatively unproblematic in terms of 
meeting these standards of data quality, two attributes need to be considered here. 
Firstly, in terms of credibility, care needs to be taken where documents are evaluative 
or discursive in nature, for example, consultation documents cannot be taken as 
giving full insight into the ‘black box’ of the policy development process; whilst they 
undoubtedly offer a useful insight into the process, it cannot be assumed that they 
represent it in its entirety. The second issue relates to representativeness. Bryman 
argues that this is not necessarily a desirable quality in official documents, as 
“materials like this are in a sense unique, and it is precisely their official or quasi-
official character that makes them interesting in their own right” (2008: 521)  
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However, when analysing such documents it is important to consider what 
perspective is being represented by the material, as authorship is often attributed to an 
organisation rather than any individual. This is further complicated where, for 
example, consultation documents report the input of stakeholders but via the filter of 
the compiling government department, or in FPAG annual reports, which are based 
upon the meetings of a diverse committee and declare that opinions shared sometimes 
conflict (see FPAG 2012: 35). Atkinson and Coffey (2004) advise that the specific 
purpose and audience for which documents have been produced is of critical 
importance, both because these factors give the material considered its value, but also 
in appreciating the limits of what it can tell us. 
 
In this context, policy documents are effectively limited to publications by 
government departments (primarily DECC) or by Ofgem. The aforementioned 
increased transparency in governmental processes, along with the rise of e-
governance (e.g., the government’s “digital by default” service standard, see Cabinet 
Office 2013b) has made policy documents increasingly accessible to researchers. 
Documents are available online relating to the majority of current and some 
predecessor schemes. Documents from older schemes have been considered as 
evidence where available. As might be expected, the older the scheme, the harder it is 
to access relevant documents; schemes that pre-date governmental initiatives towards 
online transparency tend to have little documentation available. The National 
Archives hold selected government documents for the permanent record (see National 
Archives 2014), however, catalogue searches indicated that there was little available 
with the potential to contribute to this research. The limitations of the data in this 
respect are recognised, however, this is not seen as unduly problematic given the 
focus of this work on recent policy. The document collection process was as 
systematic as possible given ongoing changes to government and Ofgem websites 
(both underwent complete overhaul during the research period). Publications tend to 
be issued on a reasonably methodical basis (e.g., annual report updates), and 
databases were scrutinised for miscellaneous materials. The core types of fuel poverty 
policy documents are detailed in Table 3.3, though a minimal number of documents 
did not fall into any of these categories (for example, the Warm Front application 
form was considered (see Carillion Energy Services Ltd. 2011), as was a one-off open 
letter written by the Secretary of State (see Davey 2012)). 
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Table 3.3: Categories of fuel poverty policy documents 
 
Document Type Description/Purpose 
Annual 
Statistics 
Annual reports on fuel poverty statistics have been published since 2009; 
before that time, this information was contained within the annual 
strategy reports. Statistical outputs are accompanied by methodological 
guidance for users, which are updated periodically as appropriate. 
Consultation 
Documents 
Documents relating to policies under development, formal means of 
acquiring stakeholder input. Generally comprised of two stages with 
separate documents for each; initial proposals and specific questions for 
stakeholders, and summary of responses, government conclusions, and 
implications for policy. 
Evaluation 
Materials 
Government and regulators produce and publish evaluation of policies, 
though not to a fixed schedule. Warm Front was subject to independent 
evaluation by both the National Audit Office (NAO) and the House of 
Commons Committee for Public Accounts (CPA) every five years. 
FPAG 
Advisory 
Reports 
FPAG produce annual reports on progress in delivering the fuel poverty 
strategy. These are distinctive documents, produced via committee; 
however, they still meet the broad characterisation of ‘policy document’ 
used here and demonstrate policy development. 
House of 
Commons 
Publications 
The House of Commons Library produce and maintain briefing material 
for Members of Parliament, including research papers and ‘standard 
notes’ on topical issues. Whilst policy documents in a more tangential 
sense, these provide a valuable source of information, particularly with 
regards to older policy activity for which primary sources may no longer 
be accessible. 
Impact 
Assessments 
Documents linked to the consultation process but more technical in 
nature, mandatory tools of policy development prepared according to a 
prescribed template. Impact Assessments usually make direct 
comparison of a number of policy options. 
Legislation The laws to which policy ultimately respond, these are made available 
online. 
Progress 
Reports 
Examples of these include annual reports on Warm Front activity and 
more frequent publications concerning ECO compliance by DECC and 
Ofgem. 
Research 
Outputs 
Departments commission research outputs as a means of producing 
evidence to guide policy decisions. 
Strategy WHECA required the publication of both an initial strategy and “from 
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Documents time to time” reports (s. 2). The initial strategy was published in 2001, 
and annual reports were published annually between 2003 and 2008. 
Technical 
Guidance 
Documents providing technical specifications for the delivery of 
schemes. Most notably published by Ofgem with regard to supplier 
obligations.   
Compiled with reference to sources: (FPAG 2012: 35, Parliament.uk 2014c, Legislation.gov.uk 
2014, BIS 2011) 
 
Documents were downloaded directly as PDFs (Portable Document Format) and 
analysed via the Preview application, which enables freeform annotation of 
documents. The analysis approach employed a systematic yet pragmatic strategy 
matched to the objectives of the study and the particular material considered (see 
section A1.1 for more methodological detail). This was heavily influenced by the 
thematic analysis approach advocated by Ryan and Bernard (2003), with some themes 
pre-established based upon preliminary document analysis and review of literature, 
and others established on emergence.  The coding process was broad, with tight 
textual analysis not generally being appropriate to the types of document under 
consideration here. It should be emphasised that the material associated with fuel 
poverty policy implementation tends to be highly technical49, making multiple 
readings a particular necessity. Subsequent analysis matched the description of a 
“cutting and sorting” processing technique, as described by Ryan and Bernard (2003: 
94-96), albeit conducted electronically via text editing software. The primary level of 
thematic grouping was that reported here as individual chapters. The previously 
discussed classifications of policy constraints, introduced as an explanatory 
conceptual tool, also represented important thematic groupings. In describing 
processes, graphical representations proved valuable as a means of developing ideas, 
and some of these are reproduced in this work. Established themes were then 
considered individually in relation to the research question, aims and objectives (see 
section 3.2.1) and written up as appropriate, with the guidance offered by Ryan 
(2006) proving particularly useful at that stage. 
  
                                                
49 The “strongest response” to the request for general comments on the ECO consultation related to the 
complexity of the consultation documents and accompanying information (DECC 2012j: 90) 
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3.4.3 Quantitative Methods  
 
Although it is often difficult to assess policy choices purely numerically, where 
quantitative assessment is possible, such techniques offer valuable insights as to the 
potential impacts of alternative strategies. With respect to fuel poverty in England, the 
principal dataset used in analysis is the EHS, which is unique in providing detailed 
information linking housing stock condition with data on the circumstances of 
occupants. This is used by DECC to generate annual reports on fuel poverty statistics 
(see DECC 2013i), but has also been used by external researchers as a tool of fuel 
poverty analysis, notably the Hills Fuel Poverty Review (see Hills 2011, Hills 2012), 
Fahmy et al.’s (2011)  mapping of fuel poverty prevalence, and work by CSE and 
EBR considering the potential costs of fuel poverty eradication  (see Preston, Moore 
& Guertler 2008, Guertler, Preston 2009, Washan 2012) .  
 
The quantitative work undertaken here is primarily based upon the 2011 EHS release 
(DCLG 2013c). A detailed account of the survey methodology for the EHS Housing 
Stock Dataset50 used in this analysis is supplied in the accompanying user guide 
(DCLG 2013a). This dataset includes data from both a physical survey and interviews 
with occupants51. The sample is stratified, and taken on a two-year rolling basis (for 
the dataset use here, this was the period April 2011 to March 2012). Grossing and 
weighting factors are supplied to enable national level estimates to be made from the 
initial sample of c.14000 households. The derived datasets provided go through a 
rigorous editing and imputation process, resulting in a very ‘clean’ dataset with no 
missing values. In addition, a dataset of fuel-poverty-specific derived variables is 
included in the release; these form the basis of the official fuel poverty statistics.  
 
This research uses analysis of the EHS dataset as a means of assessing the impact of 
policy options upon fuel poverty. As previously described, fuel poverty, as defined by 
the government - and in this analysis - is a latent variable constructed from directly 
measurable indicators. Where policies affect one of these causal factors, the impact of 
                                                
50 The EHS is comprised of two datasets, housing stock (physical and interview data) and household 
(interviews only). The former is used here as it includes the data on dwelling condition needed to 
establish incidence of fuel poverty. 
51 The housing stock dataset also includes information on the physical characteristics of vacant 
dwellings; for obvious reasons, these are disregarded when undertaking fuel poverty analysis. 
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the change upon the output variable, fuel poverty, can be modelled. This process is 
undertaken here using SPSS, a computer programme for statistical analysis (see IBM 
2014). The decision to use the LIHC definition of fuel poverty in this work presented 
significant challenges in terms of establishing an evaluation metric as it was necessary 
to replicate the LIHC fuel poverty measure created by John Hills and DECC 
statisticians. Three years of EHS datasets were released during the core research 
period, and while the last of these included variables relating to the LIHC measure of 
fuel poverty, it was still necessary to reproduce the definition from the base inputs in 
order to allow the effects of manipulating those factors to be modelled. This process 
proved complex; the definition went through numerous revisions over the course of 
this research, as minor adjustments were made. As such, establishment of an indicator 
variable was an ongoing process, undertaken with extensive reference to the reports 
produced by Hills (2011, 2012) and follow-up methodological guidance from DECC 
civil servants (2013i, 2013h). Descriptive statistics included in those reports were 
used to assess the accuracy of replication, and in some instances DECC statisticians 
were able to clarify the process via email. Table 2.10 shows descriptive statistics 
comparing outputs from the replicated indicator with the derived variables provided in 
the 2011 EHS. 
 
Table 3.4: Comparison of replicated fuel poverty variable with EHS release fuel poverty variable 
 
 Sample Grossed and Weighted 
Replicated 
Variable 
Release 
Variable 
Variation Replicated 
Variable 
Release 
Variable 
Variation 
Total households 14386 - 21918363 - 
Households in 
fuel poverty. 
1649 1649 0% 2389066 2390053 0.04% 
Individuals in 
fuel poverty. 
4550 4570 0.44% 6553627 6585131 0.48% 
Fuel poverty gap 
(£) 
6.42k 6.64k 3.2% 1.015bn 1.047bn 3.1% 
Note: Where possible, totals were verified with reference to official releases (i.e., DCLG 2013a, DECC 
2013h)  
 
Although the number of fuel poor households is the same for both variables, nine 
cases were misclassified each way, which has an impact upon the grossed and 
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weighted outputs. Despite best efforts, it has not been possible to resolve these 
unaligned cases. However, despite these minor discrepancies, the replicated measure 
is sufficiently aligned with the official measure to enable modelling to be undertaken 
with the level of accuracy required by this work.  
 
In processing the EHS fuel poverty datasets, the receipt of WFPs and WHDS are 
imputed (see DECC 2013i). In some of the analysis undertaken, it is reasonable to 
disregard the receipt of additional support (for example, in assessing targeting 
efficacy of a policies, it makes sense to do so assuming support is not being received). 
Whilst it is possible to disregard WFPs, WHDS is imputed using a more complex 
Monte Carlo simulation technique that cannot be reverse-engineered by users (DECC 
2013i: 33). This represents a limitation of the work, however expenditure on the Core 
and Broader Group elements of WHDS in 2011/12 was £112.3m (Ofgem 2012b: 5-6), 
5.2% of the £2.15bn spent on WFP (Kennedy 2013b: 29) and so this issue is a minor 
one. Where WFP has been disregarded, this is highlighted in the accompanying text. 
 
A further issue encountered in the quantitative analysis process was in the time period 
under consideration. The collection and analysis process necessary for the EHS means 
that the 2011 dataset released in August 2013 comprises data collected the period 
April 2011 to March 2012. As a result, comparison of policy options, including those 
introduced with ECO, can only be carried out using data predating the introduction of 
that policy in January 2013. However, it must be emphasised that the goal of the 
analysis undertaken here is to consider differences between state and supplier delivery 
at the broader level. Accordingly, examination of 2011 data as a means of analysing 
2013 policies is not viewed to be problematic so long as the difference is recorded 
where it occurs. The statistical modelling of policies is a complex endeavour, and 
there are innumerable other factors – such as substitution effects, and the influences 
of other policies – that are beyond what can be considered in this work. Assumptions 
and limitations within the modelling are explained when reported, but the goal of 
quantitative analysis in this thesis is only as a means of illustrating the broad effects 
of policy. Furthermore, attempts to project future impacts of policies are beyond the 
scope of this work. Further details of specific elements of the quantitative 
methodology employed are included in section A1.3. 
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3.4.4 Literature Synthesis 
 
Describing her own doctoral thesis on fuel poverty, Boardman reflects that she, 
“never thought of doing a chapter called a Literature Review because the whole thing 
was a literature review” (Liddell 2012: 13). In researching fuel poverty, the synthesis 
of literature is of particular value given the exceptionally interdisciplinary nature of 
the problem. This usefulness is intensified in analysis that considers multiple policy 
responses, as Boardman’s work did and as this research does. The critical analysis and 
synthesis of existing evidence from a diverse range of fields constitutes a powerful 
means of assessing the differing impacts of policy options, one that government have 
notably employed in their own impact assessments52. It has further been suggested 
that, as policymakers increasingly value evidence-based work, literature reviews 
present an effective means for policymakers, who are often time poor, to effectively 
assimilate a body of evidence (see Petticrew, Roberts 2006: 11-12). 
 
A traditional literature review process was undertaken, with the objective of applying 
a critical analysis of the existing literature base as a means of assessing policy 
options. Every effort was made to be methodical in this process, drawing from 
available procedural guidance  (particularly Jesson, Matheson & Lacey 2011, Booth, 
Papaioannou & Sutton 2012) ; however, a wholly systematic approach to review (of 
the sort described by Petticrew, Roberts 2006) was judged to be ill-suited to the 
diverse and disparate scope of the research topic and the limits of the existing 
literature base53. Instead, the process incorporated an initial scoping review, taking in 
all relevant academic literature relating specifically to fuel poverty (much of this 
already reported in Chapter Two). As the research entered the analysis phase, further 
focused searches were undertaken as a means of exploring emergent themes; these are 
integrated as appropriate into the relevant chapters. In recognition of the way in which 
fuel poverty intersects with many other topics of research, particular care was taken to 
pragmatically read around the topic, considering work beyond more the more 
restricted base of fuel poverty focused literature. 
 
                                                
52 See, for example, DECC (2012b). 
53 Though such a method is employed as a means of assessing the more contained set of evidence on 
the costs of interventions, reported in section 6.1. 
 91 
Contributing to the complexity of the literature synthesis process is the need to 
effectively incorporate the significant body of relevant ‘grey’ literature into the 
analysis. Grey literature is “that which is produced on all levels of government, 
academics, business and industry in print and electronic formats, but which is not 
controlled by commercial publishers” (see Grey Literature Report 2014). As a 
function of their very nature, such materials can be difficult to access via conventional 
channels. In undertaking the scoping review, it was immediately evident that a large 
body of such work existed considering fuel poverty that would prove invaluable to the 
analysis process. The aforementioned technocratic fuel poverty policy community 
accounts for a significant proportion of this; many organisations produce research, 
and the work produced by stakeholders tends to be both robust and be published more 
quickly than that which emerged via academic channels. The grey literature base is 
also able to be more reactive to policy changes as the publication process is less 
formal; the launch of new policies over the period in which this work was undertaken 
resulted in a profusion of additional material being published. News articles and press 
releases – particularly from trade sources – were used to a similar end, as often these 
types of media are the main avenues for communicating changes and stakeholder 
opinion. While there is a value to such rapid responses, this also means that work 
tends not to have been peer-reviewed, thus it is particularly important, in considering 
such work, to critically assess the validity of the research, and recognise the potential 
for authorial bias. As grey literature is not disseminated via conventional channels, it 
also means that, by definition, systematic collection is more difficult. Efforts have 
been made to be as methodical as possible in collating grey literature. The primary 
means of accessing such material is via the websites of those organisations already 
described in Table 2.2, many of which index their own research publications. These 
were reviewed on an ongoing basis throughout the research process. However, there 
is a naturally a pragmatic element to grey literature search, for example, where 
researcher involvement in fuel poverty networks resulted in documents being passed 
on informally. 
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3.4.5 Professional Engagement 
 
A particular barrier to researching energy suppliers is that of access; the desire to 
maintain commercial confidentiality limits the extent to which companies are willing 
to share information about, for example, the manner in which cost are recovered, how 
tariffs are set, and how and to whom products are marketed. Even with E.ON as a co-
sponsor of this work, this information remains if not inaccessible, then at least 
unavailable for publication. Although DECC and Ofgem do publish some statistics on 
obligation compliance, for the most part the energy supplier remains a ‘black box’. 
However, E.ON’s involvement did extend to facilitating access to interview subjects 
(not limited to employees of E.ON) who were able to discuss the practical reality of 
energy supplier management of fuel poverty obligations (see section A1.7 for more 
details of interviews and approach). This was valuable in clarifying how suppliers 
carry out obligations; because although much of the work at the structural level 
considered in this thesis is prescribed, there remains scope for suppliers to select a 
delivery approach. It should be noted, though, that as the overall availability of 
interviewees was limited, their role in the overall project is largely as a corroborative 
methodology, e.g., in substantiating messages from consultation responses and 
clarifying the manner in which policies are enacted in practice. Interviews were semi-
structured, in line with Bernard and Ryan’s guidance on interviewing ‘elite’ 
participants (2010: 371), digitally recorded, and transcripts were analysed along the 
thematic lines previously described. The TAMS Analyzer qualitative analysis tool 
was selected to facilitate coding, as it is better suited to handling transcripts (see 
TAMS Analyzer 2012). Access to E.ON employees and partners proved particularly 
valuable given difficulties encountered in accessing energy suppliers for research 
purposes; as it is an extremely competitive industry, companies are unsurprisingly 
unwilling to share information with outsiders, particularly those sponsored by other 
organisations. To some extent this limitation applied to E.ON as well, and 
interviewees were keen to highlight where they could not share information because it 
was commercially confidential. A member of E.ON staff was a member of the 
supervisory team for the project, and had access to thesis drafts to ensure no sensitive 
information had been included, however, it must be emphasised that this input did not 
extend to any censorship of the results.  
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Privileged access to E.ON meant that in some respects this is a case study of one 
company. Bryman (2008: 55-56) suggests a number of types of case study: this 
example is taken to be a ‘representative’ or ‘typical’ case given that E.ON are one of 
only six major suppliers subject to same legislation and Ofgem guidance, and it is 
assumed that there is some level of similarity in the way in which companies fulfill 
their obligations. However, the most commonly cited weakness of the case study 
approach is generalizability (see Stake 1995: 7-8), and it is appreciated that E.ON’s 
approach may not be fully representative of all suppliers. Indeed, E.ON are notable in 
their success in meeting obligations (see Ofgem 2014d: 3), if not to the point of being 
an ‘extreme’ case (see Bryman 2008: 55). However, in all the use of E.ON as a case 
study is seen as useful both in enabling privileged access to data, and as a framework 
within which to situate the mixed methodological analysis(see Yin 2014: 65-67). 
Whilst the normal limits of generalisability exist with regard to the examination of a 
single case, the application is valid so long as those boundaries are recognised, and it 
is believed that the limited number of overall cases and use of data triangulation serve 
to further mitigate this risk. 
Though participant observation was not a formal element of this work, involvement in 
the policy community undoubtedly shaped the final product. Academics and 
researchers have long been active in fuel poverty policy communities (one clear 
example being Brenda Boardman’s work as an advocate), and this trend continues to 
be encouraged. Over the course of the research, a large number of professional 
network events were attended, ranging from Local Authority meetings to E.ON 
internal consultations; a full list of events attended is included in Appendix Two. 
More intensive involvement of professionals from fuel poverty policy networks was 
considered as a possible methodological approach, for example, via a wider set of key 
informant interviews, or the use of the Delphi method (see Adler, Ziglio 1995). 
Whilst this would have been a valid avenue of investigation, it was decided that 
similar outcomes could be achieved via analysis of the large volume of policy 
documents produced by those stakeholders, which often contain both opinions and 
analysis (as discussed in sections 2.4.5 and 3.4.4). 
 
This work adhered to the ethical protocols and guidance offered by Loughborough 
University (see Loughborough University 2014), with the Economic and Social 
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Research Council's Research Ethics Framework (ESRC, 2010) consulted for further 
guidance. Departmental ethical approval for this project was sought and obtained; the 
approved Ethical Clearance Checklist is included at section A1.4. In undertaking this 
research, the four key ethical principles identified by Diener and Crandall (1978) were 
observed. These are to prevent: harm to participants; invasion of privacy; lack of 
informed consent; deception. As interviewees were speaking in a professional 
capacity, harm to participants was not judged to be a particular risk in conducting this 
work. However, care was taken to ensure that participation did not have any 
professional impact by ensuring all interviewees remained fully anonymous. As the 
research did not consider the private lives of individuals, there was not judged to be 
any significant potential for invasion of privacy. In advance of interview, all 
interviewees were provided with a Participant Information Sheet (see section A1.5) 
and given the opportunity to ask any question they might have about the research. All 
participants agreed in advance that interviews could be tape-recorded and transcribed, 
and that whilst their opinions, contributions and quotes might be included, they would 
remain anonymous in any work produced. Each participant signed and returned an 
informed consent form (see section A1.6) indicating that they had understood and 
were comfortable with this policy. All quotes and opinions cited in this work are 
taken from the transcriptions of formal interviews conducted within this consent 
framework, not from any more informal engagement (e.g., at stakeholder events). To 
ensure deception did not occur, every effort was made to be transparent as possible to 
the work being undertaken. A high level of clarity is generally helpful to the process 
when interviewing professionals, as it gives interviewees a clear understanding of the 
nature of research, enabling them to better understand the type of contributions that 
are relevant. When engaging with professionals at network events, care was taken to 
disclose researcher status, and to offer to provide more information on the project as 
appropriate.  
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has discussed the analytical approach adopted in this work, and 
explained the methodology applied. Many different approaches can and have been 
used to investigate the causes and impacts of fuel poverty, and other strategies might 
have been suited to the question under investigation. However, for reasons that have 
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been described in this chapter, a social policy analysis approach has been taken in this 
work. Whilst previous work has explored fuel poverty from a social policy 
perspective, the approach has been somewhat neglected given that treating fuel 
poverty as a problem of social welfare is undoubtedly appropriate; this is the gap that 
this work seeks to begin to fill. The defined aim of this project is to compare supplier 
and state delivery of fuel poverty policy, with a view to establishing the impact at the 
national level of new policies on fuel poverty under a revised definition. To this end, 
Patton and Sawicki’s (1993) policy framework guides a comparative research design 
that evaluates the differences between supplier and state provision, with particular 
reference made to the notion of policy constraints, as classified by Dunn (2012). A 
pragmatic methodological approach has been applied, incorporating analysis of 
official documents, quantitative analysis, literature synthesis and professional 
engagement. The second part of this thesis will report the findings of analysis 
described here, beginning with consideration of the manner in which fuel poverty was 
established as a concern of the state, and how responsibilities for its eradication have 
consequently been apportioned. 
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Part Two
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4 | Establishing Responsibilities 
 
 
The state has had a legal responsibility to take steps towards fuel poverty eradication 
since the passage of WHECA in 2000, though measures that meet the definition of 
‘fuel poverty policy’ used in this work predate even that. It might, however, be argued 
that – just as the private sector has taken an increasing role in the broader delivery of 
welfare functions (see section 3.1.1) – fuel poverty policy is entering a new paradigm, 
one in which energy suppliers take on the primary responsibility for its mitigation. 
This work compares supplier and state delivery of fuel poverty policy in order to 
establish which agent can best meet the goals of WHECA. In the first instance, then – 
in line with the aim and objectives of this work – it is necessary to determine and 
describe the political foundations of policy responsibilities as they stand and consider 
the drivers and constraints guiding that element of the process.  
 
This chapter takes a different approach to subsequent chapters in that it does not 
compare supplier and state delivery of similar elements of policy; the roles at this 
stage in the process are very different, with the state holding ultimate political 
responsibility. Nevertheless, the chapter highlights the distinctions in roles played, 
and themes introduced in this respect are important throughout this research. Drawing 
upon analysis of the Hansard transcripts of the WHECA debates, it is argued that the 
state’s legal commitment to tackle fuel poverty was based upon a misunderstanding of 
the scale of the problem, and is undermined by weaknesses in the legislation itself. It 
is then demonstrated via close analysis of policy documents that the transition 
towards the use of supplier obligations as a means of tackling fuel poverty was 
incremental, and not based on any clear evidential justification. Finally, a broader 
assessment of the policy process, again via documents, highlights significant 
weaknesses when compared with ‘ideal’ practice (here represented by the model 
proposed by Hogwood, Gunn 1984). 
 
The first section gives a brief overview of pre-2000 policies relating to affordable 
warmth. The second section then reports the results of analysis of Hansard that sought 
to establish how responsibilities were viewed in the formation of the original WHECA 
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legislation. The third section describes how responsibilities have developed since 
WHECA, including the process by which energy suppliers began to play a role in 
supporting vulnerable households. This incorporates the results of further analysis of 
policy documents that considers the intended role of schemes in meeting targets, and 
of the rationale underlying the shift to a supplier-led approach. The final section then 
offers a critical examination of failures in policy maintenance through this early 
period, and of the particular constraints that have been identified as having an impact 
at this stage. 
 
Methodological Overview 
 
The objective of the analysis reported in this chapter was to ascertain and evaluate the 
manner in which responsibility for fuel poverty mitigation has been established, 
requiring additional methods beyond those already reported in Chapter Two. A 
number of possible approaches could have been used, but given practical constraints, 
two main sources of data were selected for analysis; the Hansard transcripts of 
WHECA parliamentary debates as a means of clarifying initial intentions (results 
primarily reported in section 4.2), and policy documents as a medium by which to 
trace developments in the intervening years (results primarily reported in sections 
4.3.3 and 4.3.4). 
 
Hansard, the official edited verbatim report of proceedings of UK Parliament, is a 
source of data largely specific to this chapter. As previously discussed, much of the 
political process occurs behind closed doors and it can be hard to discern the priorities 
of policymakers, a particular obstacle in considering older policies. Hansard provides 
a valuable means of assessing the process of legislation development. The approach 
undertaken was similar to that employed by Ellis et al. (2002) who analysed Hansard 
not as a means of establishing the undeclared motives of politicians, but as a way of 
identifying key arguments made by policymakers. In this instance, the primary goal 
was to understand how, in passing WHECA, policymakers expressed that 
responsibilities for eradication should be apportioned. However, analysis also sought 
to establish a more general understanding of the way in which legislators understood 
the problem of fuel poverty, and the rationale underlying their choice to pass 
WHECA. Electronic transcripts of all WHECA Hansard debates were downloaded 
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from the UK Parliament website (Parliament.uk 2014a), and coded using the thematic 
approach described in section 3.4.2. Each transcript was considered twice, and 
following first pass-through any themes not satisfied by the predetermined category 
set were then added and applied on second consideration. The list of coding 
categories applied is included within section A1.2. From here, the established themes 
were considered individually with regard to the research objectives, and written up as 
described in section 3.4.2.  
 
Whilst policy documents are used as a source of data consistently throughout this 
research (as described in section 3.4.2), the analysis undertaken here followed a 
distinctive methodology appropriate to the purpose of the investigation. The 
objectives were: firstly, to establish which policies (and which delivery agents) were 
intended by government to contribute to WHECA goals, and to what extent; and 
secondly, how that division of responsibility had been discussed and justified. Both of 
these goals were pursued via a more directed content analysis approach, applying pre-
established coding categories (see Hsieh, Shannon 2005), a list of which are included 
in section A1.1. While not conceived as a discourse analysis, consideration of the way 
in which policy rationales were presented – as well as the direct content of such 
rationales – did come naturally into analysis. Four types of official policy document 
were selected for analysis on the grounds that they could be expected to communicate 
information about government policy intentions, rather than simply technical details. 
These were; consultation documents, FPAG advisory reports, fuel poverty strategy 
documents and impact assessments (all described in Table 3.3). These documents 
cover, to greater and lesser extents, the entire post-WHECA period, enabling analysis 
to consider the temporal development of policy. The analysis process was otherwise 
as described in section 3.4.2.  
 
It is worth at this point highlighting one category of theme that proved particularly 
prominent in the analysis of this element of the process, that which Ryan and Bernard 
(2003) describe as “missing data”, i.e., features that we might expect to be present in 
the data, but which are absent. This type of consideration is particularly valuable in 
this context for two reasons. Firstly given that the analysis was seeking particular 
information about policy intentions, it is equally pertinent if that information is not 
present. Secondly, as will be discussed, fuel poverty policy strategy was designed in 
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line with the New Public Management-influenced ‘measurement culture’ that 
incorporated extensive use of targets, prescribed metrics and performance monitoring 
as a rational means of supporting successful delivery (on New Public Management, 
see Lane 2000, McLaughlin, Ferlie & Osborne 2001; on measurement culture in the 
UK, see House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee 2003). Critical 
examination of fuel poverty policy requires that the failures in the process be 
recognised, and – as will become apparent – requires acknowledgement of 
conspicuous gaps where the process has deviated from the intended course. 
 
4.1 Early Affordable Warmth Policies 
 
For households in England to face particular struggles in maintaining comfortable 
internal temperatures is certainly not a new phenomenon. As chronicled by Rudge 
(2012), dwellings in the United Kingdom are of comparatively poor quality, in part 
because early and rapid industrialisation set an enduringly low standard for the 
national housing stock54. Income inequalities, which are increasingly problematised in 
the literature (e.g., Wilkinson, Pickett 2010b), are also a longstanding and widely 
acknowledged function of the political and economic societal structure. However, 
most accounts of fuel poverty as a concern of the state begin in the early 1970s. The 
23% increase in real domestic energy prices that occurred between 1973 and 1983 
(see Utley, Shorrock 2008: 69) was the result of two primary factors. Firstly, the 
Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), angered by the political 
involvement of industrial nations in the Arab-Israeli conflict, raised the price per 
barrel of oil by 70%. Secondly, Harold Wilson’s Labour Government removed price 
caps that had been instated to ward off inflation, allowing the state-owned energy 
suppliers to return to economic pricing that was reflective of costs (see Boardman 
1991: 18-19). To a populace which had become accustomed to rising post-war living 
standards this brought home developments that had long been in motion: that energy 
sources were finite and that market forces could be expected to reflect this in future; 
that the state was moving away from subsidising the provision of necessities; and that 
these shifts would have very real impacts on living conditions, particularly for those 
whose fuel needs and economic circumstances left them vulnerable to rising energy 
                                                
54 See also Hermann Muthesius’ famous 1904 critique of the “insubstantial structure” of the English 
house (1979: 67). 
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costs. This section offers a brief contextual review of early policies used to tackle 
what has become known as fuel poverty.  
 
4.1.1 Economic Interventions  
 
Table 4.1 gives an overview of pre-2000 economic interventions designed to support 
low income households in affording fuel, derived from review of multiple sources55. 
 
Table 4.1: Economic affordable warmth interventions, pre-2000 
 
Programme Name Years Active Description 
National 
Assistance 
pre-1965 Prior to 1966, the National Assistance Board (established via the 
National Assistance Act 1948) would make discretionary payments 
at times of perceived need, including for fuel during cold winters. 
The Board was abolished following the passage of the 
Supplementary Benefit Act 1966, but parliamentary discussions 
around the need for financial support towards heating costs (see, 
for example, Hansard HC vol. 672 col 30-96) set a clear precedent 
for subsequent policies such as Heating Additions. 
Heating Additions 1965 - 1988 Boardman identifies that in 1965, 669,000 benefits claimants were 
recorded as receiving additional support towards heating costs 
(1991: 17). These payments were to evolve into Heating Additions, 
a class of Supplementary Benefit paid to those receiving other state 
welfare support. Further Exceptional Circumstances Allowances 
and Exceptional Needs Payments were also available based upon 
perceived need, or to help pay off fuel debts. 
Electricity 
Discount Scheme 
1977 - 1979 Renewed concerns about fuel affordability following the 1973 oil 
crisis resulted in the introduction of this short-lived scheme. It was 
eventually replaced, in part, by an extension to Heating Additions. 
Exceptionally 
Severe Weather 
Payments 
1985 - 1986 Payments during periods of cold weather made at discretion of 
Department of Health and Social Security local offices. 
Cold Weather 1986 - present Additional fixed payments made to recipients of certain income-
                                                
55 Documents relating to the very earliest affordable warmth schemes have proved impossible to 
access, and indeed may no longer exist. In accounting for this gap, early literature on energy 
affordability policies and House of Commons Library Research Papers serve as a useful record of 
initial policy activity. 
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Payments related benefits for every seven consecutive days wherein in the 
average mean daily temperature falls below a given threshold, 
based on Met Office measurements (originally −1.5°C, later 0°C). 
Winter Fuel 
Payments 
1997 - present Annual payments made to those of pensionable age. Those over 80 
receive a payment at a higher rate. 
Based on compilation of sources: (Bradshaw, Harris 1983, Bradshaw, Hutton 1983, Boardman 1991, 
Mckie 1986, Kennedy 2010, Kennedy 2013b) 
 
All of the policies included in Table 4.1 were state-led, though this is somewhat 
immaterial where policies predated the privatisation of energy supply. There are 
effectively two56 core classes of policy that have taken multiple forms; supplementary 
benefits specifically targeted at heating costs, and conditional benefits applied to 
eligible households in the incidence of cold weather. Versions of these remain in 
operation, WFPs and CWPs, although it should be noted that WFPs have been 
targeted at older people universally, regardless of income. This is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter Five. It is also worth highlighting that all of these policies were 
delivered as supplements to existing income benefits, and overseen by departments in 
charge of social security policy, as opposed to energy policy. 
 
4.1.2 Technical Interventions 
 
The earliest known state recognition of the impacts of poor quality housing stock on 
the ability of households to affordably heat their homes comes from a building 
regulatory perspective. Boardman (1991: 12) cites an early mention of the 
comparative inefficiency of British homes within a 1946 report by the government’s 
Fuel and Power Advisory Committee. Fifteen years later, the influential 1961 Parker 
Morris Committee report Homes for Today and Tomorrow observed the same impacts 
of inadequate heating installations in domestic homes and proposed minimum 
standards (Ministry of Housing and Local Government 1961: 51), though Boardman 
notes that these were not implemented (1991: 13).  
 
                                                
56 Changes to the rate of VAT on fuel might be included as a further class of intervention (energy is 
currently taxed at the reduced rate of 5%, as are many technical interventions; see HMRC 2014). 
Though such a reduction is enjoyed by households across all income groups, it is likely to have 
progressive impacts (see Crawford et al. 1993). 
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Despite this early recognition of the role played by the housing stock in ensuring 
affordable warmth, the state was slow to adopt energy efficiency as an issue of social 
welfare rather than of economic resource management. In one of the very earliest 
academic considerations of fuel poverty, Bradshaw and Hutton (1983) argued that the 
capacity for energy conservation to serve as a means of promoting social welfare had 
been neglected by government at that time, describing contemporary energy 
efficiency initiatives as “piecemeal”, a description that supports Boardman’s account 
of a scattering of small-scale initiatives around the same period (1991: 68-74). Table 
4.2 provides an overview of pre-2000 public sector technical interventions designed 
to support low income households in affording fuel, derived from review of multiple 
sources. 
 
Table 4.2:  Public sector technical affordable warmth interventions, pre-2000 
 
Programme Name Years 
Active 
Description 
Homes Insulation 
Scheme 
1978 − 
1990 
Under the Homes Insulation Act 1978, required Local Authorities 
to make part grants to private sector households in receipt of certain 
state benefits to support installation of thermal insulation measures, 
primarily loft insulation and boiler cladding. 
 
Energy 
Conservation 
Programme 
1978 − 
1990 
Public sector housing counterpart of the Homes Insulation Scheme. 
Draughtproofing unknown 
- 1988 
One time payment covering only materials available to 
Supplementary Benefits recipients. 
Community 
Insulation Groups 
1975 − 
unknown 
Department of Employment projects that provided work experience 
for the long-term unemployed via the delivery of efficiency 
measures and advice to disadvantaged groups. 
Energy 
Conservation 
Programme 
1978 − 
1980 
Local Authority projects delivering measures to their own housing 
stock.  
Energy Grant 1988 – 
c.1991 
Grant available to recipients of certain state benefits, covering 90% 
of cost of draughtproofing materials. Installation had to be carried 
out by a Community Insulation Group (see above). 
 104 
Minor Works 
Grant 
1990 - 
present 
Funds allocated to certain vulnerable groups for home 
improvements at Local Authority discretion. Boardman (1991: 74) 
states that at that time these were primarily for thermal insulation 
improvements. However, an informal review of LA websites 
indicates that individual policy is now hugely variable, and often 
explicitly excludes expenditure on energy efficiency measures (for 
example, Sheffield City Council 2013), presumably because there 
are now alternative channels for such funding. 
Home Energy 
Efficiency Scheme  
1991 − 
2000 
Established under the Social Security Act 1990, this scheme 
enabled recipients of certain state benefits to apply for grants 
towards home energy efficiency upgrades. It was later rebranded as 
Warm Front, and ran under that name until January 2013. 
Note: In some cases it has not been possible to establish precise duration of scheme operation from 
reliable sources (e.g., policy documents). 
Based on compilation of sources:  (Boardman 1991, Bradshaw, Hutton 1983, Shorrock, Henderson & 
Utley 2005)  
 
In addition to this activity in the public sector, energy supplier obligations were 
introduced starting in 1994, and even the first obligation, EEC, included some 
expectation that activity would focus on vulnerable groups. These are discussed 
further in section 4.3.2. A likely cause of this early, disjointed, approach to energy 
efficiency for low income households was that the government had no mandate to 
tackle fuel poverty. This changed in 2000, with the passage of WHECA. 
 
4.2 The Warm Homes and Energy Conservation Act 2000 
 
When Mr Williams started to talk about fuel poverty, I thought, “Goodness 
gracious. I am a Conservative and he is talking about poverty.  
 
David Amess MP (Con., Southend West) 
Hansard HC vol. 345 col 1297 (10 March 2000) 
 
It was with this slightly unconventional opening speech that fuel poverty began its 
journey into the statute books. David Amess had come fifth in the ballot for Private 
Members’ Bills, and so won the opportunity to introduce a piece of legislation on to 
the floor of the House. Despite early misgivings, he was ultimately convinced of the 
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merits of a fuel poverty bill by a fuel poverty campaigner, Martyn Williams57. The 
intentions of the Warm Homes and Energy Conservation Bill (WHECB) were 
positively received across both house and party lines; debates were well attended and 
passage straightforward. The final result of this legislative process was to create in 
November 2000 what has remained the most important piece of legislation in terms of 
defining state responsibility towards fuel poverty eradication:  
 
An Act to require the Secretary of State to publish and implement a strategy for 
reducing fuel poverty; to require the setting of targets for the implementation of 
that strategy; and for connected purposes. 
 
The Warm Homes and Energy Conservation Act 2000, preamble 
 
Consideration of WHECA is important to this work because it is that legislation that 
makes fuel poverty eradication a legal requirement that government must take action 
to meet58. Without this, the question under consideration would be very different, as 
there would be no legal requirement to pursue fuel poverty alleviation, and so the 
underlying assumption of this work – that someone should be responsible – would not 
exist. Given the foundational importance of WHECA, analysis of the legislation and 
supporting parliamentary debates was taken as a starting point in understanding the 
intentions of lawmakers who felt fuel poverty eradication should be legally 
mandated 59 . This section presents the findings of that analysis. As discussed 
previously this has not been limited to lawmakers’ understanding of responsibilities 
alone, but other emergent themes. Notably, analysis identified several important 
topics of debate that would prove important in shaping the subsequent policy process. 
                                                
57Though this was not the first attempt; earlier, similar, Private Members’ Bills include the Fuel 
Poverty and Energy Conservation Bill and the Warm Homes and Energy Conservation (Fifteen Year 
Programme) Bill. Boardman records that the Labour party had already begun to recognise fuel poverty 
as a policy problem when WHECB came before parliament in 2000 (2010: 2-3).  
58 Ideally, other relevant legislation would have been added to analysis (e.g., the Utilities Act 2000, the 
Energy Act 2010). However, given the practical limitations of this research, WHECA was selected as 
most pertinent to the topic under consideration. 
59 As will be observed throughout this work, politicians do not often seem to consider fuel poverty a 
high priority. It is worth then at this stage recognising one steadfast supporter in the House of 
Commons, the late Malcolm Wicks, who not only wrote one of the earliest academic texts on energy 
affordability (Wicks 1978), but also was later Minister for Energy (see Wicks 2013), and worked 
closely with fuel poverty advocacy organisations, including NEA (see NEA 2012). 
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4.2.1 Assigning Responsibility 
 
WHECA itself is a comparatively short piece of legislation, allowing scope for 
government to establish a definition of ‘fuel poverty’ and to decide how it should be 
tackled. In that sense, the legislation itself is almost solely about establishing the 
principle that there is a responsibility to end fuel poverty, and there is no ambiguity 
about whose responsibility that is: the Act requires the Secretary of State – as the 
appropriate authority – to publish a strategy (see WHECA s. 2). Although there is 
scope for this strategy to require that suppliers play a role, the WHECB debates did 
not acknowledge such a possibility, or indicate that it might be expected. The vast 
majority of discussions of responsibilities under WHECA relate to the notion of 
establishing that the government has a responsibility to pass legislation relating to fuel 
poverty eradication, e.g.: 
 
…we would have been establishing in law the responsibility to end fuel poverty, 
which is extremely important. We would have had to argue about how to do it 
and how quickly, but no longer about whether we should do it. 
 
David Amess MP (Con., Southend West) 
Hansard HC vol. 352 col 684 (21st June 2000) 
 
Responsibility now lies firmly in the Government's hands. If they want this Bill 
or a version of it to reach the statute book, they can make it happen. They have 
promised to eradicate fuel poverty and senior Ministers are on the record as 
saying that fuel poverty must be ended, that it is a scandal and a preventable 
scourge. 
 
Damian Green MP (Con., Ashford) 
Hansard HC vol. 345 col 1351 (10 March 2000) 
 
We need collective political action on these issues to take the responsibility 
away from the individual. 
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Ian Gibson MP (Lab., Norwich, North) 
Hansard HC vol. 345 col 1308 (10th March 2000) 
 
References were made at various points to the possible responsibilities of Local 
Authorities, Housing Associations and regulators under WHECA 60 . However, 
comparatively little reference is made to energy suppliers. On only one occasion is 
reference made to the possible contribution of supplier obligations via the Utilities 
Bill (later passed as the Utilities Act 2000), which would transfer power in setting 
obligation targets from Ofgem to government 61 . However, more common are 
instances of debaters applauding voluntary initiatives by suppliers, e.g.: 
 
Some of the big companies, such as PowerGen, TXU Eastern Energy, and 
Scottish Power have been particularly active in working on these issues and--on 
energy efficiency though not on pricing--Transco has recently launched a £30 
million project, which will help to build on the Bill. 
 
Linda Gilroy MP (Lab., Plymouth Sutton) 
Hansard HC vol. 345 col 1322 (10th March 2000) 
 
Though such comments recognised that suppliers could play a role in delivering 
measures, this was not equated with an obligation or responsibility. At one point in 
the Commons Second Reading, Edward Garnier (referencing a clause that was 
ultimately deleted) asks David Amess to clarify whether, if suppliers were required to 
offer social tariffs: 
 
…that means that there will be subsidies for energy companies such as gas, 
coal or electricity suppliers, to enable them to reduce the tariff to a particular 
section of society, whether the individual consumers of those energy products 
will get the subsidy directly, or whether there will be no subsidy at all? 
 
Edward Garnier MP (Con., Harborough) 
                                                
60 See, for example, comments made by Louise Ellman MP (Lab., Liverpool Riverside), Hansard HC 
vol. 345 col 1342 (10th March 2000). 
61 Christopher Mullin MP (Lab., Sunderland South), Hansard HC vol. 345 col 1352 (10th March 2000). 
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Hansard HC vol. 345 col 1340-1341 (10th March 2000) 
 
The debate ended before Amess could respond, but this is the type of question that – 
as shall be explored in this thesis – became crucial as supplier responsibility was 
expanded; in the WHECB debates, it was barely touched upon. A possible explanation 
for this general lack of consideration as to where responsibilities might lie is that, as 
will be discussed in section 4.2.5, fulfilment of WHECA was not expected to involve 
activity above and beyond what was already occurring. 
 
4.2.2 Defining ‘Fuel Poverty’ 
 
The first provision of WHECA is primarily concerned with defining fuel poverty, 
offering this initial broad conceptualisation: 
 
For the purposes of this Act, a person is to be regarded as living “in fuel 
poverty” if he is a member of a household living on a lower income in a home 
which cannot be kept warm at a reasonable cost. 
 
Warm Homes and Energy Conservation Act 2000 (s. 1(1)) 
Crucially, the Act then allows that the Secretary of State can specify the parameters of 
the terms “lower income”, “reasonable cost” and “warm” (s. 1(2)(a))). David Amess 
offered his rationale for this loose definition during the Bill debates: 
The definition of fuel poverty is a general one, but it may be changed from 
time to time in order better to target people who need help.  
 
 David Amess MP (Con., Southend West) 
Hansard HC vol. 354 col 702 (21st July 2000) 
 
In the debates themselves, the 10pct definition of fuel poverty was universally used 
(see, for example, Hansard HC vol. 345 col 1299). However, inclusion of the term 
‘fuel poverty’ in the final legislation was a contentious issue. A small but vocal 
minority of MPs questioned the legitimacy of the concept, and whether it was distinct 
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from income poverty. The issue became something of a political pawn with 
campaigning groups happy to lose the terminology so long as the bill was passed62. 
Ultimately, though, it was decided that the term should be included, but that the 
precise definition should be left to secondary legislators. Some parliamentarians - 
particularly in the Lords - voiced scepticism as to this ability of government 
departments to redefine “fuel poverty” as they saw fit: 
 
 It is a Henry VIII clause63 par excellence. 
Lord Skelmersdale (Con.) 
Hansard HL vol. 617 col 628 (13th Oct 2000) 
 
Others hurried to offer assurances that observers would reject any convenient 
redefinition of the term: 
A new definition which miraculously removed a million households from "fuel 
poverty" would be highly suspect and would almost certainly be fiddling the 
figures. 
 
Lord McColl of Dulwich (Con.) 
Hansard HL vol. 617 col 618-9 (13th Oct 2000) 
 
The new definition proposed by the Hills Fuel Poverty Review has indeed taken 1.2m 
households out of fuel poverty (though it also classified almost 0.5m more individuals 
as fuel poor) (Hills 2012: 184). However, this review came a decade later, in 
recognition of problems with the 10pct definition. Furthermore, Hills emphasised the 
broad conceptualisation of WHECA (s.1 (1)) as fundamentally correct, and fashioned 
the LIHC definition accordingly (see Hills 2011: 17). 
 
 
 
                                                
62 See in particular the House of Commons Third Reading; though the context is not clear from the 
Hansard transcripts alone, several speakers refer to external lobbying on the matter from Friends of the 
Earth. 
63 “A provision to a Bill which enables the Government to repeal or amend it after it has become an Act 
of Parliament” (see Parliament.uk 2014b).  
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4.2.3 The Practicability Question 
 
 …that as far as reasonably practicable persons do not live in fuel poverty. 
 
Warm Homes and Energy Conservation Act 2000 (s. 2(1)) 
 
Unlike previous bills with similar intentions the word “practicable” was included 
from the earliest drafts of WHECB. However those previous bills had included 
assertions that eradication of fuel poverty should not require infringement of 
individual liberty, e.g., that authorities should not be able to forcibly enter a private 
dwelling (see Warm Homes and Energy Conservation (Fifteen Year Programme) Bill 
(s. 4(b))). It is in this same context that ‘practicable’ is used in the WHECB debates. 
Whilst the phrase itself was not discussed at any length, where it does appear the 
intention is transparent: 
 
I would dearly love to eliminate fuel poverty altogether but, although I hope 
that the Bill will address some of the  problems, some households--perhaps 
many--will refuse to co-operate with the scheme. Some houses simply cannot 
be insulated to the necessary standards and some households will be 
genuinely remiss, but I am advised that the Bill's intention to eliminate fuel 
poverty as far as is practicable is a sensible test. 
 
David Amess MP (Con., Southend West) 
Hansard HC vol. 345 col 1304 (10th March 2000) 
 
The meaning here is clear - again, that legislators wanted to ensure that Government 
was not penalised for missing the target where householders were unwilling to take-
up measures. However, the interpretation of the word ‘practicable’ would later be 
fundamental to an application for 2008 judicial review that was the difference 
between WHECA being treated as an adaptable guideline rather than as a binding 
commitment; this is discussed further in section 4.3.1. 
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4.2.4 Targets and Strategy 
 
The second provision of WHECA is the most detailed, and is concerned with 
establishing the role that the government should be required to play in tackling fuel 
poverty 64 . The two primary elements are the establishment of a fuel poverty 
eradication target and the creation of a strategy to meet this target. WHECB went 
before parliament at a time when the ‘measurement culture’ of New Labour was a 
dominant force in policy implementation (see Hudson, Lowe 2009: 274-278). 
Techniques drawn from New Public Management were influential in encouraging the 
development of quantifiable policy targets. This type of evaluation methodology has 
endured, but in 2000 it seemed rather new-fangled to some: 
 
Then Mr. Williams talked about targets. I thought, "Goodness. Targets. That 
sounds like the new sort of politics that I am trying to cope with.” 
David Amess MP (Con., Southend West) 
Hansard HC vol. 345 col 1297 (10th March 2000) 
 
However, Members were extremely positive about the proposed use of strategy and 
quantifiable targets to support the fulfilment of WHECA 2000. 
Colleagues on both sides do not want a sham Bill: we want it to contain 
figures and targets so that we can judge what the Government have achieved 
and whether or not they have succeeded. 
 
David Maclean MP (Con., Penrith and The Border) 
Hansard HC vol. 345 col 1302 (10th March 2000) 
 
The final WHECA required that a target for the eradication of fuel poverty “as far as is 
reasonably practicable” be set for “not more than fifteen years after the date on which 
the strategy is published” (s. 2). A strategy for the achievement of this fifteen-year 
target was to be produced within a year of Royal Assent, and reviewed and revised as 
                                                
64 It is also worth mentioning that this provision explicitly recognises energy efficiency measures as the 
appropriate solution (see s.2 (2)(b)). 
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necessary to ensure success. Some participants in the WHECB debates felt, however, 
that this was not ambitious enough: 
 
Mr Green: I do not expect the Minister to commit the Government to another 
target this morning, but it would be valuable if he could say whether it is 
practical even to think that we might be able to hit a target that is less than 15 
years. 
 
Mr Mullin: The hon. Gentleman asked me whether we could achieve the 
objective in under 15 years. We may do, but as he knows, we are a prudent 
Government as well as a listening Government, so we have set what we 
consider to be a prudent target. 
 
Damien Green MP (Con., Ashford) and 
Christopher Mullin MP (Lab., Sunderland South)65  
Hansard HC vol. 354 col 687-688 (21st July 2000) 
 
Despite debaters’ enthusiasm for ambitious targets and metrics that would enable 
policy monitoring, in 2011 3.2m households were 10pct fuel poor, up from 1.2m in 
2003 (DECC 2013c: 10); possible contributory reasons for this policy failure – 
including failures to review strategy - are discussed in sections 4.3 and 4.4. 
 
4.2.5 “There shall be paid out of money provided by Parliament…”66 
 
The third provision of WHECA was the result of what is termed a money resolution; a 
clause enabling public money to be spent in the fulfilment of legislation. In the case 
of WHECA, the debates that led to this provision being included were rather seriously 
misinformed. Proponents of the bill were keen to emphasise that fulfilment of the bill 
would require little if any public expenditure. 
 
The Warm Homes and Energy Conservation Bill . . . enshrines current 
commitments and mirrors measures that we already have in hand. For that 
                                                
65 Also then-Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions. 
66 This is the standard opening text of the Money Resolution in UK legislation. 
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reason, we do not believe that anything in the Bill would increase public 
expenditure above and beyond current commitments. 
 
Official Report vol. 347 c. 945-6 (4th April 2000) 
 
Several Members raised concern about the lack of any costing for the Bill, and 
expressed concerns that it might be much higher than expected. Again, those 
supporting the Bill reassured them that all it was intended to do was underscore 
intentions: 
 
A number of hon. Members have asked about cost. Nothing in the Bill would 
increase spending per se. In any case, the Government have greatly increased 
spending in this area, as I have outlined. The Bill would enshrine existing 
commitments. 
 
Christopher Mullin MP (Lab., Sunderland South) 
Hansard HC vol. 345 col 1351 (10th March 2000) 
 
This turned out to be hugely inaccurate. The scale of the discrepancy was 
foreshadowed during the Money Resolution debate: 
 
If the cost of this measure turns out to be £2 billion over 20 years, it is 
reasonable, but if it is £15 billion over five years, that is an enormous cost. 
 
David Maclean MP (Con., Penrith and The Border)  
Hansard HC vol. 347 col 946 (4th April 2000) 
 
The latter number quoted by David Maclean is likely to be much closer to the truth, if 
not conservative; Guertler and Preston (2009: 14) model a scheme that would 
alleviate 10pct fuel poverty in the seven years between 2009 and 2016 and estimate 
the cost at around £24bn. Although it is possible that it was considered that the money 
for such a programme could come from non-Treasury sources, this is not evident in 
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debates. This failure could be classed as a forecasting error67. However, it is also 
evidence of something more fundamental about the perceived role of WHECA. This 
exchange, from the Third Reading of the Bill in the House of Commons, is telling: 
 
Mr Mullin: Much money is already being spent on combating fuel poverty, but 
the Bill by itself does not commit us to further funding. We are already 
spending a great deal on such matters. 
 
Mr Forth: In that sense, anyone who claims that many extra homes will be 
heated because of the Bill is obviously not correct. 
 
Mr Mullin: A good deal of work is already under way, and many extra homes 
will continue to be heated.  
  
Christopher Mullin MP (Lab., Sunderland South) and 
Eric Forth MP (Con., Bromley and Chislehurst) 
Hansard HC vol. 354 col 708 (21st July 2000) 
 
In fact, Eric Forth’s suggestion goes to the heart of the intention of WHECA; from 
analysis of debates, it seems clear that the legislation was never expected to catalyse 
any enormous drive of activity. It is hard to argue that the parliamentarians who 
passed WHECA saw it as anything more that an expression that existing work should 
continue to focus on the vulnerable, which seems to plausibly explain why they might 
have neglected to consider any expanded role or responsibility for energy suppliers in 
the future. 
  
                                                
67 Another forecasting lapse is that the potential for fuel prices to rise was entirely disregarded; at the 
time of debates, they were falling post-privatisation (see Utley and Shorrock 2008:13). Eric Forth MP 
suggested in the Second Reading “that there is a certain irony in the fact that we are debating the issue 
against the background of secular falling fuel price” (Hansard HC vol. 345 col 1345 (10th March 
2000)). Recognition that this would not continue indefinitely would presumably have made for a very 
different perception of the problem. 
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4.3 Post-WHECA Fuel Poverty Policies  
 
Given the emphasis of the WHECA debates, it is perhaps not surprising that its 
passage did not herald a new dawn for fuel poverty reduction in England; the only 
initial, modest requirement was that a strategy be produced. In the thirteen years since 
the passage of WHECA no new state-led national level fuel poverty programme has 
been launched. However, energy supplier obligations – already in place in 2000 – 
have evolved to become the only technical fuel poverty schemes, with an additional 
supplier-led economic scheme, WHDS, added to the mix. The result is that from 
having been barely considered when WHECA was passed, energy suppliers now 
deliver a significant proportion of fuel poverty mitigation activity. This section 
describes key developments in fuel poverty policy between the passage of WHECA in 
late-2000 and ECO’s launch in January 2013. Firstly, Government activity is 
considered, then the emerging role of supplier obligations as a means of tackling fuel 
poverty. The latter part of the section covers the findings of policy document analysis, 
both with regard to the expected contribution of schemes towards the requirements of 
WHECA, and in terms of the rationale for the shift towards supplier obligations as the 
core means of delivery. 
 
4.3.1 Government Schemes 
 
As required by WHECA, the government published The UK Fuel Poverty Strategy 
(UKFPS) in November 2001 (DTI 2001). This included an overview of the problem, a 
discussion of how government proposed to define and monitor it (applying the 10pct 
definition and indicator metrics), and a discussion of existing – not new – 
programmes expected to contribute to eradication, including Warm Front, WFPs, 
CWPs and energy supplier obligations. The target declared in that document was “an 
end to the blight of fuel poverty for vulnerable households by 2010” (DTI 2001: 10). 
The target date for full eradication – 22nd November 2016, as required by WHECA –
was not declared until the publication of the first annual progress report (see 
DEFRA/DTI 2003: 6). The UKFPS contained two further objectives tied to operation 
of the Warm Front and (then forthcoming) Decent Homes schemes, but these were 
not quantifiably linked to the overall eradication target. 
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In the years following UKFPS publication, fuel prices rose and fuel poverty levels 
consequently escalated (see Figure 1.1). WHECA required that progress towards 
eradication targets be monitored, and strategy revised as necessary (s. 2(6)). However 
this did not happen. As Boardman observes: 
 
The government’s successive annual fuel poverty reports continued to be 
‘reports’, not amendments to the strategy. The strategy became a sacrosanct 
article, an end in itself, beyond the original intentions. According to the act, it 
had to be produced, it was produced, so the act had been complied with. 
 
(Boardman 2010: 8) 
 
The findings of the document analysis undertaken in this work agree with 
Boardman’s assessment that the annual progress reports released by government 
merely described work undertaken without considering how it contributed to the 
overall target (see, for example, DECC 2009). Furthermore, since 2010 the UKFPS 
progress reports have stopped entirely, with only annual reports of fuel poverty 
statistics being released. These describe the problem and drivers, but do not consider 
mitigation schemes in any detail (cf. DECC 2013c). 
 
A further blow for proponents of fuel poverty eradication came with a judicial review 
of policies in October 2008. Friends of the Earth and Help the Aged launched a joint 
claim against government departments, contending that they were failing to meet the 
responsibilities of WHECA. This was dismissed (an account of the process is given in 
Boardman 2010: 13-14): 
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I do not consider that it is open to the court to review the policy decisions of 
the Defendants as to the way they should go about the implementation of the 
Strategy. It is open to Government to have regard to its overall budget and the 
other calls upon its resources in deciding what steps to take in implementation 
of the strategy, including its requirements that efforts should be made to 
achieve the 2010 and 2016 targets as far as reasonably practicable. 
 
Friends of the Earth and Help the Aged v Secretary of State for Business 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform and Secretary of State for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs [2008] EWHC 2518 
 
 
This ruling substantially undermines the power of WHECA by allowing the 
government to decide for itself what constitutes “reasonably practicable” activity. In 
the context of the debate analysis reported above, this seems both out of keeping with 
the original spirit of those discussions, as well as an apparently accidental loophole, 
given that the original references to ‘practicability’ focused on the liberty of 
householders.  
 
As of January 2013, Warm Front, the state-led technical scheme, on which the 
UKFPS hinged, has ended, without any replacement. The only other Exchequer-
funded programmes – CWPs and WFPs – are economic schemes overseen by DWP. 
With no clear strategy in place (and the power of WHECA undermined by judicial 
review), the once-ignored energy supplier obligations now appear to be the primary 
means by which the government expects to achieve fuel poverty alleviation. 
 
4.3.2 Energy Supplier Obligations 
 
In the few decades in which fuel poverty emerged as a distinct social problem, the 
energy industries underwent significant change.  The privatised system that we know 
today is the legacy of the widespread economic and political reforms delivered by the 
Thatcher Conservative government that was first elected in 1979. The rationale 
underlying Thatcher’s aggressive privatisation of public services has been 
exhaustively documented  (see Riddell 1991, Roy, Clarke 2005, Feigenbaum, Henig 
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& Hamnett 1999) . In summary, implementing a neoliberal doctrine, Thatcher set 
about “rolling back the frontiers of the state,”68 privatising state-owned industries 
with a view to improving efficiency. An initial experiment with the privatisation of 
British Telecom in 1984 was considered successful, and privatisation of other core 
utilities followed, including gas (via the Gas Act 1986) and electricity (via the 
Electricity Act 1989). Accounts of the privatisation of the energy industries are united 
in agreement that, while the efficiencies of privatisation were expected to lower fuel 
prices, there were no initial plans to harness the new structure to deliver energy 
efficiency measures or promote equity. Greenhouse gas emissions were beginning to 
raise concern in some quarters, and the so-called ‘greening of the Conservative Party’ 
was in progress69. However, Roberts et al. (1991: 123) describe the Conservative 
government at the time of the Electricity Act as suspicious of any market intervention, 
including those directed at energy efficiency. Boardman corroborates this account of a 
focus upon supply side measures over demand side, i.e., that a more efficient market 
will lower prices, not that energy efficiency interventions should be used to restrict 
need (1991: 30, 195-196). 
 
Despite that inauspicious political context, the Electricity Act 1989 did include some 
limited provisions enabling the promotion of energy efficiency70. The Labour peer 
Lord Shepherd originally introduced an amendment to the Bill seeking to: 
  
                                                
68 A goal Thatcher herself expressed on a number of occasions, see Margaret Thatcher Foundation 
(2014a, 2014b). 
69 Prominent turning points in this process being being Thatcher’s 1988 speech to the Royal Society 
(Margaret Thatcher Foundation 2014c) and the 1989 publication of the Pearce Report (Pearce et al. 
1989), which framed environmental issues in economic terms that were ideologically appealing to that 
audience. 
70 Detailed consideration of the justification for this amendment is beyond the scope of this work, 
however, a cursory review of the Hansard debates suggests two main motives: firstly, a desire on the 
part of Labour Lords to instill the emerging private energy suppliers with a sense of responsibility 
towards energy efficiency and environmental outcomes; secondly, that those more favourably disposed 
towards privatisation suggested that - if greater energy efficiency were important - the market were 
potentially well placed to implement such schemes efficiently. 
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…require each of the public electricity suppliers to make and produce 
evidence to the Director showing that he has made such arrangements as will 
promote the efficient use of electricity. 
 
Hansard HL vol. 507 col 1044 (16th May 1989) 
 
Passed in the Lords71,, this was substantially weakened in the Commons but made it 
into the final Electricity Act 1989 (s. 41(1)(a), ‘Promotion of the efficient use by 
consumers of electricity’), enabling the regulator to “determine such standards of 
performance in connection with the promotion of the efficient use of electricity by 
consumers as, in his opinion, ought to be achieved by such suppliers”72. Whilst the 
legislation enacted leaves the role of electricity companies in promoting energy 
efficiency largely at the discretion of a then unenthusiastic Government, its inclusion 
paved the way for later activity. After several years of dormancy, in 1994 the EESoP 
programme was introduced, the first in a succession of interventions that have 
evolved and persisted through to the present day. Rosenow (2012) offers a 
comprehensive history of the development of supplier obligations in the UK, and 
identifies a number of drivers of change, some of which apply to the launch of initial 
activity. These include changing attitudes to climate change, regulatory personnel 
(particularly within the Office of Electricity Regulation (OFFER)) sympathetic to 
obligation introduction, and a growing interest in the Least Cost Planning model73. 
Table 4.3 adapts and revises Rosenow’s (2012) comprehensive overview of historic 
supplier obligations towards domestic energy efficiency, incorporating the more 
recent CESP and ECO programmes that are beyond the scope of his investigation, and 
emphasising those elements relevant to this research. 
                                                
71 Before this time a voluntary Code of Practice was in place that was designed to protect low income 
households from disconnection, see Berthoud (1983). 
72 The Gas Act 1986 was amended in 2001 to incorporate similar functions.  
73 Davison (1991) offers a contemporary assessment of the value of Least Cost Planning as used in this 
context. 
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Table 4.3: Development of Energy Supplier Obligations: 1994-2013 
 
Name of 
scheme 
EESoP1 EESoP2 EESoP3 EEC 1 EEC 2 CERT CESP ECO 
Period 1994 − 1998 1998 − 2000 2000 − 2002 2002 − 2005 2005 − 2008 2008 − 2012 2009 - 2012 2013 – 2015 
(expected) 
Target 
(lifetime) 
6.1 TWh 2.7 TWh 4.9 TWh 
Electricity & 
6.1 Gas 
(lifetime)  
62 TWh 130 TWh 293 MtCO2 ^ 
494 TWh 
19.25 MtCO2  
 
20.9 MtCO2 
(CERO), 6.8 
MtCO2 (CSCO) & 
£4.2bn notional 
savings (HHCRO) 
Target Group Public 
Electricity 
Suppliers (PESs  
Public 
Electricity 
Suppliers (PESs  
All licensed gas 
and electricity 
suppliers with at 
least 50,000 
domestic 
customers  
All licensed 
gas and 
electricity 
suppliers with 
at least 15,000 
domestic 
customers  
All suppliers 
with over 
50,000 gas 
and/or 
electricity 
domestic 
customers  
All suppliers 
with over 
250,000 gas 
and/or 
electricity 
domestic 
customers  
All licensed gas and 
electricity suppliers 
that have at least 
50,000 domestic 
customers and all 
licensed electricity 
generators that have 
generated on average 
10 TWh/yr or more in 
a specified three-year 
All suppliers with 
over 250,000 gas 
and/or electricity 
domestic 
customers, and who 
supply more than 
400 gigawatt hours 
of electricity or 
2,000 gigawatt 
hours of gas 
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period. 
 
Coverage Domestic and 
small business 
electricity 
customers  
Domestic and 
small business 
electricity 
customers  
Domestic and 
small business 
electricity and 
gas customers  
Domestic 
electricity and 
gas customers  
Domestic 
electricity and 
gas customers  
Domestic 
electricity and 
gas customers  
Domestic electricity 
and gas customers 
Domestic 
electricity and gas 
customers 
Supplier cost 
of the 
programme 
£101.7 million £48.1 million £110 million 
(indicative) 
£500 million 
(indicative)  
£1.2 billion 
(indicative)  
£5.5 billion 
(indicative)  
£377m (indicative) £2.925 billion 
(indicative) 
Expenditure 
allowance 
£1 per franchise 
customer per 
year allowed 
through the 
supply price 
control  
£1 per franchise 
customer per 
year allowed 
through the 
supply price 
restraint  
£1.20 per 
customer per 
fuel per annum, 
indicative in 
target setting 
model  
£3.60 per 
customer per 
fuel per 
annum, 
indicative in 
target setting 
model  
£9 per 
customer per 
fuel per 
annum, 
indicative in 
target setting 
model  
£51 per 
customer per 
annum, 
indicative in 
target setting 
model  
£5 per customer per 
annum, indicative in 
target setting model 
£103 per customer 
per annum, 
indicative in target 
setting model 
Percent of 
savings in 
30% (expected, 
not 
65% of 
expenditure 
67% of 
expenditure 
50%  50%  40% (15% in 
Super Priority 
Only delivered in low-
ranked IMD areas. 
25% of ECO 
savings are under 
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priority group compulsory)  (expected, not 
compulsory)  
(expected, not 
compulsory)  
Group)  the Affordable 
Warmth elements 
of the scheme. 
Mix of 
measures 
Requirement to 
use variety of 
measures  
Requirement to 
use variety of 
measures  
Requirement to 
use variety of 
measures  
Not prescribed  Not prescribed  Minimum 
levels for 
some 
measures 
(68% from 
insulation)  
Whole-house 
approach encouraged. 
Mix of measures, 
though restrictions 
under CERO. 
Administering 
body  
OFFER  OFFER  OFGEM OFGEM OFGEM OFGEM OFGEM OFGEM 
Target setting 
body 
OFFER  OFFER  OFGEM DEFRA DEFRA DEFRA and 
then DECC 
(since October 
2008)  
DECC DECC 
Primarily based upon Rosenow (2012: 377). Supplementary content for CESP and ECO based on compilation of sources: (Ofgem 2009b, DECC 2012j, DECC 2012h, Ofgem 
2013b). 
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Not included in this table is WHDS, as an economic measure, notable not only as the 
first that suppliers were obligated to deliver, but the first economic measure overseen 
by DECC, not DWP. Previously suppliers had delivered economic provision on a 
voluntary basis (see Ofgem 2007a, Ofgem 2010); WHDS was intended to replace this 
activity (DECC 2011h). Crucially, since CESP, obligations have tended away from 
being construed as a percentage of delivery within a larger scheme (e.g., priority 
groups), but as distinctly focused programmes. 
 
4.3.3 Contribution of Schemes 
 
The use of supplier obligations as a means of delivering energy efficiency 
interventions might immediately appear counterintuitive; it is hard to think of any 
other private industry that is legally required to reduce the need for its own product 
via participation in an entirely different activity (the process of installing efficiency 
measures having little overlap with the supply of the energy itself). That said, energy 
is an unusual product, an essential good provided direct to households via an 
oligopoly market. Rosenow (2012) discusses drivers of the increased size of supplier 
obligations since their inception, and includes the introduction of fuel poverty as a 
policy goal as a contributory factor, albeit one with an inherent conflict. This analysis 
has approached similar concerns from an alternate perspective, considering the 
change in the delivery balance of programmes directed at fuel poverty. That shift, 
though clear at the broader level, is difficult to clarify in part because there is no 
overarching plan as to how individual programmes are meant to contribute to fuel 
poverty mitigation.  
 
The nearest substitute is the original UKFPS, which lists a range of ongoing schemes 
that are expected to contribute to the then-newly established policy goal (see DTI 
2001: 30-49). Whilst recognising the contribution of a range of interventions 
(including CWPs and WFPs), Warm Front is identified here as “the Government’s 
main programme for private sector households” (DTI 2001: 42) . This 
characterisation persists in the first progress report (DEFRA/DTI 2003: 10), and 
reoccurs in the fourth (DEFRA/DTI 2006: 11), but otherwise any assessment of extent 
of the role the policy is expected to play is dropped or the description softened to 
Warm Front as a “key tool” (e.g., DEFRA/BERR 2007: 14). With respect to supplier 
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obligations, whilst the UKFPS estimates that 65% of prior obligation spending had 
been directed at low income households (DTI 2001: 150), the declared objectives are 
based only upon activity under Warm Front and Decent Homes (see DTI 2001: 3). 
Subsequent strategy documents consistently emphasise that although supplier 
obligations do target a priority group, this is low income, not fuel poor (see 
DEFRA/DTI 2006: 14-15)74, and that the possible contribution of supplier obligations 
cannot be quantified (though the fifth report offers an estimate that "energy supplier 
activity from 2002-2011 has the potential to remove over 100,000 households form 
fuel poverty in GB (DEFRA/BERR 2007: 19)). The final report, issued in 2009 
affirmed that the “CERT’s primary aim is reduction of carbon emission in the 
domestic sector” but that the priority group of low income and vulnerable customers 
was expected to contribute (DECC 2009: 13). However, there is no quantified 
assignation of responsibilities in these strategies, nor is any rationale given for choices 
made; the documents themselves for the most part simply describe what activity is 
taking place then, and what is planned for the near future. So, though these broad and 
recurring themes are likely to be indicative of the Government’s understanding of 
scheme contribution, it is difficult to interpret the fuel poverty strategy progress 
reports as meaningful instruments of policy rather than simply the fulfilment of a 
mandated task, and in this context any very minor changes in emphasis across those 
documents policy cannot be taken as indicative of policy rationale.  
 
Rosenow (2012: 379-380) echoes earlier work by Powells (2009) in finding that 
policy documents relating to the earlier supplier obligations clearly prioritise carbon 
emission reduction as the goal of policy, even post-WHECA. It could further be 
posited that this prioritisation worked both ways; that obligations were expected to be 
conducive to fuel poverty reduction, but were not expected to be a major contributor. 
Analysis undertaken for this work supports Rosenow’s finding that documents 
relating to the earlier obligations downplay or conspicuously fail to mention fuel 
poverty, treating the issue more as an incidental outcome of the promotion of equity 
in delivery (see DEFRA 2006: 29, Ofgem 2008c, DECC 2011l: 3). Thus at an early 
stage the two policy goals were treated as related, but distinctly separate. However, 
further analysis of documentation for later schemes not included by Rosenow indicate 
                                                
74 This aligns with the earlier findings of Powells, who quotes a civil servant as reinforcing that the 
EEC was not intended to tackle fuel poverty, calling it a “common misunderstanding” (2008: 2344). 
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a clear shift towards recognising fuel poverty as a goal of obligations. For example, 
the initial CERT consultation repeatedly reiterates that the policy “does not have a 
specific fuel poverty objective” (DEFRA 2006: 5). However, the 2012 CERT 
extension in the run up to the Green Deal introduced a new ‘Super Priority Group’ of 
“lower income vulnerable households at most risk [of] fuel poverty” (DECC 2010d: 
2)  and specifically consults on the ability of the policy to reach those groups, without 
prevarication (DECC 2010d: 44). CESP policy documents go further still, declaring 
“twin objectives of significantly reducing the fuel bills of low income households 
across Great Britain; and improving the energy efficiency of the existing housing 
stock in order to reduce the UK’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions”  (CAG 
Consultants, Ipsos MORI & Building Research Establishment 2011: 4) . This is 
consistent with the fact that CESP, unlike previous obligations, was not a broader 
requirement with a defined priority group, but that English delivery was entirely 
limited to geographical areas ranked in the lowest 10 per cent according to the Indices 
of Multiple Deprivation (Ofgem 2009b: 2). However, it should be emphasised that the 
wording of the CESP objective talks about bill reduction for low income households 
rather than fuel poverty reduction. ECO a further shift, with policy documents 
explicitly recognising fuel poverty mitigation as a goal of the initiative (see DECC 
2011i: 11). This is conceivably tied to another shift, the end of state delivery of 
energy efficiency provision; to have no active energy efficiency scheme treat fuel 
poverty mitigation as a goal would seem a gap conspicuous even in the context of 
disjointed English fuel poverty policy. Furthermore, where Rosenow (2012: 375) had 
previously observed the shift from obligation targets being expressed in terms of 
energy savings to expression in terms of carbon reduction, for the first time a supplier 
obligation target, that for the HHCRO, is conveyed as a cash value of lifetime 
notional energy savings (see DECC 2012h: 4-5), further emphasising the policy focus 
on affordability. WHDS, also, identifies “tackling fuel poverty” as its central focus 
(DECC 2011h: 7). Though this is perhaps less surprising given that an economic 
policy cannot be expected to contribute to carbon reduction, the introduction of a 
supplier-led economic scheme is a development in itself, representing a further 
movement. 
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4.3.4 Rationale for Shift 
 
Policy documents issued after the identified transference of primary responsibility for 
fuel poverty mitigation offer little in the way of rationale for the shift to supplier-led 
delivery. The closest to a rationalisation found in any of the WHDS policy documents 
considered was in response to Question 1 of the consultation. An unspecified number 
of respondents had suggested that energy suppliers were unsuited to provision of such 
economic support to fuel poor households, suggesting that state would be better 
placed instead (DECC 2011h: 8). The response offered was as follows: 
 
Government believes that energy suppliers do have a role to play in protecting 
the most vulnerable households at risk of fuel poverty. Their recognition of 
this important role was demonstrate [sic] in their Voluntary Agreement 
between 2008 and 2011 to spend a combined sum of £375 million in providing 
assistance to vulnerable consumers. 
 
DECC (2011h: 9) 
 
This justification is not particularly compelling, effectively stating that suppliers are 
well suited to deliver support because they have voluntarily done so previously. 
However no further rationale appears to have been given. The ECO impact 
assessment addresses the possibility of a state-led scheme being considered as an 
alternate policy: 
 
In comparison to delivering these measures through a tax-funded programme, 
the competitive pressures in the energy supply market provide an incentive to 
drive down the costs of installation. These pressures should allow for more 
low income and vulnerable households to benefit from measures for a given 
level of spend. 
 
DECC (2012h: 27) 
 
The impact assessment states that such options were considered “prior to the 
introduction of the primary legislation which created the parent powers for the 
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secondary legislation” (DECC 2012h: 26) . Whilst there is some discussion of 
competitiveness in the Energy Act 2010 impact assessment (see DECC 2011d: 110) 
there is no extensive consideration of the relative merits of supplier and state-led 
schemes. It might be assumed that such a consideration took place at the “options” 
stage of the consultation process, which there is no requirement to publish (see BIS 
2013). However, given the lack of any explicit valuation (and the general uncertainty 
around the costs of ECO, as will be discussed in section 6.1.4) it is reasonable to 
conclude that the estimated level of benefit has not been quantified (or, if it has, the 
government do not consider it helpful to publish the findings). None of the policy 
development documents consider a state-driven model as an alternative policy option 
in any detail. Indeed, the decision to phase out Warm Front in favour of a supplier 
obligation was declared in the Spending Review 2010 only five months after the 
coalition government was formed (HM Treasury 2010b: 62). 
 
Although not representing the views of government, the annual reports of FPAG do 
offer a valuable perspective on this strategy shift, particularly given their continuity 
(issued annually since 2002) and clear focus on fuel poverty. Initially, FPAG – 
recognising that the funds allocated for Warm Front were likely to be insufficient to 
meet targets – encouraged the use of supplier obligations to tackle fuel poverty (see, 
for example, FPAG 2004: 10). However, from 2007, the reports begin to express 
particular concern that the manner in which supplier obligations are funded and 
targeted are likely to be regressive (see FPAG 2007: 14). The final report to be 
included in this analysis, from 2011/12, explicitly states that, “FPAG is of the view 
fuel poverty schemes should be funded by the exchequer and not from a levy on 
customers’ bills.” (FPAG 2012: 17) .  
 
It is apparent from document review that many of the issues considered in this thesis 
have long been evident: the regressive nature of the manner in which supplier 
obligations are funded is discussed in the UKFPS (DTI 2001: 18); problems with 
targeting measures are raised in the second annual FPAG report (FPAG 2004: 11-12). 
However, government have tended to treat these issues as side-concerns. For 
example, while the ECO impact assessment recognises that the policy is likely to be 
regressive (see DECC 2012h: 68) the possibility of an alternative (e.g., a state-led 
policy) is not considered. Tensions with fuel poverty are, instead, treated as features 
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to be managed. For example, the ECO consultation, for example, asked respondents 
about the possible need for a “distributional safeguard” rather than considering a less 
regressive general approach (DECC 2011i: 39). Even with fuel poverty as a stated 
goal of policy, it is treated as subsidiary priority and there is a distinct lack of 
appreciation for fuel poverty as more than an incidental consideration of energy 
efficiency policy. 
 
Ultimately, the reasons for the shift to supplier obligations as a means of tackling fuel 
poverty are likely to be hard to access. There are some clear synergies with those 
identified by Rosenow (2012) as driving supplier obligations as a means of tacking 
climate change, e.g., that obligations are generally seen to have been successful in 
meeting targets, and that there is an active market for measures in existence. The key 
reason given in the ECO documentation is that competitive pressures should reduce 
delivery costs (presumably as compared to government buying services directly). It is 
also in line with the broader ideological trends discussed in section 2.2.1; for a 
government looking to find a market-led alternative to Warm Front, supplier 
obligations are an obvious, pre-existing, option. Whatever the case, given the lack of 
consideration for state-led options in the ECO policy documents, it seems fair to 
assume the decision was made by politicians behind closed doors before the impact 
assessment process began.  
 
4.4 Emergent Themes 
 
Allocation of delivery responsibility has undoubtedly shaped the policies under 
consideration in this work, and as such the findings of this chapter have implications 
for subsequent analysis. This section draws together and discusses the relevance of 
themes that have arisen here for the chapters that follow. The first half discusses the 
failure of fuel poverty policy to date, and anatomises that breakdown with reference 
to the policy process theory of Hogwood and Gunn (1984). The second half considers 
the impact of the constraints and drivers discussed here upon the roles played by 
energy companies and the government. 
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4.4.1 Causes of Policy Failure 
 
Applying the government’s own monitoring criteria, it is hard to interpret the first 
thirteen years of mandated fuel poverty activity as anything other than a policy 
failure. The number of 10pct fuel poor households rose by 162% between 2003 and 
2011, and even using the LIHC definition which largely strips out the impacts of price 
rises, fuel poverty decreased by only 1.7% (DECC 2013c: 10). The analysis 
undertaken in this chapter has identified a number of weaknesses in existing delivery 
that have likely contributed to this failure. Hogwood and Gunn offer a nine-stage 
conceptualisation of the policy process (1984: 4), and Table 4.4 applies this as an 
illustrative tool, showing the stages, how they have occurred within fuel poverty 
policy, and the problems that have been identified by this analysis.   
 
Table 4.4: Fuel poverty policy process interpreted via Hogwood and Gunn’s (1984) framework  
 
Stage Within fuel poverty context Problematic features 
Deciding to decide 
(issue search or 
agenda setting) 
Gradual acceptance of fuel poverty 
as a social problem worthy of state 
intervention. 
 
Deciding how to 
decide (or issue 
filtration) 
Various Bills proposed to tackle 
fuel poverty, consideration of issue 
by political parties. Eventual 
success of Warm Homes and 
Energy Conservation Act 2000. 
Despite growing political interest, it 
was left to a Private Member’s Bill 
to get fuel poverty on the 
legislature; resource limitations 
may have resulted in weaknesses in 
final legislation. 
Issue definition 
Fuel poverty defined in The UK 
Fuel Poverty Strategy (DTI 2001) 
Definition subject to flaws, many of 
which were not apparent at that 
time (see Section 2.1.2). 
Forecasting 
UKFPS consideration of how 
factors related to fuel poverty might 
develop, e.g., fuel prices, incomes, 
excess winter deaths. 
The possibility of fuel price rises 
was completely disregarded in the 
passage of WHECA.  
Some consideration was given to 
the possibility in the UKFPS (DTI 
2001: 17-19), but potential for 
problems not fully recognised  
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Setting objectives and 
priorities 
Target, interim target, and 
objectives set in UKFPS 
(DEFRA/DTI 2005)and 1st Annual 
Progress report (DEFRA/DTI 
2003). 
No clear plan as to how target 
should be achieved, objectives not 
linked to overall target. 
Options analysis 
UKFPS consideration of existing 
schemes. 
Only current operation of existing 
schemes considered, no real 
contemplation of alternative 
approaches.  
Policy 
implementation, 
monitoring and 
control 
Annual fuel poverty statistics 
reports issued. 
Do not consider progress with 
regard to targets and objectives. 
Evaluation and review 
Government issue annual progress 
report, FPAG issue annual 
independent evaluation 
Again, government reports tend not 
to consider progress with regard to 
targets or objectives, do not 
reassess definition as problems 
emerge. Review of documents 
indicates that government often 
disregard FPAG recommendations. 
Policy maintenance, 
succession, or 
termination 
Re-evaluation of approach by 
coalition government. 
 
Own analysis structured using Hogwood and Gunn’s (1984) framework. 
 
It is clear both from the content of WHECA debates and from the results of votes on 
the Bill that lawmakers saw fuel poverty eradication as a desirable goal. Politicians 
were keen to set quantifiable targets, and had stringent expectations about strategy 
review and delivery. However, it is equally clear that those debating the Bill saw it 
only as confirmation of a pre-existing intention to support vulnerable groups in 
meeting their fuel cost needs, and believed that significant additional spending would 
not be necessary to achieve the goals of the Bill. This perception of a Bill that would 
“enshrine existing commitments”75 is at odds with an interpretation of the new legal 
obligation to eradicate fuel poverty as a call to action frequently used by campaign 
groups (see, for example, Timms 2011). Effectively, the government was happy to 
                                                
75 Christopher Mullin MP (Lab., Sunderland South), Hansard HC vol. 345 col 1351 (10th March 2000) 
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commit to such a legal obligation, so long as the financial expense was not 
significantly above previous levels. This misunderstanding was compounded because 
the use of the word ‘practicable’ in the legislation left a seemingly inadvertent 
loophole that would enable the government to later play down its commitment76. 
 
Regardless of problems with the form and formation of the legislation, the more 
fundamental problems have emerged from the subsequent activity. The demands and 
goals of WHECA could have been more effectively reconciled if there had been better 
policy management, the element of the process for which government are 
unequivocally responsible. Even given unanticipated costs and fuel price rises, 
WHECA was designed to be flexible. For example, the definition of fuel poverty 
could be have been adapted to neutralise impacts of price rises – as the LIHC 
definition did – but this only happened after a decade, despite David Amess stating an 
intention that it should be reviewed (see section 4.2.2). Equally, despite fuel poverty, 
as a partially technical concept, being amenable to quantification, policy monitoring 
has not been the reactive process described in WHECA (s. 2(6)), but a much more 
descriptive endeavour. Even though the flexibility of the legislation has the potential 
to serve as a useful policy tool, it relies upon ambition on the part of those 
implementing activity. The problems faced are not simply about the level of resource 
available, but the handling of the problem. The government cannot be said to have 
done nothing77, but they have clearly failed to strategise for the eradication of fuel 
poverty. This has not gone unnoticed; FPAG has repeatedly urged government to 
produce a stronger strategy and costings, making recommendations to this effect year-
on year that apparently fell upon deaf ears (responses described by Brenda Boardman 
as “mild and dismissive” (2010: 8)). By way of example, the 7th Annual Report 
recommended that:  
                                                
76 It is worth noting that WHECA was a Private Member’s Bill, and so those promoting it were unable 
to access the full resources of government in planning the legislation (only £200 in expenses may be 
claimed, see House of Commons Information Office 2010). Whilst the initiative of those promoting 
WHECA is commendable, it is possible that limited resources for drafting were responsible for 
weaknesses in final legislation. Furthermore, Private Member’s Bills have a low success rate in 
Parliament (see Department of Information Services 2013) and, as referenced previously, politicians 
keen to finally get a fuel poverty bill passed, even if that meant compromising somewhat on content. 
77 The Warm Front delivery objective of UKFPS (DTI 2001: 3), for example, was met (see Watson, 
Bolton 2013: 4). 
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As a matter of urgency the Department of Energy & Climate Change (DECC) 
should prepare a ‘Road Map’ with milestones and ownership of the key tasks 
required to have eradicated fuel poverty by 2016.  
 
(FPAG 2009: 5) 
 
The subsequent response given by DECC completely fails to address the strategic 
requirement, simply listing the work undertaken (DECC 2009: 32-33). Policy 
evaluation has been carried out only in the most cursory manner. Ultimately, if the 
government wished to take action on fuel poverty, it was within their capacity to do 
so. Instead, policymakers have taken advantage of the opportunity presented by the 
inadvertent ‘practicability’ loophole and opted only to follow the letter – not the spirit 
– of the law. 
 
4.4.2 Policy Constraints 
 
At this stage three main policy constraints can be identified as impacting the policy 
process.  
 
• Legal 
 
Both the state and suppliers are subject to legal constraints; the state is required to 
eradicate fuel poverty under WHECA, and suppliers are required to deliver obligations 
under powers originally enacted under the Electricity Act 1989, since expanded. 
However, the legal requirements faced by the different players are different in nature. 
As already discussed in section 4.3.1, the judicial review of WHECA compromised 
the potency of that law. Furthermore, whilst parliamentary approval would be 
required, government are empowered to remove or amend the law, and so could 
remove or further weaken the legislation (this fundamental circularity will be returned 
to in Chapter Eight). On the other hand, although suppliers can lobby lawmakers, they 
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themselves are not empowered to change legislation, and so have to either comply 
with obligations, face significant financial penalties78, or leave the market. 
 
 
• Political 
 
A theme emerging strongly from the analysis undertaken is the lack of political 
willingness to commit resources in order to achieve fuel poverty eradication. A 
comprehensive interrogation of political motives is beyond the scope of this work, but 
the lack of political ambition is evident in the failure and mismanagement of fuel 
poverty policy by government. This has not gone unnoticed; FPAG observed in 2007 
(report published 2008) that: 
 …from the outside it appeared as if the Government had given up rather than 
looking hard at the position and re-assessing its policies in a radical way 
when the fuel poverty target started to look very difficult. 
 
FPAG (2008) 
 
Furthermore, analysis by Jansz and Guertler (2012) has demonstrated that fuel 
poverty budgets declined by 26% between 2009 and 2013, against average cuts to 
departmental budgets of 19% following the Spending Review 2010 (HM Treasury 
2010b: 5). This diminishing ambition is perhaps not surprising given the previously 
acknowledged combination of the high economic costs of fuel poverty mitigation and 
the lack of legal impetus from government. If those legal boundaries are reassessed, it 
seems likely that new legislation will mirror the current cautious attitude of 
government, rather than the comparatively unbounded optimism of 2000. 
The likely role of political ideology should also be recognised at this stage. As already 
discussed, the coalition government have pursued an agenda of increasing private 
sector involvement in the delivery of services, many more prominent than fuel 
                                                
78 The legal constraints on suppliers are in some respects economic, as the penalty is a fine. However, 
enormity of the potential penalty makes it hard to conceive that suppliers make any sort of cost benefit 
analysis (i.e., simply choosing to take some level of fine is not a viable option). 
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poverty eradication. The Spending Review 2010 framed the decision to phase out 
Warm Front as one that would enable savings to public expenditure. This is in line 
with more the ideological stance, already discussed in section 2.2.1, of David 
Cameron’s Conservatives, who favour cuts to taxes, deficit reduction and an increased 
role for the market. As such the increased role of the private sector in delivering 
energy efficiency must be viewed in context, as part of that larger philosophy of 
delivery. 
A final emerging influence that might be classed as political is that of path 
dependency. As early as 1983, Bradshaw noted the problematic influence of 
‘incrementalism’ in energy policy as it pertained to those on low incomes, i.e., that 
policies were more the result of smaller ‘tweaks’ than of a considered, high-level plan 
(see Bradshaw 1983: 107-108). Such an effect is similarly evident in the move 
towards supplier obligations as a means of tackling fuel poverty, as established in 
section 4.3.3; in place of a coherent strategy or road map for fuel poverty alleviation, 
there has been a steady shift towards incorporating fuel poverty within existing 
supplier obligations. The concept of path dependency, as developed by Paul Pierson 
(2000) is in some respects a more theoretically advanced understanding of 
incrementalism. Pierson applies the economic concept of increasing returns to scale to 
policy; any step along a particular path that produces some positive consequences that 
are self-reinforcing, makes that path more appealing in the future by comparison to 
other options. The result is ‘inertia’, that, “once an increasing returns process is 
established, positive feedback may lead to a single equilibrium. This equilibrium will 
in turn be resistant to change” (Pierson 2000: 263) . So, for example, as supplier 
obligations are already in use as a means of delivering energy efficiency measures - 
and have been relatively successful - the shift to a new state-led equivalent would 
require significant resource and so be less appealing, even if it were expected to offer 
better outcomes. Thus political institutions display a “status quo bias” (Pierson 2000: 
262) . However, certain kinds of exogenous shocks can cause a ‘critical juncture’ 
whereby more radical change is incentivised. This might be, for example, an 
economic crisis or a change in government (see Myles and Pierson (2001) for an 
application of this theory to the case of pension reform). 
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• Economic 
 
Although the ultimate economic benefits of fuel poverty mitigation may be 
significant, the immediate financial costs of improving the housing stock are 
undoubtedly substantial, as will be discussed in section 6.1. It is clear from analysis of 
the WHECA debates that the actual cost far outstrips the expectations of the 
lawmakers who passed the legislation. Thus state delivery of fuel poverty mitigation 
would require public expenditure far beyond anticipated levels. When suppliers 
deliver the Treasury are spared this expense, because the costs are ultimately 
transferred to the public via energy bills, rather than taxes; again, the implications of 
this choice are the focus of Chapter Six. 
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter reported research that set out to establish how and why responsibilities 
towards fuel poverty mitigation have been assigned in previous policy. Analysis of 
Hansard transcripts of WHECA debates found that division of responsibilities was 
given little consideration at that stage, primarily because it was assumed eradication 
would not require activity beyond what was already in place. Further analysis of 
policy documents found that, whilst a shift away from the government delivery of 
strategy towards supplier obligation as the means to tackle fuel poverty was apparent, 
this did not extend to a thorough discussion of the justification of that decision in 
terms of meeting the fuel poverty targets. While it is accepted that understanding of 
the motives of fuel poverty policymakers may be beyond the grasp of researchers, a 
number of legal, political and economic constraints were identified as likely 
impacting upon this choice. Evidence of poor policy management on the part of 
government was also presented, and it was further argued that this has likely to have 
contributed to fuel poverty policy failure.  
 
Fuel poverty mitigation and carbon reduction share many synergies, so both can be 
tackled with the same policies. However, there are tensions and therefore trying to 
achieve both goals within same framework requires careful management. As has 
already been referenced (and will be considered in detail throughout this thesis), 
energy savings, even taken as cost savings, do not necessarily translate to fuel poverty 
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savings; they need to go to the right households, and be funded appropriately. Whilst 
government have acknowledged tensions, the documents examined in this chapter 
paid little attention to the comparative impact of the decision to move from a state-led 
model to a supplier led model upon achievement of fuel poverty eradication; it is this 
gap that the remainder of this work seeks to address. 
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5 | Finding the Fuel Poor 
 
 
When designing policy it is necessary to decide whether interventions should be 
offered universally or targeted towards specific groups. The fuel poverty policies 
under consideration here are focused so that particular households are prioritised for 
support. In the case of technical measures, the motives for targeting are 
straightforward; whilst a universally efficient housing stock may be the ultimate goal, 
achievement of this will undoubtedly take many years and it is in the interests of 
equity – and fuel poverty eradication – to ensure that low income households are 
appropriately prioritised throughout that process. Economic measures also require 
some level of targeting given limits on available funds and, ideally, to support a 
coherent link between monetary interventions and energy affordability as a goal of 
policy. Effective targeting is important in enabling the efficient disbursement of 
limited budgets upon often expensive interventions, ensuring that measures go to 
those households who will benefit the most, and who are in greatest need. To do 
otherwise would be to risk policy failure; moreover, under the relative LIHC 
definition of fuel poverty, significant misdirection of support has the potential to 
increase the numbers of individuals in fuel poverty. As will be demonstrated in this 
chapter, the task of effectively identifying fuel poor households is problematic due to 
the type and quantity of data required. As energy suppliers have taken an increased 
role in delivering fuel poverty policy, they have also taken more responsibility for the 
targeting of resources. This has primarily involved identifying qualifying households 
to fulfil priority group obligations, though more recently, under WHDS, companies 
have also taken a role in forming eligibility criteria. 
 
This chapter reports the findings of comparative analysis of the roles and capacity of 
the state and suppliers to successfully target and identify fuel poor households. The 
first section gives an overview of targeting strategies employed to date, incorporating 
an assessment of the efficiency of eligibility criteria via analysis of 2011 EHS 
datasets. This section includes an account of the analysis framework and terminology 
applied in this work, which builds upon that offered by Dubois (2012). The second 
section is focused on the targeting element of the process, comparing the capability of 
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state and energy suppliers to effectively identify fuel poor households. The third 
section applies a similar approach in considering the identification of households that 
meet defined eligibility criteria, and subsequent implementation. The final section 
summarises the issues identified with current delivery mechanisms, and suggests a 
number of adjustments to policy that could address the problems. However, all 
proposed modifications would require increased state involvement and it is argued 
that, despite the current technical, legal and organisational barriers to effective 
targeting, it is likely that political will and economic limitations pose the greatest 
impediments to improvement. 
 
 Methodological Overview 
 
The analysis presented in this chapter is based on three main methodologies; review 
of policy literature, quantitative analysis, and professional engagement. Policy 
literature has been reviewed according to the process described in section 3.4.2 in 
order to develop a detailed account of the strategies applied in current targeting and, 
where stated, government perceptions of the purpose and efficacy of targeting. 
 Quantitative analysis of EHS 2011 datasets is a particular feature of this chapter. This 
is primarily based upon the use of descriptive statistics as a means of assessing the 
efficiency of eligibility criteria. Based upon the data provided in EHS 2011, dummy 
variables have been developed that serve as ‘flags’ of programme eligibility. The 
development of these is described in the Methodological Appendix, within section 
A1.4. By crosstabulating the eligibility flags with fuel poverty flags (see section 
3.4.3), it is possible to see how many fuel poor households are and are not eligible for 
policies, and so assess the efficiency with which policies are reaching that group. For 
ECO CSCO, the data within EHS 2011 was not sufficient to create eligibility criteria 
flags for individual households, as this is based upon ward-level location. As such, an 
alternative means was developed, as will be described further in section 5.1.2. Meta-
analysis of published statistics relating to previous programmes has also been 
incorporated. In establishing where alternate data sources might support better 
targeting, systematic searches of government websites were undertaken to established 
data availability. This element of the process owes a further debt to informal 
conversations with members of the policy community, who were often able to suggest 
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potential avenues for exploration. In particular, civil servants were contacted to gain 
further information on data held by government. 
 
In order to gain an insight into supplier targeting practices, the process involved 
engagement with stakeholders, including a limited number of key informant 
interviews with individuals responsible for overseeing delivery, participation in 
internal meetings and limited access to relevant internal documents. Information on 
the interview approach is provided within section A1.7 of the Methodological 
Appendix, with process documents (including a sample informed consent form) 
supplied in sections A1.4, A1.5 and A1.6. Details of events attended are included as 
Appendix Two. In determining how suppliers target households, E.ON UK has 
effectively been treated as a case study within this analysis. Whilst the limitations to 
generalisability of drawing on a single case are acknowledged, the selection of E.ON 
UK can be justified on pragmatic and academic grounds. Pragmatically, data from 
E.ON UK enables the investigation of an otherwise inaccessible subject area; whilst 
other suppliers were contacted, there was an understandable reluctance to share 
detailed information around commercial activity with a project sponsored by a direct 
competitor. Academically, E.ON UK has been successful in meeting priority group 
supplier obligations to date (see Ofgem 2013d: 20-22), and so it is suggested that they 
represent a stronger indicator of supplier targeting potential than a company that had 
not met those requirements. Additionally, and to help address the inevitable impact on 
generalisability, findings have where possible been triangulated with what limited 
information already exists in the grey literature, including that published during the 
research process  (e.g., ERA 2011, Platt, Rosenow & Flanagan 2012) . 
 
5.1 Current Policy Approach  
 
In early 2010, Labour MP David Kidney – then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of 
State at DECC – highlighted the difficulties in targeting fuel poor households. 
 
To be completely effective at hitting the targets… I would need real-time 
information about household make-up, their income and the consumption of 
energy and the condition of the property, and I do not have any of those 
details… In the meantime where should we start? We should start with the 
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properties that are weakest in their condition and have got people with the 
lowest incomes. 
 
(see Q123: House of Commons 2010) 
 
Fuel poverty as conceptualised by UK government is a constructed, formalised, latent 
variable derived from manifest characteristics79. So, whilst fuel poverty itself cannot 
be directly observed, the fuel poverty definition offers an equation that relates a series 
of measurable inputs (e.g., income, energy requirements), and defines the outputs that 
would result in households then being classified as fuel poor. It is therefore possible 
to gather precise information on those inputs and then accurately establish whether 
any given household qualifies as fuel poor. David Kidney was partially correct with 
regards to the data required to do this; a full building survey and detailed information 
about household income should be sufficient. However, this level of data goes beyond 
what it is generally possible to establish for the purposes of real-world policy 
delivery. In practice, policies have tended to be targeted via ‘proxies’, more readily 
accessible characteristics that are expected to be associated with either the manifest 
elements of fuel poverty measurement (e.g., using Reduced Data SAP (rdSAP, see 
DECC 2013o) as a proxy for energy requirements rather than undertaking a full 
building survey) or, in some instances, as direct approximations of the final target. 
One example of this latter usage is the most common proxy used in fuel poverty 
targeting to date, the receipt of particular means-tested benefits (also termed ‘passport 
benefits’), which function as a proxy for household income, but are often used alone 
to direct programmes. 
 
This section provides an overview of the way in which schemes have been targeted to 
date. In the first instance, the different approaches to both the formulation of 
eligibility criteria and identification of qualifying households are summarised, with 
some initial observations made with regard to the different positions of the state and 
suppliers in this respect. Then, quantitative data are used to examine the targeting 
efficacy of eligibility criteria under both the 10pct and LIHC definitions of fuel 
poverty. The section concludes with an overview of the perception of the targeting 
                                                
79 See Bollen (2002) for a typology of latent variables. 
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process adopted in this chapter (which builds upon previous work by Dubois (2012)), 
and an explanation of how this informs the subsequently reported work. 
 
5.1.1 Previous Targeting Strategies 
 
Table 5.1 summarises the targeting strategies employed in fuel poverty policies since 
WHECA was passed in 2000, compiled from a review of the policy literature. This 
incorporates details of both the eligibility criteria employed and the process by which 
identification of qualifying individuals or households was undertaken. Where the 
relevant aspect of the policy is the sub-targeting of a ‘Priority Group’ (PG) (or, in the 
case of CERT, a ‘Super Priority Group’ (SPG)) of vulnerable customers within a 
broader programme, this is indicated. The Decent Homes Programme and the social 
tariffs that offered by suppliers under the Voluntary Agreement are included as a 
point of comparison.  
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Table 5.1: Targeting strategies employed within fuel poverty policies, 2000-2013 
 
Scheme Duration Basis for Eligibility Criteria Means of Identification 
Technical Interventions 
Decent 
Homes 
Programme 
2000 - 
present 
All social housing that does not meet the Decent Homes Standard is eligible. Local Authorities responsible for 
identifying housing that does not meet 
the Decent Homes Standard. 
EESoP 3 2000 - 
2002 
Priority Group (PG): Receipt of income related benefits or tax credits (expected, not a 
compulsory target). 
Suppliers seek out eligible customers to 
meet obligations 
EEC 1 2002 - 
2005 
PG: Receipt of income related benefits or tax credits Suppliers seek out eligible customers to 
meet obligations 
EEC 2 2005 - 
2008 
PG: Receipt of income related benefits or tax credits Suppliers seek out eligible customers to 
meet obligations 
CERT 2008 - 
2012 
PG: Eligibility criteria based on receipt of means tested benefits and household 
composition (targeted at households containing older people, people with disabilities, and 
children). 
Super Priority Group (SPG): A subset of the above group, with tighter qualification criteria 
(though based on similar criteria types). 
Suppliers seek eligible customers to 
meet obligations 
CESP 2009 - 
2012 
All measures to be carried out in the lowest 10% of areas ranked according to IMD. Suppliers seek out eligible customers to 
meet obligations 
Warm 
Front  
2000 - 
2013 
Eligibility criteria based on receipt of means tested benefits and household composition 
(targeted at households containing older people, people with disabilities, and children 
under five). Eligible households then have dwelling assessed; must be below SAP 55 (63 
from 2012). 
Eligible households apply to scheme 
for SAP assessment and possible grant. 
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Scheme Duration Basis for Eligibility Criteria Means of Identification 
ECO 2013 – 
present 
Carbon Saving Community Obligation: All measures to be carried out in the lowest 15% 
of areas ranked according to IMD; 15% of that obligation must be carried out in rural 
areas. 
Suppliers seek eligible customers to 
meet obligations 
Home Heating Cost Reduction Obligation: Eligibility criteria based on receipt of means 
tested benefits and household composition (targeted at households containing older people, 
people with disabilities, and dependent children). This element sometimes referred to as 
the “Affordable Warmth” group. 
Economic Interventions 
Cold 
Weather 
Payments  
1986 - 
present 
Receipt of means-tested benefits and household composition. Primarily automatic identification via 
benefits system. 
Winter Fuel 
Payments 
1997 - 
present 
Age-based eligibility criteria (targeted at older people, transferred via the state pension 
system). 
Primarily automatic identification via 
benefits system. 
Social 
Tariffs 
2008 - 
2011 
Eligibility criteria selected by individual suppliers, based upon factors including age, 
receipt of benefits, and income. 
Voluntary scheme, customer required 
to apply (though suppliers agreed to 
achieve a certain level of expenditure).  
Warm 
Home 
Discount 
2011 - 
present 
Core Group eligibility restricted to older people in receipt of income related pension 
supplements. 
Most within Core Group have rebates 
automatically applied by suppliers, 
supported by DWP data sharing.  
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Scheme Duration Basis for Eligibility Criteria Means of Identification 
Scheme  Broader Group eligibility defined by individual suppliers (subject to Ofgem approval). 
These tend to relate to benefit receipt. 
Those within Broader Group must 
apply to their supplier (though 
suppliers are obligated to achieve a 
certain level of expenditure). 
Note: Light grey shading indicates state-led schemes. 
Based upon compilation of sources: (Morse 2010, Rosenow 2012, Ofgem/EST 2003, Ofgem 2013d, Ofgem 2013e, Hough, Bolton 2012a, DECC 2012k, Ofgem 
2013b, DECC 2012f, Kennedy 2012a, Kennedy 2012b, Ofgem 2011b, Ofgem 2013k). 
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Two aspects of delivery emerge as worthy of mention at this stage. First, that the state 
that has tended to hold ultimate responsibility for establishing eligibility criteria for 
programmes (and by extension, potential means of identifying households). The one, 
recent, departure from this approach is WHDS, for which suppliers are able to exhibit 
some level of control over eligibility criteria for the Broader Group element. 
However, the selected criteria must be either chosen from a pre-approved list, or 
approved by Ofgem (see Ofgem 2013k: 22-24). Table 5.2 gives an example of the 
types of criteria employed, demonstrating that they remain primarily based upon 
receipt of passport benefits or tax credits.  
 
Table 5.2: Eligibility criteria for Warm Home Discount Scheme as employed by E.ON, 2013 
 
Recipients must be an E.ON account holder and in receipt of one of the following benefit 
combinations 
Pensioners Guaranteed AND Savings Element of the Pension Credit and under the age of 75 on 
20/07/2013, not in receipt of the guaranteed element of Pension Credit (you can receive 
the savings element), over the age of 65 and in receipt of Housing Benefit or Council 
Tax Reduction 
Families Child Tax Credit with a relevant income of £16,190 or less. 
Disabilities Income Based Job Seekers Allowance and Disability Living Allowance (DLA) or 
Personal Independence Payment (PIP) (all components)  
Income Related Employment and Support Allowance and Disability Living Allowance 
(DLA) or Personal Independence Payment (PIP) (all components) 
Income Support and Disability Living Allowance (DLA) or Personal Independence 
Payment (PIP) (all components) 
Working Tax Credit with a relevant income of £16,190 or less and Disability Living 
Allowance (DLA) or Personal Independence Payment (PIP) (all components)  
Pregnant 
or Medical 
Condition 
Income Based Job Seekers Allowance and Maternity Exception Certificate (MATEX) or 
medical exemption certificate (MEDEX) 
Income Related Employment and Support Allowance and MATEX or MEDEX Medical 
Exemption Certificate  
Income Support and MATEX or MEDEX exemption certificate  
Working Tax Credit with a relevant income of £16,190 or less and MATEX or MEDEX 
exemption certificate  
Source: Adapted from E.ON UK (2014b) 
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Second, a division can be recognised between the identification approaches employed 
by the state, and those required of suppliers. State-led schemes have tended to opt for 
either recipient self-selection (as for Warm Front) or apply economic measures 
automatically via the benefits system (as for WFP and CWP). Suppliers, on the other 
hand, have generally80 been required to actively seek out households in order to meet 
their obligations. For the purposes of this work, targeting where the burden is shifted 
away from the delivery agent (e.g., automatic identification or self-referral) has been 
classified as ‘passive’, while that requiring delivery agents to seek out households is 
termed ‘active’. 
 
5.1.2 Targeting Efficiency of Previous Criteria 
 
Sections 4.3 and 4.4 discussed the disjointed nature of fuel poverty policy, including 
the lack of a clear, quantified strategy to guide the achievement of targets. It is 
perhaps unsurprising, then, that government has tended not to appraise the efficacy of 
proposed activity in targeting fuel poor households. A review of policy literature 
found only a small number of documents relating to older schemes had made an 
attempt to estimate targeting efficiency, and these tended to be post hoc appraisals. 
NAO evaluations of Warm Front estimated that only 30-40% of eligible households 
were fuel poor (Bourn 2003: 14) and only 35% of fuel poor households were eligible 
(Burr 2009b: 13). The DECC impact assessment on adjusting the eligibility criteria 
for Warm Front, estimated that 53% of eligible households were fuel poor or 
vulnerable, improving to 77% after criteria were adjusted in April 2011 (DECC 
2011g: 25) 81. The official evaluation of CESP using data from 2009 EHS estimated 
that 22.4% of households eligible for the scheme were fuel poor  (CAG Consultants, 
Ipsos MORI & Building Research Establishment 2011: 20) . The WHDS impact 
assessment includes consideration of the likely difference in the impact on fuel 
poverty of different eligibility options (see DECC 2011f: 54) which implies that 
targeting efficacy was modelled, though the figures for this are not published. The 
                                                
80 WHDS represents the exception to this, as the identification of Core Group households has been 
supported by data sharing between DWP and energy suppliers. Whilst companies are obligated to 
achieve certain levels of expenditure, the lesser burden of WHDS obligations enables suppliers to take 
a more passive approach to identification; this will be examined in depth in section 5.3. 
81 It seems fair to assume that the inclusion of vulnerable households (under a fairly generous 
definition, see section 5.1.3) in the DECC evaluation accounts for the significant uplift over the NAO 
estimates. 
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WHDS consultation considers targeting efficiency (both in terms of coverage and 
leakage), but does not link this to final eligibility criteria in any concrete way (DECC 
2010a: 9-13). The ECO impact assessment82 indicates that the Affordable Warmth 
group is expected to be around 53% fuel poor households (DECC 2012h: 199). The 
consideration of targeting efficacy of eligibility criteria in policy literature is sparse 
and inconsistent. It should also be noted that all figures cited here refer to 10pct fuel 
poverty as all literature predates the LIHC definition. 
 
The analysis presented here primarily uses EHS 2011 data to assess the targeting 
efficacy of eligibility criteria for fuel poverty programmes. The EHS contains 
sufficient data to establish whether surveyed households are in fuel poverty, and 
whether they would theoretically qualify for a range of schemes. Thus by 
crosstabulating these two factors, it is possible to establish how effective programmes 
might be in reaching fuel poor households. In the earlier releases of this dataset used 
for preliminary analysis (DCLG 2011a, 2012b), dummy variables were constructed to 
approximate eligibility criteria for programmes. However, the latest release includes 
ready-made variables for several programmes, and these have been used where 
possible. For some programmes, however, it was still necessary to construct variables; 
details of the formation of these are included in section A1.3. Estimation of efficiency 
for ECO CSCO was conducted in a slightly different manner, as it was not possible to 
use EHS 2011 data83. Instead, DECC estimations of fuel poverty incidence at the 
LSOA level (based on secure versions of the EHS 2011 datasets) released as Excel 
spreadsheets (DECC 2013a, DECC 2013b) were merged with lists of low-income 
LSOAs eligible for CSCO and analysed in SPSS (DECC 2012f) (note that this does 
not include consideration of the rural sub-target). This makes it possible to aggregate 
results, and so assess how many fuel poor households are in each CSCO-qualifying 
LSOA, and how many fuel poor households are not. The extremely diverse criteria 
chosen by suppliers for the WHDS Broader Group are beyond the scope of what can 
be modelled with the available data, however, it is possible to evaluate all other 
schemes going back as far as CERT. WFP has been removed from income considered 
                                                
82 The Green Deal and ECO consultation stage Impact Assessment also cites some assessment of the 
proportion of households eligible for other schemes that are likely to be fuel poor; 66% for Cold 
Weather Payment and 61% for CERT Super Priority Group (DECC 2011a: 112). 
83 The EHS provides data on the IMD ranking of households only by decile. Thus it is possible to 
ascertain which households might be CESP eligible (in the lowest 10% of areas) but not ECO CSCO 
eligible (the lowest 15%). 
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in assessing targeting efficacy, so that results consider fuel poverty status of 
households assuming they are not receiving that help84.  
 
Even though this work applies the new LIHC definition of fuel poverty, where 
appropriate results for the 10pct definition have also been included85. The change in 
definition has the effect of altering the officially fuel poor population (as illustrated in 
Figure 5.1; refer also to Figure 2.5 for demographic changes), and as such, it is of 
interest to consider the impact of this shift upon targeting efficacy. 
 
 
Note: Percentages may not sum due to rounding, graphical depiction of sets is not to scale. Includes 
income from WFPs. 
Source: Own analysis of DCLG (2013c). 
 
Figure 5.1: Shift in composition of fuel poor population under two different indicators, 2011 
 
                                                
84 As discussed in Chapter Three, it has not been possible to remove the WHDS payments imputed by 
DECC statisticians, however, these were comparatively low in 2011. The ECO CSCO targeting 
estimate applies DECC estimations of fuel poverty incidence, which do not remove WFP from 
consideration. 
85 Note that this is the ‘full income’ 10pct definition, based upon income before housing costs are 
accounted for, in line with the main official measure used by government. 
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The primary measure of efficiency used in this analysis is that employed by Sefton 
(2002) (after Weisbrod (1970)) for examining the criteria used on the HEES 
programme (precursor to Warm Front). This consists of two elements: 
• Horizontal efficiency, or ‘coverage’ – the proportion of the target group (here 
assumed to be the fuel poor) that are eligible for the programme. This is 
equivalent to the statistical concept of Positive Predictive Value  (see 
Westover, Westover & Bianchi 2011) . 
• Vertical efficiency, or ‘leakage’ – the proportion of eligible households who 
are not fuel poor. This is equivalent to the statistical concept of False 
Discovery Rate  (see Westover, Westover & Bianchi 2011) . 
  
Thus a perfectly targeted scheme would have 100% coverage and 0% leakage. The 
policy literature reviewed earlier in this section tends to focus upon coverage; 
however leakage is arguably no less important, particularly given that the 
misdirection of funds has the potential to increase inequality and thus relative LIHC 
fuel poverty. Table 5.3 illustrates the coverage and leakage of criteria for past and 
current programmes with regard to 10pct and LIHC fuel poverty, respectively86. 
Though supplier obligation technical schemes have not required that eligible 
households be below a certain SAP threshold (as Warm Front did), there is an in-built 
limit in the sense that houses that have already achieved a high level of efficiency 
would presumably not receive measures. Therefore a separate rating of efficiency has 
been included for all supplier obligation technical schemes that accounts for the 
viability of an efficiency upgrade (based upon an EHS 2011 variable that flags 
measure viability, so CSCO is not included) as an implicit requirement of eligibility. 
Viable measures could be identified for 76% of occupied dwellings in the EHS 
sample. Raw efficiencies are also included on the grounds that in the first instance 
delivery agents would need to identify which households are in need of said 
measures. The difficulty of establishing this is likely to vary on a case-by-case basis 
as the necessity of upgrade will be more apparent for some dwellings than for others. 
The Decent Homes Programme is included as a comparator, but note that as that 
scheme applies to a limited base (social housing) and is fairly well advanced, the 
criteria appear weaker than they likely would have done when the programme began. 
                                                
86 The benefits data provided in the EHS are modeled, and so relate to theoretical eligibility. The 
potential impacts of sub-optimal uptake will be discussed in section 5.3 
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Table 5.3: Coverage and leakage of programmes in targeting 10pct and LIHC fuel poverty  
 
Programme Coverage 
(100% 
optimum) 
Leakage  
(0% optimum) 
10pct Fuel Poverty 
Technical Interventions 
CERT Priority Group 75% 74% 
CERT Super Priority Group 41% 72% 
CESP 23% 79% 
Warm Front (criteria post 
September 2012) 
30% 49% 
ECO HHCRO 35% 61% 
ECO CSCO 17% 83% 
Technical Interventions  
(Eligibility restricted to inefficient dwellings) 
CERT Priority Group 63% 71% 
CERT Super Priority Group 34% 68% 
CESP 18% 77% 
ECO HHCRO 29% 58% 
Economic Interventions 
Cold Weather Payments 37% 69% 
Winter Fuel Payments 48% 79% 
WHDS Core Group 18% 67% 
All Schemes   
LIHC Fuel Poverty 
Technical Interventions 
Decent Homes Programme 9% 91% 
CERT Priority Group 70% 85% 
CERT Super Priority Group 43% 82% 
CESP 30% 83% 
Warm Front (criteria post 
September 2012) 
31% 68% 
ECO HHCRO 36% 75% 
ECO CSCO 15% 88% 
Technical Interventions 
(Eligibility restricted to inefficient dwellings) 
Decent Homes Programme 11% 93% 
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CERT Priority Group 61% 83% 
CERT Super Priority Group 36% 79% 
CESP 25% 80% 
ECO HHCRO 30% 73% 
Economic Interventions 
Cold Weather Payments 32% 84% 
Winter Fuel Payments 26% 93% 
WHDS Core Group 10% 88% 
All Schemes   
Source: Own analysis of DCLG (2013c). Eligibility criteria compiled from policy literature: (Ofgem 
2009b, DWP 2012b, UK Government 2014e, Ofgem 2013k). CSCO efficiency estimates based upon 
analysis of DECC (2012f, 2013a, 2013b). 
 
In all, 59% of LIHC fuel poor households are eligible for at least one of the currently 
operational schemes analysed via EHS data (ECO HHCRO, CWP, WFP or WHDS 
Core Group), down from 69% under the 10pct measure. There is an 88% leakage rate, 
up from 77% under the 10pct measure. 
 
These numbers become more meaningful in policy terms when linked to expenditure 
on the respective programmes. Figure 5.2 takes data on individual scheme 
expenditure, drawn from policy literature, and applies the efficiencies from the latter 
half of Table 5.3 to illustrate the proportion of expenditure that is expected to go to 
fuel poor households, and the proportion of ‘leakage’ Note that this is intended only 
to act as a broad attempt to indicate the potential impact of any misdirection; it is 
assumed for the purposes of illustration that expenditure on households is uniform, 
which will not always be the case in practice, particularly for technical measures. 
Expenditure is for the entire scheme (i.e., GB-wide as applicable) as anticipated for 
2013/14 if currently running, or for the final year of operation if not (exceptions noted 
in accompanying text), whereas the EHS data analysed relates to 2011 household 
eligibility. Eligibility for supplier obligated technical interventions considers all 
dwellings as qualified. 
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Note: For CERT and CESP only estimates of total lifetime expenditure for schemes are available; these 
have been allocated pro rata (the same applies to CERT PG and SPG allocations). The number of Cold 
Weather Payments made varies based upon winter temperatures, making the actual total expenditure 
difficult to predict. For illustrative purposes, the figure given here represents the average of the past 
five winters, i.e., all winters since the current £25/week rate has been in place. All costs are in real 
terms. Warm Front criteria considered are post-September 2012. 
Source: Own analysis of DCLG (2013c). Expenditure figures compiled from multiple sources:  
(Rosenow 2012, CAG Consultants, Ipsos MORI & Building Research Establishment 2011, Watson, 
Bolton 2013, DECC 2012h, Kennedy 2013a, Kennedy 2013b, DECC 2011h) . 
 
Figure 5.2: Direction of programme annual expenditure towards fuel poor households  
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As Figure 5.3 shows, the majority of expenditure is not expected to go to fuel poor 
households. Overall, of current programmes modelled, it is estimated that £320m of 
£3108m annual expenditure (10%) is likely to go to LIHC fuel poor households, 
down from £752m (24%) under the 10pct measure. WFP is the largest contributor to 
this inefficiency, because it accounts for 70% of expenditure and 93% of recipients do 
not meet the LIHC definition of fuel poverty. One source of weakness in achieving 
coverage is that the current criteria are extremely reliant on benefits as a proxy (see 
Table 5.1). Analysis of the EHS 2011 finds that 53% of LIHC fuel poor households 
(61% under the 10pct measure) were not in receipt of the various means-tested 
benefits or tax credits aimed at those on low incomes. 
 
From a policy perspective, it is also important to consider the potential numbers and 
proportions of households eligible for different programmes, and the number actually 
expected to be supported; these are given in Table 5.4. Such volumes have 
implications for administrative feasibility, for example, the criteria for ECO HHCRO 
are ‘tighter’ than those for CERT, and so, whilst leakage is lower, the eligible group is 
much smaller and so may be harder for suppliers to locate, an issue to be discussed 
further in section 5.3.3. It is also worth recognising that a larger target group provides 
an inherent boost to coverage, even where criteria are weak. There are also 
implications for the distributional impacts of policies, as will be discussed in section 
6.3.1. Numbers given as supported are those expected in the most recent year in 
which that scheme was operational, through 2013/14. Assumptions apply as for 
Figure 5.2. 
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Table 5.4: Number of households eligible and in annual receipt of fuel poverty programmes 
 
Programme Number of 
households eligible 
(as % of total 
English 
population) 
Number of 
households in 
annual receipt 
Proportion 
eligible group 
receiving support 
annually. 
Proportion 
annual recipients 
expected 10pct 
fuel poor 
Proportion 
annual recipients 
expected LIHC 
fuel poor 
Expected number 
10pct fuel poor 
households 
receiving support 
annually 
Expected number 
LIHC fuel poor 
households 
receiving support 
annually 
Technical Interventions 
CERT Priority 
Group 
9,525,849 (44.5%)   26% 15%   
CERT Super 
Priority Group 
4,799,229 (21.9%)   28% 18%   
CESP 3,572,328 (16.3%) 47,497 1.3% 21% 17% 9,752 7,895 
Warm Front 
(criteria post 
September 
2012) 
1,925,652 (8.8%) 35,000 1.8% 51% 32% 17,677 11,092 
ECO HHCRO 2,898,167 (13.2%) 202,348 7% 39% 25% 79,120 50,718 
ECO CSCO 3,255,816 (14.9%) 87,609 2.7% 17% 12% 14,944 10,549 
Economic Interventions 
Cold Weather 
Payments 
3,938,041 (18%)  74.7% 31% 16% 911,932 470,675 
Winter Fuel 7,409,478 (33.8%)  100%* 21% 7% 1,555,990 518,663 
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Payments  
WHDS Core 
Group 
1,758,864 (8%) 1,157,879 65.8% 33% 12% 381,920 138,880 
*Theoretically, all eligible households should receive WFP. However, in practice it is likely that a small number of households who are ineligible for – or not otherwise 
claiming – state pension do not receive WFP. 
Note: Some figures drawn from external sources may have been subject to rounding. No figures have been published giving the number of households in receipt of CERT or 
WFP. There is some difficulty here with regards to geography as efficiency of targeting is based on English sample, but numbers of recipients (and therefore outputs) are based 
on entire schemes. The proportion of eligible group receiving support annually may therefore be expected to be lower in reality than indicated here, as eligible households 
outside England are not included (approxiamtely 86% of GB households are in England, see ONS 2013a).  
Source: Own analysis of DCLG (2013c). CSCO estimates based upon analysis of DECC (2012f, 2013a, 2013b). Receipt figures compiled from multiple sources: (Ofgem 2013e, 
Watson, Boulton 2013, DECC 2014c, DWP 2012b, Ofgem 2013j) . 
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With ECO HHCRO and CSCO as the only energy efficiency programmes targeted at 
fuel poor households87 it might be expected to take 45 years to reach all of the 2.4m 
English households currently LIHC fuel poor at the present rate of progress88. Note 
also that there is significant overlap in receipt of economic schemes as, for example, 
Pension Credit Guarantee Credit recipients are eligible for support from all three 
economic schemes and ECO HHCRO. 
 
The outputs reported in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 will be referenced extensively throughout 
the following chapters, e.g., as a basis for the meta-analysis of the costs of tackling 
fuel poverty reported in section 6.1.3. It should be recognised that efficiency is not the 
be all and end all of policy; given that there is ‘churn’ as households move in and out 
of fuel poverty (i.e., when incomes change, when moving property), there is still 
value to supporting those on the thresholds. However, targeting efficiency remains a 
valid measure of broad success in reaching fuel poor households. 
 
5.1.3 Framework for Approach 
 
Dubois (2012) suggests that the identification of fuel poor households has three 
stages; targeting, identification and implementation. This thesis uses the same 
terminology, and shares an emphasis on the role of political and economic factors in 
guiding choices made with respect to targeting. However, Dubois’ understanding is 
drawn primarily from the French treatment of fuel poverty, or précarité energétique, a 
newer policy development. Whereas English fuel poverty targeting is the latest 
formation of a decades-long evolution, French policy approaches are only just 
beginning, and so consider the process from first principles. As a result, there are 
disparities between Dubois’ account and English policy in practice. Understanding 
these differences is helpful in clarifying some of the issues with current English 
targeting strategy. 
  
                                                
87 Assuming activity is distributed across the devolved nations in proportion to the number of 
households, i.e., 86% of households helped are in England. 
88 Note that this is not the same as eradicating fuel poverty under a relative measure, as the target will 
move. 
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• Targeting 
 
When designing interventions, policymakers must decide whether support should be 
made available to everyone (universalism) or just to those in the greatest need 
(targeted support). It is also possible to use mixed mechanisms such as New Labour’s 
‘progressive universalism’, under which support was universal, but those most in need 
received more (see Hirsch 2007). Fuel poverty programmes have historically been 
targeted at specific individuals and households (see Table 5.1), most likely because 
energy efficiency measures are expensive and – in the case of technical interventions 
– some level of targeting is necessary as not all households are able to receive support 
(e.g., those living in dwellings for which no energy efficiency upgrades are viable). 
 
Dubois defines targeting within the fuel poverty context as the selection of the 
segment of the population that should benefit from policies, emphasising that this is in 
part a political choice, and one that includes consideration of economic costs (2012: 
108-109). In the French case, there is a definition of fuel poverty (established in 
2010), but this is looser than the English definition, and there is no eradication target. 
Accordingly, there is a greater degree of flexibility in the French fuel poverty scheme, 
Habiter Meux, which allows local delivery agents autonomy in deciding whether 
households are fuel poor for the purposes of the programme (see Dubois 2012: 112). 
Fuel poverty in the UK, as already established, is more rigidly defined and monitored. 
However, this has not been met with comparable order and efficiency in targeting. 
There is no unifying strategy relating to the targeting of different fuel poverty policies 
to ensure effective interaction. While fuel poverty as a concept is tightly defined by 
government, and policies are in place that are ostensibly intended to support fuel poor 
households, as already discussed in this section, there is little consideration given in 
the policy literature to the targeting efficiency of policies towards the fuel poor. One 
possible reason for this is that, as shown, targeting efficiency is low, and so from a 
political perspective there is no motivation to declare this lack of success (particularly 
if there is no pressing incentive to improve performance). 
 
One possible justification for the low targeting efficiency is that these policies are not 
intended solely to target the fuel poor, but also other vulnerable groups (e.g., older 
people and children), with all currently active policies considering vulnerability 
 158 
factors along with income in some respect. While this is sensible in terms of 
mitigating the impacts of inefficient homes, the definition of vulnerability for fuel 
poverty purposes given in the UKFPS (DTI 2001: 10) and used within the EHS 
dataset counts as vulnerable any household with; a member aged over 60, under 16, or 
where a member is disabled or has a long-term illness. This accounts for 73% of 
English households (based on own analysis of DCLG 2013c). No prioritisation is 
included in the definition, although policies have tended to focus on older people. The 
Energy Act 2010 enabled the Secretary of State to define a “fuel poverty risk group” 
with a rather broad definition: 
 
…a category of person whom… the proportion who are (or, but for a support 
scheme, would be) living in fuel poverty is higher than the proportion of 
people in Great Britain who are living in fuel poverty. 
 
Energy Act 2010 (s.15(5)) 
 
As a result the WHDS policy documentation confusingly conflates the issues by 
defining the “fuel poverty risk group as a group that is both vulnerable and low 
income” (DECC 2011e: 5), an approach does not seem to add a great deal to the 
process. Focusing the limited resources on groups that are vulnerable and identified as 
low income is one way of prioritising budgets89, but differs from the goal of fuel 
poverty mitigation. There is no strategy specifically directed at supporting vulnerable 
groups with fuel costs, and success in targeting these groups is not monitored. 
Supporting vulnerable households, whilst a commendable goal, does not nullify the 
responsibility of the government towards the fuel poor. 
 
Thus while UK fuel poverty policy sets a higher, more rigid bar for policy success 
than that in France, there is little evidence that targeting activity has striven to meet 
those standards. The problems encountered echo those discussed in the previous 
chapter; policies are poorly organised, with no overarching strategy or clearly 
articulated targeting rationale. The population that is intended to benefit from policies 
has been declared in the form of eligibility criteria for programmes, but rarely has any 
                                                
89 Though is somewhat at odds with DECC’s decision to disregard Hills’ recommendation that 
Disability Living Allowance should be excluded from income calculations (2013j: 34). 
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effort been made to state the extent to which this is intended to comprise fuel poor 
households, or to evaluate success in this respect. 
 
• Identification 
 
Dubois defines identification as consisting of three tasks, “(a) choosing the process of 
identification of (fuel) poor households, (b) selecting criteria of identification and (c) 
actually identifying the fuel poor households” (2012: 109) . This conceptualisation is, 
again, more closely suited to the broader French policy perspective, in which fuel 
poor households – according to a looser definition – are the direct targets of the 
Habiter Meux. In the UK, there is a distinct divide between the ultimate target group – 
the fuel poor, who can theoretically be perfectly identified – and households that are 
eligible for support. In practice, policy delivery involves identification of the latter 
group (it being assumed that the targeting element of the process should have ensured 
some level of coherence between the two). Dubois (building upon Jehu-Appiah et al. 
2010), identifies three main possible identification strategies for fuel poor households; 
the use of information held in databases, geographical proxies, and “decentralised 
identification”, whereby local actors apply their own criteria (2012: 110). In the UK, 
eligibility criteria have tended to be closely linked to the benefits system, effectively a 
database, as already illustrated in Table 5.1. For information, Table 5.5 offers more 
details on types of proxies used in UK schemes. 
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Table 5.5: Proxies used in targeting UK fuel poverty policies 
 
Proxy type Examples of use in 
schemes 
Commentary 
Benefits and tax 
credits 
All schemes Government have direct access, 
suppliers have limited data matching 
powers for identification purposes. 
Disability or long term 
illness 
CERT, Warm Front, 
ECO HHCRO 
Often established via benefit receipt. 
Geographical CESP, ECO CSCO Restricted to technical schemes, offers 
added benefits in potential economies 
of scale in delivery. 
Age-related WFP, CERT, Warm 
Front, ECO HHCRO 
Often established via benefit receipt. 
Energy efficiency Warm Front Only Warm Front has explicitly limited 
eligibility to households under a certain 
level of energy efficiency, though there 
is an implicit limit on technical 
schemes insofar as it is not possible to 
apply a measure where one is already 
in place. 
Other proxies WHDS Use of supplier-selected criteria for 
WHDS has resulted in expanded range 
of proxy types, e.g. E.ON UK offer 
WHDS to certain holders of maternity 
and medical exemption certificates (see 
E.ON UK 2014b) 
 
The identification of eligible households, as already noted, has taken two main forms, 
defined in this work as passive and active. 
 
• Implementation 
 
Dubois’ framework is focused on energy efficiency measures, and takes a fairly broad 
view of the implementation element of the process that encompasses everything 
following identification (Dubois 2012: 110-111). The focus in this chapter is 
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Targeting 
Identification and 
Implementation 
narrower, and as such the relevant elements of the implementation process will be 
combined with discussion of identification, with which it is closely linked. Where 
identification is passive, implementation tends to be straightforward; e.g., CWP and 
WFP are automatically applied via the benefits system. However, active identification 
tends comes with a greater implementation burden, for example, where recipients may 
need to be convinced of the benefits of participation in schemes, particularly technical 
schemes, and where proof of eligible status needs to be manually obtained for 
regulatory reporting. 
 
This section has given an overview of the current state of fuel poverty targeting. The 
next two sections will discuss the issues identified here in more detail, with particular 
reference to the capabilities of the energy supplier and the state in effectively meeting 
requirements. Section 5.2 will discuss the relative capacity of the state and suppliers 
to target fuel poor households, and section 5.3 will consider the ability to identify 
households eligible for schemes, and to implement measures. These represent the two 
main points at which fuel poor households might be ‘lost’ from the process, as 
illustrated in Figure 5.3. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Fuel poverty targeting process 
  
Fuel%poor%households%
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5.2 Targeting 
 
As established, UK fuel poverty schemes tend to rely on proxies to target policies, 
and delivery requires the identification of qualifying households, as opposed to fuel 
poor households. However, there is still a value in considering the relative potential of 
the state and suppliers in targeting fuel poor households, as this offers the possibility 
to inform improved strategy: this is the focus of this section. In the first instance, the 
types of data that are likely to support this element of the process are discussed. Next, 
the capacity of the state to identify fuel poor households is examined; this includes 
consideration of both the types of data currently used to this end, as well as of data 
that is held but not currently used in the implementation of fuel poverty policy. This is 
then followed by a discussion of the current ability of energy suppliers to successfully 
identify the fuel poor amongst their own customers. The section concludes with a 
review of alternate external data sources identified as offering the potential to 
improve identification of fuel poor households. 
 
5.2.1 Data Requirements 
 
Given the structure of the LIHC fuel poverty definition, the most prominent types of 
data that offer the potential to support identification are those that accurately predict 
household incomes and energy requirements90. Whilst it is possible that other factors 
might prove strong indicators, the use of the EHS 2011 dataset limits consideration to 
these elements. Ideally policies should be targeted to those households with low 
incomes and high energy costs91. However, as identified in the previous section, 
current policy has tended to focus on benefits receipt alone, a proxy for low income. 
 
The Hills Fuel Poverty Review final report (2012: 70-94) included a consideration of 
the factors likely to prove effective in identifying fuel poor households, as did the 
                                                
90 Actual energy use could be considered a substitute for energy requirements, however, as will be 
considered shortly, this presents problems given the tendency for fuel poor households to underuse 
energy.  
91 Note that perfect identification would also require information on household composition in order 
that both factors could be equivalised. 
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subsequent consultation on a new framework92 (DECC 2013k: 11-33). Table 5.6 
offers further assessment of risk factors for a range of variables included in the EHS 
2011. These relative risk ratios represent the probability of a household being LIHC 
fuel poor given the presence of certain circumstances (e.g., whether the dwelling is 
owner occupied) compared with their absence, and so indicates what sort of groups 
could be targeted. A relative risk of 2 signifies that the group is twice as likely to be 
fuel poor than the wider population, whilst a risk of 1 signifies no difference in the 
risk.  Confidence intervals crossing 1 indicate that risks are not significantly different, 
whilst confidence intervals that do not contain 1 indicate a significantly lower or 
higher risk. For a more detailed explanation or relative risk ratios, see Gordon (2012). 
 
Table 5.6: Relative risk ratios for fuel poverty by demographic and housing stock factors 
 
Factor Proportion of 
households 
Relative Risk Ratios 
Relative 
Risk 
95% CI 
Upper 
95% CI 
Lower 
Significance 
Tenure type 
Owner occupied 65.6% 0.52 0.519 0.521 * 
Private rented 17% 2.603 2.596 2.610 * 
Social housing 17.5% 0.869 0.866 0.873 * 
Region 
North East 5.2% 1.114 1.108 1.12 * 
Yorkshire and the Humber 10.3% 1.007 1.003 1.011 * 
North West 13.6% 1.17 1.165 1.174 * 
East Midlands 8.7% 1.237 1.232 1.242 * 
West Midlands 10.4% 1.307 1.302 1.312 * 
South West 10.3% 0.796 0.792 0.799 * 
Eastern England 11.1% 0.917 0.913 0.921 * 
South East 16.1% 0.699 0.697 0.702 * 
London 14.2% 0.985 0.981 0.989 * 
Household type 
Lone parent with dependent 
children 
7.6% 1.841 1.834 1.848 * 
Couple with dependent children 22.5% 1.198 1.194 1.201 * 
                                                
92 For examples of other studies employing regression techniques to predict fuel poverty risk, see Healy 
and Clinch (2004), Waddams Price et al. (2007, 2012), Baker (2008), and those referenced in the 
discussion of Geographical Information Systems towards the end of this section. 
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Couple, no dependent children 7.6% 0.585 0.583 0.587 * 
Single person under 60 7.2% 1.463 1.458 1.468 * 
Single person over 60 12.9% 0.583 0.580 0.586 * 
Other multi-person household 14.3% 1.426 1.419 1.432 * 
Age 
Child under 5 in household 13.3% 1.349 1.344 1.353 * 
Child under 16 in household 28.6% 1.479 1.475 1.483 * 
Person over 60 in household 37.3% 0.701 0.699 0.704 * 
Person over 75 in household 13.4% 0.72 0.717 0.723 * 
Person over 85 in household 3.3% 0.782 0.776 0.789 * 
Employment Status 
Household with no one of 
working age employed 
14.3% 3.15 3.142 3.159 * 
Illness or Disability 
Someone in household with 
illness or disability 
29.6% 1.244 1.241 1.248 * 
Dwelling type 
Terrace 28.5% 1.317 1.313 1.32 * 
Semi-detached 26.3% 1.269 1.265 1.272 * 
Detached 17% 0.858 0.855 0.861 * 
Bungalow 8.7% 0.894 0.89 0.899 * 
Flat 19.5% 0.542 0.54 0.544 * 
Dwelling age 
Pre 1919 20.5% 2.125 2.119 2.13 * 
1919 to 1944 16.8% 1.307 1.302 1.311 * 
1945 to 1964 19.9% 1.148 1.145 1.152 * 
1965 to 1980 21% 0.56 0.558 0.562 * 
1981-1990 8.4% 0.543 0.54 0.547 * 
Post 1990 13.4% 0.255 0.253 0.257 * 
Usable floor area 
Less than 50 m2 11.3% 0.472 0.47 0.475 * 
50 to 69 m2 24% 0.628 0.626 0.631 * 
70 to 89 m2 28.1% 1.174 1.17 1.177 * 
90 to 109 m2 14.2% 1.475 1.471 1.48 * 
110 m2or more 22.4% 1.262 1.259 1.266 * 
Construction factors 
Cavity wall 64% 0.512 0.511 0.514 * 
Solid wall 26.9% 2.31 2.304 2.316 * 
Less than 80% double glazed 16.1% 1.582 1.578 1.587 * 
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More than one floor 91.3% 1.12 1.115 1.126 * 
More than two floors 20% 0.97 0.967 0.973 * 
More than three floors 5.7% 0.596 0.592 0.601 * 
Type of area 
City 20% 1.412 1.408 1.416 * 
Suburban 62.9% 0.695 0.693 0.696 * 
Rural 17.1% 1.199 1.195 1.203 * 
Heating system 
No central heating 9.2% 1.636 1.63 1.642 * 
Mains gas main heating fuel  84.2% 0.605 0.603 0.607 * 
Electricity main heating fuel 8.7% 1.599 1.593 1.605 * 
SAP rating 
A or B 0.2% No households fuel poor. 
C 14.4% 0.157 0.155 0.158 * 
D 49.7% 0.476 0.475 0.478 * 
E 28.4% 2.248 2.242 2.254 * 
F or G 7.3% 2.826 2.817 2.835 * 
Payment method 
Pays for main heating fuel by 
direct debit. 
57.2% 0.44 0.439 0.441 * 
Pays for main heating fuel by 
pre-payment. 
10.8% 1.961 1.954 1.967 * 
Pays for main heating fuel by 
standard credit. 
16.5% 1.319 1.315 1.323 * 
Occupancy 
Underoccupied 32.5% 0.952 0.949 0.955 * 
Gas connection 
Off gas network 13.2% 1.558 1.552 1.563 * 
Benefits and Tax Credits 
Household eligible for Pension 
Credit (Guarantee Element) 
8% 1.309 1.303 1.314 * 
Household eligible for Pension 
Credit (Savings Element) 
6.6% 0.915 0.91 0.92 * 
Household eligible for Child 
Tax Credit 
21.1% 2.383 2.377 2.389 * 
Household eligible for Working 
Tax Credit 
2.1% 2.986 2.971 3.001 * 
Household eligible for Income 
Support 
6.5% 2.714 2.705 2.723 * 
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Household eligible for income-
based Jobseekers Allowance 
4.1% 4.023 4.01 4.037 * 
Household eligible for income-
based Employment and Support 
Allowance 
1.5% 2.66 2.644 2.677 * 
Fuel poverty policies 
Household in CERT Priority 
Group 
43.5% 3.034 3.025 3.042 * 
Household in CERT Super 
Priority Group 
21.9% 2.637 2.63 2.644 * 
Household eligible for CESP 16.3% 2.213 2.207 2.219 * 
Household eligible for Warm 
Front (criteria post Sept 2012) 
8.8% 4.655 4.643 4.667 * 
Household eligible for ECO 
HHCRO 
13.2% 3.613 3.603 3.622 * 
Household eligible for Cold 
Weather Payment 
18% 2.131 2.125 2.137 * 
Household eligible for Winter 
Fuel Payment 
33.8% 0.676 0.674 0.678 * 
Household eligible for WHDS 
Core Group 
8% 1.309 1.303 1.314 * 
Note: * = significant at 5% level, ns = not significant at 5% level. Significant factors for which the risk 
of fuel poverty exceeds that of the wider population are shaded. 
Source: Own analysis of DCLG (2013c). 
 
Some of the stronger predictors highlighted in Table 5.6 are already accounted for in 
current policy, e.g., living in a solid wall is a risk factor, in line with one focus of 
ECO (see section 2.2.3). Most fuel poverty policy eligibility groups are more likely to 
be fuel poor than the general population, albeit by differing degrees. However, there 
are some striking discrepancies. Older people tend to be at a lower risk, with one 
element of Pension Credit being the only benefit that does not denote a higher risk of 
fuel poverty, despite being the only benefit that guarantees receipt of both WHDS and 
CWP. WFP recipients are at a lower risk of fuel poverty than the wider population. 
However, as discussed in section 5.1.3, these groups may be targeted not because they 
are fuel poor, but because they are otherwise vulnerable. That said, households 
containing a child under 16 are also at high risk, also classed as vulnerable within the 
UKFPS (DTI 2001: 10), but are not similarly targeted. As might be expected, living in 
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a property with a SAP rating of E or lower is a risk factor. More specifically, older 
properties, larger properties, properties without central heating or with electric space 
heating are also at risk. Private renters are more than twice as likely to be fuel poor as 
the rest of the population, whilst those with prepayment meters (or otherwise not 
using direct debit to pay for their main fuel) are also at a higher risk. 
 
Whilst the use of the EHS as a ‘training set’  (Tan, Steinbach & Kumar 2013: 148-
149)  to uncover strong predictors of fuel poverty is undoubtedly useful, successful 
real-world targeting also relies on access to the relevant types of data. The remainder 
of this section considers the extent to which the state and energy suppliers have access 
to the types of relevant data of the sort identified in Table 5.6, and the practical value 
of information for identifying the fuel poor households. The section concludes with a 
review of external data sources identified during this research as being potentially 
valuable in targeting fuel poor households. 
 
5.2.2 State Targeting Capacity 
 
The state has primary responsibility for setting eligibility criteria for programmes and, 
by extension, for targeting policy towards fuel poor households. As established in 
Table 5.1, currently these are overwhelmingly been based upon receipt of benefits or 
tax credits. As reported in Table 5.3, the targeting efficiency of such proxies towards 
fuel poverty is poor. However, the many subsidiary agencies of the state between 
them hold a wealth of data with the potential to enable improved targeting93. 
 
Table 5.7 reports the findings of a review of data held by state sources relating to 
housing stock quality, energy usage or incomes. This was conducted primarily via 
examination of publicly available information, though direction was provided by the 
literature review, interviews, and further conversations with members of the policy 
community, including members of the Government Statistical Service. 
                                                
93 Ravetz (2008) discusses in more general terms the unemployed potential of UK housing stock data. 
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Table 5.7: Identified state-held sources of data on incomes and housing stock 
 
Source Ownership Types of Data Held Coverage Current Accessibility 
Income Data 
DWP data on 
pensions and 
benefits 
DWP Hold data on receipt of state benefits. All recipients known. Closed, limited 
legislative powers 
support data matching of 
Pension Credit recipients 
with energy suppliers. 
Census Data Overseen by the 
Office for National 
Statistics (ONS), a 
non-ministerial 
government 
department. 
The 2011 Census included questions about employment 
status and hours of work. 
95% household response rate for 
England. 
Closed at individual 
level, secure data can be 
accessed subject to 
approval. Aggregate data 
publically available. 
HMRC Non-ministerial 
government 
department. 
Hold data on tax credits, child benefit and personal income 
tax. 
All recipients known. Closed. 
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Indices of 
Multiple 
Deprivation 
DCLG Indices of Multiple Deprivation are compiled at the Lower 
Super Output Area level (LSOA; 400-1200 households) 
based on government data, taking into account seven 
weighted domains of deprivation, including income 
deprivation and employment deprivation. IMDs were last 
compiled in 2010 and are due to be reassessed. 
Area-based measure with full UK 
coverage. 
Open. 
Survey Data Various, generally 
overseen by the ONS. 
Numerous government-sponsored surveys consider factors 
related to income, e.g., the Family Resources Survey (FRS), 
Households Below Average Income (HBAI; derived from the 
FRS), the Labour Force Survey (LFS), the Integrated 
Household Survey (IHS). The English Housing Survey (EHS) 
also includes income data. 
Based upon representative 
samples of varying sizes. 
Publically available 
versions generally 
available, in addition to 
secure data. 
Housing Stock Data 
Census  Overseen by the ONS. The 2011 census included questions on house type, number of 
rooms, number of bedrooms, central heating type, tenure and 
landlord.  
95% household response rate for 
England. 
Closed at individual 
level, secure data can be 
accessed subject to 
approval. Aggregate data 
publically available. 
Local Authority 
Housing 
Statistics 
DCLG Local Authorities submit a range of housing stock statistics to 
DECC annually, including statistics relating to energy 
efficiency. 
 
 
Aggregated at the LA level. Open. 
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English Housing 
Survey 
DCLG Collects detailed data on dwelling quality and housing stock 
for sample. Primary source used by DECC to compile fuel 
poverty statistics. 
Representative ample, EHS 2013 
includes interview and physical 
data for 14386 occupied 
dwellings. 
Open, additional secure 
access version. 
Energy 
consumption 
data 
DECC Beginning in 2005, DECC have received annualised 
consumption estimates provided at meter point level by 
electricity industry and Xoserve (company responsible for 
aggregation of gas consumption). 
Some limitations where meters 
cannot be linked to addresses. 
Around 18% of gas and 20% of 
electricity submitted readings are 
estimated, not actual, for each 
year. 
Closed, publically 
available aggregated at 
the LSOA level. 
Energy 
Performance 
Certificate 
Register 
Currently operated by 
Landmark on behalf 
of DCLG. 
Since 2007, Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs) have 
been required whenever a dwelling is bought, sold or rented. 
They include an estimation of energy costs and heat demand 
for the dwelling, current and potential RdSAP rating and 
band, some detail on dwelling characteristics, and suggested 
improvements 
As of March 2014, 11.3m 
domestic EPCs were lodged with 
the register for England and 
Wales, indicating that they are 
available for c.48% of dwellings. 
Open (access expanded 
following consultation in 
2010). 
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Home Analytics EST, a social 
enterprise largely 
funded by 
government. 
Modelled dataset based upon HEED, Experian, Census, 
Ordnance Survey, Royal Mail and EST internal data. Includes 
variables relating to housing stock (including wall type and 
insulation, lazing type, boiler type, property age, number of 
bedrooms, fuel type, property type and tenure and dwelling 
footprint), householders (limited to indication of ability to 
pay and willingness to undertake retrofit), estimated energy 
consumption, viable measures and potential savings. 
Modelled data available for all 
dwellings. 
Commercially available. 
Home Energy 
Efficiency 
Database 
EST. Compiled from a range of data sources, primarily reported 
installations under energy efficiency schemes from 2002 
onwards. Includes variables relating to property type, age, 
tenure, heating fuel, heating system, controls, boiler type, 
external wall type, loft insulation, window type, hot water 
heating system, hot water tank insulation, microrenewables, 
smart meters, advanced measures). 
At least one data point available 
for 51% of UK homes, though 
collection method naturally skews 
sample towards houses that have 
already received measures. 
Aggregated data is 
available, but access is 
restricted to particular 
classes of non-
commercial users. 
Homes and 
Communities 
Agency 
Non-departmental 
public body 
Data submitted by registered private providers of social 
housing. Aggregated at Local Authority level, includes data 
on average rent, housing benefit receipt, proportion of homes 
not meeting Decent Homes Standard. 
2.6m English homes (12%), all 
social housing. 
Closed, data aggregated 
at LA level. 
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Valuations 
Office Agency 
Executive Agency of 
HMRC 
Core data on council tax band, house type, age, floor area, 
number of rooms (including bedroom and bathroom counts), 
and number of floors. Additional data for some houses on 
presence of central heating, conservatory. 
Core data fields complete for vast 
majority of dwellings (by way of 
example, examination of VOA 
data releases indicates that only 
0.04% of properties do not have 
age data available). 
Closed. 
Note: Accessibility refers in the first instance to address-level data (where held). Closed data is that only available to owner; open data is available to general public. Secure 
data refers to that data which requires special permissions for full access (see, for example, UK Data Service 2014a). Where data sources hold clearly irrelevant data, these have 
not been listed. 
Compiled from own review, key data sources: (DWP 2014a, ONS 2011a, ONS 2012b, HMRC 2014a, DCLG 2011b, UK Data Service 2014b, DCLG 2012c, DCLG 2013a, 
DECC 2014k, HM Government 2012, DCLG 2010, HC Deb 3rd April 2014 c801W, EST 2010, EST 2012, EST 2014d, Homes and Communities Agency 2012, VOA 2014b, 
VOA 2014a) 
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Some of the data sources included in Table 5.7 have already been combined under the 
National Energy Efficiency Data Framework (NEED) (see DECC 2014d). DECC 
state that NEED has been applied in considering fuel poverty policy planning (DECC 
2014d: 7) however, this has not yet extended to the application of this data in policy 
targeting. The National Heat Map, commissioned by DECC from CSE, also brings 
together some of the data discussed in Table 5.6 (see CSE 2014b). Local Authorities 
are also able to request address level data from that model to support delivery of their 
own projects. It was further suggested by one energy industry professional 
interviewed for this research that a successful Green Deal could create useful data on 
the national housing stock as it would potentially result in more building surveys 
being undertaken (as these constitute part of the assessment process, see DECC 
2010c). 
 
It is apparent from this review that a range of unexploited data exist with the potential 
to improve the targeting of fuel poor households. There are challenges in employing 
some of this information, for example, technical complexity, limited accessibility, or 
low coverage94. It might also be more difficult to formulate convenient eligibility 
criteria of the sort facilitated by benefits receipt from more advanced types of data. 
However, advanced usages offer the potential for data to be applied in the targeting of 
fuel poor households, i.e., via improved geographical targeting, the use of data 
mining, and through centralised databases; these possible means of effectively 
utilising the identified data sources will be discussed further in the final section. 
 
5.2.3 Supplier Targeting Capacity 
 
The targeting of fuel poor households is not required within energy supplier 
obligations, and the extent to which companies actively attempt to find such 
households is unknown (one Ofgem report briefly reviews some of the efforts made 
by the Big Six in this respect, see Ofgem 2010: 9-10). E.ON UK has reviewed its own 
ability to identify the fuel poor (using the 10pct definition) amongst its own customers 
as part of a programme of Corporate Social Responsibility activity that incorporated 
Challenge 100 (see E.ON UK 2010) and a subsequent programme of activity, the 
                                                
94 Though benefit uptake coverage is by no means optimal, as will be discussed in section 5.3.2. 
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Reset Review (see E.ON UK 2012) that sought to re-evaluate the company’s 
relationship with its customers. As already established, this work is in some respects a 
case study of E.ON UK, but it offers an insight into an otherwise inaccessible 
research area. Interviews helped establish the extent to which the data held by energy 
suppliers could enable targeting of fuel poor households, and it is argued that this will 
be indicative of the position of the other obligated suppliers. As noted previously, 
E.ON UK have been comparatively successful in delivering obligations, so there is no 
reason to expect that they should be significantly less able than their competitors in 
this respect. 
 
The findings indicate that supplier ability to target fuel poor households is 
significantly limited by data access. One limitation is that the vast majority of data 
held – particularly recent data – relates only to current customers95. Beyond that 
which might potentially be useful for marketing, there is no incentive for suppliers to 
collect and store information on previous customers. Of the two core types of data 
useful in identifying fuel poor households, incomes and fuel requirements, the former 
is the element about which suppliers know least. This is to be expected; there is no 
reason why energy suppliers should have access to data on customer incomes as a 
matter of course. In the UK a range of companies specialise in the development of 
sophisticated consumer data models that are sold primarily to support product 
marketing. The most prominent are credit reference agencies Equifax (see Equifax 
2014); Callcredit, producers of the Cameo classification mode (see Callcredit 2014); 
CACI, producers of the Acorn model (see CACI 2013); and Experian, producers of 
the Mosaic model (see Experian 2014b), whom E.ON UK partnered with on 
Challenge 100. These agency models include variables that can indicate household 
income, however, they differ in accuracy and tend to be updated infrequently, 
restricting their value in predicting fuel poverty risk. Models are available at both the 
household and postcode level, however, those specialists interviewed indicated that 
postcode level data was of limited value in considering fuel poverty risk; this is in line 
with the estimation of the efficiency of CESP targeting given in the previous section. 
 
                                                
95 It is worth noting that all Big Six suppliers are participants in the midata government initiative, 
which seeks to improve transparency around the data that companies hold on consumers (see BIS 
2014). 
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Suppliers also do not hold data on fuel requirements; data on housing type is available 
for purchase from the aforementioned commercial sources, but one interviewee – a 
specialist in energy industry customer data (hereafter referred to as CI) – stated that in 
their experience this tends to be limited to house type and whether the house was built 
within the last 18 years, and that they have been unsuccessful in finding any better 
sources. Suppliers do have access to data on customer fuel source and actual 
expenditure; however, this is also subject to limitations, as suppliers will only know 
about the fuels that they supply. So, where a customer is ‘dual fuel’, they should 
know expenditure, but where a customer receives only gas, their electricity 
expenditure will be unknown. Furthermore, when a customer receives only electricity, 
the supplier does not necessarily know whether they have a gas supply at all. In any of 
these scenarios, suppliers will not know whether customers use additional fuel 
sources such as propane, oil or solid fuel. Even where fuel type is known, there are 
further uncertainties in relation to reporting of expenditure. CI reported that it takes 
multiple readings across different seasons to gain an accurate profile of household 
energy use96. In the best-case scenario, a household will self-report meter readings on 
a monthly basis; however, this is rare. Official readings are taken around every six 
months, though this varies by region. The best data comes from smart meters, which 
submit accurate monthly readings automatically. However, as of September 2013, 
only just under a million UK households (3.9%) had a smart or smart-type meter in 
place (DECC 2013n: 19), though the government target is to have a smart meter in 
every household by 2020 (DECC 2013n: 7). It is unknown as to what proportion of 
current smart meter owners are likely to be fuel poor. Despite these barriers, CI 
emphasised that it is in the interest of suppliers to accurately estimate consumer 
spend, both as a means to mitigate risk for themselves, and so that they can provide 
more accurate bills (the provision of inaccurate bills was cited as a common catalyst 
for customers switching). As such, sophisticated modelled profiles of energy use have 
been developed to support this, supported by purchased third-party consumer data. 
So, for example, where only electricity is supplied, consideration of house type and 
established energy profiles with relation to income bands can enable suppliers to 
predict whether the property is heated with electricity, or whether there is likely to be 
an additional gas supply. 
                                                
96 DECC estimate that around 18% of gas and 20% of electricity readings submitted to them are 
estimated, and disregard these in constructing NEED (see DECC 2014b). 
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Suppliers potentially hold a range of other data on customers, reported in Table 5.8 
along with commentary on data quality. 
 
Table 5.8: Energy supplier access to customer data 
 
Data type Commentary 
Address Should be known for all customers. 
Credit score As 89% of UK households are supplied with energy in advance of 
payment (see Table 5.6), suppliers frequently undertake credit checks 
on new customers and so are likely to have some knowledge of credit 
history for current (and possibly previous) customers. However, 
practice is likely to vary between companies (see Consumer Focus 
reports on the use of customer credit reference data by energy 
companies, Vyas 2011, Accent Scotland 2012). 
Fuel Direct status Indicates benefits receipt. In 2011, c. 40,000 each of electricity and gas 
customers were on Fuel Direct (Ofgem 2012a: 40-43). 
History of contacts with 
customer 
Customer contacts can help establish status and energy requirements. 
However, data is scattered and may be undermined by lack of trust 
between customers and suppliers. 
Join date Should be known for all customers. 
Name Known for an estimated 85% of E.ON UK customers. 
Participation in previous 
obligation activity 
Interviewees report that this can be difficult to access, e.g., for work 
undertaken by different suppliers via HEED (EST 2014d). Equally 
customers who have had support are less likely to be fuel poor. 
Payment methods used Should be known for all customers. 
Payment record Should be known for all customers. 
Priority Services Register 
status 
Indicates vulnerability. In 2011, 1.82m English households (8.3%) were 
on the register (Ofgem 2012a: 31). 
Warm Home Discount 
Scheme receipt  
Suppliers will know whether they apply WHDS to their own customers; 
there were 1.2m Core Group and 0.4m Broader Group rebates in 
2012/13 (Ofgem 2013j: 5). They should also be aware of any social 
tariffs or debt assistance offered under the Industry Initiatives and 
Legacy Spending elements of the programme. 
Source: Stakeholder interviews unless indicated otherwise. 
 
However, where suppliers do hold data, this is potentially undermined by ‘churn’ or 
‘data decay’, i.e., where customers move home or switch suppliers. Analysis of EHS 
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data suggests that 9.2% of English households moved into their home in the last year 
(own analysis of DCLG 2013c), whilst Ofgem-commissioned research indicates that 
15% of gas customers and 17% of electricity customers switched suppliers in 2010 
(Ipsos MORI 2011: 8). Whilst a high rate of switching might be evidence of a healthy 
market, customer churn requires suppliers to either start afresh in estimating energy 
expenditure, or work from data relating to a previous occupant or property. One 
energy supplier employee also noted that, as suppliers are not required to target fuel 
poor households, much of the potentially useful data that is held is currently spread 
across multiple systems (though this will vary between companies dependent on IT 
infrastructure). As such, even where data exists, it may not be straightforward to 
aggregate. 
 
Despite the range of barriers, all of the energy industry representatives interviewed 
believed they have had some success in predicting fuel poverty risk amongst their 
own customers with the data they already have, though without building survey data 
they have only been able to validate this with reference to the number of customers 
they would expect to be in fuel poverty. A noteworthy outcome of these modelling 
attempts is that in order to achieve viable numbers, it was necessary to artificially 
boost the energy expenditure of lower income households, i.e., many of those who 
might have been expected to be spending 10% or more of their income on fuel were 
not doing so, because of what appeared to modellers as suspiciously low expenditure. 
This supports evidence from literature previously cited in section 2.1 (e.g., Hirsch, 
Preston & White 2011)  that low income households tend to ration their fuel use. It 
also supports the finding of Hutchinson et al. (2006) that the association between 
property characteristics and actual low internal temperatures is weak.  
 
Some of the data held by suppliers is both not available to the state as a matter of 
course, and has the potential to support better targeting, e.g., credit score, payment 
history, and energy consumption; the targeting potential of such data could be a 
fruitful avenue for future research. However, at present, supplier capacity to identify 
fuel poor customers is limited. All energy industry representatives interviewed felt 
that the potential did exist to achieve better identification, but only with a level of 
investment in data and systems for which there is currently no incentive to undertake, 
as it is not obligated by government. The strongest primary data that suppliers 
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presently have at their disposal is that relating to energy use, but this is limited to 
what they themselves supply. Whilst actual expenditure is not the same as the 
required expenditure used to establish fuel poor status, it still offers the potential to 
prove a useful predictor. Targeting those with high bills might seem the obvious 
strategy, however, this is both undermined by evidence that low income households 
tend to ration energy, and because it would violate the ‘polluter pays’ principle of 
environmental policy. It would likely be more valuable to target those who are 
currently consuming less energy than is healthy; however this may present tensions 
with carbon reduction policy aims, as the intention would presumably be to encourage 
such households to use more energy. Suppliers have no incentive to share expenditure 
data amongst themselves as this would allow competitors to identify the most 
‘valuable customers’ as a marketing opportunity. Another agent (e.g., the 
government) could serve as a central hub and consolidate the data (as they currently 
do within NEED); this possibility will be considered in more detail in section 5.4.2. 
 
5.2.4 Alternate Sources of Information to Support Targeting 
 
The research process identified a number of additional potential sources of data that 
might be used to identify fuel poor households. These are reviewed briefly here as 
they might contribute to better policy solutions, as discussed in section 5.4.2. 
 
• Local Authority Data 
 
The requirement for LAs to collect housing stock data is limited to HECA reports (see 
section 2.4.4) and annual statistics that must be submitted to DCLG (referenced in 
Table 5.6). As discussed in section 2.4.4, LA interest in energy efficiency and fuel 
poverty tends to be variable, but there are certainly instances where LA data has the 
potential to contribute to better targeting at the local level. The Housing Intelligence 
for the East Midlands (hi4em) project, funded via a consortium of East Midlands LAs, 
is an example of good practice, compiling a range of data sources to support the 
activity of councils in delivering programmes at the local level. This includes maps of 
fuel poverty incidence based on locally available data (see hi4em 2014). The 
Commission for Rural Communities (CRC) and Durham County Council have 
published a manual for LAs that demonstrates how a database can be created to 
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estimate SAP ratings for all individual properties, with detailed guidance on costs and 
practical requirements (see CRC/Durham County Council 2010). Although variance 
may make it difficult to incorporate LA data within national level requirements, data 
like that discussed here – as well as the inherently superior knowledge of localities 
held by LAs – has significant scope to augment targeting when delivering at the local 
level97. 
 
• Geographic Information Systems (GIS) 
 
A number of recent projects, primarily run with some involvement from universities, 
have combined analysis of survey data with Geographical Information Systems (GIS) 
to produce sophisticated synthetic models that enable fuel poverty risk to be spatially 
mapped at the small area level. The broad approach taken is to employ regression 
techniques to develop a measure of fuel poverty risk based upon predictive 
characteristics that are known for a given locality, and then to map incidence within 
particular blocks of geography, i.e., by LSOA. Perhaps the most prominent example is 
CSE’s Fuel Poverty Indicator, which sourced initial indicators from EHCS data, and 
then synthesised the model with Census data and commercial data on dwelling age 
and valuation to produce a final model that predicted incidence of fuel poverty at the 
small area level for the whole of England  (CSE 2012, initial methodology reported in 
Baker, Starling & Gordon 2003, updates to the model reported in Fahmy, Gordon & 
Patsios 2011) . Since 2010, DECC have published their own estimates of fuel poverty 
incidence at the LSOA level, based upon a regression model (see DECC/BRE 2011). 
Morrison and Shortt (2008) adopted CSE’s technique within a Scottish context, 
working with a LA to enable mapping at the individual dwelling level. Similarly, 
Walker et al. (2012) mapped small area fuel poverty risk in Northern Ireland using an 
innovative model that incorporates consideration of heating costs, built environment 
factors (primarily floor space) and social vulnerabilities. These GIS models have all 
been used in practice, primarily to guide delivery of energy efficiency measures at a 
local level. As with LA data, use of the most innovative models tends to be limited by 
data availability to particular localities at present, but the potential for similar 
techniques to be used in national policy will be discussed in the final section. 
                                                
97 Local-level NHS data (i.e., on incidence of EWM) might also prove worthy of further investigation. 
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• Commercial Data Sources 
 
Commercial data sources have already been mentioned in section 5.2.3 as they are 
frequently integrated into risk models; for example, Experian household 
characteristics datasets are used in NEED (DECC 2014d: 7) and in EST Home 
Analytics (see EST 2012). Beyond the types of data referenced previously, which are 
mostly economic and socio-demographic, some of these companies have sought to 
model fuel poverty and allied factors more directly. Experian, for example, has 
previously developed a Fuel Poverty Propensity model (Ofgem 2010: 10), and 
worked with the Stockholm Environment Institute to develop the GreenAware model, 
which maps carbon emissions and household environmental attitudes at the individual 
level (see Experian 2014a). It should also be recognised that companies of the type 
discussed here have significant expertise in handling large quantities of sensitive data 
and may therefore have a commercial interest in taking an expanded role in policy 
targeting, as will be discussed in section 5.4.2. 
 
• Advanced Technology 
 
The potential of smart meters to offer more accurate consumption data has already 
been identified. A number of organisations have developed their own bespoke 
indicator tools for use in delivering programmes on the ground, e.g., handheld survey 
devices (see Pither, Moore 2006). A form of advanced technology that could provide 
additional insight into consumption is thermography, wherein a thermal imaging 
camera, either at street level or mounted on an aeroplane is used to visualise 
household heat leakage. However, Roberts and Starling’s (2004) case study of 
Birmingham City Council’s use of aerial thermography concluded that such the 
technology is expensive, and provides only a snapshot of usage that confirmed 
existing knowledge of the housing stock, and so was more appropriate as a tool to 
promote energy efficiency to higher income households. 
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5.3 Identification and Implementation 
 
Once eligibility criteria for programmes have been established, the next stages are to 
identify qualifying households, and then to deliver support. This is often not a 
straightforward exercise for two main reasons. Firstly, because – depending on the 
nature of the criteria used – it may be more or less difficult to find households that are 
eligible. Secondly as, even where eligibility has been established, it may then be 
necessary to get households to agree to participate. This should be straightforward 
where the programme simply involves automatically applying additional benefits, but 
complexities can arise when the intervention offered is the potentially disruptive 
installation of energy efficiency measures. This section compares the efficacy of 
state-led and supplier-led programmes in identifying eligible households and 
facilitating the take-up of measures. Particular attention is paid to the to the differing 
dynamics inherent in the structure of policies, with government themselves 
automatically applying measures, whilst requiring suppliers to take an active role in 
identifying households, and potentially imposing enormous fines if they are not 
successful. The section begins with an overview of the requirements of this stage of 
the process. Next, the manner in which state-led schemes have identified eligible 
households and delivered measures is addressed. The section finishes with an 
examination of the ways in which suppliers have sought to identify households as 
required by their obligation, again, with a focus on E.ON UK. 
 
5.3.1 Requirements for Success 
 
The requirements for identifying eligible households vary depending on the criteria 
used. At one end of the scale, any individual with a list of qualifying areas could 
theoretically establish geographical eligibility (such as that used for CESP and ECO 
CSCO). The more complex criteria include those based upon benefits receipt, which 
often hinge upon particular combinations of circumstances (e.g., for CERT SPG and 
ECO HHCRO) and which – depending upon the delivery agent – may require 
extensive engagement with households in order to establish eligibility. In such cases 
the size of the eligible group (as highlighted in Table 5.4) also becomes relevant; a 
smaller group may well be more difficult to locate via conventional marketing 
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methods (e.g., direct mail). Similarly, implementation could be as straightforward as 
automatically adding funds to an existing benefits payment, or as complex as 
convincing a household to agree to the lengthy and potentially chaotic installation of 
solid wall insulation. Furthermore, regulators may require that delivery agents collect 
detailed information on household circumstances as evidence of eligibility in order 
that delivery can be counted towards obligations. 
 
This section examines the differing ability of suppliers and state to fulfil these tasks. 
This variance in capability is partially a function of the differing nature of the 
institutions, for example, with regards to access to particular types of data. However, 
part of the variation can be attributed to the different form of the programmes 
delivered by each agent, which is itself informed by the position of those institutions 
and the types of constraints outlined in section 4.4.2. As suppliers are required to 
deliver on obligations or risk being fined, the state is able to push the limits in terms 
of what is required of suppliers in programme delivery. The government, however, 
are subject to a fairly weak legal commitment which, it is argued here, is reflected in 
the comparatively undemanding nature of the policies it is responsible for delivering.  
 
5.3.2 State-led Identification and Implementation  
 
The discussion in the sections that follow naturally separates into that of economic 
measures, and of technical measures. 
 
• Economic Measures 
 
The design of the two state economic policies, CWPs and WFPs, makes identification 
and implementation a comparatively straightforward process. Both are overseen by 
DWP, not DECC, and delivered via the benefits system, automatically applied as 
supplements to those who qualify. Recipients are not required to apply for or agree to 
receive the measures (indeed, some high profile pensioners have attempted to return 
WFPs they feel they do not need, see Collins, Winnett 2010, Hodge 2010). There can 
be problems, however, where individuals are not claiming the benefits necessary to 
trigger payment. In the case of WFPs, everyone over the qualifying age is eligible, but 
may need to apply if they are not receiving a state pension (see UK Government 
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2014e). The benefits that form the basis of CWP eligibility are more often subject to 
sub-optimal take-up by eligible individuals. Table 5.9 gives the most recent estimates 
of take-up rates for benefits and tax credits linked to fuel poverty policy eligibility 
(those linked to WHDS Core Group and ECO HHCRO have also been included). 
 
Table 5.9: Estimated take-up rates of benefits and tax credits in Great Britain 
 
Income-related Benefit Estimated Take-Up 
Percentage Range 
(by Caseload) 
Central Estimate 
Income Support &  
Employment and 
Support Allowance 
77 - 89 83% 
Pension Credit 
 
62 - 68 65% 
Jobseeker’s Allowance 60 - 67 63% 
Child Tax Credit 78 - 83 80% 
Working Tax Credit 56 - 60 58% 
Note: The cited research covers Great Britain, not England alone; however, the DWP 
report indicates that take-up rates for benefits do not differ significantly by country. 
The HMRC report gives no indication of expected variance. 
Source: Data on benefits take-up relates to 2009/10 and is sourced from DWP (2012a). Data on 
tax credit take- up relates to 2008/09 and is sourced from HMRC (2011a). 
 
Access to Benefits Entitlement Advice could improve coverage, a potential that will 
be considered in sections 5.4.2 and 7.2.3. However, it should be noted that the failure 
to take up benefits is a problem that negatively impacts those low income households 
who miss out more than it does the government, which ultimately saves money (an 
estimated £7.5-12.3bn in 2009-10, see DWP 2012a).  
 
• Technical Measures 
 
Warm Front is no longer active, however the manner in which eligible homes were 
identified provides a noteworthy counterpoint to the supplier obligation process that is 
to be discussed shortly. As Warm Front was not an obligation, it operated using a 
different mechanism. The programme was contracted out, and delivery agents did not 
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have prescribed annual targets, but rather sought to support as many households as 
possible within the budget available (Burr 2009b: 5), subject to an expenditure cap on 
the support available to each household (£3500 at the time the scheme closed, £6000 
where certain advanced technologies were required, see Watson and Bolton (2013: 
3)). The scale of the scheme was smaller than that of supplier obligations, with Warm 
Front supporting 2.3m households over its twelve years in operation (Watson, Bolton 
2013: 4). By comparison, CERT delivered approximately that number of professional 
loft insulation installations (the most prevalent measure) alone to PG households in 
four years (Ofgem 2013d: 34) (see also the lower level of expenditure under Warm 
Front, as illustrated in Figure 5.2). 
 
Warm Front operated a passive identification and implementation process; households 
were required to apply, and to demonstrate proof of eligibility via benefits receipt (see 
application form, Carillion Energy Services Ltd. 2011). There were, then, no issues in 
getting occupants to agree to participate given that the burden of identification was 
transferred to the householders themselves. In general, this approach was successful 
in identifying eligible households, with the full budget being allocated every year 
until 2011/12, when £50.6m (35%) of the £145m budget was left unspent98. FPAG 
later attributed this primarily to a lack of marketing following a period in which the 
scheme had been closed for a time, and then the eligibility criteria adjusted (FPAG 
2012: 16-17). 
 
That Warm Front could apply a passive identification process and still successfully 
reach the requisite number of households is a function of the ambition and form of the 
scheme, which itself is likely driven by political and economic motives. A larger 
programme (or one with more stringent requirements) would have made identification 
of eligible households more difficult, and so potentially have required more active 
engagement (including convincing households to apply) in order to achieve adequate 
take-up, with a consequent increase in administrative costs and risk of programme 
failure. As the scheme was not an obligation, government were ultimately accountable 
for costs, providing an additional motive to ensure that outlay was low. A more 
limited programme for which households are required to put themselves forward 
                                                
98 Established via a House of Commons written question (see HC Deb 23rd Apr 2012 c620W). 
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likely presents a politically low-risk, economically appealing policy option to 
government. 
 
5.3.3 Supplier-led Identification and Implementation 
 
• Economic 
 
As shown in Table 5.1, the supplier-led economic measure, WHDS, consists of two 
elements; the Core Group includes those in receipt of particular elements of Pension 
Credit (see Ofgem 2013k: 11), whilst the Broader Group is partially defined by the 
individual obligated suppliers (see Table 5.2), with criteria needing to be approved by 
Ofgem (see Ofgem 2013k: 22-24). The issues affecting benefit take-up previously 
discussed with relation to the state-led policies also have implications for supplier-led 
policies, both the Core Group, and the Broader Group should suppliers choose 
benefits based criteria (as is usual; see Table 5.2 by way of example). Whilst total 
expenditure on WHDS is capped under the Levy Control Framework (see DECC 
2011c), low uptake will impact upon the way in which expenditure is distributed 
across the elements of WHDS as all Core Group members are eligible for support, 
and the numbers obligated to receive Broader Group supported are planned based on 
the anticipated Core Group numbers (see DECC 2011h: 5). Furthermore, of course, 
WHDS represents a further benefit that eligible non-claimants are potentially missing.  
 
As established in section 5.2.3, one crucial difference between the state and energy 
suppliers is that the government has full knowledge of benefits receipt (and indeed 
use this as the vehicle by which they provide support), whereas energy companies do 
not. The state can automatically apply CWPs and WFPs, while suppliers must seek 
out eligible customers. This is supported to some extent by provisions enacted under 
the Pensions Act 2008 (s.142), which enables DWP to share information of recipients 
of Pension Credit with energy suppliers for the purpose of providing assistance. This 
power was piloted via the 2010 Energy Rebate Scheme, which released data on 
Pension Credit recipients to energy suppliers so that they could find instances where 
the names and addresses matched those of their own customers and apply rebates, 
achieving a 53% match rate (DWP 2010a: 2). This has been substantially improved 
under delivery of WHDS, where data matching identified 85% of recipients in year 
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one, and 93% in year two (Ofgem 2013j: 9). However, it should also be noted that 
Pension Credit is a comparatively weak predictor of fuel poverty (see Table 5.6) and, 
as shown in Table 5.9, the take-up rate for Pension Credit is only around 62-68%99.  
 
By contrast, suppliers are obligated to identify Broader Group households themselves, 
with no data matching procedure in place for the types of passport benefits employed 
for this purpose. At present the burden of identification under WHDS is fairly low; in 
year one the minimum number of required payments across all suppliers was 26,034, 
increasing to 366,356 in year two (Ofgem 2012b, Ofgem 2013j). To put this into 
context, this would place E.ON’s second year obligation requirement at somewhere 
around 0.01% of their customer base of approximately 5m households. Given the low 
burden and the flexibility in the eligibility criteria, it is perhaps not surprising, then, 
that energy companies have tended to easily exceed the minimum requirement, with 
all suppliers choosing to exercise flexibility in programme design and reapportion 
spend from the Legacy Spending element of the programme towards the Broader 
Group, exceeding Broader Group minimum spend by 33.6% (Ofgem 2013j: 13). This 
evidence, and that given by interviewees, suggests that the scale and design of WHDS 
Broader Group enables a more passive approach to be adopted for identifying eligible 
households. Giving evidence to the House of Commons Energy and Climate Change 
Committee, Alistair Phillips-Davies, Chief Executive of SSE, stated that the company 
had managed to identify around fifteen times the obligated number of customers, and 
cited frontline staff as the primary source of referral (see House of Commons 2012). 
 
Enabling supplier discretion as to the composition of the Broader Group was designed 
to reduce the administrative burdens of identification (DECC 2010a: 23). However, 
stakeholders have expressed concern over the lack of consistency this introduces, 
particularly the impact on vulnerable households. Whilst older people receive 
guaranteed support via the Core Group, people with disabilities, terminal illnesses and 
                                                
99 It was suggested by one interviewee that the Pension Credit recipients who are not matched are likely 
to be transient and thus potentially at greater risk of fuel poverty. However, exploratory analysis of 
EHS 2011 data found that those 16.4% of Pension Credit recipients who had been in residence for less 
than five years slightly less likely to be fuel poor than those who had not (Relative Risk Ratio = 0.92, 
significant at 5% level). This may be because they have moved into homes with lower costs (cursory 
analysis indicates that such households are less likely to be underoccupying, and to live in more 
efficient homes). Further research into types of households that are not matched for WHDS would be 
valuable in developing effective policy. 
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households with young children can only access WHDS if their supplier has opted to 
support them as part of their discretionary Broader Group criteria. Thus, for example, 
a cancer patient would only receive the rebate if their own supplier had chosen to 
support that group (as contested by Macmillan Cancer Support (2011). This policy 
design has been questioned by a number of interest groups (see DECC 2011h: 23, 
Hough, Bolton 2012b: 8-10, Save the Children 2011). Energy UK has also expressed 
dissatisfaction with the burden of selecting proxies being placed on suppliers (see 
Hough, Bolton 2012b: 8). Despite the best intentions of policymakers, it seems to be 
an inescapable consequence that if suppliers are to develop their own criteria, there 
will be an inherent element of discretion in support that has the potential to put 
vulnerable groups at a disadvantage.  
 
Overall, identification and implementation has been relatively straightforward for 
supplier delivery of economic measures to date. However, this is in part due to the 
design of WHDS, which is heavily weighted towards Pension Credit recipients who 
are comparatively easy to identify because of the legal provisions that are in place, 
and the undemanding size of the Broader Group. A larger Broader Group would 
likely create greater difficulties for suppliers and give grounds for data sharing to be 
expanded, a possibility that will be discussed further in the final section. 
 
• Technical 
 
Suppliers face a considerably greater challenge in identifying households eligible for 
technical measures, particularly where qualification is linked to benefits receipt rather 
than geographical location. The criteria used for supplier obligation priority groups 
have been tightened over the history of their delivery. The first schemes, EESoP (1, 2 
and 3) and EEC (1 and 2) applied a fairly loose set of criteria to identify a priority 
group obligation that initially – for the EESoP programmes – was not compulsory 
(Offer 1998: 7-8), but became so under EEC (Ofgem/EST 2003: 41). The original 
CERT Priority Group (PG) was similarly defined, but the CERT extension, 
introduced in March 2011, introduced the Super Priority Group (SPG), which 
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required 15% of savings be achieved within a much more tightly defined group100. 
The ECO PG, those households eligible for HHCRO, is more closely defined still. 
Figure 5.4 illustrates the efficiency and size of eligible groups for different schemes. 
It is hard to identify a clear trend from the data shown, but there does appear to be a 
tendency towards tighter criteria in later schemes. Furthermore, there is a tendency 
that as leakage drops, so does the size of the eligible group, i.e., as criteria become 
tighter, this results in the eligible group being smaller, and so potentially harder to 
identify. This relationship can clearly be seen in CERT PG, CERT SPG, and ECO 
HHCRO; in later schemes there is less leakage, but also a smaller group. 
                                                
100 Note that this coincides with the shift towards obligations treating fuel poverty as a distinct policy 
goal, as discussed in section 4.3. 
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Note: Assumes all dwellings as viable for improvement, Warm Front criteria used are post-September 2012. State-led schemes white, supplier-led grey. Bubble size 
corresponds to size of eligible group. 
Source: Own analysis of DCLG (2013c). Eligibility criteria compiled from policy literature: (Ofgem 2009b, DWP 2012b, UK Government 2014e, Ofgem 2013k). CSCO 
efficiency estimates based upon analysis of DECC (2012f, 2013a, 2013b). 
 
Figure 5.4: Targeting efficacy and eligible group size for fuel poverty policies 
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Early supplier obligations were generally perceived to be successful (see Rosenow 
2012). Whilst EEC 1 fell 1% short of the target of achieving 50% of measures savings 
within priority group households (Ofgem 2005: 10), EEC 2 exceeded that target by 
26% (Ofgem 2008c: 6). However, issues began to emerge under CERT, a much larger 
programme, particularly when the SPG was introduced. Suppliers experienced much 
greater difficulty in identifying households within that more tightly defined group, 
with one interviewee describing the eligibility criteria as “woefully complex” (see, for 
example, Ofgem 2011a: 65-66). More complicated criteria also resulted in a more 
complex compliance reporting procedure, creating a further administrative burden 
(see Ofgem 2011a: 54-68). A push to support compliance was undertaken in the very 
final stages via a DWP-supported exercise, which enabled suppliers to check 
addresses that had received measures against SPG criteria (Ofgem 2013d: 49). 
However, as not all suppliers were compliant, the overall PG and SPG targets were 
missed, as illustrated in Figure 5.5.  
 
 
Adapted from Ofgem (2013d: 14). 
 
Figure 5.5: Energy supplier performance against CERT Priority and Super Priority Group 
obligations 
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some of these issues in their final report on CERT (Ofgem 2013d: 49), as did Energy 
UK, whose evaluation of CERT and CESP summed up their concerns as follows: 
 
With the introduction of specific customer groups to target under CERT, 
marketing to customers became even more complicated as certain offerings 
are available only to a small number of households and will be dependent on 
many elements out of the suppliers’ control, such as their property-ownership, 
suitability of the measure on the property and their willingness to have the 
measure installed. Moreover, finding and targeting those households requires 
meticulous and expensive searching 
 
(ERA 2011: 18) 
 
Despite recognition of the issues with the CERT PG and SPG, as Figure 5.5 shows, an 
even tighter set of criteria has been retained for ECO HHCRO and CSCO (Ofgem 
2013b: 60-61). Reporting requirements remain complex (Ofgem 2013b: 61-64) and, 
as illustrated in Figure 5.5, whilst leakage is reduced, the eligible group is 
substantially smaller, resulting in reduced coverage. It is difficult to anticipate from 
available data how many eligible households suppliers might need to identify in order 
to achieve sufficient energy savings to meet their mandated obligations, as this is 
dependent on the number of measures delivered to each household. In the first twelve 
months of ECO delivery, a total of 202,348 households received support under 
HHCRO, and 87,609 under CSCO (DECC 2014c: 13). The pace of delivery may 
increase as it has under previous obligations; however, currently performance across 
all suppliers is slightly ahead of schedule. Assuming the current mix of measures is 
retained, it would be expected that suppliers would need to identify approximately 
310,000 HHCRO eligible households across the whole period in order to meet their 
obligations.101 While the numbers of households helped under CERT has not been 
published, from the numbers of delivered measures published indicates that 2.3m 
Priority Group households alone received professional loft insulation, i.e., at least 
484,000 a year pro rata. The indication, then, is that suppliers will only have to 
identify at most two-thirds of the households that they did under the previous scheme, 
                                                
101 £2.7bn savings achieved in the first 12 months towards a target of £4.2bn in lifetime savings, 
allocated across the 30 months of ECO pro rata (figures extracted from DECC 2014a: 26). 
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simply because ECO is less ambitious (see section 2.2.3). That said, for the majority 
of its existence CERT used only the looser PG eligibility, and at that time there was a 
larger eligible population in need of measures. Also it might be assumed those likely 
to apply for support have already done so. So, whilst it is hard to assess the relative 
difficulty of ECO identification against that of CERT, it is fair to assume the task 
remains a challenging one. 
 
The indication from interviews and policy literature, certainly, is that suppliers 
expend significant resource searching for eligible households. Additionally, a further 
form of ‘churn’ comes into consideration, as households move on and off benefits, or 
otherwise fluctuate in and out of eligibility; again, this introduces an inherent bias 
towards older people, who are more likely to remain eligible (e.g., for Pension 
Credit). Suppliers tend to opt for traditional marketing methods as a means of 
identifying eligible customers, i.e., door-to-door promotion, telemarketing, direct mail 
(facilitated by DWP on at least one occasion, see Ofgem 2013d: 49), and digital 
marketing. However, as one interviewee involved in energy industry marketing 
explained, there tends to be something of a trade-off between efficacy and cost, with 
the more expensive methods (such as door-to-door) being more effective in 
identifying eligibility, whilst the cheapest methods (such as e-mail marketing) are 
often dismissed by customers. One relatively expensive, though reliable, method is 
the purchasing of referrals. Suppliers may also offer cash incentives to encourage 
participants and word-of-mouth referral (Ofgem 2013d: 49). Another common 
strategy has been to form partnership with LAs. Targeting social housing, including 
LA properties was a common strategy under CERT SPG (Ofgem 2013d: 49). 
However, social housing has been excluded from eligibility under ECO HHCRO 
(though not CSCO, see DECC 2012j: 65-66), a further barrier to identification. A 
broader approach is for LAs to offer suppliers the opportunity to tender to partner 
with them in their area as a means of meeting their obligation (see, for example, 
Sheffield City Council's partnership with Scottish Power, EST 2009). However, a 
scheme of this type relies on LA proactivity102. Suppliers also have an incentive to 
engage in such schemes (and CSCO activity) in localities where they have a high 
                                                
102 Supplier delays in establishing LA approval were a common cause of delay in delivering CESP 
(see DECC 2011f: 19), which could persist under ECO CSCO. 
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concentration of customers as a legacy of their pre-privatisation arrangement (E.ON 
UK, for example have ~40% customer penetration in the East Midlands as a legacy of 
their 1998 acquisition of East Midlands Electricity). More generally, suppliers have 
an incentive to support their own customers, not only because they are easier to 
identify, but also because it aids retention. As one interviewee expressed; “if you’ve 
got to spend that money, spend it where you’re going to get some benefit.” 
 
The costs of identification are amplified by potential issues at the implementation 
stage. Households may need to be convinced of the value of measures, meaning that 
in practice, suppliers may need to identify many more eligible households than are 
required. Dodd and Dobson (2008) identified seven major barriers to the take-up of 
measures, including a lack of information about eligibility and the impact of 
measures. It was identified that lack of trust made households reticent to take 
measures offered, as they were suspicious of the idea of getting free support (an issue 
also encountered in delivering Challenge 100, see E.ON UK 2010: 43). Whilst the 
work by Dodds and Dobson is not focused upon supplier obligations, their findings 
echo the experience of interviewees  (see also Armstrong, Winder & Wallis 2006, 
Tovar 2012, Consumer Focus 2012) . Survey evidence suggests that energy suppliers, 
in particular, are not perceived as trustworthy organisations by the general public (see 
Ipsos MORI 2013a: 52-53) and as such suppliers may benefit from partnering with 
organisations who are more trusted. Dodds and Dobson suggest LAs as clear 
candidates here (2008: 29), and E.ON UK identified the participation of LAs and 
community groups as “essential to ensuring engagement” in delivering Challenge 100 
(E.ON UK 2010: 43). 
 
In targeting programmes, policymakers have to balance priorities; a larger eligible 
group, might be relatively easy to find but carry the risk of significant leakage, while 
a smaller group may be more efficient in targeting fuel poverty, but are also more 
difficult to find. The progression from early priority group formation through to ECO 
HHCRO demonstrates a clear trend towards seeking smaller groups (see Figure 5.5). 
It seems plausible that one reason for this decision is because of the increased use of 
supplier obligations as the core means of alleviating fuel poverty via energy 
efficiency measures. Choosing a smaller eligible group will increase the resource 
demands of identification, giving the government an added incentive to make use of 
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the stronger constraint upon supplier activity and have energy companies perform that 
task as part of their obligations. However, the costs of identification – including the 
costs of suppliers reporting compliance to the regulator – are transferred to customers 
via their energy bills in a manner that is highly likely to be regressive, as discussed in 
the next chapter. One barrier to research has been in establishing the costs of 
identification, even for the case study supplier, as these are highly commercially 
sensitive. It is frequently anecdotally suggested amongst the policy community that it 
can cost more to find a PG household than it does to provide measures. Former SSE 
Chief Executive Ian Marchant (2013) has claimed that identification costs can triple 
the costs of delivery, whilst Shuttleworth et al. (2012: 38-39) , working on behalf of 
Energy UK, estimate search costs of £147m. A new development within ECO is that 
government now requires suppliers to report costs of technical obligation delivery, 
which they publish as aggregated figures to protect commercial confidentiality (see, 
for example, DECC 2014c: 27). It is recommended that they extend this power to 
seek further clarification of the costs of targeting, as a basis for assessing what 
improvements might be achieved. 
 
A further issue identified here is that of the duplication of effort inherent in the 
current design of policy. As it stands, seven suppliers are all seeking the same small 
group of eligible customers and trying to persuade them to agree to measures. Thus 
inefficiency is built into the design of the programme, as there is no reason that one 
customer – particularly those households who are easier to identify – might not 
theoretically be actively targeted by every supplier. Indeed, it is hard to imagine any 
form of decentralised programme (i.e., any market-based model) that would not result 
in duplication of effort. Interviewees identified that regional working could prevent 
this as they would not expect a LA to have formal partnerships with multiple 
suppliers. However, this would not, for example, prevent a company targeting 
households with marketing in an area where there is a LA-supplier partnership 
already in place 
 
5.4 Evaluation of Options 
 
This chapter has compared the ability of the state and energy suppliers to effectively 
find fuel poor households, primarily via the synthesis of findings from policy 
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literature review, quantitative analysis and from interviews and broader engagement 
with the policy community. Efficacy has been considered in two respects: firstly, 
targeting in the purest sense (closer to that perspective adopted by Dubois (2012)), 
i.e., the ability simply to identify households meeting the official definition of fuel 
poverty; secondly, from a more practical standpoint, the ability to identify households 
that meet eligibility criteria and subsequently provide support. This section begins by 
summarising the barriers to policy success identified by this research. Three main 
policy adaptations are then proposed as offering the potential to counteract these 
difficulties, and barriers to the implementation of those changes are considered. The 
chapter closes with a summary of policy constraints identified as impacting upon the 
process of finding fuel poor households, before the chapter concludes. 
 
5.4.1 Identified Issues 
 
A number of issues have been identified as impeding successful delivery of fuel 
poverty policy. This section first discusses some of the more general weaknesses that 
have been identified by this research, before moving on to discuss a number of more 
specific barriers that are in some way compounded as a function of the different 
capacity of state and suppliers to fulfil requirements. 
 
• General Weaknesses 
 
Analysis of EHS 2011 datasets indicate that current eligibility criteria tends to be 
inefficient in capturing fuel poverty under either the old or new official measures. 
Results of modelling indicate that only 59% of fuel poor households are theoretically 
eligible for currently active programmes, assuming they claim the relevant benefits to 
which they are entitled, and only a small proportion of these will receive support in 
any given year under those programmes that are not universal. Furthermore, it is 
estimated that 90% of expenditure on the programmes considered in this analysis does 
not go to LIHC fuel poor households. This discrepancy is due in part to the current 
system’s dependence on benefits as a basis for eligibility criteria, when in practice 
they are not a strong proxy for fuel poverty. They are a comparatively convenient 
record of low income status, particularly for the government, who have full access to 
benefits data. However, relying on benefits as a means of targeting effectively 
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supports only a particular sub-section of the income poor, with significant leakage. 
This results in 41% of households with low incomes and high fuel costs not being 
eligible for support under any of the current schemes. There is also the risk that by 
focusing support on benefits recipients, “cliff edges” are heightened, i.e., the marginal 
costs of not receiving benefits become greater, creating a poverty trap103.  
 
One aspect of the problem is the lack of clarity in the definition of the group that 
policies are intended to target. The ultimate aim of policies in tackling fuel poverty is 
to address the negative outcomes of fuel poverty. From this perspective, supporting 
those most vulnerable to risk of ill health and EWM is crucial104. However, there is a 
need to balance this in ensuring funds are effectively employed. As discussed, the 
definition of ‘vulnerable’ used for fuel poverty is generous, covering 73% of English 
households without prioritisation (though not all of these are eligible for any current 
programmes). Currently older people (defined, effectively, as all those of pensionable 
age) – receive the vast majority of support, both explicitly via policy eligibility, and 
implicitly, as the benefit status of older people is more likely to remain consistent, 
making them easier to identify. However, simply removing WFP entirely from 
income has the effect of reducing the level of LIHC fuel poverty, from 2.3m to 2m 
(own analysis of DCLG 2013c); this is because doing so reduces income inequality. It 
is beyond the scope of this work to consider in detail stronger alternatives to the 
current set of eligibility criteria; however, it is worth briefly considering the political 
motivations underlying the form of current policies. To take by far the most 
prominent example, WFP has long drawn criticism105 for its failure to effectively 
target fuel poverty (FotE 2008, Lawton, Stanley 2009, Boardman 2010: 61-62, 
Consumer Focus 2010), with the House of Commons Energy and Climate Change 
Committee damningly describing it as a “most egregious example of a measure 
classified by the Government as being designed to combat fuel poverty, but which is 
                                                
103 Hills (2012: 72) gives a complete explanation of this potential. 
104 The base of evidence on wellbeing of children, in particular, is more limited. It should also be noted 
that 82% of EWMs occur in the over-75s (ONS 213b: 2), whilst the fuel poverty definition of 
vulnerability includes everybody over 60. 
105 However, criticism has not been universal. IFS research found that older people, contrary to popular 
opinion, did spend WFP on fuel (see Beatty et al. 2011a, 2011b). Similarly, research by Stockton 
(2011) for NEA identified a “virtual hypothecation” of both CWP and WFP, with participants 
generally reporting using these payments for energy-related purposes. 
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not targeted on the fuel poor” (2010: 15)106. WFP began in 1997 as a benefit of £20-
£50 in 1997 and has grown, with little in the way of review, to today’s level of £100-
£300 (Kennedy 2013b). To withdraw or substantially cut WFP would reduce the 
incomes of all pensioners, a large and desirable voting constituency. This motivation 
is not restricted to Conservatives, who have tended to win the ‘grey vote’ in recent 
general elections (see Ipsos MORI 2010). Peter Hain, a prominent Labour Party 
politician, has publically argued that the universality of WFP is an important indicator 
that the welfare state is not only for the poor, and thus sustains social cohesion (see 
Hain 2013). Regardless of politics, from a policy management perspective a clear 
general limitation exists across the policies examined here, insofar as, firstly, the 
definition of vulnerability is exceptionally broad, and secondly, the manner in which 
the targeting of the vulnerable should be balanced with targeting of the fuel poor has 
not been clarified. 
 
In practice, policy targeting will generally involve some level of trade-off between 
complexity of process and precision, and between coverage and leakage. Some level 
of ‘bluntness’107 in targeting, as Hills (2012: 71) recognises, is not necessarily 
problematic given that households move in and out of fuel poverty, and all measures 
contribute to carbon reduction more generally. However, a significant level of 
misidentification will slow progress and, as will be discussed in the next chapter, 
increase regressive impacts. The potential for improving current targeting will be 
discussed in section 5.4.2. However, ability to recognise this issue where it arises is 
undermined by the lack of focus in policy, a prominent theme from the previous 
chapter, which extends also to targeting of programmes. It is not clear exactly who 
policies are intended to target and by extension, accuracy is not systematically 
measured. Instead, the tendency seems to have been towards expediency, opting for 
convenient, but inaccurate, proxies. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
106 A number of these examples are drawn from a House of Commons Library Standard Note that 
offers an excellent overview of criticism of the WFP (Kennedy 2013b). 
107 See Atkinson (1993). 
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• Failure to Effectively Exploit Data 
 
Fuel poverty concerns the link between low incomes and inefficient homes. At 
present, targeting is weakened by a focus only on incomes – specifically benefits 
receipt – with only implicit consideration of housing quality for technical schemes 
(i.e., not applying measures to dwellings that do not need them). Incorporating 
information on housing quality into the process would likely be resource-intensive 
and difficult, and there are challenges in translating more advanced targeting into 
effective policy design. However, it has the potential to improve efficiency of 
targeting and more effectively prioritise activity, which – given the level of 
misdirected expenditure – could create savings in the long run. 
 
The review reported in section 5.2 identified a range of data sources relating to the 
housing stock, the majority of which are owned by, or to some extent under the 
auspices of, UK government. Beyond this, a number of further external sources of 
data have been identified, most notably the data held by Local Authorities (though 
this will likely be variable in quality and scope) and by commercial data sources. 
Interviews with E.ON UK employees indicated that energy suppliers hold some data 
on their own customers at known addresses that has the potential to support 
identification of fuel poor status, e.g., name (valuable for data matching), use of Fuel 
Direct, receipt of WHDS, or Priority Service Register status (if applicable), payment 
method (pre-payment being a strong indicator of fuel poverty). Suppliers also hold 
data on consumption, but only for the energy they supply themselves (though they can 
attempt to model usage of other fuels). The experiences of E.ON UK imply that 
suppliers can potentially identify fuel poverty risk amongst their own customers, but 
that this poses challenges, and – as it is not part of their current obligation – systems 
tend not to be geared to this type of activity. Furthermore, suppliers would only be 
able to do this for their own customers and would be disinclined to share relevant 
information (i.e., expenditure on supplied fuels) with other firms; thus the competitive 
nature of the market directly undermines supplier ability to find the fuel poor. 
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• Data Sharing 
 
The state and energy suppliers are differently situated with regards to accessing the 
types of data that supports identification of currently eligible households. Whilst the 
state has full access to benefits data, currently legislation only enables data matching 
to be undertaken with regard to Pension Credit recipients. Even when restricted to 
those in receipt of the Guarantee Element of Pension Credit, this is a weaker predictor 
of fuel poverty than eligibility for the benefits-based criteria used for CWP and ECO 
HHCRO (see Table 5.5.). Increased data sharing would help suppliers to identify 
those households more effectively, a possibility to be discussed shortly. Using CWP 
eligibility criteria as a basis for the WHDS Broader Group, for example, is 
recommended by Baker (2011) as a means of reducing 10pct fuel poverty, and would 
further reduce the incidence of inconsistency of support across suppliers recognised 
previously.  
 
It is also worth noting that current limits to data matching can be interpreted as a 
manifestation of path dependency (see section 4.4.2) with regards to the format of 
WHDS. The WHDS consultation response made clear that the choice of Core Group 
was driven, at least in part, by the fact that it was comparatively easy to identify 
eligible households because of data matching legislation (DECC 2011h: 19-21). Thus 
one of the drivers for the form of the programme is the legacy of pre-existing powers. 
The same section of the consultation indicated a reticence to expand data matching 
powers, the rationale for which will be discussed in section 5.4.2. 
 
• Difficulty of ‘Active’ Identification 
 
This work has identified a tension between active and passive identification of 
eligible customers, with state-led schemes notably tending to favour the latter, whilst 
suppliers are usually required to engage in the former. This dynamic is probably 
informed by the different constraints they each face, as noted in the previous chapter. 
The state, which has a fairly weak impetus to tackle fuel poverty, takes a less 
ambitious, lower risk approach. However, they are able to require suppliers – who are 
subject to stronger financial constraints (i.e., fines) – to seek out households meeting 
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increasingly specific criteria. More than one energy supplier employee interviewed 
for this research expressed the view that government seemed inclined to ask more of 
suppliers than it did of itself, an observation supported by this analysis. There is 
certainly the appearance that in relying on passive identification for state-led policies, 
government has afforded itself the most inexpensive and lowest risk identification 
strategy. 
 
Requiring suppliers to identify eligible households and market interventions in order 
to comply with obligations should provide a means of driving activity, with 
companies further incentivised to do so cost-effectively. However, this analysis has 
identified significant duplication of effort given that seven suppliers – who are not 
well situated to undertake the task in the first place – are all investing significant 
energy and money to locate the same small group of households. Companies have no 
incentive to share information or cooperate given that they are operating in a 
competitive market. Thus, rather than driving effectiveness, competition builds 
inefficiencies into the policy model. The same competitive aspect means the costs of 
targeting are unknown, however, it seems likely that they are higher than is necessary. 
Ultimately, the burden of this excess cost is shouldered by consumers, who pay the 
costs of the obligation through their bills, with (as will be explained in the next 
chapter) lower income and fuel poor bearing a greater proportion of that expense.  
 
As the project of improving the English housing stock progresses, it is likely that 
there will need to be a greater emphasis on active identification. This is because the 
dwellings that remain in need of improvement are more likely to need the more 
expensive, less cost effective measures which are more time-consuming and 
disruptive to install (e.g., solid wall insulation, which also potentially alters the 
aesthetic appearance of the home), and where homeowners (and Local Authorities) 
are less likely to be the sort of ‘early adopters’ who have already taken advantage of 
programmes that are already available. Making active identification easier has the 
potential to support not only fuel poverty alleviation, but also carbon reduction goals 
more generally. As such, there is a strong argument for investing in improvements to 
this element of the process. 
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5.4.2 Proposed Policy Adaptations 
 
This work has identified a disparity between the positions of government and energy 
suppliers, both in ability to find fuel poor households, and in the way policies have 
required the different agents to do this. Producing very specific recommendations as 
to how targeting might be improved (e.g., adjustments to eligibility criteria) is beyond 
the scope of this work, though some broader suggestions have already been noted, 
most particularly the need for government to clarify exactly who the policies are 
intended to reach. This section will offer some recommendations as to how the gap 
between state and supplier targeting capability might be resolved, taking into account 
the pros and cons of each, and likely barriers to implementation.  
 
• Increased Data Matching Provisions 
 
A crucial difference between state and supplier ability to identify eligible households 
is that the state have access to benefits data. This is particularly important given the 
current reliance on passport benefits as defining eligibility for programmes. One 
option to facilitate identification would be to expand data matching provisions beyond 
Pension Credit data to other benefits, such as those income-based benefits available to 
under-60s. There is a precedent for this, not only in the matching of Pension Credit 
data, but in DWP’s previous support of CERT SPG compliance via a data matching 
exercise (Ofgem 2013d: 49). Respondents to the WHDS consultation expressed 
support for expanded data matching (DECC 2011h: 17-21), as have Energy UK (ERA 
2011: 17), Consumer Focus (Baker 2011: 6), and FPAG (2012: 8). Those interviewed 
for this work were also positive about such an expansion. Data sharing would 
certainly make it easier for suppliers to identify those households eligible based on 
receipt of passport benefits, and would also be likely to reduce the burden of 
reporting. It would also facilitate identification for both technical and economic 
measures; the other options discussed in this section generally apply only to the 
former. Broader data sharing would further enable policies to move beyond a focus on 
older people, if that were deemed appropriate.  
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There will always be limits to the scope of data matching. Current data matching is 
based on linking benefits receipt to bill payment at a given address, creating potential 
issues where individuals move home and both benefits and energy supplier systems 
take time to register such changes.  This effect would potentially be more problematic 
for other benefits, given that younger people are increasingly expected to rent and 
have ‘chaotic’ housing pathways (see Clapham et al. 2012). Energy UK have 
suggested that, although they believe data matching is effective, there is a risk that an 
automatic process prevents recipients from engaging with measures (ERA 2011: 17), 
though this could be argued of any such identification based process, and consumers 
would still need to consent to the installation of technical interventions. There may 
also be public concerns around data protection, though these are more of an issue for 
some other recommendations (to follow shortly), and so this issue will be discussed 
later in this section. Expansion of data matching powers would require new primary 
legislation, and so relies on political commitment. In the WHDS consultation, DECC 
give two further arguments for not expanding the Core Group (see DECC 2011h: 19-
21). The first is that the introduction of Universal Credit risks rendering any new data 
sharing legislation obsolete. However, given that changes to welfare tend to occur 
with some frequency – and the rollout of Universal Credit is forecast to continue 
through 2017 (see DWP 2010b: 37) – this would seem a fairly weak rationale. 
Secondly, and perhaps more credibly, DECC suggest that increasing the Core Group 
via expanded sharing (as recommended by Baker 2011) would require greater 
expenditure than is currently available under the Levy Control Framework. Thus it is 
expedient for the government to maintain the group to which automatic payments can 
be made at a size commensurate with their perception of economic constraints.  
 
A related issue is that of the impact of low benefit take-up rates on the efficacy of data 
matching. Previous fuel poverty schemes have successfully incorporated Benefits 
Entitlement Advice (BEA), even if those schemes themselves used benefits receipt to 
define eligibility. All of those applying to Warm Front were offered BEA, which 
providers estimated resulted in an additional 5,500 applicants becoming eligible, and 
£35m in additional annual benefits paid out across scheme recipients (Burr 2009b: 
13). BEA provided under Warm Zones secured £1.8m in extra annual income, around 
£1000 per successful claim (EST/CSE/NEA 2005: 81). Only 20 of 102 Challenge 100 
participants were able or willing to take BEA, but of these 5 were found eligible for 
 203 
additional benefits (see E.ON UK 2010: 30-31). One Northern Irish scheme saw the 
56% of BEA applicants who were successful achieving an average increase to annual 
income of £2,448 in the first year (see Liddell, Morris & McCreadie 2012) . While the 
impact of improved benefits take-up extends beyond access to fuel poverty 
interventions, it is no longer required within any obligated delivery108. However, prior 
examples demonstrate that delivery of technical measures can be used as an opening 
to make face-to-face contact with those in fuel poverty, and the fact that a household 
is already receiving a measure may promote trust. Bundling BEA with Energy 
Company Obligation (ECO) provision is worthy of further consideration, however, 
the Challenge 100 final report suggests that energy suppliers may not be trusted with 
information relating to household finances (E.ON UK 2010: 51). This should be 
considered in the formation of any subsequent policy; it may be that separately 
contracted provision would make for a more appropriate delivery model. 
Incorporating BEA may be unpopular with politicians, both because of the extra 
burden on the public purse, and because it might be interpreted as being at odds with 
the current government’s goal of reducing welfare dependency (see Conservative 
Party 2010: 15). 
 
• Improved Geographical Targeting 
 
As the factors underlying fuel poverty tend to be spatially concentrated, geographic 
location can be used as a means of targeting the fuel poor. This has the key benefit of 
being extremely easy to use; any individual can identify a house as eligible for ECO 
CSCO via simple look-up tables (e.g., DECC 2012f). A further benefit of targeting in 
this way is that it enables delivery to take advantage of economies of scale, though 
returns tend to be most worthwhile when delivering higher cost insulation measures, 
e.g., solid wall and hard-to-treat cavity wall, accordingly the primary focus of CESP 
(DECC/DCLG 2009: 27). To date, schemes have been geographically targeted using 
the income component of IMD, with a sub-focus on rural communities introduced in 
CSCO. However, as demonstrated in Table 5.2, targeting efficiency has tended to be 
very low. 
 
                                                
108 BEA can optionally be provided by suppliers under the auspice of WHDS Industry Initiatives, 
however, only 1% of the £21.9m spent in 2012/13 was used to that end (see Ofgem 2013e: 6). 
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One option, then, would be to consider a means of improving the efficiency of 
geographical targeting. A number of more advanced GIS-based models were 
discussed in section 5.2. Platt et al. (2012)  propose introducing a ‘Low-Income, Low-
Efficiency Area’ (LILEA) approach, where areas are targeted which are known to 
have a high proportion of low income households living in energy inefficient 
dwellings, in line with the LIHC fuel poverty definition. Beyond those advantages 
already cited, improving targeting at the geographic level is likely to be cheaper than 
doing so at the individual level, and invoke fewer data protection concerns. This 
option would be politically low-risk, representing only a refinement of the broad 
methodology already employed within CESP and ECO CSCO. Geographical 
targeting, as already mentioned, can also provide a means of reducing duplication of 
effort within supplier obligations where LAs are involved, as they can provide a 
means of streamlining activity. 
 
The main problem with geographical targeting is that it tends to be unavoidably weak; 
efficiency is naturally constrained by the actual geographical concentration of fuel 
poverty. DECC’s sub-regional regression model for 2011 estimates the highest 
concentration of LIHC fuel poverty in any LSOA as being 62.6% (in Stoke-on-Trent 
016F, see DECC 2013a). Table 5.10 shows the limited expected efficiencies achieved 
by targeting areas with the highest concentrations of fuel poverty, based upon 
aggregating the outputs of DECC’s sub-regional regression modelling (for reference, 
CSCO areas are the lowest 15% ranked within IMD income domain)109. 
  
                                                
109CESP was particularly weak in targeting rural areas (see DECC 2011f: 23), an issue that the CSCO 
rural sub-target attempts to address (see DECC 2012c: 30). 
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Table 5.10: Expected efficiencies in targeting areas of high fuel poverty density 
 
Areas targeted Number 
Households 
Included 
(000s) 
Coverage Leakage 
Highest 5% of LSOAs 1,057 11% 75% 
Highest 10% of LSOAs 2,121 19% 78% 
Highest 15% of LSOAs 3,179 26% 80% 
Highest 20% of LSOAs 4,262 33% 81% 
CSCO eligible areas 3,256 15% 88% 
Source: Own analysis of DECC (2012f, 2013a). 
 
One option to improve efficiency would be to reduce the size of the areas considered 
(e.g., to street level). However, this would introduce more risks (e.g., with regard to 
cost and data protection), resulting in something between LSOA-targeting and the 
individual-level targeting considered in the next section. Insufficient data is available 
to estimate the efficiency of street-level targeting. At this stage,  given the recognised 
limits, it would seem inappropriate for geographic targeting at the LSOA-level to 
entirely replace household-level targeting as it has the potential to be less efficient, 
even, than current benefits-based targeting (cf. Table 5.1, Table 5.7). Additionally, 
targeting economic benefits at people in particular geographic locations may be 
politically contentious.  
 
• Fuel Poverty Data Observatory (FPDO) 
 
Ultimately, efficient targeting of fuel poverty will require effective household-level 
consideration of both incomes and dwelling quality. Policymakers have previously 
been reluctant to combine these elements110, tending to rely only on benefits. 
However, analysis of EHS 2011 indicates that 44% of low income (LIHC quadrant) 
and 53% of LIHC fuel poor households are in receipt of mean-tested benefits or tax 
credits (based on own analysis of DCLG 2013c). Given the difficulty in creating 
effective proxies that are not impracticably complex, one option would be to do away 
                                                
110 See, for example, the ECO consultation stage impact assessment, which considers both EPC data 
and passport benefits as means of targeting, but only separately (DECC 2011a: 110-111). 
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with the use of proxies for supplier obligations, and instead create a centralised 
targeting function – a Fuel Poverty Data Observatory (FPDO) – that would refer 
suppliers directly to households in need of support. This could bring together the 
types of data identified in section 5.2 and apply more advanced predictive techniques. 
Whilst the efficacy would vary according to technological ambition, it is extremely 
likely that better use of a wider range of data would achieve much greater efficiency 
than the current system. Table 5.11 gives a very broad indication of the efficiencies 
that might be achieved in combining data types.  
 
Table 5.11: Targeting efficiency of combinations of income and housing stock data 
 
Housing Stock 
Data 
Income-linked 
Data 
Size of Eligible Group, 000s (as 
% of population) 
Coverage Leakage 
Pre-1919 Dwelling Private rented 1327 18% 72% 
Receives CTC or 
WTC 
1017 15% 70% 
Receives IS, JSA 
or ESA 
526 13% 51% 
Receives JSA 208 6% 44% 
CWP eligible 671 12% 65% 
ECO HHCRO 
eligible 
745 14% 62% 
Solid wall 
construction 
Private rented 1541 21% 73% 
Receives CTC or 
WTC 
1401 22% 69% 
Receives IS, JSA 
or ESA 
697 17% 52% 
Receives JSA 288 8% 46% 
CWP eligible 881 33% 67% 
ECO HHCRO 
eligible 
921 18% 62% 
SAP E, F or G 
rated 
Private rented 1470 26% 64% 
Receives CTC or 
WTC 
1555 27% 65% 
Receives IS, JSA 
or ESA 
750 21% 43% 
Receives JSA 319 10% 35% 
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CWP eligible 1200 21% 65% 
ECO HHCRO 
eligible 
1138 24% 58% 
Note: Potential sources of data are referenced in Table 5.6, not all have complete coverage. 
Source: Own analysis of DCLG (2013c) and data sources referenced in Table 5.6. 
 
Whilst the identified groups are smaller than those for current schemes, reducing 
coverage, they are commensurate with the numbers of households actually receiving 
funding (see Table 5.4). Furthermore, easier identification removes the necessity that 
groups be large in order that members might be more easily found, as well as 
concerns around ‘sharpness’ (Hills 2012: 71). Leakage is lower, even with these 
rather crude criteria, and much more might be expected of sophisticated, multi-faceted 
models that incorporate more complex prediction of income. A referral scheme would 
significantly reduce the incidence of duplication of effort, and the involvement of the 
state in targeting could improve take-up (e.g., if DECC branding was used in 
approaching identified households). Such an approach could also be adapted to reduce 
the incidence of suppliers ‘cherry-picking’ households who are more likely to 
contribute or are otherwise easier to help, and could include some element of 
prioritisation of those with the largest fuel poverty gaps111. Ian Marchant, former 
Chief Executive of SSE advocated a very similar solution in June 2013, writing in The 
Guardian of problems delivering ECO: 
 
Surely it would make more sense to create a trusted, government fuel poverty 
agency, specifically responsible for identifying those in need (using accurate 
social security data) and instructing the private sector to deliver measures to 
the identified homes. 
(Marchant 2013) 
 
The most apparent barrier to implementation of a FPDO is cost; depending on the 
scale of the initiative, it could be an extremely expensive endeavour. A precise 
                                                
111 Prioritisation has not been discussed in detail here, but would be a valuable addition to a more 
advanced targeting strategy. Depth of fuel poverty is an obvious candidate for prioritisation, as 
suggested by Hills (2012: 88-90) in recommending the measure. Sefton (2002) suggests prioritising the 
most cost-effective properties and improvements.  EPC certificates include both current and potential 
SAP ratings, opening up the potential that this data could be used to target those dwellings with the 
largest potential gains. 
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estimate of the outlay involved is beyond the scope of this work, and would depend 
on the ambition of the project, whether it could be incorporated into existing 
functions, and whether it was operated by government in-house, or subcontracted to 
an external provider (it is suggested that the types of commercial data sources 
discussed in section 5.2 are likely to be interested in bidding to deliver this type of 
service). However, given the level of misdirected spend within current delivery 
approach, investment in identification has clear potential to provide better value for 
money in the long term. More data on suppliers’ current identification costs could be 
used to undertake a Cost Benefit Analysis that would assess the potential savings 
achievable by a FPDO. The state may also be resistant to such a project given the 
recent history of failure of large scale government IT projects (e.g., the National 
Programme for IT in the NHS (Morse 2011) and C-NOMIS (Burr 2009a). Political 
short-termism also tends to represent a barrier to ambitious projects of this type (see 
Oxford Martin Commission 2013). Care would need to be taken to comply with the 
Data Protection Act 1998, particularly were processing sub-contracted112. Schemes 
involving the use of public data often prove contentious, particularly where private 
industry is involved (see, for example, Kirby 2014). Ofgem-commissioned research 
undertaken by Ipsos MORI on the Priority Services Register found reactions to 
increased data sharing tended to be rather mixed, if leaning towards favourable (Ipsos 
MORI 2013d: 29-32, Ipsos MORI 2013c: 56-57). Only one household opted out of 
data matching under the Energy Rebate Scheme (DECC 2011h: 21). More research 
and an effective communication strategy would be needed to establish sentiment 
towards a FPDO. As with geographical targeting, a FPDO may be unsuitable to 
economic support, as it would be difficult to justify pinpointing certain households 
without an overarching rationale. Ensuring referrals are apportioned between 
suppliers equitably would also prove challenging, though not insurmountable. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
112 Some of the privacy impacts of combining these types of data were considered in the privacy impact 
assessment for NEED (DECC 2014c). Note that Dubois (2012) disregards databases as a targeting tool, 
in part because none currently exist linking relevant types of data. This perspective is perhaps 
influenced by the comparative wariness of French government towards collection of credit data, even 
for ostensibly positive purposes (Trumbull 2008). 
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• Comparison of Options 
 
Figure 5.6 summarises the options considered here in a Policy Analysis Matrix. 
Please note that the assessment made is subjective, and is intended only to offer a 
broad appraisal of options presented. 
 
 Increased 
Data 
Matching 
Provisions 
Improved 
Geographical 
Targeting 
Fuel Poverty 
Data 
Observatory 
Initial expense Low Medium Medium-High 
Privacy concerns Low - Medium Low-Medium Medium-High 
Practical difficulty Medium Medium High 
Potential to improve targeting Medium Low-Medium High 
Anticipated long term cost-effectiveness High Low Medium -High 
 
Figure 5.6 Policy Analysis Matrix of options for improving fuel poverty targeting 
 
It should be noted, however, that all of the options discussed would require some 
level of further government action to implement; as one energy supplier employee 
summarised the situation, “we aren’t doing it as efficiently as we could do because we 
aren’t getting the help.” However, as already covered in the previous chapter, the 
government are currently weakly motivated to directly intervene on fuel poverty 
policy, rather than to simply leave the brunt of the economic burden (and risk of 
public failure) to energy suppliers. 
 
A more ambitious alternative approach could be to require fuel poverty reduction as 
the direct target of supplier obligations (with a vulnerability sub-target), and free the 
market to achieve this as cheaply as possible. This would be a significant departure 
from current delivery, and exploration of the implications is beyond the scope of this 
work. Evaluating compliance, in particular, would represent an auditing challenge for 
regulators.  
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5.4.3 Policy Constraints 
 
Policy constraints identified in the previous chapter continue to have an impact with 
regards to targeting and identification. Most notably, the stronger impetus on 
suppliers to act is manifested as a tendency for obligations to require active 
identification strategies. The state, on the other hand, responding to the weakened 
requirements of WHECA has opted for passive identification within the policies that 
they themselves are responsible for, e.g., automatic identification and self-referral. A 
number of other constraints have further been identified as more particular to this 
stage of the process. 
 
• Technological Constraints 
 
Fuel poverty, is in general terms, the result of a technological constraint, i.e., an 
inefficient housing stock that is expensive to treat given current technical limitations. 
However, a specific constraint can be identified with regards to targeting insofar as 
the ability to find the fuel poor is limited by the availability and usability of data. 
David Kidney, quoted at the start of this chapter, was correct in stating that better 
information would be needed to target more efficiently. However, it has been argued 
in this chapter that current policy does not yet approach the limits of current data. In 
the trade-off between efficacy and administrative complexity, policy has tended to err 
on the side of ease, focusing on a small group of households that are easy to find, but 
with significant leakage. It is suggested, therefore, that the physical constraint on 
policy is not the primary factor shaping current approaches. 
 
• Legal Constraints 
 
The key113 legal constraint impacting upon identification relates to data access; 
currently, suppliers are only able to engage in data matching that uses Pension Credit 
data (under the Pensions Act 2008 (s.142)). Even though the state has the power to 
                                                
113 The Data Protection Act 2008 would also have implications for some the more adjustments to 
policy considered here. 
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amend this, as already discussed, they appear unwilling because of the cost 
implications and political risk.  
 
• Organisational Constraints 
 
Organisational constraints have a significant impact upon this element of the process. 
The different positioning of suppliers and the state affects not only the type of 
identification employed (passive or active), but also the capacity of agents to target 
and identify. Supplier access to data is considerably more limited, and the competitive 
nature of the energy industry creates further inefficiencies in the targeting process.  
 
• Political Constraints 
 
Two main forms of political constraint emerge from this analysis. First, governments 
tend to be risk averse as a means of preserving political power (see Harris 2014). A 
more ambitious approach to fuel poverty targeting would, in all likelihood, require an 
expanded role for government, e.g., by taking a stronger coordinating role. This, by 
extension, introduces the potential for prominent policy failure and electoral risk for 
the incumbent government. Targeting those in receipt of existing benefits is a low risk 
strategy, as is keeping a distance between the state and programme activity by having 
suppliers deliver. The fact that the current approach may be inefficient, this is made 
less problematic by the absence of a long-term target; thus effectively making it 
impossible to fail through inaction, and incentivising shorter-termism. A more limited 
approach is also consistent with the more general desire of neoliberal government to 
limit the role of the state (as discussed in Chapter Two). 
 
The second constraint also relates to the office-seeking inclination of politicians, and 
by extension the desire to appeal to particular political constituencies. The current 
definition of vulnerability in fuel poverty is very generous definition of vulnerability, 
and doesn’t clarify the extent to which policies are intended to balance targeting the 
fuel poor with targeting vulnerable groups in a wider sense (which again, makes 
policy failure on this front impossible). Current policy tends to favour older people; a 
household in receipt of the guarantee element of Pension Credit would be eligible for 
 212 
all current policies. This is partly justifiable given that older people are at greater risk 
of EWM; however, there is little research on the impacts of cold homes upon, for 
example, children or people with disabilities (as discussed in Chapter Two). 
Furthermore, it is over-75s who are at greatest risk of EWM, but 52% of WFP 
recipient households contain only under-75s and are not low income (LIHC 
definition, before receiving WFP; own analysis of DCLG 2013b). Reed and Portes 
(2014) and Cribb et al. (2013) demonstrate the tendency of coalition policy to favour 
the wellbeing of older people over children (see also Clark 2011), and Boardman 
(2010: 215) classifies the choice to prioritise older people in fuel poverty policy as a 
predominantly political one. Older people are both a valuable voting bloc (see Ipsos 
MORI 2010, Brogan 2014) and tend to be perceived as the “deserving poor”(see 
Wynne-Jones 2014). In the face of public concern around perceived benefits 
dependency (see Doron, Harrop 2012) – a sensitivity agitated by political rhetoric (see 
Sparrow 2013) – shifting expenditure from older people towards workless households 
may be considered both ideologically unappealing and politically unwise. 
 
• Economic Constraints 
 
Economic constraints also pose a barrier to the improvement of targeting. The state 
has tended to leave the more expensive, active targeting activity to suppliers. This 
potentially exacerbates fuel poverty, as costs are reclaimed via energy bills. Future 
policy is likely to require a greater emphasis on active targeting in order to maintain 
equity in delivery as more of the ‘low hanging fruit’ has been ‘picked’. This work has 
identified a number of problems where suppliers engage in active identification, and 
suggested that greater involvement from the state could improve efficiency. However, 
with greater involvement comes financial expenditure, not only in establishing new 
processes, but also in introducing a larger identifiable group in need of support. 
Previous experience (such as in the development of WHDS) indicates that the current 
government, with their focus on austerity, is unwilling to increase expenditure 
significantly and so a FPDO, as suggested here, is probably beyond the limits of 
ambition. Improvements to geographical targeting would be less expensive, but with 
commensurate limitation on what can be achieved. Investment in targeting process 
could reduce costs in the long term; however, the rate of return would likely be slow 
to emerge. As long as the government remains inclined towards austerity - and the 
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current expense is concealed in energy bills – there is little economic motivation to 
pursue improved targeting. 
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has reported the findings of research that synthesised quantitative 
analysis, review of literature and policy and interview data to compare state and 
supplier capacity to find fuel poor households. It was argued that the current process 
used in policy is ineffective, both in the rather blunt benefits-based criteria used, and 
in the means of identifying qualifying households. A distinction was introduced 
between passive and active identification, and it was noted that the state tend to go for 
the former, cheaper option, leaving suppliers to undertaken active identification. 
However, as programmes progress, it will be increasingly necessary for active 
identification to be used. This is both more expensive, and does not appear 
particularly effective in finding fuel poor households. It is recommended here that 
government should, in the first instance, clarify the target of fuel poverty policies 
(particularly with regards to vulnerability), and investigate the true costs of supplier 
identification. A number of options have then been suggested with the potential to 
improve targeting, ranging in ambition from improved data matching to a dedicated 
central targeting function. While the process of finding the fuel poor is undeniably 
challenging, current processes are not yet at the technical limits of what is possible. 
However, any enhancement will rely upon state intervention, and it is argued that at 
present political and economic factors limit ambition in this regard. 
 
Efficient, cost-effective targeting is important because of its implications for the 
distributive effects of policy. Firstly, because suppliers transfer the costs of delivery 
to energy bills, with a disproportionate burden upon fuel poor households; thus higher 
targeting costs have the potential to exacerbate fuel poverty. Secondly, these negative 
distributional effects can be mitigated by effectively delivering policies to fuel poor 
households; however, ineffective targeting will undermine efforts. The next chapter 
will consider the way in which state and supplier policies are funded, and the 
implications for fuel poverty mitigation. 
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6 | Financing Interventions 
 
If we win the election 2015, the next Labour government will freeze gas and 
electricity prices until the start of 2017. Your bills will not rise… Now the 
companies aren’t going to like this because it will cost them more, but they 
have been overcharging people for too long in a market that doesn’t work. It’s 
time to reset the market. 
 
Ed Miliband MP, Speech to the Labour Party Conference, 24th September 
2013(Miliband 2013) 
 
The promise made by Leader of the Opposition Ed Miliband at the September 2013 
Labour Party Annual Conference sparked intense debate, decried in some quarters as 
“posturing to no purpose” (Knight 2013)  and hailed by others as a means to “fix the 
broken energy market” (Lloyd 2013) . Some suppliers were quick to point out that 
levies to fund Government-imposed obligations – including those intended to mitigate 
fuel poverty – account for a significant proportion of domestic energy bills (see 
Gosden 2013, Phillips-Davies 2013b, RWE npower 2013). 
 
As the LIHC definition of fuel poverty is relative, Miliband’s proposed price freeze 
would not necessarily have any impact on official fuel poverty levels. However, the 
appropriateness of funding measures aimed at reducing fuel poverty via levies on 
energy bills is questionable due to the regressive nature of the method; ceteris 
paribus, low income and fuel poor households would be expected to pay a higher 
proportion of their income were policies were funded via energy bills than if they 
were funded via income taxation. Such regressive effects might be mitigated by the 
effective use of funds in supporting households, however, as discussed in previous 
chapters, currently delivery progress is slow, there is no detailed strategy, and 
targeting is ineffective at reaching fuel poor households.  In this chapter, it will be 
argued that retention of the current approach is likely ascribable to ideological, 
economic and political constraints that are more compelling than the motivation to 
ensure policy is effective in reducing fuel poverty. 
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This chapter considers, firstly, the likely implications of different levels of funding for 
policy upon LIHC fuel poverty, second, the impacts of the manner in which funds are 
raised, and third, the reasons for retaining a regressive funding mechanism. To begin 
with, the likely costs of mitigating fuel poverty are assessed based upon systematic 
review of the literature, and incorporating some further analysis of EHS 2011 
datasets. This includes a comparison of likely costs with real-world budgets, based 
upon examination of policy documents. The second section evaluates options for 
raising the necessary funds, focusing on the clear differential between the means by 
which the state raise funds, through general taxation, and the way in which suppliers 
meet the costs of obligation compliance, from levies on energy bills. A third option 
considered is the use of hypothecation – a practice also known as ‘ring-fencing’ – 
whereby revenues from one particular source of taxation are earmarked for a given 
usage. The final section considers the broader consequences of the choice of delivery 
agent upon funding, firstly with regard to the impact on fuel poverty, then the wider 
distributional effects. The chapter closes with an overview of other decisive factors, 
including the political and economic constraints upon the choice made, before briefly 
concluding. 
 
Methodological Overview 
 
The mixed methodological approach applied in this chapter is primarily based around 
meta-analysis and synthesis of existing literature. One approach used only in this 
chapter is that of systematic literature review, a more structured form of review that is 
particularly suited to research subjects for which the question can be tightly defined, 
where the topic tends towards being quantitative in nature (thus easing comparison), 
and for which there is a large body of research united by a single theme from which to 
draw (see Petticrew, Roberts 2006: 1-23). Here, a systematic review has been 
undertaken of literature that considers the costs of upgrading the UK housing stock, 
with a view to establishing what different levels of funding for fuel poverty policies 
might be expected to achieve; the results are reported in section 6.1, and full 
methodological details are supplied in section A1.8.  
 
A directed policy literature review has also been undertaken, as for previous chapters, 
here with a particular emphasis on meta-analysis and synthesis of official statistics 
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from a range of sources. Establishing the costs of programmes can be challenging 
with regard to fuel poverty policies, as, until recently, suppliers were not required to 
report the costs of fulfilling obligations. Furthermore, statistics relating to different 
programmes often come in disparate formats (e.g., with regard to time periods, 
scales), making consolidation difficult (Chawla and Pollitt (2012) undertook a 
comparable exercise and record facing similar issues). Every effort has been made to 
transparently record sources and underlying assumptions. A more traditional literature 
review methodology was applied in considering the broader impacts of different 
approaches to funding. The initial scoping review undertaken uncovered a small but 
focused body of academic, policy and grey literature applying analytical techniques 
beyond the scope of this research in order to assess the distributional impacts of 
taxation for environmental policies (although not fuel poverty directly). This literature 
is synthesised here, and the implications of the findings for LIHC fuel poverty 
considered, as well as the political and practical perspectives on different financing 
options. This literature review has been supplemented with some further descriptive 
quantitative analysis of the EHS 2011 (DCLG 2013c), primarily as a means of 
evaluating the likely distributional impacts of different models. This includes further 
application of the assessment of targeting efficacy for different policies reported in 
the previous chapter. 
 
6.1 The Cost of Tackling Fuel Poverty 
 
The most immediate barrier to fuel poverty alleviation in England is, arguably, cost. 
As established in section 4.2.5, at the time WHECA was passed, politicians were 
operating under the belief that contemporary levels of expenditure would be sufficient 
to eradicate fuel poverty within twenty years. Subsequent research has established 
that this belief was ill founded with regards to the 10pct definition of fuel poverty  (cf. 
Preston, Moore & Guertler 2008) , but there is little existing work investigating what 
impacts the very recent changes to the fuel poverty definition and targets are likely to 
have upon the costs of tackling fuel poverty; this chapter begins to bridge this gap in 
the existing research base. Figure 6.1 illustrates the relationship applied in order to 
estimate total programme costs for a scheme designed to reach all fuel poor 
households. In summary, the average cost of measures multiplied by the number of 
households requiring support will given the total cost (minus administration) if 
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targeting is perfect. However, if leakage is 50%, then twice as many households will 
need to be supported to achieve coverage; this relationship is explored further in 
Table 6.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Principles for estimation of fuel poverty policy costs 
 
The new relative definition of fuel poverty makes eradication a ‘moving target’. To 
counter this, assumptions have been made around programme ambition; these are 
reported as they arise. The section opens with a discussion of the few attempts made 
by government to assess the likely costs of fuel poverty mitigation policies. Whilst the 
costs of eradicating LIHC fuel poverty via economic measures can be taken to be 
simply the fuel poverty gap (assuming perfect targeting), it is considerably more 
difficult to estimate the costs of technical interventions. To this end, a systematic 
review of evidence on the costs of upgrading the UK housing stock has been 
undertaken and results reported here. This is followed by meta-analysis of evidence, 
which incorporates findings from an analysis of EHS 2011 datasets (including on 
targeting efficiency and number of households in need of support) to assess the likely 
cost and impact of different levels of activity. Finally, comparisons are drawn with 
likely real-world expenditure on fuel poverty programmes, established via policy 
literature review. 
 
6.1.1 Government Assessment of Costs 
 
Given the dwindling commitment to the 2016 eradication objective, it is perhaps not 
surprising that no official itemised budget has ever been produced detailing the 
expected costs of meeting that legal target. The UKFPS (DTI 2001) only listed 
Average cost of 
measures 
Number of households 
supported 
Administrative 
costs 
Total 
costs 
% Recipients fuel poor 
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anticipated expenditure on programmes that were expected to reduce fuel poverty. A 
review of the policy literature found that in the years following the passage of 
WHECA, FPAG sought to establish the likely costs of tackling fuel poverty using a 
similar approach to that illustrated in Figure 6.1114. In their first report, FPAG 
estimated that eradication of 10pct fuel poverty would cost approximately £2000 per 
household115, around £4.5bn for the estimated 2.3m then fuel poor vulnerable 
households and £6.5bn for 3.2m non-vulnerable households, assuming perfect 
targeting and without administrative costs (including those of targeting which, even in 
2003, FPAG anticipated to be high) (FPAG 2003: 14). The second FPAG report 
revised this estimate down to £2.5bn for vulnerable households, but identified that 
this was likely to be a low estimate (though still above then-current expenditure), and 
recommended that government produce a more detailed budget (FPAG 2004: 7). The 
third and fourth reports revise that same estimate to £2.75bn, then £3.9bn as fuel 
poverty (and fuel prices) increased (FPAG 2005: 6). The fifth report includes a final 
attempt at estimating these costs, this time with more detail. It is there suggested that 
£5.5bn would be required on measures alone to eradicate fuel poverty in vulnerable 
households, and that – including administrative costs and assuming 60% of targeted 
households as fuel poor – the cost of eradicating fuel poverty would be £13.2bn 
(FPAG 2007: 29). For context, in the first year after WHECA, the anticipated rate of 
spending was £3bn over the next decade (FPAG 2003: 14) and, as reported in section 
4.2.5, at least one participant in the WHECA Money Resolution debate felt that £2bn 
over twenty years was what might qualify as “reasonable”. 
 
Subsequent FPAG reports did not include spending estimates, though they have 
continued to agitate for government to provide their own budget as part of the fuel 
poverty ‘road map’ (e.g., FPAG 2009: 8). Whilst the ECO and WHDS Impact 
Assessments include estimates of both costs and impact on 10pct fuel poverty, these 
cannot be taken as indications of expected costs of fuel poverty alleviation given the 
                                                
114 Boardman (2010: 204-205) also reviews these attempts. Her own original estimate of the costs of 
upgrading fuel poor households such that warmth was affordable was an average of £2500 per dwelling 
(Boardman 1991: 207); however, this is based upon analysis of circumstances and costs that are now 
over twenty years old. 
115 Note that early FPAG estimates are based on work undertaken with DTI and DEFRA, using 
estimates for the costs of measures that are low by today’s standards, even accounting for inflation. For 
example, a document produced by DTI for FPAG assumed that SWI would cost between £2,500 and 
£4000 per household (DTI: 2003). EST estimate current costs as between £9000 and £26,000 for 
external SWI (EST, 2014). 
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broad scope and drivers underlying those policies (as covered in Chapter Four)116. No 
official costings have yet been published relating to LIHC fuel poverty alleviation and 
there is the added difficulty in doing so with regard to a relative measure because as 
dwellings are improved, the fuel poor population will shift. As discussed in Chapter 
Two, DECC have indicated that any new target might relate to minimum or average 
efficiency standards for low income households (DECC 2013j: 13). The remainder of 
this section will offer estimates as to likely costs of different courses of action, 
beginning by assessing perhaps the most difficult element, the cost of technical 
measures. 
 
6.1.2 Evidence on Technical Upgrade Costs 
 
The economic costs of alleviating LIHC fuel poverty are comparatively easy to 
establish, as they should be equal to the fuel poverty gap measure (once targeting and 
administration is taken into account).  The main problem is likely to be in establishing 
subsidy levels commensurate with need given the high variance in fuel poverty gaps 
(analysis of DCLG 2013c gives a mean gap of £47.76, with standard deviation 
£220.33). This may be an argument for alternative tariffs as a support mechanism, as 
will be discussed in section 7.2.3. 
 
The costs of a more permanent solution, via technical interventions, are harder to 
establish. A preliminary scoping review undertaken for this work found enormous 
variance in costs reported in studies considering upgrades to the housing stock more 
broadly. Subsequently, a systematic review was undertaken as a means of drawing 
together the existing evidence on which to base estimates of tackling fuel poverty, the 
results of which are reported here. The methodological approach was based on 
Petticrew and Roberts’ (2006) guidance on systematic reviewing in the social sciences 
(the technique is most commonly found in medical research because results tend to be 
                                                
116 The vagueness of estimates provided for ECO makes it difficult to assign a cost for each household 
removed from fuel poverty. It is stated in the Impact Assessment that the Green Deal and ECO 
combined will lift 125,000 to 250,000 households out of fuel poverty. Assuming only ECO HHCRO 
and CSCO contributed, the cost would then be £7000 to £14000 per household, however, this is an 
extremely rough approximation (DECC, 2012). WHDS is an economic measure and so removes 
households from fuel poverty only temporarily. However, taking the 2011/12 figures as an example, 
the Impact Assessment anticipated that 88,000 households would be removed from fuel poverty 
following £250m of expenditure, or £2841 per household removed (DECC, 2011). 
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quantitative, and thus easier to collate). Details of the databases searched and search 
terms are included in section A1.8 of the Methodological Appendix; as a brief 
overview, the review incorporated academic, grey and policy literature, with studies 
included if they assessed the costs of delivering energy efficiency interventions to the 
English housing stock117. Ideally, the literature would also include final impacts of 
interventions upon fuel poverty levels (under either definition) or upon SAP ratings. 
Literature based upon both modelling and evaluation of actual delivery was 
considered. Table 6.1 gives an overview of sourced literature. 
                                                
117 A body of work exists focusing exclusively on dwellings in Ireland (Clinch, Healy, 2000, Healy, 
Clinch 2004, Ahern et al. 2012), and at least one Welsh study has also been undertaken (Jones et al. 
2013). Whilst some parallels are likely to exist, this review was restricted to those studies that included 
England, i.e., whole UK or GB studies were included. 
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Table 6.1: Synthesis of studies considering costs and impacts of efficiency upgrades to English housing stock 
 
Study Overview of scope, methodology Headline figures 
Warm Front: Helping to Combat Fuel 
Poverty (Bourn 2003) 
NAO report on Warm Front scheme progress. Includes 
figures for 2001/2002. 
In 2001/2002, expenditure of £197m supported 307,700 
households (Watson, Bolton 2013: 4), which the NAO report 
indicates resulted in an average increase of 13 SAP points. A 
number of potential issues are recorded, including households 
being supported who already have a fairly high standard of 
efficiency, and significant expenditure on energy efficiency 
light bulbs, which do not impact on SAP. 
Reducing carbon emissions from the UK 
housing stock  (Shorrock, Henderson & 
Utley 2005)  
Evaluates potential for reduction of carbon emissions in the 
United Kingdom (UK) housing stock via modelling of a 
number of combined data sources. 
 
 
 
Whilst this report does not consider impact of upgrades upon 
fuel poverty or SAP ratings, it does usefully evaluate the far 
potential of energy savings achievable (albeit with a focus on 
carbon reduction, rather than energy reduction). Taking into 
account an extremely broad range of measures, it is found that 
for the year 2010 potential (though not practically achievable) 
energy savings are around 910 PJ/year, with delivery costing 
between £123bn and £1020bn. However, if limited to only 
cost effective measures, savings are in the range of 400 – 810 
PJ/year, costing between £2bn and £21bn. 
Warm Zones External Evaluation: Final 
report (EST/CSE/NEA 2005) 
Final report of delivery of the Warm Zones pilot programme, 
efforts to reduce 10pct fuel poverty within five English pilot 
scheme areas. Also incorporated ‘soft’ measures, e.g., 
Total budget was £7m, with the pilot areas home to 109053 
fuel poor households. The scheme resulted in a 10.1% 
reduction in the fuel poverty gap (defined here as the number 
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benefits advice, debt advice.  of percentage points required to remove al households from 
fuel poverty). Schemes spent an average of £5396 for every 
household removed from fuel poverty (though this ranged 
between £4796 and £10527 between different pilot areas) and 
£67 per additional SAP point gained. Average cost of energy 
efficiency household interventions was £796, however, it 
should be mentioned that this included minimal installation of 
solid wall insulation. 
Home Truths: A low-carbon strategy to 
reduce UK housing emissions by 80% by 
2050 (Boardman 2007) 
Policy model that suggests an approach to reduce UK housing 
emissions by 80% by 2050, whilst eradicating 10pct fuel 
poverty by 2016.   
 
 
 
 
Suggests target SAP 80 in order to fully insulate against fuel 
poverty. Estimates upgrade costs of £3.3bn annually from 
2008 to 2016 (£29.7bn total), at an average cost of £7500 per 
house (with 440000 dwellings requiring improvement). 
Numbers based on Energy Saving Trust cost estimates. 
How Much? The cost of alleviating fuel 
poverty  (Preston, Moore & Guertler 2008)  
Models English housing stock data to evaluate (a) costs of 
alleviating 10pct fuel poverty by 2016 at minimum expense 
and (b) programs targeted at upgrading fuel poor households 
to SAP 65, SAP 80, and SAP 120. Model assumes perfect 
targeting and includes some advanced measures. 
Study estimated that a programme aimed at eliminating 10pct 
fuel poverty at minimum expense would cost an average of 
£1826 per household (£4.6bn total), lifting 71% of households 
out of 10pct fuel poverty and achieving average SAP 64.1. A 
SAP 65 target programme would cost an average of £2412 per 
household (£6bn total) lifting 58% of households out of 10pct 
fuel poverty and achieving average SAP 69.8. A SAP 80 
target programme would cost £7.9bn and lift 67% of 
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households out of 10pct fuel poverty. A SAP 120 target 
programme would cost £10.6bn and lift 70% of households 
out of 10pct fuel poverty (i.e., similar to the proportion under 
the minimum expense model). 
How Low? Achieving optimum savings 
from the UK's existing housing stock  
(CSE, ACE & Moore 2008)  
Models four scenarios for carbon emissions reduction, each 
with increasingly ambitious parameters.  
Whilst no precise modelling of impacts on fuel poverty or 
SAP are included in this report, it is estimated that a scenario 
in which £129.7bn is spent on energy improvements 
(including advanced measures) would raise 75-80% of 
households out of 10pct fuel poverty. 
Roadmap to 60%: Eco-refurbishment of 
1960s flats  (EST, Mears Group & Travis 
Perkins 2008)  
Study modelled refurbishment of English 1960s flats, 
considering low (c. £1000), medium (c. £5000) and high cost 
(c. £10000) interventions. Target was 60% decrease in carbon 
emissions. 
Found extreme variation in the costs of refurbishing flats to 
achieve target carbon emissions. Cost per additional SAP 
point ranged from £200 to £1200. In 96% of cases, the 
medium cost intervention was sufficient to refurbish flats to a 
minimum of SAP 65 (suggested in this papers as the threshold 
at which 10pct fuel poverty risk was low). 
Raising the SAP: Tackling fuel poverty by 
investing in energy efficiency (Guertler, 
Preston 2009) 
Models English housing stock data to evaluate costs and 
impacts of proposed retrofit programmes seeking to bring 
properties up to either SAP 81 (stated as the preferential 
target) or SAP 69. Model assumes perfect targeting and 
includes some advanced measures. 
Study estimates that a SAP 81 target programme targeted only 
at 10pct fuel poor households would cost an average of £8820 
per household (£21.4bn total), raise 73% (from 0.5%) of 
properties to at least SAP 69 and remove 83% of households 
from10pct fuel poverty. A SAP 81 target programme targeted 
at all households would cost an average of £6860 per 
household (£145.6bn total), and raise 87% (from 6.4%) of 
properties to at least SAP 69. A SAP 69 target programme 
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targeted only at 10pct fuel poor households would cost an 
average of £5290 per household (£12.9bn total, and raise 58% 
(from 0.5%) of properties to at least SAP 69 and remove 77% 
of households from 10pct fuel poverty. 
The Warm Front Scheme (Burr 2009b) NAO 2008/9 report on scheme progress. Includes a range of graphed data for the period June 2005-
March 2008, though not in an easily format that is easy to 
synopsise. It is recorded that in 2007/8, when expenditure was 
£350m across 268,900 households (Watson, Bolton: 4), the 
average improvement was from SAP 42 to SAP 57. 
Warm Front Annual Reports 2009-2013 
(The Warm Front Team 2010, The Warm 
Front Team 2011, The Warm Front Team 
2012, The Warm Front Team 2013) 
 
 
Annual reports for the final four years of the Warm Front 
scheme are available online, and include performance 
statistics. 
Headline statistics are as follows, cost data taken from 
(Watson, Bolton 2014: 4): 
In 2009/10, 212,963 households received support, at a cost of 
£369m. This resulted in a change in average SAP rating from 
33 to 66, and modelled average annual savings of £653.62. 
In 2010/11, 127,930 households received support, at a cost of 
£366m. This resulted in a change in average SAP rating from 
32 to 59, and modelled average annual savings of £610.56. 
In 2011/12, 33,058 households received support, at a cost of 
£109m.  
In 2012/13, 32,059 households received support, at a cost of 
£70m. This resulted in a change in average SAP rating from 
24 to 63. 
Challenge 100: Tackling fuel poverty for Data drawn from a scheme that sought to tackle fuel poverty Scheme eradicated fuel poverty in 41% of households, costing 
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100 families, in 100 homes, in 100 days 
(study conducted by E.ON and partner 
organisations in winter 2009-2010, 
currently unpublished costing information 
supplied by project team (Haines 2013) 
in a sample of 102 English households, selected to be 
representative of the English housing stock. Included some 
income-based measures. 
an average of £6371 per household. Average percentage of 
income spent on fuel improved from 15.2% to 10.6%. 
Average SAP improved from 46 to 61 (£425 per additional 
SAP point gained). Average household fuel costs reduced by 
£531. 
Whole life costing of domestic energy 
demand reduction technologies: 
householder perspectives (Pellegrini‐masini 
et al. 2010) 
Based upon the TARBASE model, modelling economic, 
social and technical impacts of upgrading the UK building 
stock.  
Paper evaluates impact of three levels of intervention 
(including some appliance-level measures) on two common 
generic dwelling types. Considers whole life costs of those 
interventions. 
Paper does not consider impacts upon fuel poverty or final 
SAP ratings. Package initial capital costs are in the range of 
£6188 to £18998, with net annual savings in the range £268 to 
£509. 
Fixing Fuel Poverty: Challenges and 
Solutions (Boardman 2010: 203-207) 
Revises earlier estimate of Boardman (2007) based on 
changes to assumptions. 
Estimates £15-20bn per year over nine years, i.e. £135-180bn 
total to aim to take all current 10pct fuel poor households to 
SAP 81. Assumes targeting efficiency of <50% going to fuel 
poor. 
Target 2050: Future-proofing homes in 
Stroud District and beyond (Wyatt et al. 
2011) 
Report from project delivered by Stroud District Council with 
Severn Wye Energy Agency, looking to gather evidence for 
the design of a programme that will achieve the Council’s 
2050 environmental aims within the domestic sector. 
Incorporated survey of 248 local homes to establish potential 
savings, with a smaller group receiving measures under a Pay 
As You Save (PAYS) pilot. 
No details relating to impact on SAP or fuel poverty are 
given. The scheme included some more advanced measures, 
and tended towards consideration of extremely ‘deep’ retrofit 
(costing in the region of (£20k-30k). Within the ten provided 
case studies, interventions cost £16948 - £46900 and achieved 
energy savings in the range 22% - 70%. 
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Energy Bill Revolution Campaign Report 
(Washan 2012) 
Model of English housing stock investigating likely impacts 
of proposed retrofit programmes seeking to eliminate 10pct 
fuel poverty. 
A modelled programme targeted only at 10pct fuel poor 
households would cost an average of £6500 per household 
(£59.6bn total), removing 87% of households from 10pct fuel 
poverty and raising the rest to new-build standards (at least 
SAP 69). An extra £34bn (£3700 per property, on average) 
would take 10pct fuel poor homes to SAP 81. For the non-fuel 
poor housing stock, expenditure of £10.4k per dwelling would 
bring dwellings to SAP 81. It is estimated that, whilst some of 
this could be funded via the Green Deal, £66bn would need to 
be provided in subsidies (an average of £4.6k per house).   
Getting the measure of fuel poverty: the 
final report of the fuel poverty review (Hills 
2012) 
Models impact of expenditure of £0.5bn upon LIHC fuel 
poverty in English housing stock. 
Finds that under the optimum model (Exchequer funded, 
narrowly targeted), expenditure of £0.5bn would reduce the 
number of fuel poor households by 30000 in the short term 
(1% of current total), effectively costing £16700 per house 
removed from fuel poverty. However, this would result in a 
short-term fuel poverty gap reduction of £70m, and a lifetime 
gap reduction of £2.5bn. Under the best long-term model 
(supplier funded, narrowly targeted), this expenditure results 
in a lifetime reduction of 1.2m household-years of fuel 
poverty. 
The mass-retrofitting of an energy efficient-
low carbon zone: baselining the urban 
regeneration strategy, vision, masterplan 
Models mass retrofit of c. 1700 houses in a London borough. 
Takes into account possibilities for self-implementation of 
some measures. Area contains deprived populations, with 
Total cost of retrofit (including social rented sector housing) 
was £27m, or around £11400 per dwelling, reducing area 
domestic energy consumption by 56%. Modelling included 
 227 
and redevelopment scheme  (Deakin, 
Campbell & Reid 2012)  
61% of dwellings built before 1959. some advanced measures; if these were not included, cost 
could be closer to £5200 per dwelling. Considers 
comprehensive retrofit packages, but does not consider impact 
on fuel poverty levels or include data regarding efficiencies 
achieved. 
Based upon compilation of sources:  (Bourn 2003, Watson, Bolton 2013, Shorrock, Henderson & Utley 2005, EST/CSE/NEA 2005, Boardman 2007, Preston, Moore & 
Guertler 2008, CSE, ACE & Moore 2008, EST, Mears Group & Travis Perkins 2008, Guertler, Preston 2009, Burr 2009b, The Warm Front Team 2010, The Warm Front 
Team 2011, The Warm Front Team 2012, The Warm Front Team 2013, Haines 2013, Pellegrini‐masini et al. 2010, Wyatt et al. 2011, Washan 2012, Hills 2012, Deakin, 
Campbell & Reid 2012) . 
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It is immediately apparent that there is an enormous amount of variation in 
estimations of the costs of upgrading the housing stock. By way of illustration, Figure 
6.2 shows the stated cost (£) per extra SAP point achieved for studies including that 
data. Costs have been adjusted to 2011 prices using the Office of National Statistics 
(ONS) Composite Price Index(ONS 2013b). 
 
 
Note: Black columns refer to projects based on modelled data; grey columns are outputs from real-
world delivery. 
Based upon compilation of sources. Several studies contained more than one set of costings; references 
indicate option included here:  (EST/CSE/NEA 2005 (Across all schemes), Preston, Moore & Guertler 
2008 (All England), EST, Mears Group & Travis Perkins 2008 (Medium-level intervention), Guertler, 
Preston 2009 (Fuel poor households, target SAP 81), Burr 2009b, The Warm Front Team 2010 
(England), The Warm Front Team 2011 (England), The Warm Front Team 2013 (England), Haines 
2013 (Across all locations)) . 
 
Figure 6.2: Cost (£) per additional SAP point achieved or estimated in studies evaluating housing 
stock upgrades 
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This variation can be attributed to the sheer number of assumptions required in 
modelling such an enormous project (see similar issues encountered by Jenkins 2009). 
Table 6.2 summarises the key types of assumption identified within the literature, 
with commentary on impact. 
 
Table 6.2: Assumptions underlying estimations of the cost of tackling fuel poverty in England 
 
Assumption Commentary 
Administrative costs Management overheads (including the costs of promoting schemes) are 
likely to constitute a significant proportion of any final cost, and will vary 
based upon delivery method. Boardman estimates that these could add an 
extra 10-20% to the final cost (2010: 205). The Warm Zones External 
Evaluation reports that of the £67 spend required for each SAP point 
gained, £14 (21%) comprised administrative costs (EST/CSE/NEA: 131). 
Ambition of target (e.g., 
selected minimum SAP 
for fuel poor 
households) 
The ambition of the selected target will have an enormous impact on 
expenditure in the short term. However, a more ambitious short-term 
programme could prove more cost-effective in the long term (an approach 
advocated by Brenda Boardman (2010: 222). However, Fawcett (2013) 
finds that gradual upgrades can encourage take-up and enable households to 
spread out expenditure (though this paper does not consider the particular 
circumstances of fuel poor households). 
Combination of 
measures 
Where measures are delivered in combination, fixed costs can be shared. A 
notable example of this is that substantial cost reductions can be achieved 
where measures that require scaffolding are delivered simultaneously (e.g., 
external insulation and solar PV).  
Costs of measures Assumptions about the cost of measures will impact on the estimated cost 
of the programme. 
Definition of fuel 
poverty/choice of 
measure 
Where models consider impact on fuel poverty, it is clear that their choice 
of definition (most particularly whether they choose 10pct or LIHC) will 
influence all factors based upon that decision (e.g., choice of households 
targeted, final impact upon fuel poverty levels. There is also a divide 
between studies that use modelled energy usage, and those that consider 
actual savings. 
Delivery agent Most modelled work makes no assumptions about the likely differences in 
efficiency of delivery based upon choice of delivery agent (Hills 2012 being 
an exception to this rule). However, as costs of delivery under supplier 
obligations remain confidential – and there are few schemes available for 
comparison - it is difficult to assess the extent of possible efficiency gains; 
this will be discussed further in Chapter Seven. 
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Energy model applied The majority of projects use models to assess the likely impact of installed 
measures. The official fuel poverty methodology uses the Building 
Research Establishment Domestic Energy Model (BREDEM)  (see DECC 
2013i)  but other projects may use variations such as SAP05, SAP09 or 
RdSAP, which will result in some differences in output (see DECC 2013o 
for more discussion).  
Goal of programme Choice of approach will vary based upon whether the goal is carbon 
reduction or fuel poverty mitigation. For example, a programme focused on 
carbon reduction might place a higher premium on packages that involve 
moving to low-carbon heat sources than would be strictly necessary were 
cost reduction the only motive. 
Nature and size of 
housing stock sample 
Some of the projects included in the review consider limited samples of the 
housing stock, with a few that are focused only on a restricted number of 
dwelling types  (cf. EST, Mears Group & Travis Perkins 2008, Pellegrini‐
masini et al. 2010) . This will obviously affect the applicability of results to 
the wider housing stock. Even those based upon datasets like the English 
Housing Survey, which are representative of the national housing stock, are 
likely to lose relevance with time. In particular, earlier schemes are likely to 
have picked off the ‘low hanging fruit’, i.e., those houses for which larger 
efficiency gains are achievable via comparatively low cost measures, e.g., 
cavity wall insulation. In particular, insulation of solid wall dwellings is 
likely to incur significant costs and fail to meet the Green Deal ‘golden 
rule’ (see Dowson et al. 2012); these issues will be discussed further in the 
next section. 
Participation Some households may not wish to participate in schemes; where projects 
include assumptions would have to be made as to the likely opt-out levels. 
Scale of delivery The number of households to which the target applies will hugely impact 
the total expenditure required, e.g., a programme aimed only at fuel poor 
households will cost less than a programme aimed at all inefficient 
dwellings. However, a larger scale programme may achieve economies of 
scale that reduce the per-dwelling cost of delivery. 
Targeting As previously demonstrated in Table 5.2, assumptions about the efficiency 
of targeting need to be taken into consideration when considering the likely 
efficacy of any given level of expenditure. Given the problems with 
existing targeting methods discussed in section 5.1, this could have an 
enormous impact upon required expenditure. 
Time period Under WHECA, 2016 was the target for eradication; any new target could 
be extended further. A programme conducted over a longer time period 
would cost less year-on-year, though would likely require additional 
expenditure on operating costs. A longer target would also reduce pressure 
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upon the supply chain. 
Timing As well as the time period, the exact time period on which estimations are 
based has an impact. Prices in Table 5.3 have been retained as reported, 
however, inflation levels should be considered when drawing comparisons. 
Models make assumptions about projected energy prices and fuel poverty 
levels that will impact upon final costs. However, it is worth noting that 
under the relative LIHC definition, fuel poverty levels are likely to remain 
relatively stable as compared to under the absolute 10pct definition. 
Source: Own analysis. 
 
The costs of mitigating fuel poverty or achieving a SAP-based target are extremely 
difficult to estimate without a firm basis for these assumptions. It is also beyond the 
scope of this thesis to conduct the detailed dynamic modelling required to more 
accurately ascertain the likely costs of achieving a new target within the LIHC fuel 
poverty paradigm. However, government should undertake this work once a new 
target and policy framework has been established, as a basis for effective policy 
monitoring. 
 
6.1.3 Putting a Price on Efficient Homes 
 
This section reports the process of estimating the impacts on different levels of 
spending on fuel poverty programmes, via the process illustrated in Figure 6.1. This is 
similar to the methods of extrapolation previously applied by FPAG (2007: 29-30) 
and Boardman (2010: 203-207) for 10pct fuel poverty. Given the comparative 
difficulty in eradicating LIHC fuel poverty, it is assumed for the purpose of this work 
that the intention of any programme is to achieve a minimum SAP rating  for LIHC 
households, one of the options put forward by DECC in post-Hills policy documents 
(DECC 2013j: 13)118. 
 
• Average Cost of Measures 
 
As already demonstrated in Table 6.2, estimating the cost of measures is difficult due 
to the number of variables involved. For the purpose of this work, estimates of 
                                                
118 The other suggested form of target is an average, however, that is significantly more complex to 
estimate with the available data, and so a target based upon minimum SAP rating has been taken as 
commensurate with the scope of this work. 
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average cost have been taken from the Energy Bill Revolution Campaign Report119 
(Washan 2012), which considers the cost of programmes that would upgrade the 
dwellings of English fuel poor households with the intention of eradicating 10pct fuel 
poverty by 2016. This report has been selected as the most appropriate basis for 
analysis, as a comparatively recent piece of research that considers specifically the 
English housing stock, and includes cost estimates for achieving given target SAP 
ratings. Two programmes are considered; the first results in all fuel poor households 
improved, as far as is possible, to remove them from 10pct fuel poverty, achieving an 
average Energy Performance Certificate (EPC) band C, or SAP 69. The second 
includes the additional expenditure required to take those same households to an 
average of EPC band B, or SAP 81. These minimum SAP targets are retained here, 
both for convenience, and because they represent fair examples of an ambitious 
programme (SAP 81 target), and a more moderate option (SAP 69 target)120. The 
report is based on analysis of the 2009 English Housing Survey data projected to 2011 
levels (DCLG 2011a), rather than the 2011 data that is primarily used in this thesis 
(DCLG 2013c). Additionally, the research report considers the costs of upgrading 
those houses that meet the 10pct definition of fuel poverty, rather than the LIHC 
definition used here. However, comparison of descriptive statistics for these two 
datasets indicates an acceptable degree of similarity in the profiles of the populations 
under consideration, as shown in Table 6.3. 
  
                                                
119 Whilst an interest group, Energy Bill Revolution, commissioned this report the work itself is judged 
to be unbiased, adopting a robust methodology similar to that applied by CSE et al. (2008) and Guertler 
and Preston (2009). 
120 For context, in 2011, 0.2% of English households lived in dwellings rated at SAP 81 or above, and 
none of these are LIHC fuel poor (based on analysis of DCLG 2013b); this is the standard of energy 
efficiency advocated by Boardman (2010: 217). Further analysis of the 2011 EHS (DCLG 2013b) finds 
that 14.6% of households lived in dwellings rated at or above SAP 69, of whom 1.8% were LIHC fuel 
poor. Washan (2012: 32) found that the SAP 69 programme removed 87% of households from 10pct 
fuel poverty and took the remainder up to new build standard (no similar figures are given for the SAP 
81 programme). 
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Table 6.3: Comparison of descriptive statistics for 10pct fuel poor households in 2009, LIHC fuel 
poor households in 2011 
 
 10pct fuel poor, 2009 LIHC fuel poor, 2011 
Number of households (millions) 5.5 2.4 
Median SAP 46.2 50.4 
Standard Deviation of SAP 17.1 13.1 
Range of SAP 82.5 76.6 
Source: Own analysis of EHS data (DCLG 2011a, DCLG 2013c). 
 
 
It is not stated explicitly, but it can be assumed that the report is based upon 2011 
prices of measures, given that this is when the research was undertaken. As such, no 
inflationary adjustment has been made. The average assumed price of upgrades for 
fuel poor households are therefore taken to be £6500 (to reach target SAP 69) and 
£10200 (to reach target SAP 81) (based upon Washan 2012: 17-19). 
 
• Number of Households Requiring Support 
 
Washan’s aggregated estimates of cost are based upon measures being targeted 
towards all 9.1m households forecast to be 10pct fuel poor and living in dwellings 
below the target SAP ratings by 2016 (2012: 16). By contrast – in line with changes to 
the definition - it is assumed that the programmes modelled here are targeted only at 
LIHC fuel poor households. Projection is beyond the scope of this work (and, as 
discussed in section 2.1.2, the LIHC fuel poor population should remain 
comparatively stable). Currently, all 2.3m LIHC fuel poor households live in 
dwellings below SAP 81, and 98% of these are below SAP 69. However, no viable 
measures exist for the dwellings occupied by 14.1% of LIHC households (based on 
analysis of DCLG 2011a), and so these are excluded from costing considerations. 
Should any programme successfully begin to upgrade the housing stock, the threshold 
for ‘high costs’ would be lowered, pushing some of those households currently on the 
margin into fuel poverty (i.e., those currently with low incomes and low – but close to 
threshold – costs). To establish what these numbers are likely to be would require 
further dynamic modelling that is beyond the scope of this work. However, as an 
indication, Figure 6.3 shows, from analysis of DCLG (2013c) the number of LIHC 
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households below established SAP ratings that are within close range of the high cost 
threshold (assuming that the income threshold is likely to stay comparatively stable 
and that there is no influx of low-income households moving to dwellings previously 
occupied by high income high cost households). 
 
 
Note: Threshold for high costs is calculated to be £1234.35. Column percentages indicate proportional 
increase to the otherwise eligible group. 
Source: Own analysis of DCLG (2013c).  
 
Figure 6.3: Estimated numbers of near-high cost threshold LIHC dwellings at or below 
candidate minimum SAP targets 
 
It is likely that any programme would pick up many of these near-threshold dwellings 
via imprecise targeting though dynamic modelling of a definitive threshold would be 
required to establish likely coverage. 
 
• Percentage of Recipients that are Fuel Poor 
 
Washan’s (2012) costings are based upon perfect identification; however, as 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, current programmes are some distance from 
achieving this. Table 5.2 adapts a table provided by Boardman (2010: 205) that shows 
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the enormous impact that targeting efficacy can have on the cost of an effective 
programme. For illustrative purposes, it is assumed that LIHC fuel poor households in 
sub-SAP 69 dwellings are being targeted, and therefore upgrades will cost an average 
of £6500 per dwelling. Numbers of dwellings are based upon numbers of LIHC fuel 
poor households (taken from DCLG (2013c) multiplied by the relevant efficiency 
factor. 
 
Table 6.4: Relationship between targeting and programme cost 
 
Proportion going to fuel poor 
household in sub-SAP 69 dwellings 
(i.e., leakage) 
Cost per dwelling Numbers treated 
(1000s) 
Total cost 
100 £6500 2333 £15.2 billion 
50 £6500 4665 £30.3 billion 
25 £6500 9331 £60.6 billion 
Source: Own analysis of EHS data (DCLG 2013c), drawing upon Boardman (2010: 205). 
 
Previous cost estimates that take account of targeting efficacy have tended to focus 
only on the proportion of households in receipt of measures that are in the intended 
target group (see FPAG 2007: 29, Boardman 2010: 205). However, as demonstrated 
in section 5.1.2, Coverage also tends to be low, and so even if every eligible 
household received support, there would remain a significant proportion of target 
group who had not been helped. As discussed in section 5.3, it may be more difficult 
to effectively reach households who, for example, are not in receipt of state benefits. 
Thus the efficiency of programmes might be expected to diminish as programmes 
evolve unless significant advances are made in targeting accuracy (which themselves 
would likely require increased expenditure).  
 
• Administrative Costs 
 
A number of estimations are offered in the literature as to the costs of administering 
schemes. Boardman (2010: 205) suggests that administration will constitute an 
additional 10-20%, FPAG estimates assumed 20% (2007: 29), the Warm Zones 
scheme reported 21% (EST/CSE/NEA 2005: 131) and the DECC Impact Assessment 
estimates given for ECO HHCRO anticipated administrative costs as constituting 
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around 10% of programme delivery costs to suppliers, and slightly more again to 
government (DECC 2012h: 84-88). 
 
Administration costs will be highly variable based on programme form, e.g., the 
economies of scale achievable, and whether they are split across multiple delivery 
agents. As discussed in the section 5.3.3, identification difficulties also have the 
potential to inflate the cost of administration. DECC observed in the Green Deal and 
ECO Impact Assessment that suppliers have tended to be reluctant to share details of 
administrative costs (DECC 2012h: 86). However, under ECO, DECC now require 
these to be supplied, and they are published in aggregated form every quarter. For the 
first year of ECO, these constituted an additional 5.3% on top of the costs of 
measures, substantially lower than experience might suggest, though they may 
increase as delivery progresses (DECC 2014c: 37). More information as to costs will 
prove valuable in future policy planning. 
 
• Total Costs 
 
Table 6.5 summarises the process discussed in this section. Two scenarios are 
included: one to achieve a target minimum SAP rating of 69, and the other the more 
ambitious SAP 81. The assumed targeting efficiency is that of ECO HHCRO121, 
though as discussed this would in practice not achieve full coverage (the coverage of 
that criteria for LIHC fuel poor households is only 29%). Criteria with better coverage 
have thus far have tended to have significant leakage (see Table 5.1). Administrative 
costs have been assumed at 20%, in line with the majority of estimates cited here, 
though again these have the potential to vary significantly. For illustrative purposes, 
annual costs are included, assuming a programme length of six years (i.e., from 2011, 
the year of analysis, through 2016, the official target). 
  
                                                
121 Analysis of DCLG (2013b) indicates that 14.1% of LIHC households (with regard to both SAP 
thresholds) had no viable measure identified. This has not been accounted for here given that exclusion 
of these could alter assumed average costs. 
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Table 6.5: Expenditure estimates for two sample energy efficiency programmes seeking to 
upgrade LIHC households to average SAP ratings, (A) 69 (B) 81 
 
 Scenario A  
(Average SAP 
69) 
Scenario B  
(Average SAP 
81) 
Average cost of intervention (2011 prices) £6500 £10200 
Number of viable LIHC households at or below SAP target 2.0m 2.1m 
Number of households targeted (assuming 73% leakage) 7.4m 7.6m 
Total scheme cost (measures only) £48.2bn £77.5bn 
Total scheme cost (including 20% management overheads) £57.9bn £93.1bn 
Annual cost (over six year programme) £9.6bn £15.5bn 
Source: Own analysis, including quantitative analysis of DCLG (2013c). Figures are rounded. 
 
It should be expected that delivery agent choice should result in some variation. The 
potential additional expense where suppliers are responsible for identification, for 
example, was discussed in the previous chapter. Similar effects could apply to 
administration, e.g., where there is duplication of effort across multiple delivery 
agents. However, it is also possible that the measures themselves will be cheaper 
when delivered in a competitive market, as will be considered further in section 7.1.2.  
 
It should be emphasised again that these are only broad estimates of cost based on the 
available information; to support policy success, the government should produce a 
more advanced budget based upon dynamic modelling of LIHC fuel poverty. 
 
6.1.4 Real World Fuel Poverty Mitigation Budgets 
 
Having established the likely costs of achieving given levels of energy efficiency for 
LIHC households, it is helpful to compare these with actual expenditure. Real-world 
budgets can be difficult to establish, particularly as figures – if supplied at all – tend 
not to be in consistent formats. This is particularly true of expenditure on supplier 
schemes as, prior to ECO, energy companies were not required to share details of 
expenditure on obligations in order to promote commercial confidentiality. As such, 
the numbers provided in this section are based upon a comprehensive review 
encompassing all types of literature (details of sources given in notes). Numbers 
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broadly correspond with a similar exercise undertaken concurrently by Chawla and 
Pollitt (2012). Table 6.6 shows estimated spending on fuel poverty policies in the 
period 2003 to 2011122. Figure 6.4 then graphs those figures against year-on-year 
LIHC fuel poverty levels and fuel poverty gap. Note that whilst spending on social 
tariffs has been included, spending on the Decent Homes Programme has not, as no 
figures were available beyond 2008/9 (Chawla, Pollitt 2012 do not appear to have 
sourced any costings either). However, the expenditure on that programme was 
substantial; £29.4bn in the period April 2001 to March 2009 (see Morse 2010: 25). 
  
                                                
122 These years were selected because they are the only ones for which usable statistics are available. 
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Table 6.6: Estimated expenditure (£m) on fuel poverty schemes, 2003/2004 to 2011/12 
 
Scheme/ 
Financial Year 
2003/ 
2004 
2004/ 
2005 
2005 
/2006 
2006/ 
2007 
2007 
/2008 
2008/ 
2009 
2009/ 
2010 
2010/ 
2011 
2011/ 
2012 
Technical Interventions 
EEC (1 and 2) 
PG 
83.5 83.5 200 200 200 - - -  
CERT PG - - - - - 463.2 463.2 463.2 463.2 
CESP - - - - - - 57.6 115.2 115.2 
Warm Front 152 165 190 315 350 395 369 366 109 
Economic Interventions 
Cold Weather 
Payments 
3.5 1.8 8.4 3.4 4.0 211 298 435 129 
Winter Fuel 
Payments 
1916 1962 1982 2015 2070 2701 2735 2760 2150 
Social Tariffs - - - - 33.9 130.5 113 91.8 - 
Warm Home 
Discount Scheme 
- - - - - - - - 230 
 
TOTAL 2155 2212.3 2380.4 2533.4 2657.9 3900.7 4035.8 4231.2 3196.4 
Note: Figures for supplier schemes allocated across years pro rata. In lieu of better information, it has 
been assumed that spending on PG households is as for non-PG households and expenditure has been 
allotted accordingly (i.e., it is assumed that 40% of CERT spending was on PG households). Supplier 
obligations operate across the entire United Kingdom; as it is not possible to disaggregate these, they 
have been included in full in order that the table should be comprehensive. The Industry Initiatives 
component of WHDS has been disregarded. Figures are in nominal terms as the level of detail 
available renders adjusting for inflation year-on-year impossible to achieve with any relevance. For 
context, the Retail Price Index increased by 33% in the period April 2003-March 2012. 
Based upon compilation of sources: (Rosenow 2012, CAG Consultants, Ipsos MORI & Building 
Research Establishment 2011, Watson, Bolton 2013, Kennedy 2010, Kennedy 2013a, Kennedy 2013b, 
Ofgem 2010, Ofgem 2011b, DECC 2010a, DECC 2013c, ONS 2013b) . 
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Figure 6.4: Expenditure on schemes and LIHC fuel poverty, 2003 to 2011 
 
 
Based upon compilation of sources:  (Rosenow 2012, CAG Consultants, Ipsos MORI & Building Research Establishment 2011, Watson, Bolton 2013, Kennedy 2010, 
Kennedy 2013a, Kennedy 2013b, Ofgem 2010, Ofgem 2011b, DECC 2010a, DECC 2013c, ONS 2013b) . 
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As Figure 6.4 illustrates, the impact of expenditure in this period – a total of £26.6 
billion - upon LIHC fuel poverty levels appears to have been minimal. However, over 
the same period, the average SAP rating of English dwellings rose from 51.4 to 57 
(BRE/DEFRA/EST 2006, DCLG 2013d)123. The indication, then, is that funds have 
not been targeted at fuel poor households, or at the very least that low-income 
households were not improved any faster than higher income homes, as mitigation 
under the LIHC definition would require. 
 
Turning to current expenditure, ECO is now the sole vehicle by which energy 
efficiency interventions for fuel poor households are subsidised. Targets for ECO are 
not based upon required expenditure, but upon metrics tied to either carbon or cost 
savings for each element of programme. These are given in Table 6.7, along with 
Government estimates of the total subsidy cost of meeting said targets. 
 
Table 6.7: Energy Company Obligation target metrics for individual elements and official 
estimates of subsidy costs (through March 2015) 
 
Programme element Reduction target Estimated average 
subsidy cost /annum  
Carbon Saving Community 
Obligation 
6.8 MtCO2 £190m 
Home Heating Cost Reduction 
Obligation 
£4.2bn reduction in lifetime notional 
space and water heating costs 
£350m 
Total £540m 
Note: DECC anticipate that actual expenditure on ECO will vary year-on-year. However, as the level 
of variation is currently unknown, consistency has been assumed here. ECO CERO has not been 
included, as it does not qualify as a fuel poverty policy under the definition used in this work. 
Source: (DECC 2012h: 84) 
 
While budgets might appear fairly stable, inflationary impacts mean that the 2013/14 
budgets for technical fuel poverty measures are reduced in real terms. For example, in 
2013 prices, the 2009/10 technical interventions budget was £889.8m, or 65% higher 
than that for 2013/14 (see also section 2.2.3). Jansz and Guertler (2012) estimate that 
English fuel poverty budgets declined by 31% between 2009 and 2013. 
                                                
123  Though it should be noted that the Decent Homes Programme has resulted in significant 
improvements to social housing (see Morse 2010: 34). 
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Expenditure on ECO is based only upon government estimates as to what it will cost 
suppliers to comply with their obligations, the rationale being that they will seek to do 
so as cheaply as possible and thus create efficiencies. Working on behalf of Energy 
UK, Shuttleworth et al. (2012) replicated DECC’s analysis using alternate 
assumptions that they suggest to be more reliable and found that annual costs could be 
closer to £1.7bn if these are used (£624.8.m disregarding ECO CSCO). Under a 
second model, it is found that if the willingness of customers to contribute to the 
financing of measures were to be 10% lower (under the reasonable assumption that 
respondents to DECC scoping surveys were affected by the ‘warm glow’ bias 
associated with environmental programmes, and did not consider the ‘hassle costs’ of 
having measures installed), the level of subsidy required would be around £2.35bn per 
annum (£770.2m disregarding ECO CSCO). However, Shuttleworth et al. (2012) are 
keen to point out that these values do not represent an upper bound for the costs of 
ECO subsidies, merely an indication of what the cost could be under alternate 
assumptions. In November 2012, UK news outlets reported confidential sources 
within energy companies as saying suppliers were preparing for subsidy costs to be as 
high as £3.1bn per annum through to September 2016 (Mason 2012). A number of 
commentators suggested an extension to the length of ECO, which would reduce 
annual costs and accordingly the impact on consumer bills, but would require changes 
to the relevant legislation (see Utility Week 2013, Gosden, Ahmed 2013). However, 
slowing down delivery would also delay the benefits of ECO. It should be noted, also, 
that suppliers have consistently voiced concerns about the ambition of targets, and 
then proceeded to meet them (see Rosenow 2012: 381). This perhaps explains why 
DECC were unmoved by the assertion of suppliers (and seemingly suppliers only) in 
the ECO consultation that the government estimates of costs were too low (DECC 
2012j: 85-86). Energy suppliers certainly have a vested interest in less ambitious 
targets and lower cost obligations. The published costs for the first year of ECO show 
that both HHCRO and CSCO have been delivered at a cost 8% lower than estimated 
(DECC 2014c: 27)124, suggesting that – if anything – the targets were not ambitious 
enough. It is further worth considering that any state-funded programme – however it 
was delivered - might be expected to be subject to fixed or capped expenditure, given 
                                                
124 Costs scaled-up to the annual level. Reported spend does not include administrative costs, which 
were £80m across the whole of ECO. 
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that the consequences of an inflated bill for programme delivery would then be more 
directly problematic to government; this would both reduce risk to the state and limit 
the inflationary potential for households. 
 
It is also worth considering that suppliers may not pay the entire costs of ECO 
themselves, instead taking contributions from external parties. Under the ECO policy 
model, it is assumed that households in the Affordable Warmth group receive 100% 
subsidy, i.e., they do not contribute to the costs themselves either via cash payments 
or Green Deal loans125 (see DECC 2012h: 144). This is a departure from Warm Front, 
whereby the level of subsidy was capped, and households (or other funding agents) 
frequently contributed the difference between the grant and the cost of required 
measures (see Burr 2009b: 5). The evaluation of CESP found that, while it was 
assumed energy suppliers would pay 82% of the costs of that scheme, in practice 
stakeholders believed that the actual proportion had been “far lower”, down to 10%, 
with LAs and housing association meeting the difference  (see CAG Consultants, 
Ipsos MORI & Building Research Establishment 2011: 31) . The published data for 
ECO incorporates costs paid both by suppliers and by delivery partners, with no 
breakdown offered (see DECC 2014g: 18). Although third sector organisations and 
LAs are under increasing financial pressures (see CIPFA 2013, Dayson, Wells 2013, 
Hastings et al. 2013), it may be that these organisations are still contributing a 
significant proportion of ECO costs; thus further breakdowns of expenditure would be 
helpful. Furthermore, CERO – which is intended to subsidise SWI for able-to-pay 
households – is financed via the combination of Green Deal loans and subsidies 
where the “Golden Rule” is not met (see DECC 2011i: 24-25). Any higher-than-
expected CERO burden (e.g., because low interest requires that higher subsidies be 
offered to ensure obligation compliance) will go onto the bills of all households, 
resulting in a regressive impact. As such, low income households are effectively 
relying on more efficient CERO delivery (and the willingness of able-to-pay 
households to contribute) in order to avoid these larger payments. 
 
                                                
125 This is for HHCRO; no figure is given for CSCO, but as a measure similarly targeted at low income 
households, it is taken that the same assumption applies. 
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Assuming that 86% of ECO expenditure goes to English households126, at current 
rates of annual expenditure it would take one hundred and twenty five years to 
achieve the level of expenditure previously estimated as bringing all currently LIHC 
fuel poor households to minimum SAP 69, and two hundred years to complete the 
SAP 81 target programme. Whilst adjustments could be made to improve this (e.g., 
improving targeting, increased efficiency), it seems apparent that current expenditure 
will make only a tiny dent in the wider problem. 
 
6.2 Policy Financing Options 
 
The shift in responsibility for fuel poverty policy brings a change in the way in which 
programmes are financed, as suppliers finance obligation activity via energy bills, 
while the state use Exchequer funds. The transition itself can be clearly registered 
with regard to technical interventions, as charted in Figure 6.5 (based upon 
compilation of cost data drawn from policy and grey literature)127.  
  
                                                
126 Assumption based on 86% of households in Great Britain being in England (ONS 2013). It is likely 
that both fuel poverty and ECO expenditure are distributed less evenly than this between the devolved 
nations; 86% merely constitutes a best attempt assumption at apportioning expenditure. 
127 Technical interventions are the most useful means of charting this shift, as expenditure on economic 
interventions (and fuel poverty policy more broadly) are dwarfed by spending on WFP (see Table 6.7) 
which, as discussed in Chapter Five, largely goes to non-fuel poor households. 
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Note: For the purposes of this illustration, it is assumed that the delivery agent funds policies wholly. 
However, in practice other agents (e.g., Local Authorities and the households themselves) may 
contribute (see, for example, Burr 2009b: 17, DECC 2011l: 30).  
Based upon compilation of sources:  (Rosenow 2012, CAG Consultants, Ipsos MORI & Building 
Research Establishment 2011, Watson, Bolton 2013, Boardman 2010) .  
 
Figure 6.5: Estimated levels of Exchequer and energy supplier expenditure on technical 
interventions, 2003-2011 
 
For reference, Table 6.8 gives an overview of funding sources for fuel poverty 
policies active in 2013. 
 
Table 6.8: Sources of funding for fuel poverty alleviation programmes, 2013 
 
Programme Expected 
annual 
expenditure  
Source of funding 
Energy Company 
Obligation 
Carbon Saving 
Community Obligation 
£190m Energy supplier, via levy on energy 
bills. Some measures will receive 
additional part-funding from customers 
under the Green Deal Financing Model 
(see DECC 2012h) 
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Home Heating Cost 
Reduction Obligation 
£350m Energy supplier, via levy on energy 
bills 
Warm Homes Discount Scheme £300m Energy supplier, via levy on energy 
bills (subject to Levy Control 
Framework, see DECC 2011c)  
Winter Fuel Payment £2165m Exchequer 
Cold Weather Payment £244ma Exchequer 
Total £3249m  
a The number of Cold Weather Payments made varies based upon winter temperatures, making the 
actual total expenditure difficult to predict. For illustrative purposes, the figure given here represents 
the average of the past five winters, i.e., all winters since the current £25/week rate has been in place. 
Based upon compilation of sources: (DECC 2012h, DECC 2011h, DECC 2011c, Kennedy 2013b, 
Kennedy 2013a) 
 
Ultimately, the financing for fuel poverty policies is drawn from the national 
economic product. However – as this section will explain – the manner in which 
funds are collected influences the overall impact. For example, a flat-rate charge on 
all bills will impose more of a cost burden on households at the lower end of the 
income scale than those with higher incomes (i.e., it will be more regressive). Under 
the LIHC definition of fuel poverty, regressive policies would therefore potentially 
increase the fuel poverty levels unless mitigated elsewhere (Hills 2012: 36).  
 
This section synthesises existing literature to give an account of funding options for 
fuel poverty policies. First, the current dominant means of financing, the use of levies 
on energy bills by energy suppliers, is examined. Next, the state-led alternative is 
considered, the funding of policies via general taxation. The section closes with a 
discussion of some alternative propositions for funding policies focusing upon recent 
proposals for the use of hypothecated (or ‘ring-fenced’) taxation. 
 
6.2.1 Supplier-led Funding Mechanisms 
 
Levy-funded supplier obligations have been in place since before WHECA was passed 
in 2000 (see section 2.2.2), and analysis of early documents suggests that regressive 
impacts were not expected to be problematic in those initial stages (commensurate 
with the fact that suppliers were not expected to play a significant role in tackling fuel 
poverty, as established in section 4.3). In the UKFPS it was stated that the 
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government expected that any increase in energy bills as a result of the EEC – 
anticipated at around 1-2% – would be “more than offset” by the reductions achieved 
via energy efficiency improvements (DTI 2001: 18). FPAG, too, were initially keen 
for supplier obligations to be used in this way (see, for example, FPAG 2004: 6). 
However, issues began to emerge around 2007 with changes to CERT that resulted in 
a larger (and thus less tightly focused) PG that received 20% less of the overall 
expenditure than had been the case previously, a development that FPAG deemed 
“highly regressive” (FPAG 2008: 16). As will be discussed here, this trend has 
continued. 
 
In early 2013, the Warm Front scheme was officially closed, with the remaining 
unallocated funds funnelled into a Local Authority Fuel Poverty Competition (see 
Watson, Bolton 2013). From this point onwards, energy suppliers have held primary 
responsibility for funding energy efficiency measures for fuel poor households via 
ECO, as well as for the delivery of WHDS. The financing for these programmes is 
primarily drawn from levies on customer bills, segregating funds gathered in that 
manner to create what is, to all intents and purposes, an additional sales tax on energy 
that funds programmes related to energy and climate change128. This is very different 
from the more opaque way in which, for example, education is funded via the 
Exchequer amidst a plethora of other priorities. Whilst consumers may not know what 
proportion of their monthly energy costs is spent on programmes related to fuel 
poverty and climate change, the direct impact of increased expenditure on such 
initiatives is transmitted via bills. Many suppliers provide a breakdown of bill 
composition on their websites (cf. British Gas 2011, SSE 2013), as does Ofgem. 
Figure 6.6 illustrates Ofgem’s breakdown of typical household bills for electricity and 
gas, averaged across suppliers and payment methods. 
 
                                                
128 This is in addition to the 5% Value Added Tax (VAT) that is already levied on energy by 
government (see HMRC 2014). 
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Note: This data is averaged across Great Britain, not England alone. However, there is no reason to 
believe that any significant differences in bill make-up exist between the devolved administrations. 
Based on average annual consumption figures of 3,300 kWh for electricity and 16,500 kWh for gas, 
averaged across suppliers. Numbers for electricity do not sum to 100% due to rounding. 
Source: (Ofgem 2013i)   
 
Figure 6.6: Composition of typical Great Britain household bills for electricity and gas, 
December 2012 
 
Though the Ofgem literature cited does not make it explicit, comparison with supplier 
breakdowns confirms that the proportion demarcated as “environmental charges” 
includes expenditure on fuel poverty mitigation programmes, i.e., £49 (6%) of the 
typical household gas bill and £58 (11%) of the typical household electricity bill 
(Ofgem (2013i) suggests that such charges represent £82 on the typical annual energy 
bill, with ECO accounting for one-third of that amount). WHDS is subject to the Levy 
Control Framework, which caps levy-funded spending on that scheme at £300m 
(DECC 2011c: 4), the level of expenditure that government prescribed when planning 
the policy (DECC 2011h: 15). ECO spending is not subject to any such cap, and – as 
discussed in section 6.1.4 – the expenditure required to meet obligations is more 
subject to potential variation than that on economic measures. Although this enables 
flexibility to changing circumstances, it also leaves households vulnerable to 
increasing costs (for example, those discussed with relation to targeting in the section 
5.3.3).  
 
In purely theoretical terms, an energy levy is incontrovertibly regressive, as energy 
requirements are income inelastic  (see Newbery 2005, Meier, Jamasb & Orea 2013) . 
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Under the conception of required energy use used in fuel poverty calculations (see 
DECC 2013i) the relationship between energy costs and income is positive and 
significant, but weak, as graphed in Figure 6.7 (from EHS 2011 variables). A change 
in income will not alter the amount of energy required by a household (unless they 
move home), and so any increase in the unit price of energy will result in low-income 
households paying a greater proportion of their income in fuel costs. 
 
 
Note: Cases are not weighted in this analysis to enable effective graphing. Correlation is significant at 
the 0.01 level (2-tailed), n= 14386. 
Source: Own analysis of EHS data (DCLG 2013c). 
 
Figure 6.7: Relationship between annual disposable income (£) and modelled required annual 
energy expenditure (£) 
 
In practice, households may (and often do, as established in section 2.1.3) cut down 
on fuel when their income falls, and so in practice, actual energy use correlates more 
closely with income. Figure 6.8 graphs outputs from CSE’s Distributional Impacts 
Model for Policy and Strategic Analysis (DIMPSA), which estimated actual domestic 
consumption based upon Expenditure and Food Survey (EFS) data, and exhibits 
stronger correlation that Figure 6.7. 
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Note: Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), n= 24207. 
Adapted from White et al. (2010: 6) . 
 
Figure 6.8: Relationship between income decile and median modelled actual energy consumption 
(kWh) 
 
The discrepancy between required and actual usage is likely down to the desires of 
higher income households to spend disposable income on achieving greater thermal 
comfort, and of lower income households to save money (as discussed in section 
2.1.3). However, neither circumstance is desirable, the former creating excess carbon 
emissions, and the latter potentially posing a health risk to occupants. So, whilst in 
practice the impacts of per-unit charges on fuel might be somewhat less regressive 
than if all households consumed exactly the required amount of energy, the costs are 
felt elsewhere.  
 
The manner in which supplier obligations are apportioned is generally assumed129 to 
have a further impact upon the manner in which those costs are then passed through to 
customers (see DECC 2012h: 155-156). There are two broad options available; 
allocating by number of customers, or by units of energy supplied. If the former is 
chosen, it is assumed that suppliers will pass through the cost to consumers at a flat 
rate upon each energy bill, effectively as an increase to any standing charge. CERT 
and CESP obligations were apportioned in this way (Ofgem 2013d: 13, Ofgem 2009b: 
                                                
129 The implications of this assumption being incorrect will be discussed later in this section. 
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8), as are WHDS obligations (Ofgem 2013k: 11-14). However, as will be 
demonstrated shortly, this manner of allocation is more regressive than the alternative, 
apportioning by units of energy supplied. Under that latter model it is assumed that 
suppliers pass through the cost as a function of consumption, i.e., as a percentage 
increase on the bill. ECO obligation levels are allocated in this way, being based upon 
energy sales to the domestic sector, i.e., number of kilowatt-hours (kWhs) sold 
(Ofgem 2013b). This method was selected on the recommendation of the majority of 
respondents to the government consultation on ECO (DECC 2012b: 86), and in view 
of equity research undertaken by ACE (2011a) and CSE  (Preston, White & Guertler 
2010) . Figure 6.9 uses EHS 2011 datasets to demonstrate the distributive differences 
between these two options. Taking an effectively arbitrary sum of £11.2bn by way of 
example130, the median household contributions required to raise the required sums 
are given as percentage of disposable equivalised income by decile for both per-
customer and per-unit collection methods. 
 
Note: Zero incomes have been disregarded. Amounts raised vary slight due to rounding into whole 
pence, with the per-unit charge raising £10m less. 
Source: Own analysis of DCLG (2013c).  
 
Figure 6.9: Household contribution as a percentage of equivalised disposable income (deciles), 
two alternative levy funding methods 
 
                                                
130 The annual cost of the SAP 69 scheme featured in section 6.1.3, if all LIHC households were 
included (e.g., regardless of the viability of measures). 
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Whilst both methods are clearly regressive, per-unit charges are slightly less so, 
though the gap closes at higher income levels. Furthermore, per-unit charges comply 
with the ‘polluter pays’ principle by placing a cost on excessive consumption. Any 
increase to the funds being raised will intensify regressive impacts, thus if 
programmes cost more than expected, those on low incomes will shoulder a higher 
proportional burden.  
 
A number of potential issues risk exacerbating the regressive nature of energy bill 
levies further. Firstly, it is possible that suppliers do not pass costs through in as 
straightforward a manner as is generally assumed. As discussed in section 2.1.3, 
lower income households appear less likely to switch suppliers or tariffs, and as a 
result receive less favourable rates. Boardman further suggests that those who don’t 
switch are more likely to be vulnerable, with the example that those who are digitally 
excluded may not be able to access better online deals. It is plausible that these 
customers also, then, pay a higher proportion of the costs of policies. Preston et al.  
(2010: 80)  model this potential loading of costs and estimated that ‘unattractive non-
switchers’ could pay 34% more than ‘attractive non-switchers’. One energy supplier 
representative interviewed for this work reported that that company treated outlay on 
obligation fulfilment like any other cost of delivery, however, if this was not the case, 
they would be unlikely to declare publically that they effectively penalise low income 
households. As such, it would likely require government or regulator intervention to 
ascertain how costs are passed through in practice. 
 
A second risk group is the 8.7% of households who use electricity to heat their homes 
(DCLG 2013c). The fuel poverty rate amongst this group is 16.2%, against 10.9% in 
the general population (based on analysis of DCLG 2013c). This is primarily because 
lower income households more commonly use electricity as their main fuel, as 
illustrated in Figure 6.10. 
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Source: Own analysis of EHS data (DCLG 2013c). 
 
Figure 6.10: Proportion of households using electricity for as main fuel by disposable income 
decile 
 
As shown in Figure 6.6, electricity consumers pay a higher proportion of their bills 
towards environmental levies than gas consumers. Over the next decade, electricity 
prices are predicted to rise more steeply than gas prices, primarily because of 
increased investment in low-carbon technologies (as opposed to energy efficiency 
technologies) (see CCC 2012: 15-33). Preston et al.  (2013b: 23)  predict that 
electricity consumers will pay on average £48 more for their fuel by 2020, the only 
heating fuel group to see an increase in costs. This is compounded by the fact that 
fewer efficiency measures are available for electrically heated homes; Preston et al.  
(2013b: 23)  anticipate that the total cost gap between electrically heated homes with 
and without measures in 2020 will be £540. There is, then, a case that a per-unit 
charge on gas would be a more progressive means of raising funds, however, as ACE 
(2011a) note, this would mean that households without gas connections would not 
contribute and – their modelling suggests – that those in large households and 
underoccupiers would be penalised. 
 
Further risks may arise when households use more or less than that which they 
‘require, a potential already discussed in section 2.1.3. If low income households 
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consume more because their needs differ from those assumed (e.g., because of a 
disability) their levy payments will consequently be higher (see also ACE 2011a). 
However, further regressive impacts can be seen when considering modelled (i.e., 
idealised) usage. Figure 6.11 is similar to Figure 6.9, but considers the median 
proportion of income contributed by fuel poverty gap deciles (so all households 
considered are in fuel poverty, with those in the tenth decile in the deepest fuel 
poverty).  
 
 
Source: Own analysis of EHS data (DCLG 2013c). Amount raised is £11.2bn. 
 
Figure 6.11: Median LIHC household contribution as a proportion of equivalised disposable 
income by fuel poverty gap decile, two alternative funding methods 
 
The proportion contributed is almost entirely consistent where the charge is fixed, 
indicating low variance in incomes within the fuel poor group. However, a per-unit 
charge is regressive, with those in the deepest fuel poverty paying significantly more 
than those at the margins. This might be expected, because those who are in 
inefficient homes will need more energy. However, it is notable that this is modelled 
use, i.e., assuming occupants are using energy ‘perfectly’, thus the issue is entirely the 
efficiency of the dwelling. Ideally a SAP 69 programme (as is modelled here) would 
target such households; however, given the time it would take to deliver a programme 
of this scale, there would be a compelling incentive for households to underconsume 
in the meantime. 
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It is no secret that levies have a disproportionate impact upon low income households. 
The literature on energy taxes – which is what per-unit charges effectively are – 
resoundingly recognises that they are a regressive means of levying charges  (see 
Crawford, Smith & Webb 1993, Speck 1999, Preston, White & Guertler 2010, Moser 
2013) . DECC’s own research into the likely distributive impacts of policies 
(including those not aimed at alleviating fuel poverty) also recognises that this 
method is regressive (see DECC 2011e: 31, DECC 2013g: 36). However, the most 
recent Government research has focused on distribution by expenditure level rather 
than by income (DECC 2013g: 62) and emphasises that DECC anticipate that policies 
will result in energy bills being, on average, 11% lower in 2020 than they were in 
2002 (DECC 2013g: 5). While it is estimated that, on average, households in the 
lowest three income deciles are expected to spend 1.0-2.4% less of their income on 
energy than they would had these policies not been enacted (DECC 2013g: 12), no 
figures for high income households are provided for comparison. That same policy 
document also emphasises the benefits gained by those who receive measures, 
without accounting for the targeting problems previously discussed in section 5.3, 
putting a rather positive spin on the likely situation for low income households in 
2020. DECC’s work has also been criticised by the non-departmental public body 
Consumer Futures as relying on “heroic” assumptions about the impacts of policy 
(Scorer 2013). Consumer Futures’ own commissioned work, carried out by CSE131, 
predicts that average bills in 2020 will be reduced by only £31 (2%) as compared to a 
‘no policy’ scenario, modelled from 2010; if product policy fails, the result could be 
an increase of £93 (7%) (Preston et al. 2013b: 16). The government attitude to 
distributive concerns around policies might therefore be characterised as putting a 
positive spin on a recognised problem. 
  
                                                
131 Both CSE and DECC used CSE’s DIMPSA model, albeit with different assumptions. 
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6.2.2 Exchequer-led Funding Mechanisms 
 
Surely it’s a simple matter of fairness to implement these government policies, 
like most others, through a fair system of taxation? It would also help tackle 
fuel poverty by shielding the vulnerable. 
 
Alistair Phillips-Davies, Chief Executive of SSE(2013c) 
 
As already established within Chapter Four, in the early years of fuel poverty policy it 
was assumed that much of the necessary activity would be delivered by the state, and 
so would be funded by the Exchequer. Indeed, at least one MP in the WHECA debates 
suggested that if suppliers were to deliver any activity, they should perhaps be 
subsidised by the government in doing so (see section 4.2.1). By 2013, all DECC-led 
fuel poverty policies were financed via levies, with only the DWP-led economic 
interventions – CWP and WFP – funded via general taxation. 
 
The primary case for funding measures via income taxes or national insurance is that 
they are progressive, as the amount paid increases in line with the taxable base and 
those on the lowest incomes are exempt. The same principle may apply to sales taxes 
(e.g., VAT) and other indirect taxes, though this is contested, and vastly dependent on 
the types of goods that are taxed  (see Crossley, Phillips & Wakefield 2009, ONS 
2011b, ONS 2013c) . Another possible approach would be a levy on Council Taxes, 
particularly if some of the delivery of measures were transferred to Local Authorities. 
However, in their current format these taxes are both regressive and inflexible to 
changing circumstances, as household burden is based rather bluntly upon often out-
dated valuations of property (see Orton 2006, Hoogland 2010, Adam, Browne 2012). 
For the purpose of this discussion, it is assumed that an income tax-based levy is the 
form of an Exchequer-led funding mechanism, given that this represents the most 
probable route to a progressively funded system. The possibility of shifting levies 
from bills back to income or sales taxes has frequently been posited by a range of 
organisations, including some Big Six energy suppliers (see above quote), but also by 
organisations such as NEA (see Stockton, Campbell 2011), CSE and ACE  (see 
Preston, White & Guertler 2010) . Brenda Boardman supports this approach, arguing 
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that, “in an ideal world, all of the funding for fuel poverty programmes would come 
out of taxation since few of the fuel poor pay income tax (and pay less of other taxes 
such as VAT)” (2010: 93) . 
 
Adjustments to taxation are infamously difficult to model due to the complexities of 
the tax system and impacts such as substitution effects (see, for example, Hutton, 
Lambert 1982, HMRC 2011b). The Hills Fuel Poverty Review opted to consider the 
likely impact of an income tax-funded policy by using 2009 EHS datasets to model 
the impact of £500m of expenditure (Hills 2012: 144), with this sum assumed to be 
raised via a equi-proportional 0.1% tax on disposable income (Hills 2012: 215-216). 
A similar exercise has been undertaken here, substituting the £500m expenditure 
assumed by Hills for the £11.2bn used previously. A further deviation from Hills’ 
methodology has been to take account of Personal Allowance – i.e., the amount that 
can be earned before tax is payable - set at £7,475 for the tax year 2011/2012 (see 
HMRC 2011). Figure 6.12 graphs median household contributions as a percentage of 
disposable equivalised income by decile for an income tax, set at 1.75% to raise the 
funds required. Figure 6.13 then graphs median proportion of income contributed by 
fuel poverty gap deciles (so those in the tenth decile are in the deepest fuel poverty). 
 
 
Note: Zero incomes have been disregarded. Certain non-taxable benefits have been included in income 
due to limits of data. Amount raised is £11.2bn. 
Source: Own analysis of DCLG (2013c).  
 
Figure 6.12: Median household contribution as a percentage of equivalised disposable income 
(deciles), income taxation funding 
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Source: Own analysis of EHS data (DCLG 2013c). 
 
Figure 6.13: Median LIHC household contribution as a percentage of equivalised disposable 
income by fuel poverty gap decile, income taxation funding 
 
As with Hills’ modelling, this only represents only an approximation of the impact of 
income tax-based funding of measures. However, it does demonstrate that funding via 
income taxation is progressive, with those on the lowest incomes contributing much 
smaller proportions of income (cf. Figure 6.9). The relationship between the depth of 
fuel poverty and contribution as a percentage of income is also weaker than when a 
per-unit levy is used as a collection method (cf. Figure 6.11). More sophisticated 
modelling undertaken by Preston et al. includes a range of climate change policies 
and accounts for likely impacts, confirming income taxation-based funding as 
comparatively progressive when contrasted with levies on bills (2010: 70). Moser’s 
examination of European energy efficiency policies (2013) also concludes taxation 
based energy efficiency funds are less regressive than those drawn from bills.  
 
A further advantage of funding measures via income tax is that it removes some of the 
uncertainty discussed previously in relation to energy bill levies. Whilst energy 
suppliers have comparative freedom to adjust prices, income tax levels are 
customarily set annually in the United Kingdom budget, offering households greater 
stability when budgeting. There would also be greater transparency as to the burden 
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shouldered by each household, as income levels and resultant taxation are less 
ambiguous than the composition of energy tariffs. Income taxes, unlike energy taxes, 
are inherently tied to the ability of households to pay. The comparatively high 
burdens that some households will carry (i.e., because they heat their dwellings with 
electricity or because of underoccupation) are also mitigated by what is effectively a 
shift from an indirect to a direct tax. Under a Warm Front-style programme132, there 
would be a lower risk around ultimate costs, as such a programme would be based 
upon a pre-determined level of expenditure, as opposed to an obligation-style model 
wherein suppliers are given targets based upon energy savings to be achieved and 
seek to do so as cheaply as possible. However, it is important to add the final caveat 
that this discussion has assumed that any shift to an Exchequer-funded approach 
would be met with a corresponding increase in taxation. In practice, this might not be 
the case; it could be that cuts are made to other public services in order to raise the 
funds required. As lower income households are likely to be more dependent on 
services offered by the State it follows that these households will be more deeply 
affected by possible cuts (see, for example O'Hara 2014, Reed, Portes 2014 on the 
impacts of austerity), resulting in further negative outcomes for those on low incomes. 
 
6.2.3 Alternate Approaches 
 
Beyond the two primary options for sourcing funds, a number of more innovative 
means of raising the money necessary to improve the UK housing stock have been 
posited. These include: long-term public borrowing (Lockwood 2013); use of capital 
from pensions (Carrington 2011); social impact bonds linked to public health 
improvement  (Preston, Banks & Sturtevant 2013) ; specialised feed-in tariffs (Eyre 
2013); accessing property equity (Boardman 2010: 226-227); funding integrated into 
to mortgages  (Roberts, Chambers & Kaur 2005) . Detailed comparison of these 
options is beyond the scope of this thesis, and some are likely inappropriate to fuel 
poverty mitigation; however further consideration could prove a fruitful avenue for 
future research.   
 
                                                
132 Alternate state-led models are to be discussed in section 7.1.1. 
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One proposal that has received significant attention in the last few years is the use of 
hypothecated taxation, championed since February 2012 by the campaign group 
Energy Bill Revolution (EBR) (EBR 2014a), with notable supporters including three 
of the Big Six energy suppliers - E.ON, npower and SSE – as well as ACE, CSE, 
NEA and the Liberal Democrat party (EBR 2013, EBR 2014b). Hypothecated 
taxation is the process by which tax revenues from one particular source are ring-
fenced for a given purpose. With reference to energy efficiency, the source in 
question is generally an environmental tax. This is, in part, because of the appealing 
(but oft-debated) notion of the environmental ‘double dividend’ whereby revenues 
from taxes on ‘bads’ such as energy consumption, carbon or pollution are used in 
favour of taxes on ‘goods’, e.g., labour or sales taxes (see Pearce 1991)133. The idea is 
that by taxing something that the state desires to reduce (e.g., carbon emissions), it is 
possible to then reduce taxes on things that the economy wishes to encourage (e.g., 
income, labour; these are often called distortionary taxes because they ‘distort’ 
incentives). An extension of this notion is to transfer that revenue directly towards the 
funding of environmental schemes. Other European countries have recycled revenues 
from the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) in this way (see 
Sunderland 2012). Germany, for example, has, since 2012, ring-fenced almost all EU 
ETS revenues within a sondervermögen, an extra-budgetary fund that dedicates all 
expenditure to energy and climate change initiatives (see Esch 2012). Boardman 
(2010: 93) suggests that a similar tactic might work in the UK, and notes that Ofgem 
(2007b: 13) has recognised that such an approach is worthy of consideration. The 
EBR campaign is based upon commissioned research considering the likely impacts 
of the use of hypothecation in the United Kingdom (the same work used in estimating 
costs of tackling LIHC fuel poverty in section 6.1). That report (Washan 2012) 
considers the potential impact if the revenues from EU ETS and Carbon Price Floor 
(CPF) revenues were allocated to tackle fuel poverty. It is predicted that the revenues 
from these schemes will total £63.8bn in the period 2011-2027, an average of 
£4bn/annum134 (Washan 2012: 27). If this figure were allocated wholly to fuel 
poverty reduction, it would surpass not only the current anticipated annual ECO 
                                                
133 For a critical evaluation of the double dividend hypothesis, see Fullerton and Metcalf (1997). 
Luckin and Lightfoot (2008) offer a more optimistic assessment of its value. 
134 These are projected to increase annually, with revenue significantly lower in the first two years 
(Washan 2012: 26). Note also that the EBR report revenue forecasts are conservative by comparison 
with the government’s own (Washan 2012: 27). 
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budget, but even the anticipated cost of a more ambitious SAP 69 upgrade programme 
(as established in section 6.1.3), albeit over a prolonged period of time. 
 
Ultimately, households will pay the costs of both EU ETS and CPF via levies on 
energy bills (DECC 2013g). EU ETS revenues are drawn from auctioning emission 
allowances to polluters, who pass these costs through to consumers, e.g., via energy 
bills or product costs (see European Union 2013). Power generators are liable for CPF 
and so those costs will also be passed through to energy bills (see Ares 2014). As 
discussed in section 6.2.1, both increases to the costs of products and levies on energy 
bills are likely to be regressive unless offset elsewhere. Currently, revenues from EU 
ETS are channelled into general expenditure135 (see HM Treasury 2013: 102). The 
EBR campaign therefore doesn’t advocate a shift to a more progressive funding 
method so much as taking advantage of new revenue streams (EU ETS and CFP 
having only been launched in 2005 and 2013 respectively, see European Union 2013, 
Ares 2014) to engage in an ambitious programme of expenditure that could more 
effectively mitigate the effects of levies. Many studies have been conducted into the 
extent to which it may be possible to mitigate the regressive impacts of carbon or 
energy taxes by recycling revenue towards distortionary taxes (i.e., income tax) or 
into the welfare system  (see Ekins 1994, Ekins 1999, Baranzini, Goldemberg & 
Speck 2000, Ekins, Barker 2001, Zhang, Baranzini 2004, Dresner, Ekins 2006, 
Clinch, Dunne & Dresner 2006, Callan et al. 2009, Ekins et al. 2011a, Beznoska, 
Cludius & Steiner 2012, Kosonen 2012, Preston et al. 2013a) . However, a key barrier 
identified in the literature is the difficulty in targeting such benefits at low income 
households in such a way that they are efficiently compensated for an effective tax on 
energy used, given differing consumption rates within income bands (see, for 
example, Dresner, Ekins 2006). As such, using that revenue to pay for targeted energy 
efficiency measures could be an effective means of both reducing carbon emissions 
and of scaling support to need. However, it is still important to consider the 
opportunity cost of spending this revenue on fuel poverty alleviation rather than upon 
competing priorities. The argument as to how revenue should be apportioned is 
largely a political one, as will be considered in section 6.3.3. 
 
                                                
135 CFP had only just been introduced at time of writing, and so no budget was available. 
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6.3 Implications of Options 
 
It is apparent from the literature synthesis and quantitative analysis that the choice of 
funding mechanism has important implications for policy efficacy. For those who are 
fuel poor or low income to pay a higher proportion of their income towards policies 
risks negating their positive impact. This issue takes a distinct form where energy 
efficiency measures are concerned as – whilst such interventions provide sustainable 
support – they are comparatively expensive and delivery is time-consuming. As such, 
fuel poor households could end up contributing toward policies for many years before 
they become beneficiaries. 
 
This section begins by bringing together analysis undertaken in this chapter and the 
last to assess the likely impacts of funding options. A brief summary of the 
distributional effects discussed previously is given, with a further discussion of the 
likely distributional impacts from other environmental policies. This is then extended 
to consider the likely effect of policies on fuel poverty, including evaluation of 
targeting efficacy, impact of support received, and cost of interventions. Finally, 
broader policy constraints are discussed - including political and economic 
motivations for retaining the current system – before the chapter is concluded. 
 
6.3.1 Distributional Effects of Policies 
 
Figure 6.14 draws together analysis reported previously in Figures 6.8 and 6.11 to 
demonstrate the distributional impacts of per-unit energy bill levies and income 
taxation, again using £11.2bn for illustrative purposes. 
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Source: Own analysis of DCLG (2013c).  
 
Figure 6.14: Household contribution as a proportion of equivalised disposable income (deciles), 
per-unit energy charge and income taxation 
 
A further means of considering the impact of funding approach is by using equity 
weightings. These are weights that can be applied to incomes in order to account for 
the fact that each extra pound has a greater value to a lower income household than to 
a higher income household. Equity weighting thus offers a means of making an 
effective comparison, in monetary terms, of the impacts of changes upon households 
in a manner that takes account of different incomes. Figure 6.15 reports median equity 
weighted contributions by equivalised disposable income decile, with weightings 
calculated using the same methodology applied by Hills (2012: 222-224), as 
recommended in HM Treasury’s Green Book (HM Treasury 2011: 91-94). The 
impact of income taxation charges is shown to be lower for those in the lowest seven 
income deciles. The equity-weighted value of a per-unit charge on the bottom decile 
is just under £900, as compared to a little over £250 for those in the top decile.   
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Source: Own analysis of DCLG (2013c), with reference to (HM Treasury 2011). Amount raised is 
£11.2bn. 
 
Figure 6.15: Median equity-weighted household contribution by equivalised disposable income 
decile, per-unit energy charge and income taxation 
 
It should be emphasised that these regressive impacts are not limited to policies that 
are expected to directly reduce fuel poverty. The Renewables Obligation (RO) and 
Feed-in-Tariffs (FiTs), for example, are funded via electricity bills, which, as 
discussed in section 6.2.1, intensify the regressive impact136. Chawla and Pollitt 
(2012: 21) model the distributive burden of all environmental policy costs (including 
state and supplier policies) using data from 2009-10, and estimate that these equate to 
an average of 0.61% of disposable income for the bottom three income deciles, 
compared to an average of 0.16% of disposable income for the top three deciles.  
 
6.3.2 Impact on Fuel Poor Households 
 
Section 3.1.1 cited Richard Titmuss as arguing that a fundamental purpose of social 
policy is to be progressively redistributive (2008: 144). Thus far this chapter has 
considered the distributive impacts of the way in which funds are raised. However, 
even very regressive effects could be mitigated by an effectively delivered policy. 
                                                
136 Furthermore, Leicester (2011) finds that FiTs currently primarily benefit higher income households, 
and suggests that an aggressively targeted programme would be needed to correct this imbalance. 
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This section will consider the extent to which fuel poor households are likely to be net 
contributors or recipients of funds under the 2013 set of fuel poverty policies. 
Outcomes are a function of a number of factors; the overall cost of policies, the 
manner in which funds are collected, the number of households helped, and the 
efficacy with which fuel poor and low income households are targeted. These are, of 
course, inter-related, with some being more difficult to adjust than others. It would 
also be possible for accompanying non-fuel poverty policies to contribute to in 
positive redistribution (e.g., via increases to income tax personal allowance, as 
considered by Preston et al. 2013a); however, discussion of such options goes beyond 
the scope of this work. 
 
• Energy Company Obligation 
 
One issue particular to technical measures is that it is generally considered 
undesirable – and even technically challenging – to give a smaller benefit to a large 
number of people, rather than a greater benefit to a minority. Whilst many Compact 
Fluorescent Lamps (CFLs) were distributed under early supplier obligations (see, for 
example, Ofgem 2008c: 54), these were not included the CERT extension period 
amid fears that they were being distributed, but not installed (see DECC 2011l: 4). 
Increasingly, policymakers have instead favoured ‘whole house’ approaches as being 
more economically efficient, and enabling installers to ensure measures work together 
effectively (see DECC 2011i: 71). Boardman (2010: 222) further notes that a 
piecemeal approach only introduces further “administrative costs and hassle” for 
occupants. However, the whole house approach does bring a new challenge in 
promoting distributional equity in the short-term as fewer dwellings can be improved 
for the same amount of expenditure, increasing the number of households who are 
contributing without benefiting. A further emergent issue is that, as noted in section 
6.1, the remaining measures needed to be installed tend to be the more expensive 
ones, notably SWI, which generally costs several thousand pounds per dwelling, as 
opposed to CWI, which usually costs closer to £500 (see EST 2014e, 2014b). ECO as 
a whole – in line with this recognised need – is more focused on SWI than previous 
policies, particularly the CERO element (see DECC 2011i: 69-71) which, whilst not 
aimed at fuel poor households, will increase the overall regressiveness of the 
programme over comparable activity under previous obligations.  
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DECC’s Impact Assessment for ECO included modelling of distributional impacts, as 
reproduced in Figure 6.16. This shows that, by DECC’s own assessment, the Green 
Deal and ECO are expected to have an overall average regressive impact by 2020, 
with (as would be expected) the effects intensified for those households that do not 
receive measures. 
 
 
Reproduction from DECC (2011i: 68). Replicated under terms of Crown Copyright waiver (see TSO 
1999). 
 
Figure 6.16: Distribution of impact on energy bills for different income groups in 2020, Green 
Deal and ECO 
 
Drawing data from the first year of ECO HHCRO and CSCO delivery, 239,455 
households received help under HHCRO (at a scaled annual cost of £319m) (figures 
taken from DECC 2014c)  and 96,094 households received help under CSCO (at a 
scaled annual cost of £175m) (DECC 2014c). Figure 6.17 illustrates the distributive 
impacts of raising these sums via a per-unit levy and via income taxation, by income 
decile. Figure 6.18 shows the same impacts, by fuel poverty depth decile (ten being 
 
 
267 
deepest fuel poverty)137. Together these demonstrate that the poorest households, and 
those that are in the deepest fuel poverty, contribute the largest proportions of their 
income to pay for fuel poverty policies if consumption is as modelled138. 
 
 Source: Own analysis of DCLG (2013c).  
 
Figure 6.17: Median household contribution as a proportion of annual income by income decile, 
two alternative funding methods (ECO costs) 
 
                                                
137 These graphs will not be produced for further policies discussed, as it should be assumed the 
relationship would be the same, scaled to the size of the contribution required. 
138 In practice, the contribution of fuel poor households is expected to be lower where there is 
underconsumption and higher where certain low income households tend to overconsume, as 
established in Chapter Two. However, it is no less concerning that the “ideal” energy usage patterns 
lead to regressive outcomes. 
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Source: Own analysis of DCLG (2013c).  
 
Figure 6.18: Median household contribution as a proportion of annual income by fuel poverty 
gap decile, two alternative funding methods (ECO costs) 
 
Extrapolating from the analysis reported in section 5.1.2, 25% of ECO HHCRO 
recipient households and 12% of ECO CSCO recipient households are expected to be 
fuel poor (see Table 5.3). Thus approximately 2.32m LIHC fuel poor households 
(97%) are expected to be paying for, but not receiving, measures under ECO in the 
first year. If it is assumed that recipient fuel poor households are evenly distributed 
across income deciles, that use is as modelled, and that interventions are of equal cost, 
the net contribution of fuel poor households under the current levy funding method is 
£55m; fuel poor households contribute £69m to the programme but receive only 
£15m of expenditure139. If an income tax were used to raise the funds, the fuel poor 
would remain net contributors, but to a far lesser extent, a net contribution of £5m. A 
policy that was more ambitiously targeted on fuel poor households could further 
mitigate the regressive impacts of funding via bill levies; if the leakage of these 
policies were reduced from 79% to 72%, the fuel poor would become net recipients. 
These outcomes align with the findings of Hills (2012: 176), who concludes that the 
expected form of ECO at that time - with its lack of focus on low income households - 
was regressive and so likely to result in increased LIHC fuel poverty by 2016.  
 
                                                
139 All modelling in this section based on analysis of DCLG (2013b) 
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• Warm Home Discount Scheme  
 
It is difficult to model the full impact of WHDS because of the autonomy suppliers 
have in defining the Broader Group. As such, the focus here is on the Core Group, 
though analysis of CWP (discussed later in this section) may offer some insights into 
Broader Group impacts, as these policies are likely to reach similar populations. 
Considering the Core Group alone, £97m of expenditure in 2011/12 was expected to 
benefit 800,000 households (see DECC 2011f). However, analysis of targeting 
efficacy for that year suggests that only 12% of recipients are fuel poor. Under the 
current levy funded model, the net contribution of fuel poor households under the 
current levy funding method is £10m; fuel poor households contribute £14m to the 
programme but receive only £4m of expenditure. If the policy were funded via 
income tax, the fuel poor would become net recipients (though only to the level of 
£0.1m)..That said, DECC’s Impact Assessment for WHDS indicates that the policy as 
a whole (i.e., including the Broader Group) is expected to have a progressive 
distributive impact on incomes, even in its current form (DECC 2011f: 24). However, 
the distributive impact on fuel poverty is not indicated, i.e., the policy may be 
progressive, but benefit few fuel poor households. The programme was expected to 
reduce short-term 10pct fuel poverty by 88,000 in 2011/12 (i.e., a cost of £2841 per 
household temporarily removed, though some will be supported but not removed) 
(DECC 2011f: 28). Baker (2011: 24) finds that expanding the WHDS Core Group to 
include CWP eligible households would reach 45% more 10pct fuel poor households 
at a cost of £440m annually.  
 
• Winter Fuel Payment 
 
That WFP has at least some regressive impacts – despite being Exchequer-funded – is 
evident simply in that removing it from incomes before calculating poverty reduces 
fuel poverty by around 370,000; this indicates that WFP increases income inequality. 
Whilst £2175m was distributed to 12.6m households in 2013, it is estimated that only 
7% of recipients are fuel poor. However, as the policy is funded via taxes, it is 
expected that the fuel poor are the net recipients of £718m; this would reduce to 
£498m if levy funding were used. Hills (2012) found that changes to WFP had a very 
 
 
270 
small impact on LIHC fuel poverty, in part because of targeting efficiency, and 
because few households were close enough to the income threshold for the 30% 
increase modelled to make a difference.  
 
• Cold Weather Payment 
 
It is difficult to model the impact of CWPs given that they are distributed based upon 
local weather conditions. An average annual spend of £244m (as modelled in Table 
6.8) goes to c. 3.9m households(see Table 5.4), and it is estimated that 16% goes to 
the fuel poor. Currently, the fuel poor are estimated to be the net recipients of £55m; 
this would reduce to £30m if the policy were funded via a levy. There is 
comparatively little literature considering CWPs, perhaps because it is a fairly minor 
element of the overall support structure (see Table 6.8). Hills’ analysis does consider 
an increase to means-tested benefits as a possible income-related intervention, an 
adjustment that would likely have a similar impact to increasing CWP-type payments, 
an finds that the reduction in fuel poverty would be greater than for similar changes to 
WFP (Hills 2012: 163). As with WFP, though, poor targeting and the minimal impact 
of a fairly small payment hamper reduction in fuel poverty levels. Overall, given that 
CWP is targeted fairly tightly at low income households and funded via the 
Exchequer, the overall impact is expected to be progressive. 
 
• Overview of Policy Impacts 
 
By way of summary, Figure 6.19 presents the figures reported above within a Policy 
Analysis Matrix. 
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 Energy 
Company 
Obligation 
(CSCO and 
HHCRO) 
Warm Home 
Discount Scheme 
Core Group 
Winter Fuel 
Payment 
Cold 
Weather 
Payment 
Current funding method Levies on 
energy bills 
Levies on energy 
bills 
General 
taxation 
General 
taxation 
Total annual expenditure £494m £97m £2165m £244m 
Proportion fuel poor in 
annual receipt  
3% 4% 37% 26% 
Annual expenditure on fuel 
poor households 
£30m £18m £476m £49m 
Net annual amount 
contributed/received by fuel 
poor households – if levy 
funded 
£55m £10m -£497m -£29m 
Net annual amount 
contributed/received by fuel 
poor households – if tax 
funded 
£5m -£0.1m -£718m -£54m 
Likely Current Overall 
Distributional Impact on 
Fuel Poor Households 
Regressive Regressive 
(expected to be 
progressive if the 
Broader Group is 
included) 
Progressive Progressive 
Note: Current funding method highlighted in grey. CWP cost estimates use same approximation 
methodology as applied in Table 6.8.  
Based upon analysis of DCLG (2013c) (including analysis reported in Chapter Five) and compilation 
of sources: (DECC 2014c, DECC 2011h, Kennedy 2013a, Kennedy 2013b) . 
 
Figure 6.19: Policy Analysis Matrix of distributional impacts of current fuel poverty policies 
 
6.3.3 Policy Constraints 
 
Given that levies on energy bills are fundamentally regressive, an obvious question 
arises: why retain them as a means of funding fuel poverty policies? Here, it is argued 
that the reasons are primarily political in nature. This section discusses policy 
constraints identified as impacting the choice to fund fuel poverty policies via levies 
on energy bills. In this instance, political and economic constraints are discussed 
together as they are inextricably entwined. Organisational constraints also have some 
relevance here. The discussion primarily focuses upon income taxation and supplier 
levies as competing funding mechanisms, however, some consideration is also given 
to the EBR hypothecation proposition. 
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• Organisational Constraints 
 
Perhaps the strongest argument for maintaining levies on bills as a funding 
mechanism is that a policy regime in which suppliers must treat the cost of complying 
with obligations as an unavoidable delivery expense is integral to the manner in which 
the market is currently used to incentivise efficient delivery of technical interventions. 
Under this model, it is in the financial interest of suppliers to meet these obligations at 
the lowest possible cost, whether via efficient delivery or by selecting the most cost-
effective measures. Doing so will enable suppliers to avoid fines, and have greater 
scope to lower prices (to win business) or increase profit margins. To have 
government subsidise suppliers (as was very briefly considered in the WHECA 
debates) would undermine this incentive. Alternative delivery structures (such as 
Warm Front-style procurement and Payment-by-Results) will be considered in the 
next chapter. However, the fact that suppliers are faced with potentially enormous 
fines if they fail to deliver is an incentive that would not apply to public sector-led 
delivery.  
 
That said, this argument does not apply to economic measures such as WHDS as 
these are simply cash rebates. There is little way in which suppliers could improve 
efficiency in delivery here, except perhaps in terms of better targeting of the Broader 
Group (which is not required or monitored) or via a reduction in administrative costs 
(the potential for which is likely to be minimal).  
 
• Political and Economic Constraints 
 
In section 6.1.3, the cost of upgrading all currently viable LIHC fuel poor households 
to SAP 69 was estimated at £57.9bn. This is considerably more than the £540m 
government currently anticipates being spent in fulfilment of ECO CSCO and 
HHCRO (DECC 2012h: 84), which itself is a reduction in spending under the 
previous suite of fuel poverty policies (see Figure 6.5, Table 6.8). Numerous 
commentators have suggested that the current budget is too low to make a significant 
dent in fuel poverty levels (see Boardman 2010, 2012, ACE 2011b). One option 
would simply be to redress the overall balance of ECO, which is currently 
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apportioned 73:27 in favour of expenditure targeted at non-fuel poor homes (i.e., 
CERO is almost three times larger than CSCO and HHCRO combined) (DECC 
2012h: 84) . This balance was considered during the consultation period (at which 
point it was 75:25), with “many” respondents feeling the balance was too far in favour 
of able-to-pay homes (DECC 2012j: 85). The government response in the 
consultation itself was somewhat vague, simply stating they felt the current balance 
was “the most appropriate split to help [them] deliver the twin objectives of ECO” 
(i.e., carbon reduction and fuel poverty mitigation) (DECC 2012h: 86). Examination 
of the ECO final impact assessment offers more of an insight into the decision-
making process, as four different adjustments to the policy balance were modelled 
and scored (DECC 2012h: 188-194). Adjusting the policy balance to 35:65 was 
expected to improve the Net Present Value (NPV)140 of the policy, achieving the 
second-best score of all options considered, and increasing savings to HHCRO 
eligible households by 28% (DECC 2012h: 193). However, that policy option reduced 
expected carbon savings to around two-thirds of those achieved by all other options, 
illustrating the tensions between fuel poverty policy and environmental goals 
discussed in Chapter Two. As such, CSCO was introduced, effectively as a 
compromise measure that was expected to increase savings to the HHCRO, but by 
only 5% (lower than all other options considered, see DECC 2012h: 193). 
 
There are strong arguments for a more ambitious energy efficiency programme 
beyond the alleviation of fuel poverty or even the allied goals of carbon reduction and 
improvement of health and wellbeing. A larger programme could function as an 
economic stimulus package, creating jobs via the delivery of measures that could 
largely pay for themselves141 (see Smith 1998, Clinch, Healy 2000, Stern 2006, 
Guertler, Preston 2009, Ekins et al. 2011b, Cambridge Econometrics/Verco 2012). 
Ideally such a programme would focus effectively on fuel poor households to ensure 
equity in delivery, e.g., by ensuring the majority of benefits are delivered to – or at 
least targeted towards – fuel poor households. Government certainly recognise the 
potential of energy efficiency in this respect; in the Green Deal consultation 
documents, “investment driving economic growth” is given as one of the six goals of 
                                                
140 The NPV is a calculation of costs and benefits frequently used by government in assessing policy 
(see Cabinet Office 2014). 
141 Though this would rely on the development of an appropriate supply chain in order to deliver that 
uplift in measures. 
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the project (DECC 2011i: 11). However, despite the government’s appreciation of the 
benefits of investment in energy efficiency, the inclination appears to be to cut back 
on spending in this respect. This reticence is in line with the political characteristics of 
the coalition government142 outlined in section 2.2.1, i.e., a desire to limit public 
spending, reduce taxes, and to limit the role of the state. Certainly, significantly 
increased public spending on fuel poverty policy (e.g., via a renewed Warm Front or 
other increased Exchequer-funding of activity) would seem inconsistent with a 
political environment in which cuts to public spending on benefits and services 
dominate the agenda. It further renders the extensive use of hypothecation – such as is 
advocated by EBR – unlikely, as revenues from EU ETS and CFP can be used to 
reduce the deficit. 
 
That said, the policy choices made in recent years appear not to be the result of a 
straightforward desire to reduce spending on energy efficiency, so much as a desire to 
distance the financing from general taxation. The announcement of the Green Deal 
and ECO in the 2010 Spending Review was accompanied with a description of the 
benefit to the public purse: 
 
Extra support to reduce energy bills and help improve heating and insulation 
will be provided by energy companies to combat fuel poverty This will allow 
the Warm Front public spending programme to be phased out over time, 
saving £345 million by 2013-14. 
(HM Treasury 2010: 62) 
 
The implication is that energy suppliers will be required to counterbalance state cuts 
to fuel poverty spending. However, given that ECO is assumed by government to be 
transferred in full to customers as a cost of delivery (DECC 2012h: 85), the actual 
outcome is a slight cut in spending, which is then transferred to by what is known to 
be a more regressive means of raising money. It would appear, then that FPAG were 
right in describing government as “disingenuous” in their framing of the policy shift 
(FPAG 2012: 18). Certainly the option of reverting back to income taxation as the 
                                                
142 Though this lack of ambition is by no means a new development, as established in Chapter Four 
(see also Boardman 2010: 206). 
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primary source of funding has not been considered, only possible means of mitigating 
against the recognised (but unchallenged) regressiveness of policies (DECC 2011i: 
128-133). This is a far cry from the original statement in the UKFPS, that: 
 
The Government has confirmed that it will not impose new taxes on the 
domestic use of fuel and power. This would have an unacceptable social 
impact and runs counter to fuel poverty policies. 
(DTI 2001: 13) 
 
Although not taxes in the strictest sense, levies on energy bills have been 
characterised in the media – and by some suppliers – as “stealth taxes” (Nichols 2013, 
Phillips-Davies 2013a), the popular description for charges that effectively function as 
taxes, but either exist outside the conventional system or are otherwise concealed. 
Politicians have long been accused of using such tactics to avoid increasing income 
tax, with the New Labour government of 1997-2010 often held up as particularly keen 
practitioners of the approach143 (MacErlean 2004, Hirsch 2006). It can well be argued 
that levies on energy bills meet this description; they are a compulsory charge on a 
necessity good, and – as government need to at least appear to be pursuing fuel 
poverty eradication – if the necessary funds were not raised via bills, they would 
presumably need to be collected via the income tax system. Given the Conservative 
Party’s ongoing commitment to cutting income taxes and reducing public spending 
(see Conservative Party 2014), the current approach must be somewhat appealing to 
the current coalition government from a political perspective. Taken as a whole, the 
Green Deal and ECO limit the role of government in energy efficiency policy delivery 
to one of oversight, and so the policy structure meets all three characteristics of a 
neoliberal approach to governance described in section 2.2.1. 
 
These changes are probably also symptomatic of some level of path dependency (see 
section 4.4.2) given that that the obligations levied on bills have gradually increased 
since 1994, with policies such as the RO and FiTs added along the way. As the public 
and policymakers adapt to the notion of higher bills and additional charges it seems 
plausible that energy levies will become more palatable as a funding option, even as 
                                                
143$The 1997 Labour Party election manifesto also promised not to raise the basic or top rate of income 
tax over their first five years in government (see Labour Party 1997).$
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they run counter to the intentions of policy because of their regressive nature. Political 
short-termism will tend to result in income tax rises for the purposes of funding long-
term investment being seen as unpalatable due to electoral pressures, and placing the 
charge on energy bills instead can function as a means of distancing government from 
the need to raise funds for policy. However, Vaze and Hewett (2012) found that 
consumers were more supportive of income taxation over bill levies as a means of 
funding social and environmental schemes after participating in deliberative 
workshops designed to promote understanding of funding mechanisms (64% of 
participants preferred payment via bills over taxation before workshops, 38% 
afterwards, see Vaze, Hewett 2012: 28). An Irish study by Clinch and Dunne (2006) 
examined public attitudes to increased energy levies and found widespread 
misinformation or lacking understanding around the existence of such an option. This 
was identified as a major impediment in gaining consumer support for alternate policy 
funding mechanisms, with “focus groups show[ing] resoundingly that people were 
suspicious and distrustful of the government in relation to tax policy” and “hostile” to 
the notion of increased energy taxation in that country. The indication from these 
studies, then, is that energy ‘taxes’ have been successfully stealthy, the general public 
aren’t aware of their impact and – by extension – that it is not something that 
government have an electoral incentive to reform. 
 
Beyond the more overtly political incentives, there are environmental arguments for 
maintaining levies on bills, some of which have already been discussed. From a 
carbon reduction perspective, levies on bills – particularly those linked to 
consumption as per-unit charges – are in line with the ‘polluter pays’ principle, i.e., 
that there should be disincentives to prevent high consumption144. This theoretically 
also enables the ‘double dividend’ (Pearce 1991) to be reaped, i.e., taxes on desirable 
activities (such as labour) can be cut. The Conservative Party manifesto of 2010 
indicated a preference for such an approach, pledging to: 
 
…increase the proportion of tax revenues accounted for by environmental 
taxes, ensuring that any additional revenues from new green taxes that are 
principally designed as an environmental measure to change behaviour are 
                                                
144 This effect could be further amplified via the use of Rising Block Tariffs, see section 7.2.3. 
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used to reduce the burden of taxation elsewhere. 
 
(Conservative Party 2010: 31) 
 
However, as demonstrated in Figure 6.10, fuel poor households that consume ‘ideal’ 
amounts of energy will then pay an even larger proportion of their income towards 
schemes, creating an incentive to keep homes below healthy temperatures. Overall, 
the selection of levies over income taxation as a means of funding fuel poverty 
policies – as well as the current balance of ECO – is indicative of carbon reduction 
being pursued in a manner that does not also prioritise equality, to the detriment of 
fuel poverty policy. This is perhaps unsurprising given the comparably strong legal 
and political constraints driving carbon reduction, as discussed in section 4.4.2. 
 
The most ambitious proposal covered in this chapter was the EBR campaign to 
hypothecate EU ETS and CFP revenues. This complies with the ‘polluter pays’ 
principle by incentivising energy saving (indeed, one of the issues with hypothecation 
is that if the tax is successful, there will be less revenue). It could also provide a 
means of offsetting the regressiveness of the rapidly accruing levies on energy bills by 
harnessing the proceeds from new environmental taxes to specifically support low 
income households. The anticipated revenue from EU ETS and CFP would be at 
levels more in line with the required spending modelled in section 6.1 than current 
ECO funding. There is wide support for such a programme within the policy 
community (see PRASEG 2012, EBR 2014b), and international precedent for the 
hypothecation of EU ETS (see Sunderland 2012). However, there are a number of 
impediments to adoption of such a policy. Firstly, hypothecation is subject to many of 
the same barriers as any increase in spending, i.e., a desire to reduce spending, a lack 
of incentive for politicians to be ambitious with regard to fuel poverty, a focus on 
carbon reduction. The argument for hypothecation is primarily about securing 
commitment to a certain level of expenditure - the source identified remains 
regressive – and so political ambition remains a key constraint145. It is also notable 
that the EBR report (Washan 2012) includes little detail as to how the money raised 
                                                
145 As recognised by Martyn Williams of EBR who has stated that the goal is more about ambition than 
method of funding: “the heart of the campaign is not strict legally binding hypothecation. It is a broader 
concept. We would like a commitment that money of the scale of £64bn will be reinvested.” (PRASEG 
2012). 
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would be used, for example, how energy efficiency supply chains might handle such a 
steep increase in expenditure on measures. Furthermore, UK governments have 
historically been opposed to the use of hypothecation on the grounds that it is 
inflexible to need, and sets a precedent for the (perhaps under-informed but 
enthusiastic) public to demand expenditure be earmarked towards more popular 
causes (see Jordan et al. 2003: 188, Seely 2011). In the House of Commons 
Committee Debates around the Energy Act 2011, Minister for Energy and Climate 
Change Greg Barker stated that the adoption of any such policy would ultimately be 
down to the Treasury and has “300 years of prejudice against hypothecation to 
contend with” (Energy Bill [Lords] Deb col 299). That said, there has been a 
particular case made, historically, that environmental taxes are well suited to 
hypothecation as the practice could raise public support for such levies by enabling a 
means of directly demonstrating how they can be beneficial (see Seely 2011: 11-13). 
A rare example of this occurring in practice is the Landfill Communities Fund146, 
which effectively hypothecates a proportion of Landfill Tax to promote 
environmental activity near landfill sites (see Morris, Read 2001 for a critical 
discussion). A possible precedent for fuel poverty hypothecation can also be found in 
the fourth FPAG annual report, which cites an instance of taxation on the windfall 
profits of upstream producers being recycled to finance interventions for low income 
households (FPAG 2006: 12). It can be argued that the need for flexibility in funding 
sources is something of a non-issue where fuel poverty is concerned given that the 
amount of extra expenditure required is so great (and the funding source stable). 
Whilst there is some merit to the argument that hypothecation sets a difficult 
precedent, that an approach has not tended147 to have been used historically is not 
itself a reason to rule it out. 
 
In conclusion, Figure 6.20 summarises the implications of different financing options 
discussed in this chapter within a Policy Analysis Matrix, linked to the evaluation 
criteria established in Chapter Three. 
  
                                                
146 Formerly known as the Landfill Tax Credit Scheme. 
147 Though it has been used to some extent, e.g., with regard to earmarking of road tax, tobacco duties, 
and National Insurance contribution (see Seely 2011: 14-17) 
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Income 
Taxation 
Levies on Energy 
Bills 
Hypothecation 
Compliance with 
‘polluter pays’ 
principle 
No Yes Yes 
Regressiveness: 
income 
Low High High, but with greater increased for 
mitigation 
Regressiveness: fuel 
poverty 
Low High (and greater than 
for income) 
High (and greater than for income), 
but with increased potential for 
mitigation 
Implications for those 
who overconsume 
None Increased regressive 
impacts 
Increased regressive impacts, but 
with increased potential for 
mitigation 
Implications for those 
who underconsume 
None Decreased regressive 
impacts (and so may be 
encouraged) 
Decreased regressive impacts (and 
so may be encouraged), but with 
increased potential for mitigation 
Impact on the public 
purse 
High Very low Very low 
Impact on energy bills None High Very high 
Requirement for state 
involvement 
High Restricted Restricted 
 
Figure 6.20: Policy Analysis Matrix of fuel poverty financing options 
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has synthesised evidence and mixed-methods analysis to offer a 
comparison of income taxation and supplier levies as means of funding fuel poverty 
policy. Employing a systematic review of literature on improving the English housing 
stock it has been established that – whilst the sheer number of assumptions required 
make estimating programme costs difficult – it is evident that the expenditure 
required to meet potential new LIHC fuel poverty-based targets by 2016 far outstrips 
current government projections of expenditure on energy efficiency interventions for 
low income households. Indeed, the overall trend identified is towards lower sums 
being collected and distributed in ways that are increasingly regressive. It has further 
been quantitatively demonstrated that funding programmes via energy bill levies, as is 
now the default approach, is fundamentally more regressive than doing so via income 
taxation. The impact on fuel poor households is likely to be particularly stark as, 
under the LIHC definition, having higher than median energy requirements is an 
intrinsic part of the definition; thus fuel poor households will be compelled to either 
contribute a greater proportion of their income than non-fuel poor households, or – as 
seems likely – to underconsume energy with grave implications for health and 
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wellbeing. In view of evidence that current funding approaches run counter to the 
intentions of policy, the chapter concluded with a detailed analysis of the policy 
constraints that would lead the government to persist in such a regressive course of 
action. It was suggested that a number of factors are likely to contribute, including: 
the desire to retain supplier obligations as a market-led means of delivery; favouring 
of levies on environmental pollutants over taxes on labour and income; that 
transferring expenditure to levies enables lower income taxes, reduced public 
expenditure, and limited state involvement, all of which are politically and 
ideologically appealing to neoliberal governments.  
 
The furore surrounding Ed Miliband’s pledge to freeze fuel prices demonstrates that 
domestic energy bills are an issue of greater political (and electoral) significance than 
they perhaps once were; indeed, the Labour Party has chosen to make the cost-of-
living a core campaign issue of the 2015 general election (see Labour Party 2014). A 
rise in the real costs of household energy is to some extent unavoidable so long as the 
UK remains primarily dependent on fossil fuels as an energy source (see DECC 
2014j). However, recent years have also seen creeping regressive impacts with 
regards to the policies charged to bills, and it might be argued that a more 
constructive means of equitably reducing the costs of living would be to tackle that 
issue. Shifting financing to income taxation wholesale may not be possible if supplier 
obligations are to be maintained as a delivery vehicle, but a more ambitious focus on 
the fuel poor – with spending maintained at levels that would enable achievement of 
carbon reduction targets - could go a long way to offsetting regressive impacts and 
ensuring an equitable transition. This approach would represent a long-term 
investment in the English housing stock, insulating against fuel poverty, creating 
opportunities for businesses and increasing employment. However, there is no 
comparable argument for funding economic measures via energy bills. Whilst WHDS 
may be progressive, it would be more so if financed from general taxation; the 
delivery implications for this will be considered in the next chapter. What is clear it 
that whatever approach is chosen, ultimately the money is collected from households. 
The choice is between more and less regressive means of doing so, and to pretend 
otherwise is intellectually dishonest. Given that government has accepted the need for 
intervention whilst acknowledging the regressiveness of programmes, it can be argued 
that effective fuel poverty policy is being sacrificed to competing priorities and 
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political expediency. The key possible counter-argument to this is that supplier 
obligations are the best possible vehicle for measures, and that funding source and 
delivery agent are inextricably linked; this claim will be examined in the next chapter. 
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7 | Delivering Support 
. 
 
Over the past twenty years, the private sector has become increasingly involved in the 
provision of support to fuel poor households. The pursuit of privatisation is motivated 
by a belief that private industry makes for a more effective delivery agent than the 
public sector. Beginning in the late-1970s, the Thatcher government began to 
experiment with the denationalisation of state-held industries, ultimately selling off 
holdings in telecommunications, steel, air travel, water, railways, gas, and electricity 
(see Evans 1997, Parker 2009). This policy was continued under John Major’s 
government, which privatised coal, electricity generators, and rail travel (see Dorey 
1999, Parker 2012), and – to some extent – Tony Blair’s New Labour administration, 
via its Private Finance Initiatives model of funding public infrastructure projects  (see 
Wilks-Heeg 2009, Toms, Beck & Asenova 2011) . The trend persists into the current 
coalition government, with the recent sale of Royal Mail (see Parker 2014b), and 
indications of similar intentions towards both the NHS (see Davies 2013) and road 
infrastructure (see Watt 2012). 
 
The increased involvement of private actors in leading the delivery of domestic 
energy efficiency makes for an interesting case study given that, as discussed in 
Chapter Four, supplier obligations are in some sense a side effect of privatisation; 
they exist as a legacy of provisions within the Electricity Act 1989 – the legislation 
that privatised the electricity industry – that were introduced by Labour peers in an 
effort to encourage a sense of responsibility towards energy consumption within 
fledgling private providers. Energy efficiency is a relatively new concern of 
government, and for most of the last two decades state and supplier-led programmes 
have co-existed (see Figure 2.7). As such, the transition to an entirely industry-driven 
approach has been gradual rather than dramatic. Indeed, energy efficiency is, 
unusually, not even the main business of those tasked to deliver it, with their 
involvement merely a requirement of participation in that other, more lucrative 
industry, the supply of gas and electricity to domestic customers. With regard to 
technical obligations, the government have sought to create additional markets that 
incentivise effective delivery of supplier obligations and with the end of the Warm 
Front scheme in January 2013, the responsibility to provide energy efficiency 
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measures to fuel poor households now falls entirely to suppliers under the auspices of 
ECO. As of 2011, suppliers also have a role in delivering economic interventions; 
however, the potential for these to achieve efficiency gains would seem to be limited 
given that, for the most part, scheme cost and delivered benefit are effectively the 
same. 
 
This chapter will compare the ability of suppliers and the state to effectively support 
fuel poor customers, with a focus on the delivery of measures. Fundamental 
differences between the two agents result in very different delivery model options; 
this chapter explores these, analysing the differences in depth, with a particular focus 
on the implications for fuel poor households. The chapter is divided into two distinct 
halves, as technical and economics measures are so distinctly different when it comes 
to delivery that they must be considered separately. Each section outlines available 
delivery models, offers evidence-based analysis of the fundamental differences 
between the models and the implications for fuel poverty alleviation, and reviews 
relevant policy constraints. For economic measures, some alternate methods of 
providing economic support are also considered. Ultimately, it is argued that the 
entrenched, established market for supplier obligations generates a dependency in that 
policy path that – along with political and economic motivations – strongly 
incentivises government to continue using this model to delivery fuel poverty policy, 
however inappropriate it might be. By contrast, economic supplier obligations are a 
relatively new phenomenon, and there is no compelling reason to maintain a 
comparatively ineffective approach beyond the end of WHDS. 
 
Methodological Overview 
 
The methodology applied in analysing the delivery of programmes is a more 
straightforward application of policy analysis than was used with regard to other 
elements. The primary approach has been to establish delivery model structure via 
close examination of policy literature, with consultation documents, impact 
assessments and technical guidance proving the most valuable sources of data; section 
3.4.2 provided a description of document types and generalised analysis procedure. 
Analysis of the implications of models also incorporated broader academic and grey 
literature, particularly when looking to establish the likely impacts of policy elements 
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on fuel poverty where that aspect may not have been considered before. For example, 
there is a growing literature on the efficacy of supplier obligations as an energy 
efficiency policy instrument, but authors rarely reflect on the implications of that 
model for fuel poverty; this work is intended to fill that gap.  
 
A particular barrier to this element of the research was the limited number of 
instances in which the policy models under consideration have been applied; one 
(now concluded) instance of the state procuring technical measures, a series of 
supplier energy efficiency obligations that effectively represent the evolution of the 
same model, two state economic benefit supplements schemes, and one mandated 
energy bill rebate programme. To counter this issue, where possible the use of similar 
approaches in other policy areas has been examined, most notably the use of 
Payment-by-Results in the welfare-to-work arena. The comparative approach of this 
work also required that different delivery models be assessed in order to establish 
which elements of delivery inherently differ between agents in the institutional 
formation considered here. For details of the systematic process by which this was 
undertaken, please refer back to section 3.3.4.  
 
7.1 Technical Interventions 
 
The enduring answer to fuel poverty lies in material improvements to the housing 
stock. By replacing inefficient heating equipment, sealing leaky buildings and 
reducing the thermal conductivity of dwelling walls, energy demand can be reduced 
and affordability improved. Furthermore, reducing energy requirements is crucial 
both as a means of cutting carbon emissions and in making it easier for households to 
maintain internal conditions that are conducive to the health and wellbeing of 
residents. However, far-reaching improvement of the English housing stock will be 
both expensive and logistically difficult. Whilst a range of delivery models have been 
used to deliver technical interventions to fuel poor households (see, for example, 
EST/CSE/NEA 2005, E.ON UK 2010), the scope of this work limits focus to two 
main candidates, which this section describes and compares. The first model 
considered is that which government used in delivering Warm Front, i.e., the state 
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purchasing of packaged services148 via a procurement process. However, it is argued 
that such a model is unlikely to be selected by government even if a return were made 
to state-led provision, as it is too far removed from the market-driven strategies that 
are now favoured. As such, an alternative approach – one that is also procurement-
based – is introduced for consideration, that of ‘Payment by Results’, which has been 
endorsed by the coalition government as a favoured model. The second class of 
delivery model discussed here is that which underlies supplier obligations, whereby 
the state serves as regulator and a market based on the trading of the ‘white 
certificates’ method of recording achieved savings is in operation. This section will 
discuss each mechanism in turn, outlining key structural elements and including, 
where available, data on their efficacy in practice. Where available, quantitative data 
are used to demonstrate delivery efficacy of these models. The section then moves on 
to offer a detailed comparative analysis of programmes, based primarily on synthesis 
of existing literature. Finally, the policy constraints that drive the current approach are 
discussed, and it is argued that supplier obligations are so firmly entrenched as to 
make change unappealing to policymakers at this stage. 
 
7.1.1 Comparison of Delivery Models 
 
• State-led Delivery Models 
 
The only national-level Exchequer-funded schemes aimed at providing energy 
efficiency measures to low income households to date have been Decent Homes – 
which was delivered by LAs – and Warm Front. The latter programme started out as 
the Home Energy Efficiency Scheme (HEES), launched in 1991 via provisions in the 
Social Security Act 1990 (s.15). Boardman (2010: 1) describes this action as a means 
of consolidating earlier ad hoc policies, as already described in Chapter Four. From 
2000, HEES was marketed in England149 as Warm Front, overseen first by DEFRA 
and later DECC, and monitored not by Ofgem, but via separate evaluations 
undertaken by both the House of Commons Committee for Public Accounts (CPA) 
                                                
148 The descriptions used here are taken from Hill and Bramley’s (1986: 103-105) continuum of state-
market service delivery, as already cited in Chapter Three. 
149 Parallel schemes were in operation for the devolved administrations; see Richards and Hough 
(2012: 4). 
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and the National Audit Office (NAO) in 1998, 2003/4 and 2009150. The delivery of 
the scheme itself was procured, initially from energy efficiency companies TXU 
Powergen and eaga Ltd., then from 2005 to eaga Partnership Ltd. alone who were 
then taken over – along with the Warm Front contract – by Carillion Energy Services 
in 2011  (Burr 2009b: 9, Jones, Tighe & Hammond 2011) . Contractors were 
responsible for marketing the scheme and referring eligible customers to a network of 
subcontractors for the installation of measures (Burr 2009b: 10). Warm Front did not 
have prescribed annual targets, but rather sought to support as many households as 
possible with the budget available (Burr 2009b: 5). Eligible households received a 
capped level of financial support towards a range of standard energy efficiency 
measures, £3500 at the time the scheme closed (£6000 where certain advanced 
technologies were required) (Watson, Bolton 2013: 3). 
 
Figure 7.1 graphs Warm Front annual budgets for the period 2000/01 to 2011/12, 
along with the number of households receiving assistance in that year. Note that 
funding for the scheme was scaled back drastically in the final years, and that the 
ambition of the scheme was always fairly limited in comparison to the level of fuel 
poverty.  
  
                                                
150 See Bourn (1998, 2003), Burr (2009), CPA (2004, 2009). 
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Adapted from Watson, Bolton 2013: 4. 
 
Figure 7.1: Warm Front annual budget and number of households receiving assistance, 2000/01 
to 2011/12 (2011/12 prices) 
 
Assessors identified that one limitation of Warm Front was that it did not monitor the 
impact of the scheme on fuel poverty (see CPA 2004: 5, Bourn 2003: 2). The NAO 
evaluations opted to look instead at the scheme’s contribution to energy efficiency 
and found that, whilst the scheme did improve the SAP rating of participating 
households (Burr 2009b: 15), often this improvement was minimal, with more than 
half of all interventions achieving a SAP increase of ten points or fewer151 (Burr 
2009b: 14-15). This was in part a consequence of expenditure restrictions that limited 
the level of intervention possible - a particular concern with regards to hard to treat 
homes – with solid wall insulation unavailable (Burr 2009b: 14). Sefton (2004) 
analysed data from the 2001 English House Condition Survey (EHCS; the 
predecessor of the EHS) and found that the scheme as it operated at that time could be 
expected to remove only 58,000 households from 10pct fuel poverty in the period 
2000-2004 (against 1.2m 10pct fuel poor in 2004; DECC 2013a: 10), and reduce the 
10pct fuel poverty gap by 7% (Sefton 2004: 31). 
 
                                                
151 For comparison, in 2010/11, the scheme achieved an average uplift of 27 SAP points (The Warm 
Front Team 2011: 4). 
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The delivery mechanism underlying Warm Front was an extremely straightforward 
form of procurement. Whilst it should be expected that bidding companies would 
compete as to how many measures they expected to deliver for the allotted budget, 
after award the only requirement of the successful organisation was to distribute those 
funds via the installation of energy efficiency measures. This design might now seem 
rather old fashioned; more recently, government have tended to favour forms of 
procurement that incentivise contractors to achieve greater efficiencies in delivering 
programmes, effectively introducing market processes as an ongoing feature of 
provision. In particular, the Open Public Services white paper (HM Government 
2011) asserted the coalition government’s preference for the ‘Payment by Results’ 
(PbR) model. As the name suggests, this is a contracting model whereby payments 
made to providers are in some respect conditional on successfully completed 
delivery152. PbR is favoured as a means of achieving value for money by ensuring 
expenditure is linked to output; this aligns with austerity policies (see Pattison 2012). 
Though PbR is a comparatively untested policy instrument153, it has recently been 
applied in UK welfare-to-work  (see Bennett 2013, Rees, Whitworth & Carter 2014)  
and justice policy (see Maguire 2012, Fox, Albertson 2011). It seems likely, in this 
context, that a rejuvenated state-lead energy efficiency scheme might incorporate 
some element of PbR, i.e., whereby delivery organisations are not simply tasked with 
distributing a budget (as was the case for Warm Front; see Burr 2009), but with 
delivering a pre-established quantity of savings (as with a supplier obligation), for 
which full payment is then only made upon successful delivery. Accordingly, this 
analysis considers the implications of such a model.  
 
• Supplier-led Delivery Models 
 
The energy supplier obligation model in operation in the United Kingdom is an 
example of a ‘white certificate’ market-based policy instrument (MBI) (see EEA 
2005, Mundaca 2007, Bertoldi et al. 2010, Pavan 2012) . Bertoldi (2011) identifies 
five key elements of such schemes, as follows: 
                                                
152 So, for example, in delivering the Work Programme, providers received payment when clients 
joined the scheme, when work was found, and on sustainment of employment (see DWP 2014). 
153 Though the New Labour government applied PbR extensively as a policy tool within the National 
Health Service, see Appleby and Jobanputra (2004). 
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1. The creation and framing of the demand (government set the overall target 
and its apportioning to obliged actors).  
2. Institutional infrastructure and processes (such as measurement and 
verification) to support the scheme.  
3. The cost recovery mechanism, in some cases.  
4. A system of sanctions in the case of non compliance.  
5. The tradable instrument (certificate) and the rules for issuing and trading. 
 
Bertoldi (2011: 7)  
 
White certificates are an example of ‘command and control’ governance  (see 
Baldwin, Cave & Lodge 2013: 106-114) ; the state selects a target for energy savings, 
and wields its legal authority as a means to require agents to meet their share of the 
target or else face penalties. In such schemes, an official body such as a regulator or 
other governmental organisation will generally oversee compliance. Trading is also a 
common feature of programmes, under three main possible guises: horizontal 
(additional savings achieved are sold to other obligated suppliers), vertical (obligated 
suppliers purchase savings achieved by third parties), and temporal trading (excess 
savings achieved in one obligation period are carried over to another) (see Bertoldi, 
Rezessy 2009: 23). A number of European countries have white certificate schemes in 
place, including Denmark, France, Italy, the UK, and the Flanders region of Belgium 
(see Bertoldi et al. 2010), as well as the US states of Connecticut, Nevada and 
Pennsylvania, and the state of New South Wales in Australia  (see Tyler, du Toit & 
Burchell 2011) . 
 
Beginning with the EESoP in 1994, the UK was an early adopter of the white 
certificate policy mechanism. An overview of supplier obligations in England has 
already been provided in Table 2.7; for a more detailed account of the evolution of 
supplier obligations through CERT, see Rosenow (2012). In the UK, government 
have used their role in framing obligations as means of shaping programmes, i.e., not 
simply requiring that agents comply with targets, but also prescribing, to some extent, 
how they should be met. The current ECO framework varies from previous 
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programmes, most notably in its mandated interaction with the Green Deal (though as 
already discussed, this is assumed not to substantially affect the elements of the 
scheme specifically aimed at low income households), a required increase in the 
overall focus on higher cost measures such as SWI (as discussed in Chapter Six), and 
a reduction in scheme ambition (as discussed in Chapter Two). However, the forms of 
ECO CSCO and HHCRO continue to broadly align with Bertoldi’s (2011) five key 
elements. Rosenow (2012) discusses changes to the form of the target, with a 
movement from energy savings (measured in TWh) under EESoP and EEC to carbon 
emissions (measured in MtCO2) under CERT. ECO introduces a further development; 
whilst CERO and CSCO targets are still given as annual required reduction in carbon 
emissions, the HHCRO target is - for the first time in a UK supplier obligation – 
based upon a notional reduction in lifetime heating costs (measured in pounds) (see 
DECC 2012h: 84). The consultation stage Impact Assessment for ECO indicates that 
this shift is because DECC do not anticipate that measures delivered under HHCRO 
will necessarily result in carbon reductions, indeed many are expected to “take more 
comfort” and so “a new type of currency is needed” (DECC 2011b: 118) . As was the 
case for previous supplier obligations, Ofgem, the legally designated ECO 
Administrator, oversees the scheme. Suppliers must provide monthly records of 
delivered interventions to Ofgem, who undertake audit and technical monitoring of 
delivery (see Ofgem 2013b). As covered in Chapter Six, cost recovery is via energy 
bills, with expenditure passed through to customers. Under the Utilities Act 2000 
(s.59; s.95), Ofgem are empowered to penalise obligation non-compliance with fines 
of up to 10 per cent of company global turnover, a potentially enormous sum (see 
Murray 2011). All three forms of trading – horizontal, vertical and temporal – are 
possible under ECO (see Ofgem 2013b). The ECO design has further attempted to 
promote new options for vertical trading via the new ECO Brokerage. This constitutes 
an online platform on which obligations – or ‘ECO points’ – can be traded 
anonymously (see DECC 2012e). The goal of this is two-fold; “to provide a 
transparent platform for revealing the marginal cost of delivering the ECO targets and 
therefore the price faced by energy companies… [and] to contribute to an efficient 
working of the market by allowing fair access to ECO subsidy for all Green Deal 
Providers and reducing potential barriers to entry” (DECC 2012b: 8) .  
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As ever, it is difficult to assess the extent to which ECO delivery has impacted upon 
fuel poor households because this is not measured. Indeed, data relating to ECO 
delivery is less accessible than Warm Front data because of attempts to retain 
commercial confidentiality. The projected impact of ECO on fuel poverty – a 
reduction of 125,500 – 250,000 households (10pct definition) across the whole 
delivery area (DECC 2012h: 70) is both limited (given that there were 3.2m 10pct 
fuel poor households in 2011, see DECC 2013c: 12) and unhelpfully broad. As ECO 
is now the sole technical programme, its impact might be tracked to some extent via 
official statistics, however, these operate with a two-year delay, and include no 
consideration of ECO’s impact above and beyond ‘business as usual’. For illustrative 
purposes, Table 7.1 shows progress in terms of delivery of measures, assuming 
delivery is consistent across scheme lifetime. Even allowing that delivery rates should 
be expected to increase as the scheme becomes better established, these figures 
suggest that progress is mixed, with some measures lagging behind. This may indicate 
that suppliers have opted to meet obligations via measure combinations different to 
those anticipated by DECC, as they are free to do under the policy framework, or to 
focus on different measures at different stages of delivery. In particular, loft insulation 
(under CSCO) and heating system replacement (under HHCRO) appear to have been 
favoured thus far. 
 
Table 7.1: Progress towards ECO target delivery of measures, September 2013 
 
Scheme  
Measures 
expected 
delivered by 
March 2013  
(27 months of 
delivery) 
Measures 
delivered to 
end December 
2013  
(12 months of 
delivery) 
Progress 
towards 
projected total, 
December 2013 
Pro rata progress 
towards final 
projected total, as 
of December 2013 
Carbon Saving Communities Obligation 
Solid Wall 
Insulation 
39,100 1,952 5% 11% 
Cavity Wall 
Insulation 
181,500 26,454 15% 33% 
Loft 
Insulation 
68,300 66,641 98% 220% 
Home Heating Cost Reduction Obligation 
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Cavity Wall 
Insulation 
45,000 9,297 21% 46% 
Loft 
Insulation 
90,000 33,429 37% 84% 
Heating 
Systems 
260,000 196,662 76% 170% 
Source: Adapted from DECC (2012a, 2014b: 23-34).  
 
Figures provided by Ofgem further indicate significant variation between suppliers in 
meeting obligations, as illustrated in Figure 7.2. For reference, at time of reporting, 
67% of time available for delivery had elapsed. 
 
 
Note: Some measures delivered but not yet submitted to Ofgem may be missing from these figures. 
Some carryover from CERT and CESP may also have not been included. First Utility is by far the 
smallest obligated supplier, and as such it can be assumed that their extreme over-compliance with 
HHCRO is because their burden is significantly smaller. They may intend to sell this excess to other 
suppliers, or trade for savings under CSCO and CERO where their performance is significantly behind 
(see Figure 3.1 in Ofgem 2014d: 3) 
Source: Adapted from Figures 3.2 and 3.3 in Ofgem (2014d: 3). 
 
Figure 7.2: Individual supplier progress towards ECO compliance, through December 2013 
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And so the overall picture at this stage is that, whilst suppliers are mostly on track 
with the delivery of HHCRO, CSCO is lagging behind. 
 
7.1.2 Key Differences in Delivery 
 
Thus far, three possible delivery models have been considered; the straightforward 
procurement of services (as per Warm Front), a potential (but thus far untested) 
Payment-by-Results (PbR) model, and a white certificates scheme such as has been 
applied for previous UK supplier obligations. For reference, Figure 7.3 illustrates 
these options. 
 
1Ofgem (and predecessors) have fulfilled this role for supplier obligations; the NAO and CPA did so 
(though only periodically) for Warm Front. 
Source: Own analysis of prior delivery, partially modelled upon Ipsos MORI/CAG 
Consultants/BRE(2011: 22). 
 
Figure 7.3: Three candidate delivery models for technical measures 
 
As marked in Figure 7.3, consideration here is firmly at the meso level. It is assumed 
that the macro level will stay constant – government will oversee whichever model is 
selected – as will the micro, with a similar group of installers involved in applying 
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measures at the household level154. This section compares and contrasts the three 
candidate models, focusing on the following key elements identified via analysis of 
literature; establishing targets, cost-effective delivery, ensuring delivery success, and 
energy consumption behaviour. Whilst the natural focus is upon the implications of 
these differences for fuel poverty, broader issues are also considered where they have 
implications for the final choice of approach. These are then discussed further in the 
following section, which details identified policy constraints. 
 
• Establishing Targets 
 
Targets – particularly quantitative targets – have increasingly been utilised by UK 
government as a means of monitoring policy progress (see Hudson, Lowe 2009: 274-
278) though, as discussed in Chapter Four, they have not always been assiduously 
applied where fuel poverty is concerned. It would seem likely that targets would be 
different under supplier and state-led programmes as a function of the dynamics 
involved. Supplier obligations require energy companies to achieve targets or face 
sanctions. By contrast, Warm Front simply procured an agent to distribute a set level 
of expenditure. A new state-led programme would be assumed to be similarly 
procurement based155, though might respond to a savings-based delivery target (e.g., a 
predetermined level of carbon reduction) and apply a PbR model. Successful bidders 
could then attempt to deliver the required outcomes at lower costs in order to increase 
profit margins. 
 
On the face of it, there exists no reason why state-procured delivery couldn’t respond 
to the same targets as supplier obligations. However, the differing dynamics of the 
options available suggest that differences would emerge. The command-and-control 
framing of supplier obligations empowers government to set ambitious targets, with 
suppliers having no option but to either achieve them, pay vast fines, or leave the 
market. As reported in Chapter Six, suppliers have repeatedly argued that government 
underestimate the expenditure required to meet obligations (though current ECO 
spending tallies with DECC calculations). Rosenow (2012) identifies that, 
                                                
154 Though different policy models may influence the shape and size of that group to some extent. 
155 Making reference to government guidelines on achieving ‘Value for Money’ in procurement (see 
NAO/OGC 2013). 
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historically, suppliers have also disputed the extent to which proposed targets are 
achievable; this has persisted under ECO. Supplier responses to the ECO consultation 
(as well as media statements, see Chazan 2013b, Chazan 2013a) stated that they 
considered the proposed (and ultimately retained) targets were both too high156 and 
unachievable at DECC’s projected expenditure levels; meanwhile, consumer groups 
and LAs expressed concerns that the targets were not ambitious enough (DECC 2012: 
84-86). As already illustrated in Figures 7.1 and 7.2 the current evidence is that whilst 
CSCO delivery is lagging behind, all suppliers but one are ahead of schedule with 
HHCRO, with E.ON UK having surpassed their obligation only two-thirds of the way 
into the period. This somewhat undermines supplier claims that the obligations are 
excessively burdensome and it seems likely that such protests are simply part of the 
lobbying and negotiation process.  
 
By contrast, a scheme based upon state procurement would require that other delivery 
organisations (such as installers, LAs or energy service companies) bid to deliver 
measures. While government could set a target commensurate with those applied 
under supplier obligations, they might not initially be expected to achieve the same 
efficiencies (as will be discussed shortly), it would be paying for it directly from the 
public purse, and would be accountable for any failure to reach targets. As such, there 
would be a clear incentive to set less ambitious targets. Less ambitious targets would 
lead to diminished support for fuel poor households. Furthermore, it might be argued 
that output-based targets (e.g., those communicated in terms of the energy saving to 
be achieved) offer greater security in terms of outcome than expenditure-based 
targets, i.e., a set £100m of expenditure has the potential to offer very different 
outcomes, as discussed in Chapter Six and demonstrated in delivery of Warm Front 
(see Burr 2009b). That said, effectively tackling fuel poverty is an endeavour that 
goes beyond simply providing insulation to a vaguely defined target group. As 
already discussed, targeting weaknesses - teamed with regressive funding methods 
that are not mitigated by delivery - mean that compliance with obligations does not 
equate to correspondingly positive impacts for fuel poor households. However, such 
problematic elements are firmly in the macro domain, and thus down to the state. 
 
                                                
156 Quirion (2005) further suggests that supplier obligation targets should be amended on an ongoing 
basis, in line with changing market share. 
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• Cost-effective Delivery 
 
A presumption of increased cost-effectiveness is central to the rationalisation for 
releasing welfare functions to private providers. The ongoing incentive of 
“competitive pressures” on suppliers to keep costs low in meeting obligations is cited 
in ECO policy documents as a core justification for the use of the obligation 
mechanism (see DECC 2011d: 110, DECC 2012h: 27). This may hold up 
theoretically, though it is difficult to assess impact from real-world experience given 
the paucity of available evidence (prior supplier obligations having not required costs 
be made public), and the differences in scheme structure that make it hard to draw 
helpful comparisons (e.g., because Warm Front capped spending at the household 
level)157. The Hills Fuel Poverty Review compared a supplier obligation-style scheme 
with a Warm Front-style programme and concluded that, if targeted effectively, the 
former would be both more cost-effective and remove more households from LIHC 
fuel poverty in the long-term (see Hills 2012 169-170; Hills 2012: 225 gives an 
explanation of the efficiencies achievable via obligations in economic terms). Hills 
(2012: 152) also suggests that the two different archetypes should be expected to 
result in different combinations of technical measures being employed, with suppliers 
opting for those that are most cost-effective in meeting obligations158. It may well be 
that the most cost-effective measures are not the most appropriate to tackling fuel 
poverty; there is, for example, a risk that suppliers will ‘cherry pick’ the eligible 
households that offer the greatest cost effectiveness in delivery, rather than focusing 
on those who are genuinely in need159  (creating an effect not dissimilar to the 
'creaming and parking' phenomenon encountered in PbR delivery of welfare-to-work 
services, see Rees, Whitworth & Carter 2013) . 
 
                                                
157 One energy supplier employ interviewed anecdotally evaluated the UK white certificate market as a 
strong one. 
158 Usually cost-effectiveness in energy efficiency refers to payback time, e.g., the time it takes for a 
measure to pay for itself. A measure that cannot pay for itself within its lifetime would not be cost-
effective. However, it can be argued that this is less relevant when considering fuel poverty, as 
households are largely not expected to be paying for the measure themselves, and the goal is to shield 
them from ongoing energy costs. 
159 The example of widespread distribution of CFLs raised in Chapter Six might be taken as an example 
of this sort of activity, as it was a means by which suppliers could rapidly dispel obligations without 
necessarily having any impact on energy costs or carbon emissions (i.e., because lighting is 
comparatively cheap, and bulbs may never have been installed anyhow). 
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Some attempts to further enhance the efficiency of the market for technical measures 
have proved less than successful. Vertical trading is an important component of 
supplier obligations, as energy companies are not naturally equipped to deliver 
technical measures directly160. The ECO Brokerage platform, discussed previously, 
was an attempt to improve market efficiency at this level by providing an anonymous 
means of trading savings, leaving price as the only signal. However, in practice it has 
proved unpopular, with suppliers wary of the risk involved in an anonymous platform 
(see DECC 2014e). Suppliers have tended to prefer to continue to use known 
providers, seemingly placing a value on risk minimisation to ensure obligations are 
met (Parker 2014; supplier risk averseness is discussed shortly). Thus the barrier to 
entry for new providers remains, and the market is consequently stagnant. The 
government could feasibly make it obligatory to use the brokerage platform or offer 
incentives to suppliers, though these options were rejected at the consultation stage 
(see DECC 2014e). It might, however, be easier to compel use of such a platform 
within a renewed state scheme with fewer incumbent providers. Despite such issues, 
the cost of ECO introduces a compelling motive for efficient delivery. Figure 7.4 
illustrates the estimated annual average costs of delivering ECO against reported 
supplier profits for 2013/14. 
  
                                                
160 Though some have opted to acquire installation businesses, see for example E.ON UK’s purchase of 
Matrix (Bounds, 2013). 
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Note: ECO estimated average costs derived by dividing DECC’s annual cost estimate of £1.3bn by six. 
A seventh supplier is obligated, however, as that company is so much smaller, its obligation will be a 
fraction of that of the Big Six companies.  
Based on compilation of sources: (DECC 2012h: 84, Ofgem 2014f (embedded tables analysed)) 
 
Figure 7.4: Big Six energy supplier reported profits on domestic energy supply 2013/14 versus 
estimated average ECO delivery costs (£m) 
 
The anticipated annual total cost of delivering ECO is almost exactly the same as the 
average reported profits of Big Six suppliers in 2013/14, and represents 4.7% of the 
expenditure of domestic energy supply (based on own analysis of Ofgem 2014f). 
Given that it constitutes such a significant cost, there is a strong incentive for 
companies to deliver ECO efficiently. However, it is also worth noting that, whilst the 
risk of Ofgem fines is real, in practice they have yet to be used to their full extent, as 
the investigation into CERT and CESP non-compliance remains open (see, for 
example, Ofgem 2013f, Ofgem 2013g). 
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Whatever inefficiencies may lie in the current delivery model, there still remains 
doubt whether any alternate, state-led scheme has the potential to be as cost-effective. 
Certainly, Warm Front offered little motive for delivery efficiencies to be maintained 
beyond the initial bidding process, which included only four geographic ‘lots’ and 
which, tellingly, was dominated by a single supplier, Carillion Energy Services (see 
Burr 2009b: 9, Watson, Bolton 2013: 2). A PbR model could potentially offer a 
stronger motive for companies to deliver cost-effectively on an ongoing basis via 
financial incentives. This could be achieved by organisations bidding to deliver self-
defined volumes of measures (as is the case via the ECO brokerage), or by the 
government dividing the overarching target into ‘lots’, possibly by geography (as with 
Warm Front), which companies could then bid to deliver (potentially via a network of 
subcontractors of the kind used in delivering the Work Programme, see Lane et al. 
2013). However, there is no obvious existing market for such a scheme to tap in to. 
The current system is based around supplier obligations, and whilst some energy 
companies may have an interest in operating as ‘prime providers’(cf. DWP 2013d) in 
any replacement market (particularly those who have been successful under the old 
model), others may prefer to completely withdraw, leaving a gap to be filled. 
Whichever method was chosen, establishing a state-led marketplace with sufficient 
capacity to rival the one that currently underpins supplier-led delivery is likely to be 
an extended process, as in the first instance there may be a limited number of 
organisations positioned to bid. An uncompetitive market would potentially leave 
companies in a position to make cautious bids, resulting in inefficient delivery. 
 
• Ensuring Delivery Success 
 
As already discussed, energy suppliers have tended to protest that obligation targets 
are too high. However, in practice they have tended to meet - and on occasion exceed 
them - though recently has there been some shortfall in compliance with CERT and 
CESP (see section 5.3.3). Delivery of ECO HHCRO has been fairly strong, though 
CSCO is lagging somewhat (see Figure 7.2). Certainly overall ECO delivery has 
outstripped that of the Green Deal, with more than forty times more measures 
installed (DECC 2014c: 6). It has further been suggested that the ECO delivery period 
might even be extended – or the obligation otherwise cut – as a means of ensuring 
success for companies currently trailing (see Straw 2013). It is difficult to extend such 
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comparisons to Warm Front, as the design of that programme made failure 
unlikely161. The historic success of obligations might be taken as a sign that they have 
been appropriately – or even generously – pitched. While government will want 
obligations to provide as much value as possible, it is not in their political interest to 
have policies fail. It is perhaps also a testament to the power of fines as an incentive; 
though they have never been enforced, Murray (2011) speculates that government 
could apply them now both as a means of raising funds and to score political points. 
Rosenow (2012) suggests that the success of supplier obligations is likely to be a 
factor driving their retention as a means of driving energy efficiency, and it seems 
plausible that this also applies to fuel poverty. 
 
A new state-led market would not have the option of imposing significant sanctions162 
on unsuccessful delivery agents, as this would discourage participation in that 
voluntary market. This has been a significant issue with the government’s flagship 
welfare-to-work scheme, the Work Programme, another social welfare scheme that is 
currently delivered by the private sector, albeit under a PbR model. Though the 
market is seemingly healthy, targets have been consistently missed (see DWP 2013c). 
Whilst this may be due to broader economic factors, government would have no 
recourse where suppliers are simply not trying hard enough. The main penalty 
available would be to not offer future contracts to those providers. However, this is 
less viable when multiple agents fail, where there is little difference in performance 
across the board (as was true for CERT, see Ofgem 2013d: 14), or where the market 
isn’t large enough to sustain competitiveness once bidders are lost because of 
sanctions. Under the PbR model, there is a stronger incentive, however, it is worth 
noting that the Work Programme operates on this basis and has still encountered 
problems. By contrast, the obligations model offers a compelling means of ensuring 
policy success, by using companies’ own profit motives as an incentive. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
161 See section 5.3.1; failures to dispel budgets have attributed to an insufficient allowance for 
marketing which, if true, is the fault of government, not the delivery agent. 
162 Though a PbR model would enable some form of financial punitive action to be used. 
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• Energy Consumption Behaviour 
 
This work focuses on fuel poverty in the objective sense. Whilst energy consumption 
behaviour will not have an impact on fuel poverty levels as currently measured, it is 
undeniably important at the level of individual experience. Furthermore, the point at 
which interventions are delivered presents an excellent opportunity – and one in line 
with the ‘whole house’ philosophy – to ensure households understand how to use new 
and existing heating systems, are given advice as to what constitutes a healthy living 
environment. It is also important to affirm that, although standard energy behaviour 
narrative encourages using less, fuel poor households tend to under-consume so may 
need to be offered different support and advice, such as to ‘take savings in comfort’ 
from any new measures. However, this could present an area of tension with carbon 
reduction goals, and a risk of ‘mixed messages’ being given to certain households. 
Home Energy Advice (HEA) was included within Warm Front (see Burr 2009b: 10) 
and as a CESP-eligible measure (see Ofgem 2009b: 18-22)163. Such an intervention is 
not included with ECO: it can be funded under the Industry Initiatives element of 
WHDS, though only 5% of the 2012/3 budget was used to this end (see Ofgem 2013j: 
6). The government do operate or support a number of other schemes that offer 
energy consumption advice, but these are not incorporated into the delivery of 
obligations (e.g., there is no requirement that households be referred), and are – with 
some exceptions - largely focused on energy saving over maintaining a warm home 
(see Home Heat Helpline 2014, DECC 2014a, EST 2014c). It might be argued that 
suppliers are not the appropriate agent to offer energy consumption advice, both 
because it might be seen as a conflict of interest, and because of indications that 
consumers tend not to trust them (as discussed in Chapter Two), and so may be wary 
if told by an energy company that they need to use more fuel. And so, whilst advice 
on energy use is crucial – and perhaps not sufficiently incorporated into the current 
policy structure – it would seem best operated by an external provider. 
 
Chapter Two also referenced the ‘building performance gap’, the phenomenon 
whereby real-world installations do not achieve previously estimated savings levels. 
                                                
163 Though the CESP evaluation found that energy advice was an underused measure; despite being 
supported at the consultation stage, stakeholders reported that the level of administration it required did 
not justify delivery given the relatively low carbon score awarded (CAG Consultants et al. 2011: 16). 
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Whilst some of the discrepancy might be accounted for by ensuring households know 
how to effectively heat their homes post-installation, it is also crucial that any scheme 
– supplier or state-led – includes robust technical assessment to ensure delivery is of a 
high standard; this role has traditionally been played by independent public sector 
bodies, e.g., the NAO and Ofgem.  
 
• Overview of Comparison 
 
Figure 7.5 summarises the examination of options undertaken in this section within a 
Policy Analysis Matrix. 
 
 Supplier Obligation / White 
Certificate 
State Procurement State Procurement: 
Payment-by-Results 
Establishing 
Targets 
Government are empowered to 
set ambitious targets. 
Targets would need to be commensurate with the 
level of competitiveness in the market; this may 
be limited, particularly at first. 
Cost-effective 
Delivery 
Ongoing incentive for 
suppliers to deliver cost 
effectively. Some risk of 
‘cherry picking’. Suppliers 
tend to be risk averse, creating 
market stagnancy. 
Little incentive for 
cost-effectiveness 
beyond the initial 
bidding stage. 
Slightly increased 
incentive to deliver cost-
effectively. 
Ensuring 
Delivery 
Success 
Strong (though largely 
untested) incentive to achieve 
targets. 
Weak incentive to 
reach targets unless 
market is competitive. 
Some incentive to meet 
targets, but no recourse 
for the state if this does 
not occur. 
Energy 
Consumption 
Behaviour 
Suppliers likely unsuited to 
deliver this element of support 
due to conflicts of interest and 
lacking consumer confidence. 
State (or other external contractor) potentially 
presents a more appropriate agent for advice. An 
external body is required to monitor work 
undertaken by contractors.  
 
Figure 7.5: Policy Analysis Matrix comparing supplier and state participation in delivery of 
technical measures 
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7.1.3 Policy Constraints 
 
One of the fundamental differences between supplier and state-led delivery is that 
those institutional structures result in the differing dynamics of obligations versus 
procurement. As such, organisational constraints play a pivotal role in differentiating 
between models. That said, both methods have been used previously – neither is 
prohibited by current circumstances – and as such it is fair to assume that political 
constraints and motivations also play a significant rule in shaping the final decisions 
about how technical interventions should be delivered. A further identified constraint 
has only been briefly referenced thus far, the physical limits of the technical potential 
of supply chains in delivering energy efficiency measures. 
 
• Technological Constraints 
 
In Chapter Six, the cost of raising the currently occupied, viable, dwellings of all 
LIHC fuel poor households to SAP 69 was estimated at £57.9bn. Even if that money 
were made available with immediate effect it would not be possible to deliver all 
interventions in a single year because of the limits of the supply chain. The rate at 
which the industry can physically install measures therefore represents a natural 
physical constraint on policy. The most apparent limit is with regard to SWI, where 
there remains significant savings potential (see Element Energy/EST 2013: 76-77), in 
part because previous obligations have been focused on CWI. 
 
The ECO and Green Deal final impact assessment estimated that annual SWI 
installations were expected to reach almost 42,000 in the first year (DECC 2012h: 
166-167), exceed 100,000 within three years, and remain around the 110,000 mark 
through 2022 (DECC 2012h: 47). However, statistics for the first year of programmes 
show that only 28,000 installations were actually delivered (DECC 2014c: 30-31), of 
which only 11,000 were delivered under ECO CSCO (see Figure 7.1; HHCRO is not 
generally intended to include SWI). Previously, CERT delivered 59,000 SWI 
installations in 56 months (i.e., 12,000 per annum)  (Ofgem 2013d: 33)  and CESP – 
which was more focused on that measure – installed 80,000 in 40 months (or 24,000 
per annum) (Ofgem 2013e: 13) . These schemes ran largely concurrently, and so the 
installation rate through 2010-12 was around 36,000 per year, indicating that 42,000 
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installations under ECO was perhaps not an unreasonable expectation. Still, a 
significant uplift would be needed to exceed 100,000 annual SWI installations by 
2015, as DECC had previously projected (DECC 2012h: 166-167).  
 
Development of the market for energy efficiency measures has probably not been 
helped by the demand uncertainty that exists as a result of policy changes. Previous 
supplier obligations have enabled a strong market of installers to emerge around the 
delivery of energy efficiency measures, an element of the programme often praised by 
interviewees (see also Rosenow 2012). However, recent policy changes have created 
uncertainty within the industry. The activity hiatus between the end of CERT and 
CESP, and the point at which ECO and the Green Deal became fully active resulted in 
thousands of job losses (see BMJ 2013). Whilst the Green Deal was expected to build 
demand for energy efficiency measures beyond obligation activity, at least one major 
installation company has gone into administration as a result of problems with that 
scheme (see Shankleman 2013). In planning the Green Deal and ECO, DECC 
acknowledged that the SWI supply chain would need strong demand signals in order 
to achieve the required level of growth (see DECC 2012h: 27), but these do not 
appear to be forthcoming. If the supply chain is to reach the level necessary to 
effectively tackle fuel poverty within a reasonable timescale, the industry will need to 
be reassured by confident, ambitious policies, ideally accompanied by reliable, 
consistent investment. 
 
• Organisational Constraints 
 
The primary difference between the two delivery models considered here is in the 
internal power dynamics. Under supplier obligations, the state can wield legal powers 
to enforce compliance; under state procurement, government must generate market 
conditions that encourage participation to the point that delivery is efficient. 
Effectively, the difference is in the choice to either use regulatory powers as a ‘stick’, 
or to create a ‘carrot’ of potential profits that encourages a market to grow around 
delivery of energy efficiency measures. This dynamic is not, in itself, a policy 
constraint as such, as either option is viable at present; indeed they have recently been 
applied concurrently. However, as already discussed, the choice has significant 
implications, e.g., for the potential size of targets, and for cost-effectiveness. As such, 
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the organisational elements of the models effectively become constraints when 
considered together with political objectives. 
 
• Political Constraints 
 
Previous chapters have already considered the ideological reasons that might lead 
neoliberal governments to lessen their direct involvement in the delivery of energy 
efficiency measures. With reference to the delivery element of the process, it is also 
highly likely that some degree of electoral pragmatism is at work, and any 
government will wish to avoid being associated with an unsuccessful policy. Supplier 
obligations currently meet this requirement in two respects, i.e., by having a high 
success rate, and providing an expedient means of transferring accountability (and 
consequent price rises) away from government. Given the convenience of the current 
policy model, it is hard to imagine a government choosing to change this approach, 
particularly if fuel poverty is not regarded as an electorally sensitive issue. Any new 
policy design would introduce the risk of failure, and government might be expected 
to be particularly risk averse where energy efficiency policy is concerned in light of 
problems with the Green Deal (see Chapter Two). Ongoing and well-publicised 
problems with the Work Programme, a similarly handled policy in a different domain 
(see Gentleman 2013, Swinford 2013), might also leave government hesitant to 
launch a new large-scale procurement exercise. The notion of path dependency again 
applies here, as any change can be assumed to incur costs, both in literal terms, and in 
terms of opportunity cost as the system adapts to the new approach. For example, a 
new system based on state procurement would be likely to take time to establish a 
competitive market that could rival the cost-effectiveness of supplier obligations. By 
contrast, continuing with the twenty-year-old system of supplier obligations requires 
little extra effort and so should garner constant - if not increasing – returns to scale.  
 
As discussed previously, frequent changes in energy efficiency policy have proved 
problematic for supply chains. Evidence suggests that suppliers, too, have found the 
“remarkable and frequent changes” in the development of obligations (Rosenow 
2012: 381) difficult to manage, particularly as stipulations on the way those 
obligations must be met have increased (e.g., increasingly defined priority groups, 
restrictions as to what measures are allowed). All of the energy supplier 
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representatives interviewed for this work repeatedly identified changes to energy 
efficiency policy, particularly the “tweaking” and refining of obligations by DECC, as 
one of the most significant barriers they faced in compliance, making it difficult to 
plan ahead. Energy UK, reviewing CERT and CESP, also emphasised this as a 
problem in the delivery of those programmes, reporting on behalf of suppliers that 
“the more certainty [companies] have relating to their obligation, the easier it is to 
plan and deliver an obligation within time constraints and in a cost efficient manner” 
(ERA 2011: 9). One supplier representative interviewed for this project suggested that 
suppliers were unwilling to consider innovative means of delivery because of 
concerns about risk that policy would change suddenly, rendering experiments 
worthless; similar views have also been expressed by Energy UK (ERA 2011: 7-8). 
Concerns about risk certainly appear to have impeded use of the ECO Brokerage 
mechanism, with suppliers seeming to favour the use known providers over unknown 
quantities, even if the initial cost is greater. Some level of risk might be unavoidable, 
e.g., because of electoral cycles; Labour’s promise to freeze energy prices, for 
example, was blamed by some for subsequent price rises where suppliers tried to 
account for that potential should they be elected (see Hickey 2014). Given the design 
of the obligation, households will bear the costs incurred both by suppliers adjusting 
to policy change, and as a result of the increased inefficiencies that stem from risk 
aversity on the part of obligated parties. Low income and fuel poor households will be 
most significantly affected by these costs because of regressive charges. As far as 
potential changes to policy are concerned, it seems unlikely that suppliers would 
object to having obligations withdrawn in any respect, however, it is important that 
any changes are clearly communicated with an appropriate lead-in period, to limit the 
extent to which fuel poor households bear the costs of delivery uncertainty. 
7.2 Economic Interventions 
$
Of the two ways in which fuel poverty can be alleviated, economic measures are a 
secondary resort. From Brenda Boardman’s early work (1991) through the Hills Fuel 
Poverty Review (2012) and to current Government policy (DECC 2013j), technical 
measures have – rightly – been identified as the enduring solution to both fuel poverty 
eradication and the sustainable reduction of carbon emissions. Indeed, under the 
LIHC definition of fuel poverty, economic measures can only provide temporary 
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alleviation. This is evident in the fact that the fuel poverty gap refers to “the [amount] 
by which the assessed energy needs of fuel poor households exceed the threshold for 
reasonable costs” (Hills 2012: 9), i.e., not lack of income, but excess of costs. So, 
whilst price adjustments could theoretically remove this gap, income supplements can 
only provide a commensurate amount of money with which to pay the difference 
between actual and reasonable costs. In a minority of cases, economic measures might 
persist as the only means of supporting households living in those dwellings for which 
technical measures are not sufficient to remove households from fuel poverty, 
however, there is a significant amount of ground to be covered before those 
households are the only ones remaining. This is not to say that economic interventions 
have no place in fuel poverty alleviation; their most obvious strength is immediacy; 
bureaucracy aside, economic measures can be applied, theoretically, instantaneously. 
This is particularly valuable given the timescales involved in delivering technical 
measures. Given that the ultimate goal of fuel poverty policy is to prevent low income 
households being forced to live in cold homes, this strength cannot be overlooked. 
 
The core current economic policies under consideration here are effectively income 
supplements, rather than price adjustments164, though the potential of the latter will be 
considered later in this section. There is a clear distinction to be drawn between state 
and supplier-led economic measures at present, as the former is delivered entirely via 
benefits supplementation, whilst the latter consists of rebates delivered via bills. This 
section focuses upon comparing these two models, and the extent to which each is 
successful in meeting the specific intention of fuel poverty alleviation. It has a similar 
structure to the last, opening with an overview of the policy models under 
consideration, before moving on to report a comparative analysis of programmes. 
Then follows a slight diversion, wherein a number of alternate means of providing 
economic support to fuel are considered, with particular reference to the appropriate 
role of energy suppliers in delivery. Finally, relevant policy constraints are 
summarised and it is argued that the reasons for retaining the current, apparently 
ineffective use of supplier-led economic must be political and economic.  
 
 
                                                
164 Whilst the impact of the two might be taken to be the same, price adjustments will be linked to 
energy consumption in a way that income supplements are not.  
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7.2.1 Overview of Current Structure 
 
WHECA specifies only that fuel poverty should be eradicated “by means including the 
taking of measures to ensure the efficient use of energy” (s.2 (1)) with no mention of 
economic interventions. This means that there is no statutory requirement to provide 
economic support to the fuel poor, leaving all activity at the discretion of the state. 
Three national schemes are currently in operation, of which two – CWPs and WFPs – 
are long-running, state-led supplementary benefits, and the third – WHDS – is a 
comparatively new supplier-led rebate scheme. This section will give an overview of 
the delivery of each scheme, highlighting key elements and, where possible, an 
assessment of the likely impact of each upon fuel poverty. 
 
• State-led Delivery Models 
 
Whilst the technical interventions targeted at fuel poor households have undergone a 
significant evolution over the past ten years, economic mechanisms have remained 
comparatively consistent. CWP is the oldest of the current schemes, having been 
introduced in 1986, to replace earlier schemes such as Heating Additions and the 
Electricity Discount Scheme (Kennedy 2010, in a House of Commons Library 
Standard Note, offers a thorough history of the development of the scheme). CWPs 
are funded by general taxation, via the Social Fund, and eligibility is based upon 
receipt of particular income-related benefits (DWP 2013b). The payment itself is a 
supplementary benefit, with payment triggered automatically when temperatures (as 
forecast or recorded by local weather stations) dip below 0oc for a consecutive seven-
day period (DWP 2013b). The payment level was £8.50 per period between 1995 and 
2007, at which point it rose to the £25 rate where it currently remains165 (Kennedy 
2010: 4-5).  
 
WFPs were launched in in the winter 1997/1998 by the Labour government166. They 
were immediately framed as a measure to “tackle fuel poverty amongst pensioners”, 
and their role in fuel poverty alleviation was later confirmed in The UK Fuel Poverty 
                                                
165 For details of CWPs pre-1995, please refer to Kennedy (2010: 4-5). 
166 Again, the House of Commons Library Standard Note offers a helpful and thorough historical 
overview; see Kennedy 2013b. 
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Strategy (Kennedy 2013b: 3, DTI 2001: 116-117). The initiative is Exchequer-funded, 
and usually paid as an automatic subsidy to the State Pension (or other social security 
benefit) (Kennedy 2013b, UK Government 2014e). WFPs are universally available to 
those born before a given date, updated annually, regardless of income or disability 
status167. At time of writing this date was 5th January 1952 making the youngest 
recipients at the start of winter 2013/14 sixty-one years old (UK Government 2014e). 
Currently, those aged under 80 on the qualifying date receive £200, whilst those over 
80 receive £300 (UK Government 2014e). This represents a significant increase from 
the £20 to £50 payment that was made WFPs were first introduced (see Kennedy 
2013b: 8) 
 
The government do not formally measure the contribution of either scheme to fuel 
poverty reduction. Modelling the likely impact of CWPs on fuel poverty is difficult, 
in part because of the variability of the payment. Because payments are triggered in 
periods of cold weather, they will vary both year-on-year and by geographical 
location. Furthermore, the EHS uses self-reported income data (see DCLG 2013e), 
which makes it seem likely that such small payments will be misreported particularly 
when, for example, households have opted to report their income on a monthly basis, 
or are interviewed during warmer times of year. However, it is possible to draw some 
broad conclusions by considering the size of the payments made, and the efficiency 
with which they are targeted at fuel poor. Firstly, in winter 2011/12, £129.2m was 
paid out in 5.2m individual payments (DWP 2012b). Of the 92 localities, only four 
were triggered three or more times, and all of these were rural Scottish locations with 
comparatively low populations. Of the 4.2m eligible individuals, 74.7% received 
some payment, with 46.8% of the total receiving two or more payments, i.e., £50 or 
more. However, the median fuel poverty gap in that year was £256, and only 13.5% 
of LIHC fuel poor households had a fuel poverty gap of under £50 (based on analysis 
of DCLG 2013c). Furthermore, as reported in Chapter Five, the estimated ‘leakage’ of 
CWPs is 69% (see Table 5.1). So, whilst CWP is undoubtedly valuable to those in 
receipt, it is unlikely to have much of an impact on the larger problem, even in the 
short term. As already discussed in Chapter Five, WFPs represent a particularly 
                                                
167 Note that from winter 2015/16, WFPs will no longer be made to UK citizens living in European 
countries in which the average winter temperature is higher than that of the UK (HM Treasury 2013: 
31). Those in residential care receive a partial payment (see Kennedy 2013c). 
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conspicuous example of inefficient targeting. Kennedy (2013b: 17) cites a Lords 
written answer that estimated that WFP reduced the number of households in 10pct 
fuel poverty by 850,000. However, as mentioned in the previous chapter, WFP 
exacerbates LIHC fuel poverty, as the new measure is relative. As the majority of 
WFP funds go to those already on high incomes, the programme exacerbates income 
inequality, raising the threshold for low income (as this is based upon a median 
income measure) and drawing a further 370,000 households into LIHC fuel poverty 
(see section 6.3.2).  
 
• Supplier-led Delivery Models 
 
The Warm Home Discount Scheme (WHDS) is the most recent economic scheme to 
be implemented, commencing in April 2011 and set to conclude in March 2015 
(Ofgem 2013k). WHDS represents the first economic intervention that suppliers are 
mandated to deliver, though many suppliers have delivered support of their own 
volition in the past. A Voluntary Agreement existed between all Big Six suppliers and 
Government that enabled flexibility as to the form of social programmes, but 
committed them to agreed levels of expenditure (see Hough, Bolton (2012a: 11-13). 
The social requirements of suppliers were formalised as statutory under the Energy 
Act 2010 in a section specifically titled, “Schemes for reducing fuel poverty” (s.9-15), 
making the intention of the legislation clear. This commitment was later fulfilled by 
the Warm Home Discount Regulations 2011.  
 
The scheme itself consists of four main elements. The Legacy Spending part enables 
suppliers with ongoing programmes established under the Voluntary Agreement, 
particularly social tariffs, to count a given level of that expenditure towards their 
WHDS targets (Ofgem 2013k: 28). This element of the scheme is intended to 
facilitate a smooth transition from the Voluntary Agreement to WHDS, and as such 
the level of expenditure is reduced annually (DECC 2011h: 12). The Industry 
Initiative element, similarly, builds on the support offered previously under the 
Voluntary Agreement, enabling suppliers to include expenditure on approved 
alternate initiatives including benefits advice or cancelation of energy debts (Ofgem 
2013k: 31-33).  
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The other two elements of WHDS are a more distinct departure from the Voluntary 
Agreement, and account for a greater proportion of total expenditure (DECC 2011h: 
12). Both the Core and Broader elements of the scheme offer a rebate on energy bills 
to eligible customers – £135 for 2013/2014 – and all are provided via rebates on 
electricity bills (so as not to exclude those not in receipt of gas) (see Ofgem 2013k: 
17, DECC 2011h: 3). Core Group eligibility varies year-on-year, but is currently 
aimed at older people and linked to receipt of Pension Credit (DECC 2011h: 13-14). 
Participating suppliers have discretion over eligibility for the Broader Group scheme 
(subject to Ofgem approval; see Figure 5.2 for sample criteria). Broader Group spend 
is set at a minimum level, i.e., suppliers are only required to spend a set amount on the 
scheme and do not have to support every eligible customer. By contrast, suppliers are 
required to provide a rebate to any customer who meets Core Group eligibility and so 
- because WHDS spending is capped under the Levy Control Framework - higher 
than expected numbers of Core Group recipients will potentially result in cuts to the 
Broader Group (Ofgem 2013k: 11-14). However, suppliers do have flexibility to 
reapportion some level of Legacy Spending and Industry Initiative expenditure 
towards the Broader Group, and all companies chose to do so in the first year of 
activity (see Ofgem 2012b: 17). Figure 7.6 illustrates the manner in which DECC 
expect spending to be allocated between elements over the lifetime of WHDS. 
 
 
Source: Adapted from DECC(2011h: 12). 
 
Figure 7.6: Expected allocation of spending under the Warm Home Discount Scheme 
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The impact assessment for WHDS included modelling of the projected impact of the 
scheme, estimating that 41,000 households would be removed from 10pct fuel 
poverty (DECC 2011f: 51-54). However, as the LIHC definition classifies fewer 
households that contain older people (and are thus likely to be Core Group) as fuel 
poor, it seems likely that impact under the new definition might be lessened, given 
that the Core Group accounts for the majority of expenditure. The discretionary nature 
of the Legacy Spend, Industry Initiatives and Broader Groups make the likely impact 
of those elements fuel poverty difficult to model with the available data.  
 
7.2.2 Key Differences in Support Provided 
 
In many respects, economic measures are much more straightforward than technical 
interventions; money is either transferred to households as tax-funded benefits 
supplements, or else provided as a rebate which is both delivered and funded via 
energy bills. It is, in essence, a fairly straightforward reallocation of funds (though 
subject to the differences in targeting and distributional impacts discussed in previous 
chapters). This analysis identifies two areas where the choice of delivery agent alone 
could result in changed outcomes. The first of these is arguably less consequential; 
currently there is a cap on levy-funded expenditure on economic measures, with no 
counterpart for state-led delivery. However, this is a government-imposed restriction 
and so fairly pliable. More meaningfully, the way in which the money is applied –via 
benefits or directly to energy bills – could have implications for recipients. This 
section presents a thorough review of relevant evidence that can offer insight into the 
potential consequence of both options. 
 
• Level of Overall Assistance Provided 
 
Currently, the key difference between supplier and state overall expenditure is that 
supplier expenditure on WHDS is limited by the Levy Control Framework (LCF), 
which seeks to guard against “unsustainable increase[s] in electricity bills” (DECC 
2011c: 3). State expenditure on CWP and WFP is not subject to the same type of cap, 
varying annually dependent on the number of eligible households, and (in the case of 
CWP) temperatures (though variance is subject to reasonably predictable factors). 
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Any shift towards supplier-led economic measures would require that this cap be 
lifted if a commensurate impact were to be achieved, an option that is entirely at the 
discretion of government. As discussed in Chapter Five, increased supplier levies 
would probably have regressive impacts (though it is not clear from policy documents 
whether this is an explicit intention of the LCF). If the cap were removed altogether, 
there would exist a further risk of uncertainty around energy bills, particularly if the 
CWP temperature-based eligibility criteria were retained168.  
 
• Delivery Vehicle 
 
Here, ‘delivery vehicle’ refers to the means by which funds are transferred between 
the delivery agent and recipients. Suppliers have historically delivered support via 
direct rebates to bills (i.e., a discount from costs), whereas state support has been via 
the benefits system (i.e., an increase to income received). On the face of it, it may not 
appear to make much difference how monetary support is delivered; a pound is a 
pound, whatever the form. However, there are evident differences. Firstly, from a 
definitional standpoint, if a benefit supplement is treated as increasing income and a 
rebate as reducing costs, it seems likely that – by way of example - an additional £200 
rebate to a given group of fuel poor households energy costs would be more likely to 
reduce LIHC fuel poverty than a £200 income supplement to the same group. This is 
because incomes have a much greater variance and range than fuel bills, and so a 
given sum of money is more likely to move a household over the high costs threshold 
than over the low income threshold. Furthermore, as the fuel poverty gap primarily 
relates to energy costs, a rebate is also more likely to result in improvement to that 
metric. However, this inherent sensitivity to prices is arguably simply a quirk of the 
LIHC definition (and an effect that was much more significant under the 10pct 
measure, see Hills 2011: 106). What is more important is the extent to which the 
difference in delivery method has an impact on the experience of fuel poor 
households. 
 
One core difference between the two options is that recipients have the freedom to 
spend benefits supplements as they wish, whilst rebates are automatically deducted 
                                                
168 The weather-based variance can be surprisingly high, e.g., in 2010/11 the amount paid out was over 
three times that in 2011/12 (see Kennedy 2013: 4). 
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from bills. This distinction displays clear parallels with current debates around 
personal responsibility and the welfare state. Neoliberal thought tends to prioritise 
individual freedoms and personal responsibility over state intervention (see discussion 
in Harvey 2005 64-86). Under this ideology, it seems likely that direct payments 
would be viewed as paternalistic, as they remove the autonomy of individuals to 
spend their income as they wish, and instead effectively mandates that they make 
particular consumption choices (i.e., in apportioning a £135 rebate directly to fuel 
rather than allowing the household to choose how it is spent). This philosophical 
standpoint arguably underlies many of the changes to the benefits system introduced 
by the coalition government. For example, under the proposed Universal Credit 
system, all benefits are merged into a single monthly payment which recipients 
manage themselves169, with Housing Benefit no longer sent directly to landlords (see 
DWP 2010b: 19-20). In this context, the shift to delivering economic support via 
direct rebates would seem out of step with broader patterns. That said, it might 
conversely be argued that the serious implications of underconsumption for the health 
and wellbeing of those living in cold homes justifies direct intervention. Any 
reduction in expenditure on heating will impact the quality of life and health not only 
of those making that decision, but also of others living in those households, including 
dependent children. Previous research by Probert (2010) examined the Fuel Direct 
programme, which enables customers that are both in arrears and in receipt of 
particular income-related benefits to have energy bills paid automatically, directly 
from their benefits (see UK Government 2014b). Whilst proponents of neoliberal 
thinking might consider this to be extremely paternalistic, the research found that both 
energy companies and consumer advocates enthusiastically supported the scheme. 
Suppliers reported that Fuel Direct worked in their favour, ensuring that the payment 
was made, and removing both the economic burden of pursuing debts, as well as the 
responsibility to make punitive disconnections (Probert 2010: 83-84). Independent 
advice agency representatives testified that consumers too, favoured the scheme – 
even though its use involves an extra charge – to the extent that one member of 
support staff for a charitable trust reported that they would purposely offer grants at a 
level that did not fully clear arrears, in order to ensure customers would remain 
                                                
169 Universal Credit payments will also go to households rather than individuals (see DWP 2010: 33), 
which could have implications, for example, where the thermal comfort requirements of individual 
residents differ. 
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eligible for Fuel Direct (Probert 2010: 84-85). A possible middle ground might be 
found in ‘soft paternalism’170, a phenomenon allied to that already encountered in 
section 5.4.1 with regard to the effect of labelling WFPs. Some research has indicated 
that labelling cash payments as being intended to contribute towards energy bills (e.g., 
CWPs, WFPs) does create enough of a ‘nudge’ to ensure that they are used as 
intended  (Beatty, Blow & Crossley 2011, Beatty et al. 2011, see Stockton 2011) . 
 
A final identified implication of delivery vehicle choice is that, under a rebate 
scheme, only customers who are with a participating supplier and, by extension, in 
receipt of the grid-delivered fuel used to transmit the discount can receive support. 
Though the majority of suppliers do participate in WHDS – including many who are 
not obligated to do so (see UK Government 2014d) – and most households receive 
electricity via the grid, this still leaves a possible gap in the effective delivery of 
support that could widen if the role of rebates were increased. On the other hand, 
rebates can be delivered to households that are not in receipt of state benefits, 
potentially reducing the necessary dependence on that means of transmitting support 
identified in Chapter Five171. Thus there is some level of trade-off in reaching 
particular groups with either delivery vehicle. 
 
• Overview of Comparison 
 
Figure 7.7 summarises the analysis presented in this section within a Policy Analysis 
Matrix. 
 
 State Delivery: Benefits 
Supplement 
Supplier Delivery: Energy 
Bill Rebate 
Level of Assistance Provided Delivery agent unlikely to make a difference, as this will be state-
mandated, though currently Levy Control Framework limits 
supplier expenditure. 
                                                
170 This term tends to be used by critics such as Glaeser (2006); Thaler and Sunstein (2003) write more 
sympathetically on what they call “libertarian paternalism”.  
171 Though in practice guidance on Broader Group eligibility criteria generally encourages that support 
be focused on households who are in receipt of benefits (see Ofgem 2013g: 22-23). It also may be 
possible to develop state-led economic measures that are not benefits supplements, e.g., vouchers or 
targeted tax credits. 
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Delivery Vehicle Potentially has a more limited 
impact upon LIHC fuel poverty 
levels and the fuel poverty gap. 
Promotes autonomy, recipients are 
in control of cash payment. 
However, this may result in 
money being spent on 
commodities other than fuel. 
Requires recipients be in receipt 
of a state benefit.  
Should have an increased 
impact on LIHC fuel poverty 
and will directly reduce the 
fuel poverty gap. 
Ensures benefit is applied 
directly according to intended 
purpose, however, may be 
viewed as ‘paternalistic’. 
Requires consumer be with a 
participating supplier.  
 
 
Figure 7.7: Policy Analysis Matrix comparing supplier and state participation in delivery of 
economic measures 
 
7.2.3 Alternative Means of Support 
 
The economic measures discussed so far have all revolved around the straightforward 
redistribution of funds. However, a number of other measures have been applied that 
deviate from this form, whilst remaining fundamentally economic in nature. All have 
been made available on a limited and generally localised basis, i.e., not as national 
schemes; some remain active under the auspices of the Industry Initiatives and 
Legacy Spend elements of the WHDS (though provision is at supplier discretion). 
Literature on these interventions remains extremely limited, and it is an area where 
further research would be of clear value. This section takes steps to fill this gap by 
synthesising what literature has been sourced relating to five of the most prominent 
mechanisms, offering a brief overview of potential practical and political 
implications, and possible roles for delivery agents. For practical reasons, 
consideration has been restricted to those mechanisms that could provide households 
with economic respite from the effects of fuel poverty, as opposed to those that 
operate more structurally, providing no reduction in price or increase in income, but 
making payment for energy otherwise more manageable (e.g., Fuel Direct, debt 
management advice). 
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• Alternative Tariff Structures  
 
Energy companies have intermittently offered ‘social tariffs’, i.e., favourable pricing 
structures made available to those customers who are likely to be fuel poor or 
otherwise vulnerable, and which ideally should represent a supplier’s cheapest market 
price, regardless of payment method (as required by the regulator, see Ofgem 2008b). 
By reducing the costs of energy, social tariffs are arguably a more appropriate 
economic intervention than income supplementation in tackling LIHC fuel poverty, 
and will reduce the fuel poverty gap. Furthermore, unlike WHDS-style standardised 
rebates, social tariffs could feasibly provide a level of financial support that is in some 
way commensurate with individual fuel poverty gaps (and thus in some way account 
for the high variance discussed in section 6.1.2). Social tariffs found their greatest 
popularity under the Voluntary Agreement that pre-dated the Warm Home Discount 
Scheme, with all Big Six suppliers offering some form of social or otherwise 
discounted tariff during that time (see Ofgem 2011b: 20-21). As of March 2011, 
112,803 customers across the UK were on such tariffs (see Ofgem 2011b: 17-18). 
However, there were a number of problems with this voluntary system of support. 
Firstly, there was a degree of variability in the social tariffs offered by different 
suppliers (see Boardman 2010: 86-88, Ofgem 2011b: 22-25). This is particularly 
problematic given that social tariffs were usually only available to existing customers, 
i.e., there was no option to switch directly to the social tariff of another supplier at a 
better rate (see Ofgem 2011b: 20). Furthermore, whilst Ofgem guidance was that 
suppliers should “keep in mind that support should be targeted towards customers 
vulnerable to fuel poverty” (Ofgem 2011b: 20) ultimately eligibility criteria were 
entirely at the discretion of energy companies, which Consumer Focus argued 
resulted in them being inequitably focused upon older people (see Consumer Focus 
2009). Today, suppliers may still choose to offer social tariffs under the Legacy 
Spending component of WHDS, however, this is due to be phased out by 2014/15 
(see DECC 2011h: 15). In the consultation that preceded WHDS, DECC clarified that 
social tariffs were no longer viewed as being in line with departmental guiding 
principles, stating that: 
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[social tariffs] do not provide a clear or targeted benefit, as different 
suppliers may offer different benefits to different groups of customers, 
depending on their tariff regime… It is therefore inconsistent with the 
principle of maintaining competitive markets. 
 
(DECC 2010a: 18) 
 
Cheaper rates also arguably violate the ‘polluter pays’ principle, and could encourage 
overconsumption. The notion of cheaper energy for those on benefits might further be 
politically at odds with the coalition government’s aim of reducing benefit 
dependency (see Conservative Party 2010: 15), though it is clearly not inconsistent 
with the goal of helping those on low incomes to achieve a decent standard of living.  
 
One other alternative tariff structure is worth considering, the Rising Block Tariff 
(RBT). Baker and White (2008) assessed four different tariff models under a range of 
criteria. Of these, only RBTs were judged as offering outcomes comparable in social 
justice terms to social tariffs themselves (Baker, White 2008: 3). Currently, via 
standing charges, prices fall as consumption increases, a choice justified on the 
grounds that the marginal cost of supply is lower at higher volumes, with Ofgem 
actively encouraging cost reflective pricing (see Ofgem 2009a: 10). However, such a 
pricing strategy violates the ‘polluter pays’ principle and means that those who use 
less – including many fuel poor households – pay a higher average unit price. RBTs 
would reverse this structure so that the first units of energy were priced at a low rate 
(or even supplied for free), whilst energy use at higher levels would cost more, 
enabling supplier costs to be recouped overall. Effectively, essential energy use would 
remain cheap, while use that is more likely to be ‘optional’ would cost more. Baker 
and White conclude that such tariffs would be both more environmentally and 
socially progressive than the current tariff structure, though the extent of the 
improvement is somewhat dependent on the specific system structure (2008: 31). 
However, they register that although such tariffs are already common in parts of 
Europe, they require all suppliers to participate and so Government mandate would be 
required (2008: 29). Baker and White further emphasise that this type of intervention 
runs counter to the philosophy of economic liberalisation that underlies the current 
governance of the UK domestic energy market (2008: 31). The Hills Fuel Poverty 
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Review consideration of RBTs came to similar conclusions (2012: 122-124), and 
cited a piece of CCC-commissioned research by Hulme and Summers (2009) that 
modelled the impact of different RBT structures on 10pct fuel poverty, finding that 
under such a tariff regime, fuel poor households would be worse off. However, this 
finding rests upon Hulme and Summers’ assumption of energy use as required – 
rather than actual – in their modelling (2009: 11) and so, whilst they – and later Hills 
(2012) – conclude that RBTs would be regressive unless applied after consumption 
had been lowered via energy efficiency measures, it seems likely that in practice this 
would not be the case given that fuel poor households are actually likely to 
underconsume energy. Still, RBTs could create a difficult precedent by giving fuel 
poor households with high energy needs a financial incentive to keep their homes 
cold. 
 
• Benefits Entitlement Advice 
 
Chapter Five discussed Benefits Entitlement Advice (BEA), a form of guidance that 
allows individuals to check whether they are eligible for any state benefits that they 
are not currently claiming. The current take-up rate across all income-related benefits 
is between 77% and 84% (DWP 2012a: ii), and improving this might not only 
supplement incomes, but also potentially allow households to access fuel poverty-
specific support such as CWP and WHDS, the eligibility for which is dependent on 
receipt of other benefits. Chapter Five offered examples of the successful delivery of 
BEA under Warm Front, Warm Zones, Challenge 100, and in Northern Ireland. All 
suppliers offered BEAs under the Voluntary Agreement activity (see Ofgem 2011b: 
66-67); however, they have not been incorporated within supplier obligations, 
something that has been highlighted as a missed opportunity  (see CAG Consultants, 
Ipsos MORI & Building Research Establishment 2011: 10) . Currently, suppliers may 
choose to offer BEA under the Industry Initiatives element of WHDS, but in 2012/13 
only 1% of the £22m expenditure was used to that end (Ofgem 2013j: 6). If BEA 
were to be expanded, it could feasibly be bundled with technical obligations, e.g., in 
requiring that it be offered to any household approached for delivery. However, the 
Challenge 100 final report suggests that energy suppliers may not be trusted with 
information relating to household finances (E.ON UK 2010: 51). This should be 
considered in the formation of any subsequent policy; it may be that separately 
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contracted provision, to which suppliers then refer, would make for a more 
appropriate model. However, expansion of BEA is likely to be unappealing to the 
coalition government given that increasing take-up would be a burden on the public 
purse, and possibly be viewed as at odds with stated goals of reducing welfare 
dependency (see Conservative Party 2010: 15). 
 
• Charitable Trusts 
 
In this context, Charitable Trusts (CTs) are those organisations that offer financial 
support to households struggling to pay their energy bills. At the time of writing, five 
of the Big Six energy suppliers have identifiable links with such trusts (see Charis 
Grants 2014a, E.ON UK 2014b) that, again, can qualify towards the Industry 
Initiatives component of WHDS. CTs can offer grants to support households that are 
in need, though negotiated cancellation of fuel debts (via links with individual 
suppliers) and the donation of energy efficient appliances have also been used. CTs 
are well placed to fill two particular gaps in the current provision of economic 
support. Firstly, via the provision of crisis loans or hardship funds so that households 
who find themselves suddenly struggling (e.g., because of redundancy) can afford 
essential costs. This function might be particularly valuable given that DWP have 
recently indicated that they intend to withdraw funding from local welfare assistance 
schemes designed to support those who face sudden hardship (see Butler 2014).  
 
Secondly, in overseeing Payment Matching Schemes, sometimes christened ‘Restart’ 
schemes within the utility industry (see Auriga 2013). Under such schemes, customers 
who have found themselves in debt are asked to maintain a mutually agreed payment 
schedule for a predetermined period and, if they are successful, the supplier may 
cancel some or all of their debt, or offer another form of discount. Whilst there is little 
research on this support model, early work has indicated that it can be helpful in 
promoting trust in the customer-supplier relationship via a third party (the CT), 
particularly where that association is one of debtor-creditor (see Probert 2010: 92).  
 
At present a single external contractor, Charis, operates the CTs for four out of the 
five suppliers (see Charis Grants 2014a) with only E.ON operating their Caring 
Energy fund in-house (see E.ON UK 2014b). Funding from suppliers will be 
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regressively raised, though at present the amounts involved are presumed to be fairly 
small. Using a third-party provider may be beneficial given that those accessing 
support may be wary about engaging with their creditors, and so be more comfortable 
dealing with an intermediary (applications for support often require that the individual 
divulge personal financial information; see, for example, Charis Grants 2014b). That 
said, suppliers are able to play a very useful role by engaging with such trusts, as they 
are positioned to cancel arrears directly, and to implement innovative Restart-style 
schemes. 
 
• Improvements to Market Efficiency 
 
Whilst it has been widely documented – including by Ofgem itself - that UK energy 
market is generally uncompetitive (see Platt 2012, OFT/Ofgem/CMA 2014), from a 
fuel poverty perspective the concern is whether inefficiencies are exacerbating 
underlying equalities to the detriment of those who are vulnerable, as opposed to 
affecting all households equally. Some of the reasons to believe this is the case were 
discussed in Chapter Two, including the additional charges imposed on those paying 
via prepayment meters, the potential that fuel poor households are subject to less 
favourable tariffs, and that those same households may be disinclined to switch or 
review energy tariffs. Improvements to the efficiency of the UK energy market are 
arguably slightly beyond the realm of this consideration, as they are not a 
‘mechanism’ per se. However, they represent an economic means by which the 
impacts of high prices upon fuel poor households can be somewhat mitigated, ideally 
in a more enduring way than that which is achievable via more standard mechanisms.  
 
In recent years, government has made some scattered moves to address and assess 
potential price differentials. These have included requiring that additional charges on 
prepayment meters be reflective of costs (by amending the Standard Licence 
Conditions, see GEMA 2014: 58), by incorporating the issue as a consideration of the 
Retail Market Review (see Ofgem 2013h), and through the Energy Prices, Profits and 
Poverty Commons Select Committee inquiry (see House of Commons Energy and 
Climate Change Committee 2013). However, a good starting point would be to gather 
quantitative data on real-world energy tariffs that could shed some light as to the scale 
of the problem (as may already be underway via the Energy Follow Up Survey, see 
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DECC 2012c: 10-11). This would support the development of an appropriate 
intervention, and the extent to which energy suppliers could be appropriately 
involved. Social tariffs have already been discussed in this section as a potential 
means of ensuring fuel poor or vulnerable customers were able to access the best 
available offers. Another option might be a campaign offering tariff advice to 
households who are likely to be fuel poor, possibly delivered in tandem with BEA. 
Under the Challenge 100 project, participants were offered tariff advice; however, 
whilst it is known that 58 of 102 participants took up the service, no data was made 
available as to the benefit gained (see E.ON UK 2010: 36-37).  
 
• Collective Switching 
 
Collective Switching (CS) refers to the arrangement whereby multiple consumers 
band together to negotiate better energy prices. The principle is that different 
suppliers can bid for the custom of the whole group, potentially gaining many new 
customers in one fell swoop whilst also saving the purchasers money. CS began to 
garner attention following the publication of a New Local Government Network 
(NLGN) White Paper by Scott-Smith (2011), which reported Dutch CS schemes as 
achieving average fuel bill reductions of around 20%, and suggested that LAs could 
spearhead similar initiatives in the UK. The idea was soon picked up by a number of 
LAs, including South Lakeland (see Bell 2013), Cornwall (see Cornwall Together 
2014) and Greater Manchester (see Qureshi 2013). Additionally, a national-level not-
for-profit-led programme, ‘The Big Switch’, received 287,365 sign-ups (see Which? 
2014). DECC have since endorsed CS, publishing guidance for those looking to 
access schemes (see DECC 2013d), encouraging suppliers to cooperate (see Davey 
2012), and launching the Cheaper Energy Together competition, which offered £5m 
funding in support of the establishment of CS programmes. In evaluating Cheaper 
Energy Together, DECC praised the success of winning schemes, reporting that they 
enabled over 21,000 households to save an average of £131 (see DECC 2013m: 21). 
DECC also noted the early successes of smaller suppliers in Collective Switching 
auctions (see DECC 2013m: 5). This is perhaps because CS represents a chance for 
such suppliers to gain a large group of new customers, despite lacking the marketing 
budgets and economies of scale available to the Big Six firms.  
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In principle, the notion of CS might be viewed as a relatively uncontroversial means 
of improving the competitiveness of UK energy markets – in which customers are 
notoriously ‘sticky’ - by creating a new impetus for households to switch supplier. 
However, there exists the potential for problems to emerge with regards to the 
situation for fuel poor customers. Most CS schemes – and DECC’s own literature – 
make reference to their potential to mitigate fuel poverty (see, for example, the very 
title of Scott-Smith 2011, DECC 2013m: 5). However, the literature review 
undertaken for this research found no published evidence evaluating the actual 
impacts of Collective Switching on fuel poverty. Furthermore, under the LIHC 
definition of fuel poverty, any collective scheme that lowered prices would have to 
help as many (or ideally, more) fuel poor households than non-fuel poor households, 
or risk exacerbating inequalities, and thus fuel poverty, further. This might seem to be 
a rather unnecessarily theoretical conceptualisation of the problem; arguably the most 
important thing is that the competitiveness of the market is improved, and that 
consumers benefit from lower prices. However, here the LIHC definition exposes a 
more problematic potential; that the savings received by those switching could be 
shifted on to the bills of households who do not participate. Should fuel poor 
households be adversely affected in this way, official statistics, which are based on 
modelled energy prices, would not register the issue.  
 
The DECC review of Cheaper Energy Together reported that 11% of switchers across 
the various programmes reported annual incomes below £13,380 (DECC 2013m: 27) 
which tallies with the percentage of fuel poor in England as of the most recently 
published statistics (see DECC 2013h: 11): a positive indicator of the potential of 
such schemes (though a higher proportion would have been more progressive). 
Internet access could also constitute a barrier, with some of the largest CS schemes to 
date operating primarily via internet registration (see, for example, Which? 2014, 
thePeoplesPower 2014). This is particularly pertinent given the link between material 
deprivation and digital exclusion in the UK demonstrated by Longley and Singleton 
(2009). Whilst CS programmes could be designed to focus on fuel poor customers, 
there is a risk that suppliers may be disinclined to bid for their custom, perceiving that 
group of consumers as undesirable and at higher risk of default because of their 
income status. Indeed, it may be that some CS schemes might be more appealing to 
suppliers than others because of the types of customers included (i.e., schemes run by 
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Local Authorities in wealthier areas where houses tend to be larger), further 
weakening the benefit of such schemes for fuel poor customers. A well managed, 
appropriately targeted CS programme could go some way to countering the reluctance 
of low income customers to engage with the market. That said, the risks identified 
here suggest that it would be wise to proceed cautiously in case fuel poor customers 
are, unnoticed, bearing the brunt of savings enjoyed by wealthier participating 
households.  
 
7.2.4 Policy Constraints 
$
As with technical measures, both the state and energy suppliers have (and in this case, 
currently do) deliver economic interventions. It is therefore apparent that there are no 
substantial physical or legal blocks to either approach being applied. Furthermore, 
delivery of economic measures is inherently more straightforward, and is not subject 
to any sort of target, removing the incentive for government to apply the type of ‘stick 
over carrot’ approach that is used to drive installation of energy efficiency measures. 
Supplier obligations to deliver economic measures are a comparatively new 
endeavour, with WHDS commencing only in April 2011. Taken together, the 
evidence presented so far indications that suppliers are, on balance, poorly suited to 
the delivery of economic interventions; they have no particular ability to ensure 
measures are appropriately targeted (though there may be some scope to improve this, 
as discussed in section 5.2.3), the manner in which they finance delivery is inherently 
more regressive than a tax-based method, and – unlike with energy efficiency 
interventions – there is no significant way in which they can be feasibly expected to 
achieve greater delivery efficiency via a competitive delivery model. Whilst it might 
be argued that rebates are a more effective means of ensuring funds are spent on 
energy bills than simply giving cash to households, this is suspiciously inconsistent 
with the broader anti-paternalism trend of coalition welfare policies such as Universal 
Credit. It might also be argued that rebates reduce energy costs (as opposed to 
supplementary benefits, which increase income), and so are more consistent with 
LIHC fuel poverty alleviation; however, in practice this is effectively a definitional 
issue. Perhaps the most compelling argument for rebates is that they enable a means 
of delivering economic support to those not in receipt of state benefits, countering a 
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persistent targeting problem identified in Chapter Five.  However, no indication is 
given in any of the policy documents reviewed that the government recognises this 
strength of that model, and at present WHDS remains primarily directed at benefits 
recipients anyhow.  
$
Given the apparent inferiority of energy company-led delivery of economic measures, 
the obvious question is; why introduce an economic supplier obligation? Examination 
of policy documents undertaken for this work illustrates that, once again, the 
constraints directing action are primarily political and economic. The clear precedent 
for the WHDS was the Voluntary Agreement that ended in March 2011. Spending 
under this agreement was lower than under WHDS, and was primarily disseminated 
in the form of social tariffs (see Hough, Bolton 2012b: 11-13). However, in light of 
criticisms of the coverage of the Voluntary Agreement, government opted to make 
supplier delivery of economic measures an obligation via the Energy Act 2010  (see 
Smith, Smith & Gore 2009) . It is very clear from policy documents that WHDS was 
intended as the successor of the Voluntary Agreement and the one-off 2010 Energy 
Rebate Scheme, cementing functions that were previously optional under both (see 
DECC 2010a: 15, DECC 2011h: 10, DECC 2011f: 11, Hough, Bolton 2012b). In 
assessing policy options, the WHDS Impact Assessment considers only voluntary 
supplier activity against mandated delivery, and does not consider an option whereby 
a similar level of support was instead delivered by the state (DECC 2011f: 1). Whilst 
consultation respondents did question whether a state-funded scheme would be more 
appropriate, DECC’s response was simply to say that that they felt suppliers should 
play a role, and took participation in the Voluntary Agreement as confirmation that 
companies concurred (DECC 2011h: 9). There are clear reasons to believe a 
government – particularly one focused on austerity politics – might not want to 
introduce a new state economic obligation, some of which have already been 
discussed; additional cost, potential for failure, and lack of electoral capital in tackling 
fuel poverty. WHDS represents an alternative approach that it is easy to imagine 
appealing to government as it makes it appear that they are being tough on suppliers 
(who are often poorly regarded by the public), but requires only fairly light touch 
regulation of a scheme that is comparatively straightforward, being based primarily 
upon rebates. WHDS is a way for government to appear to be doing something to 
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offer help to fuel poor households in the short-term, even if the evidence suggests that 
it is not the best use of resources. It might also be taken as another example of path 
dependency; government choosing simply to adjust, enforce and streamline existing 
activity, rather than design a new programme from scratch. 
 
In considering technical measures, it was suggested that supplier obligations have 
progressed far enough along a set ‘path’ – having developed supply chains and a 
market for achieved savings, and with suppliers accustomed to the model – that the 
disruption of change would make policy adjustment undesirable. The initial phase of 
WHDS is set to last for four years, and it is hard to argue that its ‘path’ is truly 
entrenched, particularly given that there are concurrent state-led programmes running, 
and economic measures delivery model is inherently less complex, involving no 
supply chain or market. If the supplier-led model is indeed less effective in achieving 
the policy’s stated goal of fuel poverty mitigation, the March 2015 end of WHDS 
would provide an apposite point for reassessment, i.e., a ‘critical juncture’ at which 
alternatives models – including state-led options – might be considered. This could 
also be taken as an opportunity to address broader issues with economic schemes, for 
example; reassessing the poorly targeted expense of WFPs172; uniting DWP and 
DECC in considering how economic policies can achieve effective coverage; 
clarifying overarching intentions (e.g., via specific targets) within a broader policy 
‘road map’; potentially considering some of more ambitious proposals of the type 
advocated by Ekins and Lockwood (2011), whereby receipt of technical and 
economic measures interact to ensure subsidies intended to tackle fuel poverty are 
provided only to those in inefficient homes. However, government are likely to be 
reluctant to undertake such an evaluation, firstly because it is likely recommend a 
state scheme that would be undesirable to them for the reasons outlined above. 
Secondly, because – as WHDS is not quantitatively monitored or subject to any target 
– it is easier to call the policy effective and follow the path of least resistance: inertia. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
172 WFP has arguably demonstrated a creeping path dependency of its own, as the minimum payment 
has increased tenfold over time without external reassessment (see Kennedy 2013b: 8). 
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 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has examined the policy mechanisms by which the state and energy 
suppliers deliver both technical and economic fuel poverty interventions. With regard 
to energy efficiency measures, distinct differences have been identified between the 
two; supplier-led delivery occurs within a well-established market of ‘white 
certificate’ obligations, whilst state-led delivery to date has only been via the 
straightforward purchase of measures by a single designated subcontractor. 
Commercial confidentiality has resulted in a dearth of data on the costs of previous 
delivery that – along with the limited examples of each mechanism – makes it 
difficult to effectively compare efficiency. However, it seems plausible that supplier 
obligations would result in energy companies striving to deliver measures as 
efficiently as possible, given the high costs of delivery, and the link between cost-
effectively discharging obligations and increased profits. Certainly, fulfilment of 
obligations has been largely successful, likely due in no small part to the ‘stick’ that 
government have at their disposal in enforcing compliance, i.e., fines of up to ten per 
cent of global turnover. Supplier obligations also have the political advantage of 
distancing government – and the treasury – from a costly, involved activity. The 
alternative considered here, a new state-led market similar to that currently underlying 
welfare-to-work provision – would be subject to an establishment process that is 
likely to be both drawn-out and difficult, and with a high risk of failure. And so, 
whilst it is possible that a state-led market would be more effective in terms of fuel 
poverty reduction (because the attached funding method should be more progressive), 
this chapter has argued that it seems unlikely that government would pursue such a 
model, particularly given the political and economic climate. 
 
By contrast, the ways in which the state and suppliers deliver economic measures 
have been shown to be much more similar, particularly given the increased emphasis 
on straightforward rebates as the medium of support. The choice of delivery vehicle 
could raise concerns with reference to the paternalism of rebates, or the lack of access 
to state supplements faced by those who are low income but not on benefits. 
However, the first issue is out of step with broader coalition policy with regard to 
personal responsibility and the latter could be surmountable (e.g., via labelled tax 
credits or vouchers). In this context – given the regressiveness of funding measures 
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via bills, and problems faced by suppliers in targeting – it is recommended that 
WHDS should be discontinued when the current phase is over. Furthermore, it is 
suggested from a review of the available literature that some alternative models of 
economic support could prove valuable to fuel poor households. Whilst Ofgem has 
rejected social tariffs as non-compliant with the ‘polluter pays’ principle (and so are 
being phased out), Rising Block Tariffs would seem worthy of further consideration, 
certainly as energy efficiency levels increase, though these would require regulatory 
intervention to be enacted. Collective Switching should be treated cautiously as it has 
the potential to exacerbate inequalities, but current literature indicates that Charitable 
Trusts, Benefits Entitlement Advice and advice on energy tariffs all offer value to fuel 
poor households. However, delivery of these is minimised under the current structure 
of WHDS (see Figure 7.6). Energy companies may not be the most appropriate agents 
to deliver these more complex interventions given the significant potential for 
conflicts of interest, and consumer distrust of suppliers. However, they can play a 
valuable role, for example, in facilitating Restart schemes and referring customers for 
BEA. 
 
This chapter ends the part of this thesis that is focused on comparing the manner in 
which the state and suppliers manage the different elements involved in delivering 
fuel poverty mitigation schemes. The next chapter will integrate the conclusions 
drawn to provide a response to the overarching research question, critically examine 
overall findings and the contribution made, and offer recommendations based on this 
work, both for policy, and for future research. 
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8 | Discussion 
 
After close to a decade of stagnancy in fuel poverty policy, this research coincided 
with a period of crucial change. Whilst the specifics of delivery remain in flux, there 
has been an undeniable shift towards government holding energy companies 
accountable for the delivery of fuel poverty mitigation activity. Energy suppliers are 
now responsible for primary delivery of energy efficiency measures to low income 
households, and for the first time have been mandated to deliver economic support. 
This research set out to analyse the implications of this transference with regards to 
the policy goal of fuel poverty mitigation. The evaluation approach adopted has been 
to compare supplier and state delivery of current and previous fuel poverty mitigation 
programmes. A pragmatically mixed methodology has been applied, incorporating 
analysis of policy via documents, quantitative analysis, synthesis of existing literature, 
and interviews and engagement with energy industry professionals. These approaches 
have been combined as a means of exploring the efficacy of emergent policies, and 
identifying, as far as possible, relevant policy constraints.  
 
This chapter concludes the thesis by drawing together the findings to provide a 
response to the overarching research question, ‘what role is appropriate to the energy 
supplier in alleviating fuel poverty?’ The opening section gives an overview of 
findings, addressing the overarching research question, aims and objectives supplied 
in section 3.2.1. The second section then elucidates the core argument of this work: 
that energy suppliers have been designated as primary delivery agents for fuel poverty 
policy, not because they are the most appropriate agent, but because they are, 
economically and practically convenient. The third section discusses the two main 
identified limitations of this work, which pertain to restrictions in access to data, and 
potential constraints as to the extent that the LIHC definition can represent the real-
world experiences of households that are struggling to afford energy. The penultimate 
section outlines the contributions of this work, to current understanding of fuel 
poverty policy, to broader theory, and methodologically. The chapter then closes by 
delineating the key recommendations drawn from the results of this research, in terms 
of suggested improvements to fuel poverty policy, and of possible avenues for future 
research.  
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8.1 Overview of Findings 
 
The structure of this research was aligned with the identified policy process (see 
Figure 3.3), with mixed methods applied pragmatically to compare the probable 
implications of delivery agent choice on fuel poverty levels, taking into account 
policy constraints (as described in Table 3.2).  
 
Chapter Four examined the fuel poverty policy process, with a particular focus on 
the initial aims of government, as established via WHECA. Analysis of the Hansard 
debates determined that politicians did not appreciate the scale of the commitment 
they made in passing that legislation. However, WHECA was further undermined by 
the ‘practicability clause’, which effectively removed the legal constraint on 
government with regards to fuel poverty eradication. These factors together, it is 
argued, have motivated and facilitated government in moving incrementally towards a 
supplier-led delivery model of a type that was never anticipated when WHECA 
passed. Document analysis suggests that fuel poverty has been gradually subsumed 
into the larger, more politically demanding, goal of carbon mitigation, which is 
largely delivered by supplier obligations. The targets, milestones and metrics that 
politicians were so eager to embrace when WHECA passed were effectively 
immediately abandoned. Indeed, if they had been maintained when the UKFPS was 
written, the resource requirements might have been clearer from the start. 
 
Chapter Five considered the differing ability of the state and suppliers to effectively 
target and identify the presumed target group, fuel poor households. Initial 
examination of policy documents highlighted that even policies ostensibly aimed at 
reducing fuel poverty rarely evaluated success in reaching this target group, and 
quantitative analysis of EHS datasets showed that current criteria are extremely 
inefficient in this respect. It was subsequently demonstrated via literature review and 
interviews that suppliers are comparatively poorly placed to both identify fuel poor 
households, and those meeting government-endorsed eligibility criteria. Whilst the 
government is able to compel suppliers to seek out households, energy companies do 
not have the necessary data, e.g., on incomes, benefits receipt or housing quality. By 
contrast, the state does have access to much stronger data, but tends not to exploit it, 
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opting for more ‘passive’ methods of identification such as benefits supplementation. 
As a result of this policy approach, energy suppliers spend what is believed (though 
the data available is limited) to be significant resources in meeting their obligations, 
with the competitive nature of the model driving duplication of effort. Energy 
consumers will pay the resultant costs via bill increases. On these grounds, it is 
recommended that the state intervene to centralise identification functions. 
 
Chapter Six turned to programme funding. Here, the divide between suppliers and the 
state is stark; suppliers fund programmes through levies, whilst the state use 
Exchequer funds, collected by taxation. A process encompassing literature synthesis 
and meta-analysis estimated that the cost of raising all viable LIHC dwellings to an 
average SAP rating of 69 would be £57.9bn, which would take one hundred and 
twenty five years to complete at current ECO spending rates. However, the impact of 
this spending would be dampened under a supplier-led delivery model, as policies 
would be funded via energy bills, which are comparatively income inelastic. This has 
regressive implications, with those on the lowest incomes – many of whom would be 
fuel poor and not in receipt of measures - paying the most.  
 
It was further demonstrated that there is additional negative distributional effect 
affecting customers in fuel poverty, with those in the deepest fuel poverty paying the 
highest proportions of their income under a levy funded system (though the 
relationship was more complex when a tax funded policy was considered). One way 
to mitigate such effects would be simply to raise more money, but then subsequently 
spend enough to cancel out the costs more quickly, i.e., a more aggressive campaign 
of redistribution of the sort proposed by Energy Bill Revolution. However, it was 
argued that in view of the current level of ambition towards fuel poverty mitigation, 
this would seem unlikely. The use of levies (rather than taxes) to fund programme 
delivery is undoubtedly worse for fuel poverty, but does offer government the further 
political and economic incentives of keeping expenditure away from the public purse 
and restricting state involvement. 
 
Chapter Seven analysed the differences between the state and energy suppliers in 
terms of delivery models used. With respect to technical measures, a ‘white 
certificates’ market has been created around compliance, and suppliers are compelled 
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to deliver volumes of savings, or else face fines. By contrast, the state is likely simply 
to buy in measures via some form of procurement. There is an assumption that 
suppliers have an incentive to deliver at a lower cost; however, there is insufficient 
evidence to establish the extent to which this might work in practice. The fact that the 
state is able to legally compel suppliers to delivery enables it to be more demanding 
with regards to targets, and supplier obligations have been fairly successful to date. 
Furthermore, the supplier obligation model has the not-inconsiderable advantage of 
being already in place, and in placing delivery – and, by extension, the risk of failure 
– at a distance from government. Economic measures are more straightforward, in 
that (with some minor differences) the fundamental form of the intervention is 
effectively the same under either delivery agent, and there is little potential for 
efficiencies to be achieved. As such – in view of the fact that suppliers struggle to 
target households, and fund measures regressively – there is no compelling reason to 
retain the recently introduced supplier economic obligation.  
 
8.2 Contention of Work 
 
This work responded to the overarching research question, ‘what role is appropriate 
to the energy supplier in alleviating fuel poverty?’ That question assumes that 
somebody has a role in alleviating fuel poverty and – as explained in section 3.1.2 – 
this is taken to have been established through WHECA, which made fuel poverty 
eradication a legal responsibility of the state. However, as established in sections 
4.2.3 and 4.31, the law contains a significant loophole that weaken its effect and mean 
that, in practice, government can meet their legal requirement simply by making 
minimal effort to tackle fuel poverty. As a result, in the absence of an effective 
mandate, government have opted not to tackle fuel poverty in any concerted way, but 
simply to include an imprecise focus on low income households within larger, pre-
existing supplier obligations aimed chiefly towards carbon mitigation. 
 
In all the literature reviewed whilst undertaking this research – policy, grey and 
academic – never has any policymaker been cited as disagreeing that fuel poverty 
should be tackled. Whilst those on benefits have been the target of rhetoric that 
divides the population into ‘scroungers’ and ‘strivers’ (see Jowit 2013), such (highly 
questionable) judgements seem not to have been handed down to fuel poor 
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households. This is perhaps because, firstly, many older people (a valuable voting 
bloc) are fuel poor, certainly under the 10pct definition. Secondly, because of the 
confounding factor of housing quality as a determinant of fuel poor status, it is 
perhaps harder for politicians to cast aspersions and imply shirking of responsibility 
when it is so indisputably evident that the English housing stock is aging and 
inefficient. Furthermore, it is hard to believe that it is beyond the ability of 
government to take steps to tackle to problem; section 6.1.3 estimated that the cost of 
upgrading, where necessary, the dwellings of all 2.3m currently viable fuel poor 
households to SAP 69 – even assuming 73% leakage and 20% management 
overheads – would be £57.9bn, which would need to be spread over a number of 
years due to supply chain constraints. While this might seem an enormous amount of 
money, consider that in 2011/12 alone, £2.2bn was spent on WFPs, of which it is 
estimated that upwards of 90% went to non-fuel poor households (see Kennedy 
2013b: 29, section 5.1.2). If government spending on fuel poverty in the first decade 
post WHECA had been commensurate with the £23bn spent on WFP in that period 
(Kennedy 2013b: 29), the problem would be closer to solved. 
 
Given that it is possible to make significant inroads in tackling fuel poverty, the clear 
follow-up question is: why hasn’t this been done? The only apparent answer would 
seem to be a lack of political willpower to do so. Of all the policy constraints 
examined within this work, political constraints have been arguably the most 
consistent and most significant. This disinterest is even more jarring given the 
focused, technocratic policy community that exists around fuel poverty as a policy 
issue (see section 2.4.5). The lack of government commitment to fuel poverty is likely 
the product of a number of factors: political short-termism (see Oxford Martin 
Commission 2013); a lack of ‘electoral capital’ in the issue; that the benefit is 
somewhat confounded by the medium, i.e., the benefit of provision of insulation is 
less clear than, for example a equivalent cut to income tax. The commitment to 
tackling fuel poverty was undoubtedly lacking under the Labour government (see 
section 4.3.4); however, it seems to have deteriorated further since the election of the 
austerity-focused coalition government. Ambition towards energy efficiency more 
generally has fallen substantially under the Green Deal and ECO set of policies (see 
Figure 2.6). Essentially, the type of action required to reduce fuel poverty – a 
significant annual expenditure, ideally with focused state input to improve targeting 
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and reduce regressive impacts – conflicts with the coalition’s core goal, to “achieve 
cyclically-adjusted current balance”(HM Treasury 2010a: 1). The change to the 
definition and closure of Warm Front are not coincidence; both were included in that 
first spending review, with the specific aim of reducing public expenditure (see HM 
Treasury 2010b: 62). Shortly after election, David Cameron declared he wanted “the 
greenest government ever” (see Randerson 2010). Three years later, however, he was 
quoted as wanting to “get rid of all the green crap” (i.e., policies like ECO) from 
energy bills (see Mason 2013) as a means of bringing down prices before the election. 
Whilst the latter statement was not made in public, it seems representative of the 
approach taken by the coalition to date. 
  
Where successive governments have been successful – intentionally or otherwise – is 
in ‘muddying the water’ to the extent that it is difficult to clarify where problems are 
occurring (and so difficult to research, as will be discussed in section 8.3). Whilst 
annual statistics (but no strategy updates) continue to be released, there is no ‘road 
map’, no clarification of the effect individual policies are intended to have, who they 
are meant to target, or why. More information would, at this stage, simply be more 
detail as to where government has fallen short. Here, there are parallels with the 
government’s other poverty eradication target, the commitment to end child poverty 
made under the Child Poverty Act 2010 (see Brewer, Brewer & Joyce 2011, Dickens 
2011, Piachaud 2012) . Fuel poverty has emerged as a policy goal that requires more 
resources than governments have been prepared to commit, now an expensive policy 
objective inherited by an austerity-driven coalition government. Once a law has been 
passed, it takes another Act of Parliament to revoke it; this is not an easy process, and 
one that would draw further attention to the problems. As such, governments have 
appeared to go for the next best option: obscuring the lack of progression as far as is 
possible within the requirements of the law. 
 
Grafstein (1988) argues that the constraints imposed by political institutions have an 
inherent circularity; governments both create laws, and are subject to them. In the 
case of fuel poverty, the legislation was poorly constructed and ill informed, and 
government are left in the position of having to abide by the product of their own 
mismanagement. Approaching the issue from a policy analysis perspective, it is 
evident that fuel poverty policy has failed from the top-level statistics alone (see 
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Figure 1.1), and there are clear deficiencies with regard to both the management of 
policy (see section 4.4.1) and in dedicating sufficient resources. These shortcomings 
have been in place since the UKFPS was released thirteen years ago; they are not 
new. As such, it is argued that government have never tried in any meaningful sense 
to eradicate fuel poverty. Ideally government would have taken meaningful action 
from 2000, but they never did. Instead, they have moved towards outsourcing that 
responsibility to delivery agents who are, this thesis has posited, ill suited to that task. 
So, to return to the overarching question of what role is “appropriate” to the energy 
supplier in fuel poverty policy – if the intention of policy is to alleviate fuel poverty, 
the answer is: a minimal role. However, if the goal is to handle fuel poverty policy in 
the most politically advantageous way, cutting costs and keeping it at arms length, 
minimising risk, while still appearing to make some nominal effort to address the 
problem, suppliers clearly have something offer. 
 
8.3 Research Limitations 
 
Whilst every effort has been made to ensure that this work has been as comprehensive 
as possible within the natural limits of a thesis, inevitably there are some limits as to 
what can be concluded from findings. Numerous approaches would have been viable 
in addressing the overarching research question (see section 3.2.1 for justification of 
selection), and some of these are discussed in section 8.6.2 as possible routes for 
future research. However, two key limitations were encountered in taking the 
particular route selected here, and had an impact upon the final output. 
 
• Inaccessible Data 
 
The most prominent limitation was in accessing relevant data. As established in 
section 3.4.5, information on the internal working of energy suppliers is extremely 
difficult to access – even with E.ON UK as project sponsor – because of concerns 
around commercial confidentiality. Whilst this was understood as a barrier from the 
outset, it became apparent as the project progressed that government effectively 
present a further obstacle to data access. Only the state, with its legal authority, can 
compel suppliers to release data on their performance under obligations. Whilst 
government have a duty to ensure that confidentiality is sufficiently protected so as to 
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ensure markets function well, there are instances where doing so is in the public 
interest. It would appear that government have recognised that this is the case with 
regard to data of supplier obligation delivery, as anonymised information on ECO 
fulfilment costs is now available (see, for example, DECC 2014c: 27). This format 
protects individual suppliers, whilst enabling external stakeholders to assess 
performance. This helpful development should be applauded, but it comes only after 
two decades of supplier obligation delivery. As speculated in section 8.2, it may be 
that government have opted to not make data public because it reflects poorly on 
policy (i.e., in making the burden on bills transparent). Whatever the reasoning, the 
first twenty years of delivery represent a lost opportunity to understand the cost 
implications of supplier obligations, and now we find ourselves in a situation whereby 
energy companies are the main delivery agent. For the purposes of this project, it 
would have been possible to gain a much clearer picture of the implications of the 
shift with better data – both quantitative and qualitative – for example, on the costs of 
delivering given measures under Warm Front versus average supplier delivery, or 
with validated supplier data on the costs of targeting measures to compare with state 
programmes. It is difficult to have an informed discussion about policy options when 
information is so hard to come by, and it is worth questioning whether poverty 
reduction policy, particularly, should be impeded by efforts to sustain commercial 
confidentiality. 
 
• Understanding Everyday Impacts 
 
The second limitation relates to the extent to which this research can be said to assess 
the true implications of delivery agent choice for those living in cold homes. As 
justified extensively in section 2.1.4, the Hills definition was used as the key metric in 
this work because it is set to become the manner in which government assess policy, 
it is held to be more appropriate that the 10pct definition, and it considers fuel poverty 
as an inequality (i.e., relative), in line with current consensus on poverty 
measurement. However, whilst all of this may be valid, the available evidence 
suggests that objective measures of fuel poverty do not align with the perceptions of 
households, e.g., they often tend to consider themselves fuel poor when they do not 
meet the definition, or vice versa  (see Waddams Price, Brazier & Wang 2012) 
Furthermore – as considered throughout this work – assumptions about energy tariffs 
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and consumption are often inconsistent with the reality. This work has effectively 
assessed whether the state or suppliers are better at complying with the goals of 
policy, under those specific assessment conditions prescribed by government. It is 
important, then, to recognise the limitation that this doesn’t necessarily correspond to 
an assessment of whether the state or suppliers are better at delivering a situation that 
will result in more people feeling they are able to keep warm affordably. As such, 
there remains a risk that policies won’t address that core issue. 
 
Despite these recognised limitations, this work offers a valuable contribution in 
exploiting what data is currently available to evaluate government policy via its own 
yardstick. It is hoped that future research will be able to build on this work, assessing 
policy approaches via improved data and an increasing understanding of the problem. 
 
8.4 Contributions of Work 
 
The broad contribution of this work is in applying mixed-methods to offer a novel 
comparative analysis of the potential for the state and energy suppliers to effectively 
support fuel poor households, taking into account motivations for policy choices. In 
doing so, this work combines two topics that have rarely been explicitly considered 
together. Firstly, fuel poverty, on which there is a growing literature, but little work 
exploring the issue from a more political or social policy-led perspective. Secondly, 
the role of markets in delivering social welfare service, on which there is a significant 
literature (e.g., Taylor-Gooby, Lawson 1993, e.g., Gingrich 2011) but no work yet 
considering the (comparatively recent) growth of the private sector in addressing fuel 
poverty. This work has developed an original argument that the use of supplier 
obligations is effectively a ‘get-out clause’ for a government disinterested in fuel 
poverty, rather than a considered policy approach. In doing so, the link between 
politics and policy failings has been made explicit. The scope of this work also 
positions it as a contribution to a growing body of ‘austerity literature’ (e.g., Yeates et 
al. 2011, Levitas 2012)that examines the implications of the policies of the coalition 
government upon welfare. 
 
Subsidiary contributions of this work are as follows: 
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• An in-depth analysis of the process by which WHECA was passed established 
the disparity between the intentions of politicians and the interpretation of that 
legislation. It was further identified that suppliers were not originally intended 
as delivery agents and – via further document analysis – the incremental 
manner in which they have been drawn in, culminating in full responsibility 
for delivery of technical measures under ECO. 
• Quantitative assessment of the targeting efficacy of schemes currently in 
operation, including the most recent set of programmes. The implications of 
this for misdirection of spending were demonstrated. 
• An evidenced assessment of the ability of the state and suppliers to target and 
identify households established the different data available to each agent. This 
included a full review of data sources available to government with the 
potential to improve efficacy. The notion of active and passive targeting – a 
core difference between state and supplier delivery – was introduced.  
• A systematic review of literature relating to the costs of energy efficiency 
established that there is enormous variance in estimations, and catalogued the 
identified sources of uncertainty that could cause discrepancies. 
• Meta-analysis was used to establish a first known estimation of the potential 
costs of tackling LIHC fuel poverty. 
• The distributive effects of levy- and taxation-based funding were considered 
according to depth of LIHC fuel poverty gap. 
• The implications of three different delivery models were analysed and 
discussed with regard to the goal of fuel poverty alleviation. The models 
evaluated included a previously unconsidered model favoured by the coalition 
government in other domains, Payment-by-Results. 
• The potential for alternative economic interventions was considered, including 
some measures that have not previously been fully explored with regards to 
implications for fuel poverty, e.g., collective switching and ‘Restart’ schemes. 
 
This research also offers a methodological contribution, in the application of policy 
constraints as a tool of comparison. A set of policy constraint classifications, based 
largely upon those proposed by Dunn (2012) was selected as an explanatory device 
within analysis. Dunn’s suggested application was to real-world policymaking, as a 
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means by which the limits on policy could be catalogued. Here they have proved 
useful as a means of differentiating between the positions of the state and suppliers, 
enabling underlying dynamics to be effectively considered. That said, consideration 
of fuel poverty policy constraints could have a practical value, given that one way of 
improving policy may be to see where said constraints could be ‘loosened’. For 
example, if the legal constraint on access to Pension Credit data were loosened, 
identification of eligible households might be improved. 
 
Given the inherent pragmatism of policy, this work is consciously devoid of theory, 
though Pierson’s (2000) account of path dependency, and theories of the policy 
process (e.g., Hogwood and Gunn (1984)) have proved valuable to analysis. That 
said, the use of policy constraints as an explanatory tool has clear links to concepts 
used in governance theory, for example, the work of Ellen Immergut on institutional 
constraints (e.g., Immergut 1998, 2006). A key contribution of this work is in 
beginning to apply a similar theoretical approach to fuel poverty as a policy area, and 
one that is particularly interesting given the growing requirement that private industry 
participate in a system which is delivering social welfare functions via a governance 
approach that is increasingly regulatory. 
 
8.5 Final Recommendations 
 
The recommendations ensuing from these research findings fall into two sets; 
recommendations aimed towards policymakers, with a view to supporting improved 
delivery, and recommendations of potentially fruitful avenues for future research. 
 
8.5.1 Recommendations for Policy 
 
As befits a work of policy analysis, the primary recommendations of this work relate 
to ways in which the current approach could be adapted to better meet declared goals 
(i.e., the mitigation of fuel poverty) and in some instances, ways in which government 
might consider amending these goals to encourage outcomes that are closer to 
presumed intentions. The overall indication is that the state are the delivery agent best 
suited to fuel poverty alleviation; however as already discussed in section 8.2, there 
are reasons – primarily political – to think it unlikely that the role of government will 
 
 
341 
be significantly expanded in the near future. Assuming, then, that the overarching 
model will remain broadly similar to the current configuration, the following changes 
are suggested as having the potential to improve outcomes. 
 
• Policy Monitoring 
 
Fuel poverty policy has been plagued by monitoring issues almost since WHECA was 
passed, as detailed in section 4.4.1. In section 8.2, it was argued that these should not 
be assumed to be the product of negligence or incompetence, but that it is more likely 
an indication that the level of ambition is so low by comparison with the target set as 
to render the evaluation process ineffectual. Accordingly – given that raising the 
ambition of government with regards to fuel poverty is not something that can easily 
be accomplished – a first recommendation is that government should produce a more 
workable target, one which is achievable within short enough timescales that 
politicians cannot disown the commitment, and based on a considered assessment of 
the likely costs of activity, availability of expenditure, and the technical capacity of 
the energy efficiency industry. The obvious risk is that a new target would shift the 
goalposts too far in the opposite direction, resulting in unambitious policy. This 
would appear hard to avoid if those setting targets are the ones expecting to have to 
meet them; however, risks could be alleviated by an effective and transparent 
consultation, particularly given the enthusiasm of the policy community to participate 
in similar processes previously (see Hills 2012: 178-179, DECC 2012j: 7-8). 
Introducing a new, more achievable, target would make it harder for a government to 
justify – legally and politically – any failure to comply, and political attention could 
give the issue a renewed prominence. The WHECA legislation is amenable to 
considerable adjustment via secondary legislation (see section 4.2.2), but its retention 
would preserve those loopholes that have proved problematic (see section 4.2.3). The 
ideal would be to remove these, however, it seems highly unlikely that government 
would move to introduce new legislation that would be more demanding. 
 
The process of developing a new target should incorporate extensive consideration of 
the resources required in meeting that objective, so as to avoid pitfalls encountered in 
the first decade of fuel poverty policy. This should then be developed on an ongoing 
basis, accounting for changes (e.g., to fuel pricing) that could impact chances of 
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success. Developing and introducing in supplementary consensual or subjective 
measures of fuel poverty could further provide a valuable counterpoint to the Hills 
definition, particularly in addressing some of the definitional eccentricities of that 
measure and its operationalisation  (see discussion in section 2.1.3, also Moore 2012, 
ACE, CSE & Moore 2012, Gordon 2014) . Ideally, a quantitative road map of the sort 
endorsed by FPAG (see FPAG 2009: 5) could be used to model and assess the 
impacts of measures on the fuel poverty gap. This should consider the long-term 
impact of energy efficiency measures, but also the more temporary influence of 
economic measures. Whilst the latter do not represent an enduring answer to the 
problem of fuel poverty, there is a risk this means that researchers and policymakers 
overlook them; there is certainly less literature relating to economic measures than to 
technical solutions. However, given that a UK housing stock that is fully insulated 
against fuel poverty is years – if not decades – away, it is crucial that economic 
policies work effectively in combination, not as in ineffective and somewhat 
piecemeal stopgap. For example, it is suggested that policies tend to be targeted 
overwhelmingly towards particular groups (e.g., Pension Credit recipients), and the 
impact of those in combination is not considered in any policy documents identified 
by this work. Now is perhaps a particularly opportune time for such a review given 
the planned shift to Universal Benefit, which will change the nature of the types of 
benefits that are currently used to target economic fuel poverty interventions. The JRF 
(2014b) have recently suggested that the Office for Budget Responsibility, an 
independent advisory body of UK government, should be tasked with external 
monitoring of income and child poverty policies, and such a function could also prove 
valuable for fuel poverty. 
 
In summary, the recommendations for policy monitoring are as follows: 
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• Government should work with the fuel poverty policy community to establish a 
new fuel poverty policy target which is achievable, yet demanding. 
• A ‘road map’ should be developed which lays out in detail, including 
quantitatively, how this will be achieved (i.e., taking into account expected 
targeting efficacy of policies, anticipated volumes of delivery). 
• Progress towards the target should be stringently and consistently monitored, via 
quantitative metrics where possible. Introduce supplementary consensual and/or 
subjective measures for inclusion in official reporting. Any barriers that arise in 
complying with targets must be accounted for in annual revisions to the road map. 
• The road map should also consider how economic policies can serve effectively as 
short-term support for fuel poor households, particularly how they can achieve 
effective coverage in combination with technical interventions. 
 
 
• Improved Targeting 
 
Chapter Five identified that the current means of targeting fuel poverty policies are 
inefficient both in terms of achieving coverage and in avoiding leakage (see table 
5.2). This is potentially extremely problematic, both in terms of successfully reaching 
the households that are the object of policies, and in ensuring funds are effectively 
disbursed. Hills’ analysis found that the efficiency of targeting had a significant 
impact on policy outcomes, with only ‘narrowly focused’ archetypes succeeding in 
reducing long-term fuel poverty (see 2012: 169). 
 
The initial problem identified by this work is a lack of clarity in terms of the ‘target 
group’ of policies (see section 5.1.3). Policy documents emphasise a focus on the 
overlap between vulnerability and low income (DECC 2011h: 5), but the definition of 
vulnerability used encompasses 73% of the population (see section 5.1.3), with no 
prioritisation. This is particularly problematic with regards to WFP, for which every 
individual over sixty-three years of age is eligible, but of whom 93% are expected not 
to be fuel poor (see table 5.2). It would seem advisable to develop a rationale for these 
decisions, and to understand where true vulnerabilities lie. For example, it is notable 
that 82% of EWMs occurred amongst those aged 75 and over (ONS 2013e: 2) (see 
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DECC 2013i: 8-9). There is also limited evidence on the impacts of cold homes upon 
children (see section 2.3.2); a full review of the thermal comfort needs of a range of 
vulnerable groups could support better policy monitoring. If government remain keen 
to retain WFPs for political reasons (see section 5.4.1), it may, then, be appropriate to 
relabel it as a pension supplement. 
 
Having established an effective targeting strategy, the next step is to establish how 
these groups might best be reached. The findings communicated in Chapter Five 
indicated that suppliers are poorly placed – by comparison to the state – to do this, 
due to a relative dearth of information, and a required ‘active’ identification process 
that results in significant duplication of effort (see sections 5.2. and 5.3). Three 
adaptations were proposed as offering the potential to improve the situation; these 
comprised (in increasing order of difficulty) increased data-matching provisions, 
improved geographical targeting, and the establishment of a Fuel Poverty Data 
Observatory (see section 5.4.2). 
 
In summary, the recommendations for improving targeting are as follows: 
 
• Clearly identify and communicate which households fuel poverty policies are 
intended to support (i.e., additional vulnerable groups). This should be evidence-
based, and not limited to older people. 
• Where necessary, establish how policies might be effectively focused on those in 
need, e.g., via appropriate eligibility criteria, adaptions to policy evaluation 
process. In particular, it seems likely that Winter Fuel Payment will need to be 
reassessed. 
• Review means of improving identification, particularly where energy suppliers are 
to continue to play a role in delivery. Suggested enhancements include increased 
sharing of benefits data with suppliers, development of more sophisticated 
geographical proxies, and the establishment of a dedicated Fuel Poverty Data 
Observatory 
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• Exploration of Alternate Funding Mechanisms 
 
Chapter Six demonstrated that energy bill levies are an inherently more regressive 
means of funding policies than income taxation. Whilst a more ambitious policy 
approach (such as that endorsed by supporters of the Energy Bill Revolution 
campaign) could offset regressive impacts, it seems unlikely that a government 
focused on austerity would embrace a programme of this scale (see section 6.3.3). 
Further consideration goes beyond the scope of this work; however, it is suggested 
that a less regressive means of funding supplier-led delivery of energy efficiency 
measures would considerably increase the impact of schemes like ECO in supporting 
fuel poor households (or at least, not overly negatively impacting upon those who do 
not receive support). This is no straightforward proposition; the fact that suppliers are 
expected to fund measures as a cost of delivery is the incentive for cost-effective 
delivery that drives supplier obligations. It may be, however, that there is some way in 
which a taxation-funded part-subsidy could be given to suppliers, so that some of the 
competitive motivation remains (albeit slightly diminished), but some of the 
regressiveness is lessened. 
 
The recommendation made, then, is as follows: 
 
• Investigate whether any means of funding measures could be devised that would 
lessen regressive impacts, whilst still incentivising cost-effective delivery, e.g., 
some level of part-subsidy for suppliers. 
 
 
• Reconsidering the Warm Home Discount Scheme 
 
As argued in the conclusion to Chapter Seven, there are numerous reasons why 
supplier obligations might appeal to government as a means of delivering technical 
measures, not least that the model is so deeply entrenched that to change it would 
introduce significant political risk. As a result, despite the potential unsuitability of 
obligations as a means of tackling fuel poverty (e.g., because of regressive funding 
methods), change seems unlikely at this point. However, such constraints do not exist 
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for economic measures; WHDS only launched in 2011, and so economic supplier 
obligations are a relatively new phenomenon. As explored in section 7.2.1, supplier 
delivery offers no inherent benefit over state delivery; indeed, the benefit is likely 
limited by the regressive nature of funding. DECC’s impact assessment for WHDS 
indicates that they expect the scheme to be progressive, as the broad impact of what is 
effectively a cross-subsidy is predominantly in favour of low income households (see 
DECC 2011f: 24, also Baker 2011: 16). Regardless of any the political desire to keep 
expenditure away from the public purse, it is recommended that funding of WHDS 
should be transferred to the state when the current cycle concludes in 2016. It would 
then be possible to have the scheme continue as currently, but with government 
transferring money to suppliers with which to make the payments. Alternately, the 
government could develop a new state-led economic measure. Re-evaluation of the 
WHDS would also present an appropriate point at which to resolve issues with the 
inconsistency of eligibility criteria (as discussed in section 5.3.3), and perhaps to 
consider making Broader Group eligibility universal (as suggested by Baker 2011) so 
as to prevent qualifying households from missing out simply because they are not 
amongst the first to apply. 
 
As established in section 7.2.4, WHDS was designed explicitly as a replacement for 
the pre-existing Voluntary Agreement between suppliers and the state. This previous 
programme was primarily based upon offering social tariffs, a means of support that 
Ofgem have since renounced (see section 7.2.2). The literature review and synthesis 
reported in section 7.2.3 identified a number of ways in which suppliers can play a 
role in supporting fuel poor customers that effectively employs their position within 
the energy supply process. For example, as creditors, suppliers are positioned to 
support the delivery of ‘Restart’ schemes. Whilst suppliers may be inappropriate 
agents to convey advice on benefits eligibility and energy tariffs, they could be 
required to refer customers to an externally contracted agent (including through ECO 
delivery). Finally, Rising Block Tariffs could provide a means of ensuring essential 
energy is available at a lower price, though currently there is a risk that fuel poor 
households living in inefficient homes (or with otherwise high actual energy needs) 
would be penalised by such a system. However, as the housing stock becomes more 
efficient, RBTs could become an increasingly viable and equitable, though it would 
require that government mandates suppliers to comply. 
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In summary, the recommendations for Warm Home Discount Scheme are as follows: 
 
• After the current cycle concludes in 2016, the support currently offered under the 
Warm Home Discount Scheme should be reconfigured so that it is funded via 
general taxation. 
• At this stage, the eligibility criteria and scope should be reassessed to ensure 
support is consistently applied.  
• The ways in which suppliers can appropriately offer economic support (i.e., by 
virtue of their position) should be reviewed and, where suitable, integrated with 
technical obligations.  
• The potential of Rising Block Tariffs should be assessed on an ongoing basis, and 
enforced if and when the expected result is to increase equity and energy 
affordability.  
 
 
• Enhanced Data Collection and Dissemination 
 
As raised in section 8.3, access to data has been a particular barrier to this research. 
Whilst the nature of commercial organisations means that some data on energy 
suppliers will likely always be beyond the reach of investigators, two main ways have 
been identified in which government could intervene to make research of this type 
more practicable without compromising commercial confidentiality. Firstly, 
government can require that energy suppliers release more information on 
performance, anonymised as necessary. This could even be to the benefit of suppliers: 
for example, as discussed in section 5.3.3, suppliers have claimed that the costs of 
identifying eligible households are excessively high, but individual companies will 
not release details for commercial reasons. Requiring that these be released in 
anonymised form could shed light on the scale of the problem. Such an approach 
would furthermore be in line with government policy on improving the transparency 
and accountability of public services (see Cabinet Office 2014b). Secondly, the EHS 
is an extremely valuable resource for fuel poverty researchers, being the only resource 
of its size that combines detailed information on dwelling construction with data 
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relating to the demographics and income status of residents. Cuts to this survey (such 
as have previously occurred, see Inside Housing 2010) should be avoided for risk of 
reducing the potential of a valuable source of information. Ideally, the data would be 
enriched further, for example, incorporating data on actual unit price paid by 
households, and real-world consumption. These could be gathered via the Energy 
Follow Up Survey, or via the collection methods used for NEED as referenced in 
section 5.2.2. The most recent version of the EHS included a very small number of 
questions on individuals’ experiences of maintaining warmth in the home (DCLG 
2012a: 70). These could be expanded and linked to a formalised subjective or 
consensual measure of fuel poverty, as suggested in section 8.3. 
 
In summary, the recommendations for data collection and dissemination are as 
follows: 
 
• Government should collect, anonymise, and release as much data on supplier 
obligation performance as is feasible without compromising commercial 
confidentiality in such a way as might harm the cost-effectiveness of delivery. 
• The English Housing Survey should be maintained, and ideally augmented with 
data on real-world energy tariffs and usage. The interview element of the survey 
could incorporate more questions on experiences of energy affordability, which in 
turn might be reported alongside official fuel poverty statistics or used as the basis 
for a subjective or consensual measure. 
 
 
8.5.2 Recommendations for Future Research 
 
Fuel poverty continues to evolve as an area for research, and many avenues remain 
open for future work. Three particular themes are identified here as potentially 
valuable, all of which build from this work. 
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• Micro-level Delivery 
 
Section 3.1.2 justified the decision to approach this topic from a macro perspective, 
evaluating the manner in which multiple social policies are delivered by two delivery 
agents with the aim of tackling fuel poverty at the national level. A natural next step 
would be to shift focus to the micro-level, and consider particular elements of 
delivery. There would, of course, be an immediate barrier to handling such a study as 
a comparison, given that no state-led technical scheme is currently running and so 
supplier obligations would be the only active object of examination. This work has 
established that suppliers are not so well suited as the state to meet the goals of fuel 
poverty policy; however, it would appear that they are set to be tasked with delivering 
technical measures, at least, for the foreseeable future. As such, one possible focus for 
future work would be in establishing how individual elements could be adjusted to 
improve outcomes, and how the state might play a role in this. For example, 
considering in detail the kinds of options for improved targeting discussed in section 
5.4.2, establishing how data sources might be combined to greater effect in policy. 
Future research could also consider the ways in which suppliers engage with the 
recipients of interventions and the impact this has upon policy success and obligation 
compliance, as well as for the experiences of fuel poor homes. Previous research – 
including this work – has tended to focus on delivery ‘best practice’ in energy 
efficiency delivery, but not individual-level experiences as recipients of supplier 
obligations specifically. It could be valuable to consider how and why suppliers 
engage in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) work above and beyond what is 
mandated of them. For example, Probert (2010)explored the potential for better 
customer relations to improve payment rates and reduce the incidence of customers 
defaulting upon debts. Another potential area of study would be the extent to which 
fuel poor customers may not be viewed as ‘desirable’ by energy suppliers (given their 
low income status), and how this might have an impact on delivery. Evaluation at this 
level would introduce different areas for consideration, as supplier staff will not be 
the only agents engaging with customers; in large part, it will be contractors, unless 
there is debt involved. Research of this type would be subject to significant barriers, 
as it would require access to suppliers who, as this research has found, have a desire 
to retain commercial confidentiality, and may not be willing to publicly contemplate 
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the profitability of poor fuel poor customers. It would also require the involvement of 
consumers who may themselves be difficult to identify and engage. 
 
• Political Theory 
 
One of the objectives of this work was to introduce consideration of political drivers 
of policy in a way that previous literature has tended to avoid (see section 3.2.1). The 
approach taken here was consciously pragmatic, as befits a social policy perspective 
(see section 3.1.2), and the focus has been on making a contribution that is empirical 
rather than theoretical. That said, the work has touched upon a number of theoretical 
concepts from social policy and – in particular – new institutionalism; most notably 
path dependency, but also policy networks and constraints. The appropriate roles of 
the state and the market in delivering public services are undoubtedly amongst the 
major topics of study in political and economic theory of the last century. This work 
has made some headway in extending this consideration to the social problem of fuel 
poverty in England. There is certainly further scope for philosophical debate around 
the role of the market in delivery of energy efficiency measures. This is a social 
problem that presents a particularly interesting case, in this respect, as it requires 
large-scale investment that is often beyond the capabilities of individuals, and so 
presents a strong case for intervention. In The Road to Serfdom, Friedrich Hayek – 
considered by many to be the father of classical liberalism – famously argues against 
state intervention. However, even in that definitive defence of freedom, Hayek 
recognises that there are some areas in which government should play a role. These 
include environmental issues(Hayek 2006: 40)and in ensuring that all individuals can 
access, “some minimum of food, shelter and clothing, sufficient to preserve 
health”(Hayek 2006: 124-125)Even within the confines of a continued neoliberal 
approach, a case might be made that intervention on fuel poverty is necessary to 
enable all adequate shelter. Whatever the case, this work has demonstrated where 
politics is fundamental to the decisions made, as the current dominant ideological 
emphasis on austerity, low income taxes and the liberalisation of energy markets – 
along with institutional structure – play a definitive role in shaping approaches to fuel 
poverty. A more theoretical consideration could extend the generalisability of this 
work to alternative political contexts. 
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• Beyond England 
 
This work focused upon the English case, for reasons explained in section 3.2.2. The 
most apparent next step as far as scope is concerned would be to consider the 
implications for the devolved nations. Effects may vary from those experienced in 
England because, for example, there are variances in the housing stock, fuel mix, and 
demographic compositions(DECC 2013c: 18-19)The political configuration of 
devolved governments are different, and a different set of energy companies are in 
operation in Northern Ireland (see Utility Regulator 2013: 15)After the UK, Europe 
presents a clear potential for further investigation given comparative similarities in the 
climatic conditions, housing stock and political institutional structures. Indeed, some 
early dissemination of this work has reflected on the implications of findings for EU 
member states(see Probert 2010, Probert 2014)Whilst a growing body of work 
considers the incidence and experience of fuel poverty in the EU  (e.g., Tirado 
Herrero, Ürge-Vorsatz 2012, Bouzarovski, Petrova & Sarlamanov 2012) little of this 
work takes a policy perspective, for example, in considering the use of supplier 
obligations in countries such as Denmark and France, and the implications for low 
income households. The UK has long been at the forefront of fuel poverty policy 
(thanks in large part to the pivotal research of Brenda Boardman, along with a 
dynamic fuel poverty policy community), and as such can offer something in the way 
of lessons learned – both positive and negative – to countries like France and Austria, 
who have more recently begun to forge their own way in tackling the problem. 
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9 | Conclusion 
 
Illness is neither an indulgence for which people have to pay, nor an offence 
for which they should be penalised, but a misfortune, the cost of which should 
be shared by the community. 
 
Aneurin Bevan, 1948 (cited by Bevan Commission 2011: 2) 
 
The communal solution famously endorsed by Bevan was introduced under the 
National Health Service Act 1946. Clear parallels exist between the problem 
described above and that of fuel poverty. The majority of England's housing stock 
was built before 1945 (DCLG 2013d: 12) and so fuel poverty is largely an inherited 
problem, with those living in low quality housing having little choice in the matter; it 
is neither ‘indulgence’ nor ‘offence’. Furthermore – as with health services – the cost 
of energy efficiency measures is often prohibitively high, introducing a need for 
government intervention. Even Friedrich Hayek, the father of neoliberalism, held the 
state should play a role in ensuring all can achieve a decent standard of living, 
including adequate shelter (Hayek 2006: 124-125).  
 
This thesis has addressed the research question, ‘what role is appropriate to the 
energy supplier in alleviating fuel poverty?’ with the conclusion: a minimal one, if 
fuel poverty alleviation is the true goal of policy. For a start, suppliers are poorly 
situated to know who is fuel poor because (as might be expected) they hold little of 
the required information with regard to customers’ incomes and dwellings. The 
market-based instrument of supplier obligations is designed to incentivise cost 
effectiveness in the conveyance of technical measures by requiring suppliers to absorb 
costs of delivery. However, this results in commensurate regressive impacts, as 
measures must be funded via bills, or risk the loss of some of that theoretical cost-
effectiveness that is the incentive in the first place. For economic measures, the 
rationale underlying supplier obligations as a mode of delivery is even weaker, as 
there is little efficiency to be achieved when simply distributing money. 
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Ultimately, fuel poverty does not lend itself to being easily resolved via market 
forces, in part because the parameters of the problem are so complex. This is not to 
say that suppliers have no role in supporting fuel poor customers. Involvement in the 
(highly profitable) market for an essential good should come with a moral duty 
towards customers, particularly those who are vulnerable. It should perhaps go 
without saying that suppliers should treat customers well, and not disconnect (or act 
in such a way as to encourage the self-disconnection of) of any household, 
particularly those that are vulnerable. However, such behaviours are not themselves a 
means of addressing fuel poverty (as defined in policy); there is a line between 
suppliers behaving in a way that is socially responsible, and in actually taking a role 
in alleviating fuel poverty. The selection of policy mechanisms should be about 
ensuring the best outcomes for fuel poor households, rather than selecting an 
inadequate response because it better suits the economic approach and ideology of 
government.  Today’s energy market was created by government, in the hope that the 
pursuit of profit would drive more efficient delivery. To then criticise said market for 
doing exactly that would seem hypocritical on the part of the state. Here, there are 
clear parallels with the ineffectual regulation of the banking sector that was a major 
cause of recent periods of economic recession (see Gamble 2009). One might further 
argue that capitalism both created the inequalities that are the root cause of fuel 
poverty (i.e., in income, and in variations in the housing stock), and continues to 
perpetuate them via the new role of markets in delivering support to that group. There 
is also an inconsistency in the fact that neoliberal governments tend away from 
intervention in markets, but in this case impose significant obligations on private 
companies. The result is a weak, incoherent, inconsistent middle ground, with energy 
suppliers fulfilling a task to which they are unsuited, but compelled to continue to 
deliver. A core problem identified by this research is that WHECA, which was 
initially intended as little more as an expression of good faith by policymakers, 
became a burden on government. Fuel poverty alleviation is high cost, politically low 
yield, operationally complex, and – on occasion – conflicts with carbon mitigation 
goals. Given the identified weakness of the legislative incentive, the lack of political 
impetus to tackle the problem, and the current political pursuit of austerity and a 
limited role for the state, supplier obligations are likely to be viewed as a delivery 
mechanism ‘appropriate’ to the broader aims of government, if not to optimal fuel 
poverty mitigation. 
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The most convincing justification here identified for the maintenance of supplier 
obligations is, effectively, that they are already in place, and it would be difficult at 
this stage to develop an alternative, state-led market. That said, policies continue to 
evolve. Since the data collection period of this research concluded, there has been a 
continuing stream of amendments to energy efficiency policy, including a 
consultation on the future of ECO (DECC 2014f); a proposal for a new fuel poverty 
strategy, encompassing a suggested target that is aligned with the ‘SAP 69’ 
programme modelled in Chapter Six of this work (though with the ‘practicable’ 
loophole intact) (HM Government 2014); and a further proposal on required energy 
efficiency standards within the private rented sector (DECC 2014i), an area of 
particular relevancy given that these households are 2.6 times more likely to be fuel 
poor than the wider population (see Table 5.7). There have been fewer amendments to 
economic policies, though these are arguably easier to change, in part because the 
logistical requirements of delivery are less burdensome; it is a core recommendation 
of this work that WHDS be reassessed when this phase of the policy concludes in 
2016. 
 
The necessary shift to a low carbon economy in the face of climate change is 
unquestionably one of the greatest challenges of the age. In the UK, demand 
management is likely to comprise a significant element of any successful transition 
(see HM Government 2010: 94-124) and so it is vital to ensure that delivery of this is 
equitable. A true commitment to fuel poverty eradication could reduce carbon 
emissions whilst also boosting the economy and improving the lives of those on the 
lowest incomes.  Such an approach is not unheard of in economies similar to that of 
the UK; the German Energiewende, though not without problems of its own (see 
Dehmer 2013), certainly displays a level of ambition above and beyond what has yet 
been seen in the UK. The choice is fundamentally a political one, and at present the 
desire for lower taxes and reduced public spending dominates. If fuel poverty is to be 
eradicated, government need a realistic goal, a workable plan, strong data and – 
perhaps most importantly – resources and commitment. And unless the state are 
prepared to exhibit greater ambition in ensuring an equitable transition, the fuel poor 
will continue to be left behind. 
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Appendix 1 | Methodological Appendix 
 
 
A1.1 Core Document Coding Categories 
 
The codes used to analyse policy documents were established in the preliminary 
stages of research, whilst evaluating the fuel poverty policy process (see section 3.3) 
and drawing up aims and objectives (see section 3.2), and then piloted during the 
initial scoping review of literature (see section 3.4.4). Codes were purposely kept to a 
minimum in view of the sheer volume of material under consideration; a ‘light touch’ 
was applied in initially analysis, and more detailed undertaken once documents had 
been broken down. Table A1.1 lists the codes applied; documents analysed are listed 
as references due to space constraints. 
 
Table A1.1: Codes used in policy document analysis 
 
Definitional Issues Implementation 
Distributional Impacts Performance Data 
Economic State 
Energy Supplier Targeting 
Environmental Issues Technical 
 
Codes were only universally applied to policy documents and interview transcripts 
(see section A1.7) for the most part, though similar mark-ups proved helpful as a 
means to obtain a consistency of analysis in reviewing broader literature. Each 
document was considered at least twice, though some of the more significant and 
technically orientated documents had to be appraised many more times (for example, 
DECC 2012, Ofgem 2013). Coding was primarily applied in the Preview PDF editor, 
occasionally by hand on some of the more complex documents (making use of colour 
mark-up for ease). 
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A1.2 Analysis of Hansard  
 
All WHECA debates were downloaded for analysis from the UK Parliament website, 
as listed in Table A1.2. Note that sometimes a stage in the passage of a bill may not 
involve any debate, for example, the first reading tends to be a formality (see 
Parliament.uk 2014). Parliament has many esoteric traditions and customs that can 
make processes difficult for outsiders to understand. For an explanation of these (with 
particular reference to the House of Commons), see House of Commons Information 
Office (2010). 
 
Table A1.2: WHECA Hansard debates included in analysis 
 
Date House Stage Title 
10th March 2000 Commons Second Reading 
4th April 2000 Commons Money Resolution 
5th April 2000 Commons Standing Committee First Sitting 
12th April 2000 Commons Standing Committee Second Sitting 
21st July 2000 Commons Third Reading 
13th October 2000 Lords Second Reading 
 
As established in Chapter Four, the analysis process used was iterative; each 
transcript was considered twice, and following first pass-through any themes not 
satisfied by the predetermined category set (which were based largely on those used 
for policy documents and interview transcripts, see Table A1.1) were then added and 
applied on second consideration, as shown in Table A1.3. 
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Table A1.3: Coding categories applied in analysis of WHECA debates 
 
Pre-Established Codes 
Carbon Emissions Income Poverty 
Charities Local Authorities 
Cold Weather Deaths NHS 
Definitional Issues Older People 
Devolved Administrations Performance Data 
Distributional Impacts Role of the State 
Economic Rural 
Energy Supplier State 
Environmental Issues Targeting 
Fuel Prices Technical 
Implementation Urban 
Codes Established During Analysis 
Budgetary Concerns Medical 
Child or Family Poverty Methodology 
Crime Reduction Parliamentary Process 
General Implementation Personal Responsibility 
Geography Political Philosophy 
Health (not of older people) Social Problems 
Insulation (specific) Social Tariffs (specific) 
Landlords  
 
A1.3 Supplementary Quantitative Methodological Information 
 
The primary quantitative analysis in this work is based upon the 2011 English 
Housing Survey (DCLG 2013b), with the broad approach described in section 3.4.3. 
A detailed account of the EHS survey methodology is provided in DCLG 
supplementary publications(2013e, 2013b), and research development included 
survey specific training on the EHS methodology (see section A2.2). To summarise 
the process, an initial systemic random household sample is drawn from the Royal 
Mail’s Small User Postcode Address File. Some sub-sampling is then employed to 
ensure that all tenure-types are sufficiently represented so as to facilitate reliable 
analysis. This sample is then released to interviewers, who conduct a computer-
assisted routed survey which includes detailed questions on demographics, 
satisfaction with accommodation and neighbourhood, tenancy status, occupation, and 
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income(full questionnaire at DCLG 2012a). Further sub-sampling is then applied to 
those households for which a physical survey is possible (i.e., where the household is 
either vacant or the occupant consents) to ensure the final ‘paired’ sample (the sample 
for which both interview and physical data is available) is reliably representative of 
the population. Qualified building surveyors then undertake full physical surveys, 
which includes consideration of dwelling size, age, and space heating(see full survey 
document at DCLG/BRE 2012). 
The EHS dataset analysed in this work was downloaded from the UK Data Archive, 
with the usage purpose registered. The particular version used was the 2011 EHS 
Housing Stock Dataset, which holds data on both the physical characteristics of the 
home and from the household interview with occupants (as opposed to the EHS 
Household Dataset, which only includes the latter). The sample size for this was 
14,386 (with no vacant dwellings), which weights to just under 22m households. The 
specific tables used in analysis were the general, interview and physical derived tables 
(general_10plus11.sav, interview_10plus11.sav and physical_10plus11.sav), as well 
as the energy performance table (energy_performance_10plus11.sav). These were 
merged on the unique household identifier (aacode) and weighted by the provided 
variable (aagph1011) to create a single dataset that served as the basis for the 
quantitative analysis reported in this thesis. 
 
A requirement of analysis – particularly that on targeting – was the development of 
dummy variables that signalled whether or not a given household qualified for 
particular policies. Earlier issues of the dataset used for preliminary analysis (e.g., 
DCLG 2011, DCLG 2012) did not include any such variable, however, the 2013 
release included pre-established variables signifying eligibility for Warm Front, 
CERT PG and SPG and ECO HHCRO. For the remaining schemes, dummy variables 
were created: the processes for these are described in Table A1.4. 
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Table A1.4: Development of dummy variables signifying scheme eligibility 
 
Scheme Process Notes 
CESP True if household is in the lowest decile 
ranked according to IMD (Imd1010 = 1). 
The actual indicator is based only on 
the income component of the IMD 
measure (see CAG Consultants et al. 
2011: 20). This information is not 
available in the EHS, and so the full 
indicator was substituted. 
CWP True if household is in receipt of Income 
Support, Jobseeker’s Allowance or 
Employment and Support Allowance AND 
household contains someone under 5, over 65 
of long-term sick or disabled ((DECC_IS = 1 
OR DECC_JSA = 1 OR DECC_ESA =1) 
AND (pyngx < 5 OR ageoldx >= 65 OR 
hhltsick = 1). 
These eligibility criteria are 
particularly difficult to approximate 
given the available data. To test 
validity, checked that number 
eligible corresponded reasonably 
closely with number listed in actual 
receipt (i.e., within 5%). 
Decent 
Homes 
Programme 
True if property is social housing (tenure2x = 
2) AND property does not meet the Decent 
Homes Standard (dhomesy = 0). 
Decent Homes Standard applied 
according to the Housing Health and 
Safety Rating System (HHSRS) 15 
model. 
WFP True if someone in the household is over 61 
(ageoldx>=62). 
Actual eligibility is based on 
birthdate, however, as this level of 
detail is not included in the EHS, 
age in years was used as an 
approximation. 
WHDS Core 
Group 
True if in receipt of Pension Credit Guarantee 
Credit (DECC_PCguar = 1). 
Eligibility criteria change year-on-
year; applied criteria from scheme 
year one (Ofgem 2013: 11). 
 
Estimations of ECO CSCO efficiency were not conducted within SPSS due to lack of 
relevant data; the process by which this was undertaken is described in section 5.1.2. 
 
! !
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A1.4 Ethical Clearance Checklist 
 
ETHICAL(ADVISORY(COMMITTEE(
 
 
Ethical Clearance Checklist 
(TO BE COMPLETED FOR ALL INVESTIGATIONS INVOLVING HUMAN 
PARTICIPANTS) 
 
If your research is being conducted off-campus and ethical approval has been 
granted by an external ethics committee, you may not need to seek full approval 
from the University Ethical Advisory Committee.  However you will be expected 
to provide evidence of approval and the terms on which this approval has been 
granted. 
If you believe this statement applies to your research, please contact the Secretary of 
the Ethical Advisory Committee for confirmation. 
 
If your research is transferring into Loughborough University and approval was 
obtained from your originating institution, there is a requirement on the 
University to ensure that appropriate approvals are in place. 
If you believe this statement applies to your research, please contact the Secretary of 
the Ethical Advisory Committee with evidence of former approval and the terms on 
which this approval has been granted. 
 
It is the responsibility of the individual investigators to ensure that there is 
appropriate insurance cover for their investigation. 
If you are at all unsure about whether or not your study is covered, please contact the 
Finance Office to check. 
Section A: Investigators 
Title$of$Investigation$
The Role of the Energy Supplier in Fuel Poverty Alleviation      
 
Name, Status and Email Address of Senior Investigators (University Staff 
Research Grade II and above): 
(Please underline responsible investigator where appropriate) 
Dennis Loveday, Professor (d.l.loveday@lboro.ac.uk) 
Victoria Haines, Research Fellow (v.j.haines@lboro.ac.uk) 
 
Department: School of Civil and Building Engineering (Dennis 
Loveday)/Loughborough Design School (Victoria Haines) 
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Name, Status and Email Address of Other Investigators (other University Staff 
and Students): 
Lauren Probert, PhD Student (l.probert@lboro.ac.uk) 
 
Department: School of Civil and Building Engineering 
 
A1. Do investigators have previous experience of, and/or adequate training in, the 
methods employed? 
Yes  No†   †If No, Please provide details below 
 
A2. Will junior researchers/students be under the direct supervision of an experienced 
member of staff? 
Yes  No†  †If No, Please provide details below 
 
A3. Will junior researchers/students be expected to undertake physically invasive 
procedures (not covered by a generic protocol) during the course of the research? 
Yes†  No  †If Yes, Please provide details below 
 
A4. Are researchers in a position of direct authority with regard to participants (eg 
academic staff using student participants, sports coaches using his/her athletes in 
training)? 
Yes†  No  †If Yes, Please provide details below 
 
If you have selected one of the answers above marked with an † please provide 
additional information on how you intend to manage the issues (please continue 
onto a separate sheet if required), then submit this checklist to the Secretary to 
the EAC: 
      
Section B: Participants 
 
Vulnerable Groups 
Will participants be knowingly recruited from one or more of the following 
vulnerable groups? 
 
B1. Children under 18 years of age     Yes#  No  
(please refer to published guidelines) 
B2. People over 65 years of age     Yes#  No  
B3. Pregnant women       Yes#  No  
B4. People with mental illness     Yes#  No  
B5. Prisoners/Detained persons     Yes#  No  
B6. Other vulnerable group (please specify      )   Yes#  No  
 
If you have answered ‘No’ to questions B1-B6, please now go to Section C 
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#  If the procedure is covered by an existing generic protocol which refers 
specifically to the vulnerable group(s), please insert reference number here       
If the procedure is not covered by an existing generic protocol, please submit a 
full application to the Ethical Advisory Committee 
 
Chaperoning Participants  
If appropriate, e.g. studies which involve vulnerable participants, taking physical 
measures or intrusion of participants' privacy:  
 
B7. Will participants be chaperoned by more than one investigator at all times? 
Yes  No*  N/A†  †If N/A, please provide details below 
 
B8. Will at least one investigator of the same sex as the participant(s) be present 
throughout the investigation? 
Yes  No*  N/A†  †If N/A, please provide details below 
 
B9. Will participants be visited at home? 
Yes*  No  N/A†  †If N/A, please provide details below 
 
* Please submit a full application to the Ethical Advisory Committee. 
 
If you have selected one of the answers above marked with an † please provide 
additional information on how you intend to manage the issues (please continue 
onto a separate sheet if required), then submit this checklist to the Secretary to 
the EAC: 
      
Section C:  Methodology/Procedures  
 
To the best of your knowledge, please indicate whether the proposed study: 
 
C1. Involves taking bodily samples     Yes#  No   
 (please refer to published guidelines) 
C2. Involves using samples previously collected with consent  
for further research       Yes#  No   
C3. Involves procedures which are likely to cause physical, psychological, social or 
emotional distress to participants    Yes#  No   
C4. Is designed to be challenging physically or psychologically in any way (includes 
any study involving physical exercise)   Yes#  No  
 
# If the procedure is covered by an existing generic protocol, please insert 
reference number here       
If the procedure is not covered by an existing generic protocol, please submit a 
full application to the Ethical Advisory Committee 
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C5. Exposes participants to risks or distress greater than those encountered in their 
normal lifestyle      Yes*  No  
C6. Involves collection of body secretions by invasive methods Yes*  No  
C7. Prescribes intake of compounds additional to daily diet or other dietary 
manipulation/supplementation     Yes*  No  
C8. Involves testing new equipment    Yes*  No  
C9. Involves pharmaceutical drugs     Yes*  No  
 (please refer to published guidelines) 
C10. Involves use of radiation    Yes*  No  
(please refer to published guidelines).  Investigators should contact the 
University’s Radiological Protection Officer before commencing any research 
which exposes participants to ionising radiation – e.g. x-rays). 
C11. Involves use of hazardous materials    Yes*  No  
 (please refer to published guidelines) 
C12. Assists/alters the process of conception in any way  Yes*  No  
C13. Involves methods of contraception    Yes*  No  
C14. Involves genetic engineering     Yes*  No  
* If you have answered ‘Yes’ to any of the above please submit a full application 
to the Ethical Advisory Committee 
 
C15. Involves testing new equipment    Yes†  No  
† If you have answered ‘Yes’ to C15 please provide more information below 
(please continue onto a separate sheet if required), then submit this checklist to 
the Secretary to the EAC.  Please attach a description of the new equipment and 
a risk assessment. 
 
Section D: Observation/Recording  
D1. Does the study involve observation and/or recording of participants?  
Yes  No  If No, please go to Section E 
If Yes, 
D2. Will those being observed and/or recorded be informed that the observation 
and/or recording will take place?     Yes  No*  
 
* Please submit a full application to the Ethical Advisory Committee 
Section E: Consent and Deception  
 
E1. Will participants give informed consent freely?  
Yes  If yes please complete the Informed Consent section below.  
No*  *If no, please submit a full application to the Ethical Advisory 
Committee.  
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Note: where it is impractical to gain individual consent from every participant, it is 
acceptable to allow individual participants to "opt out" rather than "opt in". 
Informed Consent 
E2. Will participants be fully informed of the objectives of the investigation and all 
details disclosed (preferably at the start of the study but where this would interfere 
with the study, at the end)?     Yes  No*  
 
E3. Will participants be fully informed of the use of the data collected (including, 
where applicable, any intellectual property arising from the research)? 
        Yes  No*  
 
E4. For children under the age of 18 or participants who have impairment of 
understanding or communication: 
- will consent be obtained (either in writing or by some other means)? 
Yes  No*  N/A  
- will consent be obtained from parents or other suitable person? 
       Yes  No*  N/A  
- will they be informed that they have the right to withdraw regardless of parental/ 
guardian consent?     Yes  No*   N/A  
 
E5. For investigations conducted in schools, will approval be gained in advance from 
the Head-teacher and/or the Director of Education of the appropriate Local Education 
Authority      Yes  No*   N/A  
 
E6. For detained persons, members of the armed forces, employees, students and 
other persons judged to be under duress, will care be taken over gaining freely 
informed consent?     Yes  No*   N/A  
 
* Please submit a full application to the Ethical Advisory Committee 
 
Deception 
E7. Does the study involve deception of participants (ie withholding of information or 
the misleading of participants) which could potentially harm or exploit participants?  
     Yes  No  If No, please go to Section F 
If yes,  
E8. Is deception an unavoidable part of the study?   Yes  No*  
E9. Will participants be de-briefed and the true object of the research revealed at the 
earliest stage upon completion of the study?   Yes  No*  
E10. Has consideration been given on the way that participants will react to the 
withholding of information or deliberate deception?  Yes  No*  
 
* Please submit a full application to the Ethical Advisory Committee 
 
Section F: Withdrawal  
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F1. Will participants be informed of their right to withdraw from the 
investigation at any time and to require their own data to be destroyed?
 Yes  No*  
 
* Please submit a full application to the Ethical Advisory Committee 
Section G: Storage of Data and Confidentiality 
 
Please see University guidance on Data Collection and Storage 
 
G1. Will all information on participants be treated as confidential and not identifiable 
unless agreed otherwise in advance, and subject to the requirements of law? 
        Yes  No*  
G2. Will storage of data comply with the Data Protection Act 1998?  
 (Please refer to published guidelines)   Yes  No*  
G3. Will any video/audio recording of participants be kept in a secure place and not 
released for use by third parties?      Yes  No*  
G4. Will video/audio recordings be destroyed within ten years of the completion of 
the investigation?      Yes  No*  
G5. Will full details regarding the storage and disposal of any human tissue samples 
be communicated to the participants?   Yes  No*  
 
* Please submit a full application to the Ethical Advisory Committee 
Section H: Incentives  
 
H1. Have incentives (other than those contractually agreed, salaries or basic expenses) 
been offered to the investigator to conduct the investigation? 
   Yes†  No    †If Yes, Please provide details 
below 
H2. Will incentives (other than basic expenses) be offered to potential participants as 
an inducement to participate in the investigation?  
   Yes†  No    †If Yes, Please provide details 
below 
 
If you have selected one of the answers above marked with an † please provide 
additional information on how you intend to manage the issues (please continue 
onto a separate sheet if required), then submit this checklist to the Secretary to 
the EAC: 
      
 
Section I: Work Outside of the United Kingdom  
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G1. Is your research being conducted outside of the United Kingdom? 
   Yes  No     
If Yes, you may need additional insurance cover/clearance for your research.  
 
If, having completed this checklist, you will be making a full application to the EAC 
this issue will be checked for you as a part of the process.  If however you do not need 
to complete a full application please contact Hiten Patel (H.Patel@lboro.ac.uk). 
 
Section I: Declarations 
 
Checklist Application only: 
If you have completed the checklist to the best of your knowledge without 
selecting an answer marked with an * or †, your investigation is deemed to 
conform with the ethical checkpoints and you do not need to seek formal approval 
from the University's Ethical Advisory Committee.  Please sign the declaration 
below, and lodge the completed checklist with your Head of Department or his/her 
nominee. 
Declaration 
I have read the University’s Code of Practice on Investigations on Human 
Participants. I confirm that the above named investigation complies with published 
codes of conduct, ethical principles and guidelines of professional bodies associated 
with my research discipline.     Please sign below 
 
Checklist with additional information to the Committee: 
If, upon completion of the checklist you have ONLY selected answers which 
require additional information to be submitted with this checklist (indicated by a 
†), please ensure that all the information is provided in detail and send this 
checklist to the Secretary to the EAC. 
 
Full Application Needed: 
If on completion of the checklist you have selected one or more answers which 
require the submission of a full proposal please download the relevant form from 
the Committee’s web page. 
A copy of this checklist, signed by your Head of Department should accompany 
the full submission to the Ethical Advisory Committee. 
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Signature of Responsible Investigator     
Signature of Student (if appropriate)  ...............................................................  
Signature of Head of Department or his/her nominee ...............................................................  
Date  ...............................................................  
 
Advice to Participants following the investigation 
Investigators have a duty of care to participants. 
When planning research, investigators should consider what, if any, arrangements are 
needed to inform participants (or those legally responsible for the participants) of any 
health related (or other) problems previously unrecognised in the participant.  This is 
particularly important if it is believed that by not doing so the participants well being is 
endangered.  Investigators should consider whether or not it is appropriate to recommend 
that participants (or those legally responsible for the participants) seek qualified 
professional advice, but should not offer this advice personally.   Investigators should 
familiarise themselves with the guidelines of professional bodies associated with their 
research. 
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A1.5 Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PhD Project: The Role of the Energy Supplier in Fuel Poverty Alleviation 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
PhD Researcher: Lauren Probert (l.probert@lboro.ac.uk), c/o School of Civil and 
Building Engineering, Loughborough University, Loughborough, Leicestershire. 
LE11 3TU. 
Telephone: +44735882248. 
Supervisors: Dennis Loveday (d.l.loveday@lboro.ac.uk), c/o School of Civil and 
Building Engineering, Loughborough University, Loughborough, Leicestershire. 
LE11 3TU. 
Telephone: +441509222635. 
Victoria Haines (v.j.haines@lboro.ac.uk), LDS 2.15, Loughborough Design School, 
Loughborough University, Loughborough, Leicestershire. LE11 3TU.  
Telephone: +441509226915. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
 
This study explores the role of the energy supplier in the alleviation of fuel poverty. 
Government legislation such as the Energy Company Obligation looks set to increase 
the responsibility of energy suppliers in achieving fuel poverty eradication targets and 
more generally upgrading the energy efficiency of the national housing stock. This 
project seeks to establish how this role might be most effectively fulfilled, both in 
terms of economic and technical solutions. 
 
Who is doing this research and why? 
 
This study is part of a PhD research project being conducted by Lauren Probert within 
the School of Civil and Building Engineering at Loughborough University, under the 
supervision of Dennis Loveday (School of Civil and Building Engineering) and 
Victoria Haines (Loughborough Design School). The research is supported by an 
Industrial CASE studentship, co-funded by the Engineering and Physical Sciences 
Research Council (EPSRC) and E.ON. 
 
What will I be asked to do? 
 
We are seeking participants who have been involved in fuel poverty alleviation 
programmes to be interviewed about their experiences of conducting this work. We 
are interested in opinions and experiences – there are no right or wrong answers. 
Interviews will be recorded using digital audio equipment. 
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How long will it take? 
 
Interviews are expected to last no longer than one hour, though there is scope for 
shorter or longer discussions as appropriate.  
 
Where will these take place? 
 
It is anticipated that most interviews will take place face-to-face. However, the project 
looks to maintain a high degree of flexibility and a phone interview may be arranged 
where convenient for both parties. 
 
Is there anything I need to do before the sessions? 
 
You do not need to do anything, however, if there were any documents relating to 
your work that you would be happy to share (e.g., reports, promotional materials), 
these would be much appreciated as a means of directing and supporting discussion. 
You may also wish to discuss your involvement in this project with colleagues if you 
feel this is appropriate, but the extent to which you do so is entirely at your discretion.  
 
Will my participation in this study be kept confidential? 
 
Neither participating individuals nor the organisations that they represent will be 
identified by name unless permission is granted in writing. If you have any questions 
about anonymity, please do not hesitate to contact the main investigator (Lauren 
Probert). Digital recordings and transcripts of interviews will be stored on a secure 
laptop accessible only to the investigators, and will be kept for no longer than seven 
years. 
 
Once I take part, can I change my mind? 
 
Yes! After you have read this information and asked any questions you may have, we 
will ask you to complete an Informed Consent Form. However if at any time, before 
or during the interview you wish to withdraw from the study please just contact the 
main investigator (Lauren Probert). You may also withdraw after the interview has 
been taken place, providing analysis of the data has not progressed so as to make your 
contribution indistinguishable from those of others (the investigator will be able to 
provide details of timescales for analysis on request). You can withdraw for any 
reason, and you will not be asked to explain your reasons for withdrawing.  
 
What will happen to the results of the study? 
 
The project will form the basis of a PhD thesis, and may also be disseminated via 
other academic channels (e.g., journal articles, conference papers), as well as through 
presentations and reports. 
 
What do I get for participating? 
 
Participants will be given access to the final PhD thesis and other outputs, as far as is 
practical. Researchers will also be available to discuss results with participants, with a 
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view to identifying how findings might benefit future work. Where possible, 
researchers would also be open to presenting findings to participating organisations. 
 
I have some more questions who should I contact? 
 
The main investigator is Lauren Probert (contact details are at the head of this sheet). 
 
What if I am not happy with how the research was conducted? 
 
Please feel able to contact the Project Supervisors at any time with concerns (details 
at the head of this sheet). Loughborough University has a policy relating to Research 
Misconduct and Whistle Blowing, which is available online at 
http://www.lboro.ac.uk/admin/committees/ethical/Whistleblowing(2).htm.   
 
 
371 
A1.6 Informed Consent Form 
 
 
 
 
Project: The Role of the Energy Supplier in Fuel Poverty Alleviation 
 
 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM  
(to be completed after Participant Information Sheet has been read) 
 
 
The purpose and details of this study have been explained to me.  I understand that 
this study is designed to further scientific knowledge and that all procedures have 
been approved by the Loughborough University Ethical Advisory Committee. 
 
I have read and understood the information sheet and this consent form. 
 
I have had an opportunity to ask questions about my participation. 
 
I understand that I am under no obligation to take part in the study. 
 
I understand that I have the right to withdraw from this study at any stage (prior to 
data processing) for any reason, and that I will not be required to explain my reasons 
for withdrawing. 
 
I understand that all the information I provide will be treated in strict confidence and 
will be kept anonymous and confidential to the researchers unless (under the statutory 
obligations of the agencies which the researchers are working with), it is judged that 
confidentiality will have to be breached for the safety of the participant or others.  
 
I agree to participate in this study. 
 
 
 
                    Your name 
 
 
 
              Your signature 
 
 
 
Signature of investigator 
 
 
 
                               Date 
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A1.7 Interview Approach 
 
Due to the limited accessibility of interview participants, the role of formal interviews 
in this work was largely corroborative, e.g., in substantiating messages from 
consultation responses and clarifying the manner in which policies are enacted in 
practice. Five extended key informant interviews were undertaken for this project; 
Table A1.5 provides the dates of these, and gives details of interviewee roles. To 
avoid compromising interviewee anonymity (a particular challenge given the highly 
specialised nature of the industry under consideration), only very broad descriptions 
of interviewee roles are supplied. 
 
Table A1.5: Research interviews undertaken 
 
Date Role of interviewee 
1st June 2012 Third sector worker, role involves targeting 
energy efficiency schemes 
28th June 2012 Energy supplier employee, role involves 
targeting and delivering obligations 
21st August 2012 Local Authority Energy Efficiency Officer, 
role involves partnering with energy 
suppliers to deliver obligations  
24th October 2012 Private sector contractor to energy industry, 
role primarily involves targeting obligations  
25th January 2013 Energy supplier employee, role involves 
delivering obligations  
 
Following the advice of Bernard and Ryan (2010: 371) with regard to conducting key 
informant interviews, a loose structure was used in interviews. All those interviewed 
were experts discussing their specific professions, and no one set of questions would 
be appropriate to all. All those interviewed proved keen and able to talk at length 
about their work (without overly digressing), and overall the process was 
straightforward. However, the following list of generic questions was established in 
advance as a means of ‘breaking the ice’ and of recording core information about 
participants: 
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• Could you give an overview of your professional responsibilities? 
• How do you see fuel poverty as fitting into your role? For example, do you have 
any objectives that relate to fuel poverty mitigation? What proportion of your 
work relates in some way to fuel poverty? 
• How would you define fuel poverty for your purposes? Do you use the official 
definition, or would another conceptualization be more appropriate? 
• What drives the work you undertake on behalf of [employer]? For example, is 
your role primarily about generating profit? Legal compliance? 
• Who do you feel should play a role in tackling fuel poverty? 
• With regard to fuel poverty mitigation, are there any tasks currently fulfilled by 
your organization that you feel another agent could do better? If so, why? 
• What, if anything, would you change about the way in which fuel poverty is 
tackled? 
• What, if anything, could government do to improve fuel poverty policy? 
• Are there any other issues you feel would be useful to discuss? 
 
 
Interviews were digitally recorded on a secure machine, transcribed into a text editor, 
and then coded using TAMS Analyzer (TAMS Analyzer 2012). The codes used were 
the same as for policy documents (see Table A1.1). This was in part to maintain 
consistency in analysis, and in part because the interviewees were from such different 
backgrounds, the identification of broad themes was identified as more practically 
appropriate than the development of a very long list of more specialised codes that 
may only apply to single participants. 
 
A1.8 Systematic Review Process 
 
The process of searching for literature is unavoidably subjective; the goal of a 
systematic review is to transparently communicate the process undertaken so as to 
avoid bias in the final review and enable replicability. This approach is not always 
possible (or desirable) where the topic is less well defined, as it may difficult to define 
the scope of the search, and be necessary to include more tangential literature. The 
review process undertaken here was informed by the guidance offered by Petticrew 
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and Roberts (2006) on systematic reviewing in the social science, responding to the 
protocol, “what are the costs of delivering energy efficiency upgrades to the English 
housing stock?” Two main classes of databases were searched, as illustrated in Table 
A1.6: the online literature repositories of organisations specialising in fuel poverty 
research (all of whom are included in Table 2.2), and more generalised databases. 
 
Table A1.6: Databases included within systematic review process 
 
Specialised Databases Generalised Databases 
eaga-CT Loughborough University’s Catalogue Plus  
(incorporates a large number of academic literature 
repositories, see Loughborough University 2014) 
Centre for Sustainable Energy Google 
National Energy Action National Archives 
Association for the 
Conservation of Energy 
 
Consumer Futures*  
Gov.uk  
 *Though consideration was limited to energy-related publications (CF holds responsibility for 
representing consumer interests within industries including the postal services and estate agents). 
 
In the case of the specialised websites, it was possible to consider all documents held. 
A slightly different strategy was adopted for Gov.uk based on the search filters 
available there. It was possible to narrow down the search for publications by 
department or public body, so all documents were reviewed for the primary relevant 
agencies, i.e., DECC, the CCC, and FPAG. Additional searches limited by the 
keywords “energy” and “fuel poverty” were applied to publications by departments 
that had previously held some fuel poverty remit, i.e., BIS and DEFRA. It should be 
noted that Gov.uk is a new database that is in the process of being populated, and that 
many Governmental publications are currently only in the National Archives; this is 
why it was feasible to conduct complete searches on the held publications. 
 
For generalised databases, it was not possible to consider every indexed item and so a 
search strategy was developed. Guidance from the University of Strathclyde (2014) 
refers to the need that systematic searches be “sensitive and specific”, i.e., that the 
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search should find as much of the relevant literature as possible, whilst keeping the 
irrelevant literature considered to a minimum. It is noted that there is always a trade-
off between these two elements. To optimise the sensitivity and specificity of this 
search, a strategy was formulated that involved relating search terms from two groups 
with Boolean “AND” operators. The first group included words relating to financing, 
the second included words relating to fuel poverty and interventions. By coupling, the 
intention was to find relevant literature and avoid extraneous outputs. So, for 
example, searching “fuel poverty + energy efficiency” or “financing + funding” 
would likely turn up too many irrelevant results, whilst “fuel poverty + financing” or 
“energy efficiency + funding” would achieve the required overlap. Lists of words for 
each category were compiled based upon the policy literature and consideration of 
synonyms. Truncation was used to ensure all word variations were captured. Table 
A1.7 contains the included words; all seventeen ‘energy affordability’ words were 
paired with each of the six ‘financing’ words, to create a total of one hundred and two 
unique search terms. 
 
Table A1.7: Table of search terms used for systematic review 
 
‘Energy affordability’ search terms  
 
 
 
 
 
 
AND 
‘Financing’ search terms 
Fuel Poverty Cost* 
Energy Efficien* Fund* 
Energy Poverty Regress* 
“Energy Company Obligation*” Distrib* 
“Warm Home Discount Scheme” Capital 
Carbon Emissions Reduction Target Financ* 
Community Energy Saving Programme  
EESoP  
Winter Fuel Payment*  
Cold Weather Payment*  
HEES  
EEC  
Social Tariff*  
Supplier Obligation*  
Retrofit*  
Warm Front  
Green Deal  
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Searches on Google and Library Catalogue Plus also made use of the option to filter 
out non-English language material and material more than twenty years old. The 
Library Catalogue Plus search was further limited to items published in the last 
twenty years, and ‘Books’, ‘Journals’, ‘Articles’ and ‘Thes(es)’ (removing items 
likely to be unsuitable, e.g., ‘Audio Visual’. Where searches produced in excess of 
500 results, searches were further limited to those that mentioned “United Kingdom” 
or “England” (using Boolean “OR” operators). In all cases, where the number of 
recovered items exceeded 500, pages of search results were reviewed until it became 
clear that all items were no longer relevant (i.e., search saturation, see Petticrew, 
Roberts 2006: 100-101).  
 
Table A1.8 gives details of the number of documents originally accessed from each 
source via the aforementioned search strategy, as well as documents identified via 
review of bibliographies and via personal communication (Haines 2013). Where 
duplicates were found, they are attributed to the first method through which they were 
sourced. Google results are only counted where the result included a research report 
(else the numbers of results given would be unhelpfully large). Note also that Google 
was placed last in the search process, given that many documents found via the other 
search avenues would also be recovered via a Google search. Documents were 
included in the final review if they contained information on the costs of delivering a 
defined level of improvement to UK housing stock.  
 
Table A1.8: Summary of systematic review screening process 
 
Search 
Order 
Database Reports 
Considered 
Rejected Based on 
Abstract/Title/Duplicate 
Rejected 
Based on 
Full 
Reading 
Included  
in Final 
Review 
1 eaga-CT 58 40 17 1 
2 Centre for 
Sustainable 
Energy 
94 69 23 2 
3 National Energy 
Action 
138 130 7 1 
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4 Association for 
the Conservation 
of Energy 
57 38 18 1 
5 Consumer Futures 65 49 27 1 
6 Library Catalogue 
Plus 
936 838 94 4 
7 Gov.uk -* - 6 5 
8 National Archives -* - 0 0 
9 Google -* - 5 3 
- Bibliographies of 
Sourced 
Literature 
6° - 4 1 
- Personal 
Communication 
1 1 1 1 
Total 1355 1165 202 20 
*For generalised databases, the process is slightly different as reports are only considered after looking 
at search results; including the entire set of search results adds little to the explanation. 
°Again, not every item in every bibliography was considered, just those for which the title or context 
suggested the potential of relevance. 
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Appendix 2 | Dissemination 
 
A2.1 Academic Presentations Given 
 
• The Role of the Energy Supplier in Fuel Poverty Alleviation. 2nd Work-in-
Progress Workshop. Institute for Advanced Studies on Science, Technology and 
Society. March 2014. Graz, Austria  
• Financing Fuel Poverty Alleviation in England. 1st Work-in-Progress Workshop. 
Institute for Advanced Studies on Science, Technology and Society. December 
2013. Graz, Austria  
• Energy Poverty Eradication in Policy and Practice: Lessons from the English 
Experiment. 12th IAS-STS Annual Conference: Critical Issues in Science and 
Technology Studies. Institute for Advanced Studies on Science, Technology and 
Society. May 2013. Graz, Austria 
• Mining for Cold: Practicable Means of Identifying the Fuel Poor for Policy 
Delivery in England. Fuel Poverty in Policy and Practice – A Postgraduate 
Symposium. November 2012. Sheffield, UK 
• The Warm Homes and Energy Conservation Act 2000: Exploring the 
Foundations of English Fuel Poverty Policy. Joint Annual Conference of the East 
Asian Social Policy Research Network and the United Kingdom Social Policy 
Association. July 2012. York, UK 
• Poster: Practicable Means of Fuel Poverty Identification in England: A Mixed-
Methods Approach. United Kingdom Energy Research Centre Summer School. 
June 2012. Warwick, UK 
• Finding the Fuel Poor: An Exploration of Challenges and Practicable Solutions. 
Postgraduate Symposium on Household Energy Consumption, Technology and 
Efficiency. Accelerating and Disseminating Methodological Innovation in 
Energy Research Project. June 2012. Birmingham, UK 
• The Role of the Energy Company in Fuel Poverty Alleviation. National Energy 
Action East Midlands Regional Forum. February 2012. Nottingham, UK. 
• Fuel Poverty: An Overview. Guest Speaker. Centre for Doctoral Research in 
Energy Demand. October 2011. Loughborough, UK 
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• Fuel Poverty: An Overview (introduction for keynote speaker Dr. Brenda 
Boardman). Building Energy & Comfort Knowledge Sharing Symposium 3. July 
2011. Loughborough, UK 
• Exploring the Role of the Energy Company in Fuel Poverty Alleviation. Doctoral 
Seminar, Department of Civil and Building Engineering. June 2011. 
Loughborough, UK 
• Fuel Poverty. Guest Speaker. Centre for Doctoral Research in Energy Demand. 
March 2011. Loughborough, UK 
 
A2.2 Academic Events Attended 
 
• Midlands Energy Graduate School 4th Annual Conference. September 2013. 
Loughborough, UK. 
• Energy Vulnerability Conditions and Pathways: Towards a Research and Policy 
Agenda. May 2013. Manchester, UK 
• Fuel Poverty Related Illnesses: A Preventable Plague (part of ESRC Festival of 
the Social Sciences). November 2012. Sheffield, UK 
• Building Energy & Comfort Knowledge Sharing Symposium 5: Energy 
Performance of Buildings - The Gap Between Prediction and Actual Energy Use. 
November 2012. Loughborough, UK 
• United Kingdom Energy Research Centre Summer School. June 2012. Warwick, 
UK 
• Building Energy & Comfort Knowledge Sharing Symposium 4: Recent 
Sociotechnical Research on National Energy Demand. May 2012. Loughborough, 
UK 
• Fuel Poverty, Energy Vulnerability and Social Justice: From Distribution to 
Capabilities. Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research. February 2012. 
Sheffield, UK 
• Spotlight on the Energy Obligation. NEA. December 2011. Manchester, UK 
• Energy Justice in a Changing Climate: Defining an Agenda. InCluESEV. 
November 2011. London, UK 
• Hills Fuel Poverty Review Academic Seminar. May 2011. London, UK 
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• Building Energy & Comfort Knowledge Sharing Symposium 2: An 
Interdisciplinary Conversation. March 2011. Loughborough, UK 
• Mapping Vulnerability to Fuel Poverty. InCluESEV. February 2011. 
Birmingham, UK 
• Survey Skills: English Housing Survey. Survey Resources Network. February 
2011. London, UK 
 
A2.3 Policy Community Presentations Given 
 
• The Hills Fuel Poverty Review: Overview of recommendations and their 
implications for practitioners. East Midlands Carbon Action Network. September 
2012. Leicester, UK 
• The Role of the Energy Company in Fuel Poverty Alleviation. NEA East 
Midlands Fuel Poverty Forum. February 2012. Nottingham, UK 
 
A2.4 Policy Community Events Attended 
 
• Member of the NEA East Midlands Fuel Poverty Forum, 2011-13 
• ECO Roadshow and Energy UK Question Time. April 2013. Sheffield, UK 
• Smart Metering – Who Profits? Energy Institute. March 2012. Sheffield, UK. 
• Inside Government - Tackling Fuel Poverty for Vulnerable Households. March 
2012. London, UK 
• E.ON UK Reset Review Forum on Vulnerable Customers. February 2012. 
London, UK 
• NEA Annual Conference. September 2011. Harrogate, UK 
• Fuel Poverty: A Time for Change. NEA. March 2011. York UK 
 
A2.5 Events Organised 
 
• Fuel Poverty in Policy and Practice – A Postgraduate Symposium. November 
2012. Sheffield, UK. Funded via a Social Policy Association Postgraduate Grant 
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A2.6 Memberships and Affiliations 
 
• Energy Institute 
• Friend of NEA  
• Fuel Poverty Postgraduate Network (as founder) 
• Midlands Energy Graduate School 
• National Energy Research Network 
• NEA East Midlands Fuel Poverty Forum 
• Research Fellow at the Institute for Advanced Studies on Science, Technology 
and Society in Graz, Austria from September 2013 to March 2014 
• Social Policy Association 
 
A2.7 Publications 
 
• 2014. ‘Manfred Heindler Research Grant Project Report: The Role of the Energy 
Supplier in Fuel Poverty.’ Internal Report to Government of Styria, Austria 
• 2013. ‘Book Review: Making Markets in the Welfare State: The Politics of 
Varying Market Reforms by Jane R. Gingrich.’ Social Policy and Administration 
48(3): 386-388 
• 2012. ‘Enron.’ Encyclopedia of Energy, ed. Morris A. Pierce. New York: Salem 
Press 
• 2012. ‘The Hills Fuel Poverty Review: assessing early implications for 
practitioners.’ Carbon Action News 34: 29 
• 2012. ‘Fuel Poverty Eradication in the United Kingdom: A model for the EU?’ 
Guest contributor to the EU Fuel Poverty Network website. Available at: 
http://fuelpoverty.eu/2012/05/08/ukmodelfortheeu/ 
• 2011. ‘The Hills Fuel Poverty Review Interim Report: assessing proposals and 
implications.’ With D.L. Loveday and V.J. Haines. People, Place & Policy 
Online 5(3): 161-173 
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